Decolonizing Minds: Reclaiming Intellectual Freedo…

By Aleena Saif Ullah The writer is an MPhil Scholar in International Relations, specializing in global defence and security, University of the Punjab, Lahore. On February 28, the first day of Operation Epic Fury, a strike hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in Minab, in Iran’s Hormozgan province. Iranian state media reported that 168 children and 14 adults were killed. Anadolu reported two strikes roughly forty minutes apart. President Trump said on March 7 that in his opinion Iran had done it, citing Iranian inaccuracy with munitions. Bellingcat had already established otherwise. Its researchers identified a Tomahawk cruise missile — a munition no other belligerent in the conflict fields — in footage released by Iran’s Mehr agency, and geolocated the strike sequence. The New York Times, the Associated Press and CNN reached compatible conclusions through independent satellite and video analysis. By March 11, NPR reported that a preliminary Pentagon assessment had determined the United States was at fault. Five months later, the accountability failure is not the one I described when I first wrote about this case, and the actual failure is more instructive. A process was initiated. On March 13, Secretary Hegseth announced a formal command investigation, with CENTCOM appointing a senior officer from outside the command to lead it — the correct procedural choice. Lawmakers have said that officer submitted an initial report in April. CENTCOM has held it since. On May 19, Admiral Brad Cooper told lawmakers under oath that the investigation was complex, near completion, and that “I’m fully committed to transparency” once it concluded. No findings have been published. Then in July, CNN reported the detail that reframes the case. Within a week of the strike, the first two stages of the battle damage assessment were complete, establishing that American forces had hit the location. The third stage — the standard review in which Defense Intelligence Agency analysts examine the full body of satellite imagery and intelligence to determine holistically what occurred — had not been ordered as of early July. One source familiar with the matter told CNN there had been no detailed analysis and that CENTCOM had locked down the investigation. NBC reported that preliminary findings pointed to outdated intelligence as the likely cause. This is a different kind of institutional failure from the one international lawyers usually describe, and it is worse. An absent process can be demanded. A process that ran, produced a document, and stopped is much harder to move, because officials can accurately say an investigation took place. The context makes it harder still. On May 13 the Pentagon’s own Inspector General found that the Department had systematically failed to implement its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, with all eleven objectives reclassified as at risk and the legally mandated Civilian Protection Center of Excellence lacking key staff and leadership. The architecture built specifically to prevent and account for incidents like Minab had been allowed to decay before the war that tested it. Congress has asked the right questions and been ignored. A letter led by Senator Chris Van Hollen and signed by more than forty senators asked Secretary Hegseth directly whether American forces conducted the strikes, what the intended target was, whether AI tools were used in targeting, and whether a no-strike list was established before operations began. Answers were requested by March 18. More than 150 House members signed a parallel letter on the broader civilian toll. The comparison the Pentagon itself invites is unflattering. As NBC noted, the Department has publicly disclosed its role in comparable incidents before: a special forces raid in Yemen, a bombing in Iraq that killed more than a hundred civilians, the strike on an Afghan hospital that killed at least forty-two, a drone attack in Afghanistan that killed ten. Disclosure in those cases was not generous, but it happened. What Minab demonstrates is that the binding constraint on accountability is not evidence. Volunteer open-source investigators, working entirely from public material, established the essential facts within nine days. The state that conducted the strike established them internally within seven. The constraint is that no mechanism exists to compel publication of a report a government has decided not to publish — not the Rome Statute, to which the United States is not a party; not the Security Council, where it holds a veto; and not the Inspector General, who can find institutional failure but cannot release another command’s findings. One lever remains, and it is domestic rather than international. Congress can require declassified release of the findings through the National Defense Authorization Act. Whether it does will indicate more about the state of accountability for civilian harm than any further open-source analysis. The evidence is not missing. The report is not missing. Both exist. Neither can be read.    

A few days ago, Mr. Hakan Fidan, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, briefed the media on the MJDA. He said that the operational mechanisms will be decided at the first meeting of the joint committee comprising the foreign and defense ministers and the Chief of General Staff. He also provided an overview of possible areas of cooperation. In this context, it is high time to discuss the future orientation of the MJDA, especially areas of cooperation and investment to build a future-oriented alliance. A few areas have been identified for consideration.   First of all, the three partners must understand that the era of traditional war is rapidly becoming irrelevant. The concepts of 5th-, 6th-, 7th-, and 8th-generation warfare are evolving into new dynamics: 9th-generation warfare. Thus, Cooperation under MJDA must be based on the new elements and needs of 9th-generation warfare, in addition to traditional areas. Now the question is, what is 9th-generation warfare? 9th-generation warfare has a few characteristics that distinguish it from past generations of warfare.   First, 9th-generation warfare will minimize, if not eliminate, the role of humans to a greater extent. The first glimpse of this type of warfare is evident in the form of unmanned UVs. Russia-Ukraine and USA-Iran wars further reinforce this argument. However, humans are still engaged in one way or another in wars, including devising and executing plans and engaging in face-to-face combat. For example, during the application of 4th- and 5th-generation warfare in the Middle East, humans remained a constant factor in leading and executing the wars. After the bombardment of Iraq, it was humans who captured the land.   However, it is anticipated that artificial intelligence will take over this job in future wars, and future wars will be run by artificial intelligence and its tools. For example, in 9th-generation warfare, artificial intelligence-based robots can take over the role of humans. Robots can invade a country, or they can also be used in guerrilla warfare. Countries can also use robots to conduct terrorist activities. They can send the robots with an anonymous identity, and no one will be able to trace the origin. Organized crime organizations can also use them to conduct their activities, such as targeted killings.   Let’s imagine another scenario. Robots are invading a country. They fight either humans or other robots. Countries with better technology can turn robots into double-edged weapons. On the one hand, robots will be fighting machines. However, they can also equip robots with destructive explosives, such as nuclear material or other explosives. Then what would be the opponent’s choices? How will opponents fight an explosive-ridden robot? They will take over the country if they do not stop the robots. On the other hand, if they try to destroy the robots, the nuclear explosives will detonate, which can cause serious damage. The scenario would be quite scary, and countries with advanced robot and AI technology can maneuver situations in their favor.   Second, the most developed countries have recently taken war into outer space, especially the USA. The USA’s obsession with and investment in outer space have compelled other countries to follow the suit. As a result, they are investing heavily, instigating an outer space race for dominance. The race has accelerated since the establishment of the US Space Force. According to the Vice President of the USA, Mr. Pence, the force was launched with four specific objectives. First, U.S. Space Command “will establish unified command and control for our Space Force operations; ensure integration across the military; and develop the space warfighting doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures of the future.” Second, a military astronaut corps, which Pence called “an elite group of joint warfighters specializing in the domain of space.” Third, a Space Development Agency that will research and develop new technologies and “ensure cutting-edge warfighting capabilities.” Fourth, new bureaucratic structures that will define “clear lines of responsibility and accountability to manage the process of standing up and scaling up the United States Department of the Space Force.”   The USA and its allies are enhancing cooperation to outpace others and dominate outer space. As a result, they have launched a malicious campaign against China and Russia. They are portraying China and Russia as threats to global peace and to the use of outer space to attract public attention, support, and financial resources. At the same time, they also want to hinder the advancement of other countries in space technology to maintain their hegemony in the application of space technologies for war dominance. For example, during the Gulf War of the 1990s, the USA and allied forces used space technologies to outmaneuver their opponents. Since then, the USA and its allies have been working to further improve space technology and prevent other countries from developing these technologies.   Therefore, it is anticipated that space war will be multifaceted. On the one hand, there will be a race to control or maneuver opponents’ satellites by interfering with their software. This will be done to obtain information or spread disinformation. Sending arms into space to destroy opponents’ satellites is also possible. On the other hand, some countries have developed capabilities to hit satellites from the ground. This has opened a new field of military offense.   The use of space technology for military dominance created fear in the developing world. They fear that leading countries in space technology will use space for control and interference, collect information, and dictate to other countries. For example, the USA uses navigation systems to collect data and outmaneuver others in wars.   Third, in recent times, we have observed that COVID-19 has played havoc with humanity. It has shaken the whole world. The whole world came to a standstill. Markets were closed, and the tourism industry sank. It has introduced the world to a new danger of biological war. Biological war is considered one of the most lethal forms of war, as only one person can paralyze the world. One virus can shut down the whole world

Nations, organizations, and individuals who rely on borrowed time never prosper. Vision of the future is paramount to growth. Stagnation leads to disaster. In a world driven by technology, only change is permanent. As a nation, we started off well. The founding fathers burnt the midnight oil not only to sustain but also to prosper. Early in the decade of the fifties, the entire development framework was put in place. For industrialization, PIDC (Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation); for water and power, WAPDA (Water & Power Development Authority); PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission) headed by Dr I.H. Usmani; PCSIR (Pakistan Council of Science & Industrial Research) under Dr Salim-Uz-Zaman Siddiqui; PSI (Pakistan Standards Institution), now PSQCA (Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority); PIAC (Pakistan International Airlines Corporation). The father of the nation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, himself inaugurated the State Bank of Pakistan in 1948. The discovery of natural gas at Sui in 1952 was a gift of nature. At 12 TCF, it was considered one of the largest deposits of its time, sufficient to meet the needs of the nation for a century. Future requires investment, both short and long term. It was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s vision to bring the Muslim population of the Sub-continent into the mainstream. Starting with schools, he moved on to colleges and finally the Aligarh University, which not only led the movement for the creation of Pakistan but also provided the manpower to sustain it. In the formative years of the republic, education was taken seriously both by the teachers and the taught. In my entire academic journey, I never once missed a class, even during my term as President of the departmental student union. The first-born free generation was being prepared to lead, not follow. Instead of buying time, the future was being built. In the 1973 constitution, literacy was declared a fundamental right. Under Article 25-A, every Pakistani had to be literate by the year 1985, but the target was not only missed, the entire effort was sidelined. The government of Muhammad Khan Junejo tried to narrow the gap by introducing the Nai Roshni program, which was shut down after his government fell. For meaningful nation building, education, employment and health are critical. The recent student uprising in India focused on professional education followed by employment. They demanded transparency and merit, which were being compromised. Modi’s shining India meant very little for them. Other countries have experienced similar protests (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Indonesia). Pakistan needs a lot of catching up to do. It is back to the basics of nation building. Universal Primary Coverage is the starting point. Every five-year-old child should be in school this year. This will reverse the trend of the swelling out-of-school youth population. Once primary coverage is ensured, the next target should be to cover those who missed out. The country is blessed with a bulging youth population, which must be made productive. Despite all the challenges of governance, the informal sector continues to perform well by providing the needed goods and services. Confidence in the formal sector is needed for a meaningful and cohesive march forward. In the decade of the fifties, Pakistan was poised to emerge as the first Asian Tiger; now it seriously lags behind while other nations have grown, which includes China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia — the list goes on. Rightly said, this is the Asian Century. It is time to look inwards. The future belongs to educated and healthy nations who do not settle for short-term gains but instead focus on the future. Pakistan should not be a burial ground for those who build fortunes abroad. The homeland must come first. The best cannot be left for last.

For more than a decade, the global debate over critical minerals has focused almost entirely on mining and extraction. Western policymakers, multinational mining companies and international financial institutions have invested billions of dollars in securing mineral reserves across Africa and Latin America. From cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Lithium Triangle of South America, the prevailing belief has been simple: control the mines and secure the future of the green energy transition. However, this overwhelming focus on extraction overlooks a fundamental reality of modern industrial power. In today’s world, strategic independence is not achieved simply by digging raw minerals out of the ground. True industrial strength lies in refining those raw materials into high-purity, battery-grade and industrial-grade minerals through advanced chemical processing. It is at this critical processing stage, often referred to as the “processing bottleneck,” that China has established an extraordinary and nearly unmatched global dominance. The Mining Illusion and China’s Refining Monopoly Understanding why Western efforts to reduce dependence on China continue to struggle requires recognising the crucial difference between mining and refining. Raw lithium extracted from Australian hard-rock mines or South American brine deposits cannot be used directly in electric vehicle batteries. It must first undergo complex chemical processing to produce lithium hydroxide or lithium carbonate with a purity of 99.9 percent. The same applies to rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel and graphite. Without refining, raw minerals have little value for advanced technology or defence industries. This is where China’s true strength becomes evident. While the country’s share of global mining production is relatively limited, it dominates global refining capacity. China currently refines about 35 percent of the world’s nickel, between 50 and 70 percent of global lithium and cobalt, and nearly 90 percent of all rare earth elements. It also controls virtually 100 percent of the global market for spherical graphite, a key material used in battery anodes. This creates a major strategic challenge for Western economies. Even if companies in the United States, Europe or Australia develop new mines, much of the extracted material still has to be shipped to China for chemical processing. As a result, many attempts to bypass China ultimately continue to strengthen its refining ecosystem. The Structural Foundation of China’s Success China’s refining dominance is neither accidental nor simply the result of low labour costs. It reflects more than three decades of consistent industrial planning and state-backed investment. During the 1990s and early 2000s, many Western economies shifted heavy industries overseas to reduce costs and meet stricter environmental regulations. At the same time, China recognised that chemical refining would become the foundation of future technological leadership. Through successive five-year development plans, Beijing invested heavily in large-scale refining facilities, specialised metallurgical universities and low-cost energy infrastructure. Decades of research enabled Chinese engineers to master technologies capable of refining even low-grade ores efficiently and at relatively low cost. China also accepted the significant environmental costs associated with refining. Processing rare earth minerals produces toxic waste, radioactive by-products and hazardous chemicals. While strict environmental regulations and public opposition have made large-scale refining projects difficult in North America and Europe, China accepted these environmental challenges as part of its long-term national strategy. Why the West Cannot Easily Replicate China’s Model Concern over potential Chinese export restrictions has encouraged the United States and its allies to invest in domestic refining infrastructure. However, matching China’s industrial ecosystem remains an enormous challenge. Several major obstacles stand in the way First, time. Building a modern refining facility in Europe or North America typically takes seven to twelve years because of environmental approvals and legal procedures. In China, similar projects can often be completed in less than two years. Second, cost. Chinese refineries benefit from economies of scale, low electricity prices and extensive government support. Western facilities face much higher labour, environmental and operational expenses. Without strong financial guarantees, private investors remain reluctant to finance projects that could later become uncompetitive if China lowers prices. Third, skilled manpower. Decades of industrial outsourcing have reduced the number of mining metallurgists and chemical engineers in many Western countries. Meanwhile, China continues to produce thousands of specialised engineers every year, maintaining a steady pipeline of technical expertise. Strategic and Geopolitical Consequences China’s refining advantage extends far beyond electric vehicles and consumer electronics. It has become a critical factor in global defence and national security. Modern military equipment—including guided missiles, radar systems, nuclear submarines and fifth-generation fighter aircraft such as the F-35—depends heavily on refined rare earth magnets and processed critical metals. In the event of a military crisis involving Taiwan or the South China Sea, China would not necessarily need to block access to global mines. Instead, it could simply restrict exports of refined minerals. Such a move could disrupt Western defence manufacturing within months, even if friendly nations continued producing raw mineral resources. The global competition over critical minerals, therefore, is no longer centred solely on who owns the mines. It increasingly depends on who controls the refining process—the stage where China has built its strongest and most strategically important advantage.

The previous part VIII of this series concluded that a just tax system must satisfy more than the requirements of arithmetic. It must rest upon legislative competence, representative consent, rational classification, due process, protection against arbitrary deprivation, transparent expenditure and effective remedies. Parliament, while levying taxes cannot constitutionalise injustice merely by enacting it. Pakistan’s fiscal crisis will not be resolved by asking citizens to finance an unreformed state through increasingly coercive instruments. A recent book by Dr Hafiz A. Pasha, Fatima Malik and Hafsa Tanveer, Pakistan: Reforming an Inefficient and Inequitable Tax System, provides an appropriate opportunity to carry that argument forward. The volume is ambitious, data-rich and deserving of serious attention. Few recent studies attempt, within a single work, to map federal and provincial taxation, estimate tax gaps through different methodologies, examine incidence across income groups and sectors, evaluate fiscal incentives and finally present a quantified reform programme. Its central diagnosis is familiar but supported by extensive empirical work. Pakistan combines high statutory rates with a low tax-to-GDP ratio, excessive dependence on indirect taxation, pervasive evasion, severe sectoral disparities and weak provincial revenue mobilisation. The authors propose reforms that, in their estimation, can increase the national tax-to-GDP ratio by approximately three percentage points by 2027–28. The principal difficulty lies not in what the book measures. It lies in what the framework of measurement necessarily leaves outside its calculations. The usefulness—and limits—of the tax-gap lens The organising idea of the book is the tax gap. Through cross-country regressions, a representative-tax-system approach, monetary estimates of evasion and bottom-up calculations, the authors conclude that Pakistan possesses the potential to collect approximately three percent of GDP more in taxes. This is analytically valuable. It also risks converting a constitutional and political problem into an accounting exercise. A tax gap is not necessarily a reservoir of revenue waiting to be collected. Parts of it may reflect privileges protected by influential groups. Other parts arise from low productivity, fragmented enterprises, unemployment, weak financial inclusion and the regulatory costs created by the state itself. Informality is not always a voluntary choice made for the purpose of evasion; it can also be a survival strategy in an economy where formalisation invites multiple taxes, withholding obligations, inspections and compliance costs without ensuring reliable public services. Citizens also judge taxation in relation to expenditure. Their reluctance cannot be understood solely as non-compliance when additional revenue appears likely to finance debt servicing, administrative expansion, elite concessions, loss-making state enterprises and politically negotiated subsidies rather than education, healthcare, transport, security of property and equal economic opportunity. The decisive question is consequently not only how much more can be collected. It is who controls the state, who bears its burdens, who receives its rents, and why technically sound reforms repeatedly fail. Public finance asks how the gap should be closed. Constitutional Political Economy asks why the beneficiaries of the existing arrangement would permit it to be closed fairly. The selective fiscal state The book repeatedly recognises the presence of powerful vested interests. It identifies the under-taxation of property, agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, real estate and parts of the services sector. At the same time, it finds a disproportionate burden upon large-scale manufacturing, banking and formal businesses. Its estimate that industry bears taxes equivalent to 23.8 percent of its value added, with the incidence on large-scale manufacturing exceeding 36 percent, is particularly revealing. These figures demonstrate that Pakistan does not suffer from a uniformly low-tax equilibrium. Pakistan has created a selective fiscal state: coercive towards visible and organised taxpayers, accommodating towards politically protected or administratively difficult constituencies. This conclusion should change the design of reform. Where political influence determines the tax structure, another catalogue of proposed rates and bases cannot alter the equilibrium by itself. Reform must address the rules through which fiscal choices are made, concessions are granted and enforcement is selectively applied. A technically perfect proposal remains politically irrelevant when those who must enact it derive power from the arrangements it seeks to dismantle. Withholdingisation is not income taxation The book correctly notes that withholding and advance taxes generate overwhelming part of total income-tax revenue and have failed to eliminate evasion. It also recognises the distortions created by presumptive/mimum taxation and the fragmentation of income into separately taxed blocs. The consequences are more serious than those of an imperfect collection technique. Withholdingisation represents the gradual abandonment of income taxation as a levy on net accretion to economic power. Banks, utility companies, telecom operators, employers, import authorities, registrars and purchasers have been converted into unpaid tax collectors. Gross transactions are taxed without determining actual income, allowable expenditure, losses or the taxpayer’s real capacity to contribute. The revenue authority obtains money without developing the institutional capacity to examine accounts, conduct intelligent audits and establish taxable income. Compliant businesses suffer liquidity costs and wait for adjustments or refunds, while informal and influential sectors remain beyond meaningful assessment. The reform of income taxation must restore the return, assessment and audit as its foundations. Withholding should remain confined to situations where it is a genuine advance payment—principally salaries, dividends, profit on debt and payments to non-residents (mostly covered under tax treaties). It should remain fully adjustable against the final liability. A system based upon extracting money from every visible transaction may achieve collection targets. It cannot be described as a coherent income tax. Contradictions within the reform programme The book advocates broad-basing and criticises presumptive taxation, but later recommends restoration of a one-percent fixed tax on export proceeds. It supports neutrality while proposing a general five-year tax holiday for investment, enhanced deductions for energy costs and other selective allowances. These proposals arise from genuine concerns. Pakistan’s investment rate remains dangerously low, exporters face high energy and financing costs, and industry competes under an unstable exchange-rate and tariff environment. The proposed remedies nevertheless risk recreating the same exceptionalism that has made Pakistan’s tax system discriminatory, unpredictable and vulnerable to lobbying. A fixed tax on export proceeds is not a tax on income. It taxes turnover

As a journalist, my entire professional life has been dedicated to defending freedom of expression, civil liberties, and an independent press. Throughout more than two decades in journalism, I have firmly believed that the right to express one’s views is a fundamental human right, protected not only by Pakistan’s Constitution but also by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the laws of most democratic nations. However, no right in any civilized society is absolute. Every freedom comes with responsibility. When freedom is divorced from responsibility, it ceases to be a force for reform and instead becomes a source of disorder. That is why every mature democracy has established legal and ethical boundaries to ensure that freedom of expression serves the public interest rather than undermining it. The rise of social media has revolutionized the flow of information. Today, an ordinary citizen possesses communication power that was once reserved for major media organizations. A smartphone, a short video, and a single click can spread information, allegations, or opinions across the globe within minutes. Used responsibly, this technology promotes transparency, accountability, and public awareness. Used recklessly, without verification or evidence, it can inflict irreparable damage on individuals, institutions, and society. The recent controversy involving the University of the Punjab illustrates this challenge. A video circulated on social media in which serious allegations were made against several faculty members. Shortly after the video surfaced, the university administration issued an official statement rejecting the allegations and referred the matter to the police, the Cyber Crime Investigation Agency, and other relevant authorities for investigation. The episode also exposed another troubling aspect of today’s digital environment. Several freelance vloggers and social media accounts amplified the allegations, yet many failed to present the university’s official response with equal prominence. One of the fundamental principles of journalism is to provide all concerned parties with an opportunity to present their position before public opinion is shaped. Based on the information currently available and my own research, the viral video did not publicly present independently verifiable evidence supporting the allegations. Nor has it been established that a formal written complaint was submitted through the university’s prescribed grievance mechanism before the video was released. If the ongoing investigation establishes otherwise, those findings must be accepted with the same commitment to fairness and truth. Equally important is ensuring that the investigation is not limited solely to the allegations themselves. If it is established that any individual or group deliberately misled students, orchestrated a coordinated campaign, or exploited social media to damage the reputation of an institution or its members, those responsible should also be held accountable under the law. Conversely, if the allegations are substantiated, the complainants deserve full justice without discrimination. Accountability must apply equally to everyone. This case extends far beyond a single university. It reflects the growing problem of irresponsible social media usage. Increasingly, individuals bypass legal forums, institutional complaint mechanisms, and investigative authorities, choosing instead to take their grievances directly to social media. Within minutes, a viral post can shape public opinion, damage reputations, and, in many cases, allow the “court of social media” to pronounce its verdict long before any formal investigation has concluded. Such a trend blurs the line between freedom of expression and irresponsible expression. Recognizing these risks, many developed countries have introduced stricter regulations governing digital platforms. The European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) require major technology companies to act swiftly against illegal content, terrorist propaganda, child sexual abuse material, counterfeit products, and other harmful content. These laws also require greater transparency in algorithms, stronger user protections, and comprehensive risk assessments, with violations carrying multi-billion-euro penalties. The United States follows a different constitutional model. While the First Amendment provides broad protection for freedom of speech, this does not mean that every form of online content is beyond regulation. Social media companies continue to enforce community standards against hate speech, incitement to violence, terrorism-related content, child exploitation, financial fraud, and other unlawful activities. Several U.S. states are also developing legislation addressing AI-generated deepfakes, child online safety, and digital privacy. In Pakistan, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) provides the principal legal framework for addressing cybercrime. However, concerns have repeatedly been raised by political parties, journalists, and human rights organizations regarding aspects of its implementation. This underlines the importance not only of effective legislation but also of its transparent, impartial, and constitutional enforcement. The rapid rise of artificial intelligence, deepfake technology, disinformation, and organized online propaganda has made responsible journalism and responsible social media use more important than ever. Freedom of expression remains the cornerstone of every democratic society, but using that freedom to damage individuals or institutions without credible evidence serves neither journalism nor democracy. Pakistan, like many other countries, faces the challenge of preserving free expression while preventing the misuse of digital platforms. The objective should never be to silence legitimate criticism or suppress dissent. Instead, it should be to ensure that freedom is exercised with honesty, evidence, and accountability.   Freedom of expression is the soul of democracy. Yet when it is separated from truth, integrity, and responsibility, it no longer remains freedom—it becomes disorder. A civilized society is one where the law protects those who speak the truth while holding accountable those who knowingly spread falsehoods. That balance represents the true spirit of free expression and remains the hallmark of every democratic, civilized, and dignified nation.