petroleum ministers diagnosis

Petroleum Minister’s diagnosis & indictment

Federal Minister for Petroleum Ali Pervaiz Malik has made an unusually candid assessment of Pakistan’s energy sector. Speaking at the Energy Conference 2026, he conceded that inconsistent policies discourage exploration, petroleum has been subjected to “exorbitant taxation”, domestic refineries remain in a dilapidated condition, gas-sector liquidity is impaired, circular debt remains a central concern, and structural reform requires competition, unbundling and private participation.

These admissions deserve attention because they come from inside the government. They also raise an unavoidable question: if the government understands the structural weaknesses so clearly, why does its own fiscal and administrative policy continue to aggravate them?

The minister’s strongest observation was that the Petroleum Division cannot remain the instrument upon which excessive taxation and financial interventions are loaded merely to meet budgetary requirements. The diagnosis is correct; the choice of victim is not. A government division does not bear taxation. Consumers, farmers, transporters, manufacturers and exporters do.

Pakistan collected a record Rs. 1.567 trillion through petroleum levy during the fiscal year (FY) 2025-26, exceeding the budgeted target by about Rs. 99 billion. Petroleum products are nominally exempt from general sales tax, but motorists should not confuse exemption with relief. The levy, customs duty and the new climate support levy together impose an enormous burden at the pump. 

An analysis of notified prices and consumption estimated that these petroleum charges generated around Rs. 166 billion in July 2026 alone—equivalent to roughly one-fifth of that month’s collection of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). On petrol, government imposts exceeded Rs. 100 per litre during parts of August. [Ministry of Finance fiscal operations; OGRA notified prices]

This is not energy policy. It is fiscal opportunism. Petroleum levy is especially attractive to Islamabad because, unlike federal taxes included in the divisible pool, its proceeds are retained by the federal government. Replacing sales tax with levy does not broaden the tax base or improve its progressivity [Bankruptcy of ideas—VII: The Petroleum (Levy) State, June 18, Minute Mirror, 2026].  It merely enables the federation to collect revenue without sharing it under the National Finance Commission mechanism. Provinces lose their constitutional share while the entire economy absorbs higher transport, agricultural and production costs.

The levy is also excessively regressive. A litre consumed by a motorcyclist, rickshaw driver or small farmer attracts the same fixed charge as one consumed by the owner of a luxury vehicle. Diesel taxation travels through freight into the price of flour, vegetables, medicines and construction materials. The poorest household may not own a vehicle, but it still pays petroleum levy indirectly on almost everything it buys.

The minister should have said plainly that Pakistan’s narrow and inequitable tax system is being sustained by taxing mobility and production. Powerful retailers, speculative real-estate interests, large landowners and beneficiaries of untaxed or lightly taxed wealth remain inadequately documented. The salaried class, formal businesses and petroleum consumers are repeatedly squeezed because they are visible and collection is easy.

The minister also called for consistent and predictable policies to attract investment in high-risk onshore and offshore exploration. No serious investor can disagree. Exploration requires large sunk expenditure, long lead times and the possibility of complete failure. Pakistan cannot invite investors with one policy, reinterpret its terms through another notification, delay payments, restrict remittances and then wonder why exploration interest remains weak.

The Pakistan Economic Survey 2025-26 acknowledges constrained domestic petroleum production, continued import dependence, suboptimal refinery utilisation and the effect of international instability on the import bill. These are not new discoveries. Governments have been promising energy security, refinery upgrading and accelerated exploration for decades. The institutional cycle remains familiar: announce a policy, delay agreements, accumulate liabilities, offer concessions, change fiscal terms and launch another policy.

Offshore exploration is important, but it must not become another slogan. A dry well is a commercial risk; unstable contracts, delayed decisions and politicised administration are sovereign risks created by the state. Pakistan cannot remove geological uncertainty, but it can remove bureaucratic caprice. That requires published contractual frameworks, credible dispute resolution, transparent bidding, assured repatriation rules and protection against retrospective fiscal changes.

The minister’s claim that the flow of circular debt has been maintained near zero without increasing consumer prices also needs closer examination. Circular debt is not eliminated merely because its current flow is temporarily contained. Arrears can be shifted through subsidies, delayed payments, financing arrangements, tariff adjustments, accounting recognition or government guarantees. The stock remains a claim on citizens even when it disappears from a ministry’s preferred flow indicator.

Gas-sector circular debt reflects delayed tariff adjustments, expensive imported LNG, diversion of gas between consumer categories, distribution losses, theft, weak recoveries, unpaid subsidies and government-directed supplies without timely budgetary compensation. It impairs the liquidity of exploration and production companies, which then lack funds for new exploration. The state taxes petroleum to repair its budget while withholding or delaying money owed within the energy chain. This is fiscal cannibalism: one part of the sector is consumed to keep another functioning.

The condition of local refineries provides another indictment. The minister rightly asked why they remain “dilapidated” and have not become deep-conversion facilities. Old hydro skimming refineries produce an output mix increasingly misaligned with domestic demand, including excess furnace oil and insufficient quantities of cleaner, higher-value fuels. Modernisation requires billions of dollars, technological planning and certainty over tariffs, duties, pricing and product specifications.

Refineries, however, have enjoyed various forms of protection and deemed-duty support in the past. Any new incentive must be conditional. Public support cannot become a permanent reward for postponing investment. 

Each refinery agreement should disclose the investment commitment, financing plan, completion milestones, product-quality improvements, environmental obligations and consequences of default. Consumers should not finance refinery upgrades through protected margins without enforceable delivery.

The proposed unbundling of the gas sector—separating infrastructure from commodity trading—can improve transparency. An independent network operator, regulated access charges and genuine third-party access could allow producers and large consumers to contract without forcing every transaction through an opaque state monopoly. But changing organisational boxes will not cure political pricing, excessive losses, poor metering or regulatory capture.

Competition requires more than announcing deregulation. Pipeline access must be nondiscriminatory; capacity allocation and tariffs must be public; OGRA must possess real autonomy; dominant incumbents must not decide which competitors receive access; and low-income consumers must be protected through direct, budgeted assistance. Deregulation without these safeguards can replace a public monopoly with a private oligopoly.

The minister thanked the World Bank for supporting unbundling and reform. Technical assistance can help, but Pakistan has accumulated shelves of donor-financed energy studies. Its principal deficit is not diagnosis. It is political willingness to confront beneficiaries of inefficiency, disclose contractual obligations, stop using tariffs and levies as off-budget fiscal instruments, and subject every subsidy to parliamentary scrutiny.

A Cabinet Committee on Energy meeting every two months may improve coordination between petroleum, power and finance authorities. Committees, however, cannot substitute for an integrated energy policy approved after public consultation and supported by measurable targets. 

Petroleum, gas and electricity cannot be managed as separate ministerial estates. Pricing decisions in one segment create liabilities in another; imported LNG affects electricity costs; rooftop solar alters grid demand; refinery configuration influences imports; and petroleum taxation affects the entire productive economy.

Ali Pervaiz Malik has identified much of the disease. His government now stands accused by its own diagnosis. Sustainable reform demands a transparent reduction in petroleum dependence, progressive taxation of income and wealth, settlement of verified energy-chain liabilities, conditional refinery modernisation, competitive gas-market rules, independent regulation and complete disclosure of circular debt.

Future generations, whom the minister invoked, will not judge this government by the number of committees it revived or policies it announced. They will ask whether it dismantled the system that taxes energy to conceal fiscal failure, socialises institutional losses and calls the resulting burden reform.

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Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, writer, literary critic, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996. 

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    By Ali Hamza Alvi, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University and Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS Some individuals attain prominence because they occupy positions of authority; others earn an enduring place in history because they transform the destiny of humanity. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela unquestionably belongs to the latter category. His greatness did not arise merely from his election as the first democratically elected President of South Africa; rather, it was forged through his unwavering commitment to justice, equality, human dignity, and reconciliation. Even during the darkest chapters of his life, Mandela remained steadfast in his conviction that freedom and human rights were worth every sacrifice. Nelson Mandela was born on 18 July 1918 in the rural village of Mvezo in South Africa’s Eastern Cape. He was raised in a society deeply scarred by racial discrimination, where the colour of one’s skin determined virtually every aspect of life. Under the oppressive system of apartheid, Black South Africans were systematically deprived of their political, social, and economic rights. They were denied equal access to education, employment, healthcare, and public services, while racial segregation was enforced through an elaborate framework of discriminatory laws. Witnessing these profound injustices from an early age inspired Mandela to dedicate his life to dismantling institutionalised racial oppression and establishing a society founded upon equality and human dignity. Recognising the transformative power of law, Mandela pursued legal studies with the conviction that the law should function as an instrument of justice rather than a mechanism of oppression. As a practising lawyer, he represented countless individuals who had been denied their fundamental rights solely because of their race. These experiences reinforced his belief that genuine justice could exist only where every individual stood equal before the law, irrespective of race, ethnicity, religion, or social background. His legal career became not merely a profession but a platform for challenging systemic injustice and advocating constitutional equality. Mandela’s opposition to apartheid inevitably brought him into direct conflict with the South African government. His relentless campaign against racial discrimination and political repression led the authorities to regard him as a dangerous opponent of the existing order. In 1962, he was arrested, and following the historic Rivonia Trial, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Confined for twenty-seven years, much of that time on Robben Island under exceptionally harsh conditions, Mandela endured one of the longest incarcerations of any political prisoner in modern history. Yet imprisonment neither diminished his resolve nor extinguished his hope. Instead, it strengthened his moral character and reinforced his unwavering belief that justice would ultimately prevail. Life behind prison walls subjected Mandela to severe physical hardship and profound emotional suffering. He was compelled to perform exhausting manual labour, endured restrictive prison conditions, and remained separated from his family and loved ones for decades. Despite these immense personal sacrifices, he refused to succumb to bitterness or hatred. Mandela understood that resentment imprisons the human spirit just as effectively as physical confinement. Instead, he embraced forgiveness as a transformative force capable of healing divided societies. His profound insight that reconciliation, rather than revenge, offers the surest path to lasting peace would later become the defining philosophy of his public life. Following sustained international pressure, widespread domestic resistance, and growing recognition that apartheid was morally and politically indefensible, Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990. His liberation marked not merely the end of his personal imprisonment but the beginning of a new era for South Africa. Across the world, millions celebrated his release as a triumph of justice over oppression. Many anticipated that Mandela would seek retribution against those responsible for his decades of imprisonment. Instead, he astonished the international community by advocating reconciliation, peaceful dialogue, and national unity. He firmly believed that South Africa could achieve genuine freedom only by replacing hatred with mutual respect and by building a future founded upon forgiveness rather than vengeance. In 1994, South Africa conducted its first democratic elections based on universal adult suffrage, culminating in Nelson Mandela’s election as the nation’s first Black President. His inauguration represented far more than a political transition; it symbolised the moral triumph of democracy over racial tyranny and the realisation of aspirations long denied to millions of South Africans. As President, Mandela dedicated himself to fostering national reconciliation, strengthening democratic institutions, and promoting equality before the law. His administration sought to heal the wounds of the past by encouraging cooperation among citizens of every race, culture, and community, thereby laying the foundations for a constitutional democracy committed to human rights and the rule of law. Among Mandela’s most remarkable qualities was his extraordinary humility. Despite occupying the highest office in the nation, he remained approachable, gracious, and deeply respectful of others. He believed that authentic leadership is measured not by personal power or privilege but by one’s willingness to serve humanity with integrity and compassion. His conduct demonstrated that strength need not be accompanied by arrogance and that true authority is exercised through wisdom, empathy, and moral example rather than coercion. Today, Nelson Mandela stands as one of the most revered figures in modern history. His legacy transcends the geographical boundaries of South Africa and continues to inspire people across every continent. He demonstrated that courage is not the absence of fear but the determination to uphold justice despite fear; that forgiveness is not a sign of weakness but the highest expression of moral strength; and that enduring social transformation is achieved not through hatred or violence but through reconciliation, equality, and respect for human dignity. His life remains compelling evidence that a single individual, guided by unwavering principles, extraordinary perseverance, and profound compassion, possesses the power to alter the course of history and leave an indelible legacy for generations to come. Nelson Mandela’s life demonstrates that while another individual may one day attain comparable moral stature and global influence, becoming another Nelson Mandela in the truest sense is extraordinarily difficult. His greatness did not stem merely from his imprisonment for twenty-seven years or his election as the

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