The Education Dilemma

By Augustine Nasim Gill The debate over new provinces or smaller administrative units in Pakistan should not be reduced to maps, language, identity, or political representation. The central question should be whether new administrative units will improve governance, bring public services closer to citizens, strengthen revenue collection, reinforce the rule of law, and restore public confidence in the state. Many countries have improved administrative performance by transferring authority from the center to states, regions, districts, and local governments. Yet these experiences have not all been equally successful. Where political authority was matched by adequate financing, competent administration, credible elections, the rule of law, and strong oversight, results generally improved. Where governments merely created new boundaries, assemblies, and ministries while corruption, patronage, and weak institutions remained unchanged, costs increased without transforming citizens’ lives. A Basic Distinction Must Come First Creating new provinces and genuinely devolving power are not the same thing. Successful decentralization has at least four dimensions: Four Essential Pillars Political authority: Local and regional governments must be created through regular, free, and fair elections. Administrative authority: They must have genuine authority to manage departments, appoint qualified personnel, and hold officials accountable for performance. Fiscal authority: Their responsibilities must be matched by revenue powers, a predictable share of national taxes, grants, and budgets. Legal and institutional authority: Their powers must be protected by the Constitution or strong legislation so that federal or provincial governments cannot abolish them at will. Why Smaller Administrative Units Can Succeed Smaller, empowered units bring government closer to citizens. Residents of remote districts are less likely to travel hundreds of kilometers to a provincial capital for matters involving land, education, health, policing, courts, or development projects. Regional governments also understand local conditions more clearly. The coastal areas of Balochistan, the agricultural districts of southern Punjab, a major metropolis such as Karachi, and the mountainous or tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa do not face identical challenges. A single policy designed in one provincial capital is often unable to respond effectively to such diversity. Smaller units can also increase political accountability. Citizens can more clearly observe the performance of their chief minister, ministers, mayors, district leaders, and civil administration. This benefit, however, appears only where elections are credible, information is open, and oversight institutions are independent. 1. Germany: Shared Powers, Shared Taxes, and Fiscal Equalization Germany is a federal country composed of sixteen states, known as Länder. Each state has its own constitution, parliament, and government, and enjoys substantial autonomy over its internal organization. The federal government is responsible for national defense, foreign policy, currency, and broad national legislation. The states play central roles in education, policing, culture, public administration, and the implementation of many laws. Municipal governments provide water, sanitation, local transport, urban planning, and many daily services. Major taxes are not retained exclusively by the federal government. Personal income tax, corporate income tax, and value-added tax are shared among the federal government, the states, and, in some cases, municipalities according to established rules. A fiscal equalization system then narrows the gap between wealthier states and those with weaker revenue capacity. Germany’s success is not simply the result of having sixteen states. It rests on clearly defined responsibilities, a strong tax administration, judicial oversight, a professional civil service, and a predictable equalization system. Lesson for Pakistan: Before new provinces are created, the country must decide how income tax, sales tax, customs duties, natural-resource revenue, property taxes, and other revenues will be divided. A permanent, transparent, and publicly understood formula is essential. 2. Spain: Regional Autonomy, Public Services, and Different Fiscal Models Spain is composed of seventeen autonomous communities. These regional governments exercise wide authority over health, education, social services, and regional development. Most regions receive a share of national taxes, limited authority over certain taxes, and equalization grants. The Basque Country and Navarre have broader tax-collection powers: they collect most taxes within their territories and then transfer an agreed contribution to the central government for national services. Regional government strengthened education, health services, and local identity, but Spain has also faced regional debt, fiscal imbalances, and separatist political movements. The lesson is that autonomy is not only a financial issue; national identity, constitutional boundaries, and commitment to the shared state also matter. Lesson for Pakistan: New units should not be designed solely around language. Administrative efficiency, population, economic viability, public consent, and national cohesion must all be considered. 3. Poland: Phased Reform, a Three-Tier System, and Local Development Poland did not devolve authority in a single step after the end of communist rule. Municipal self-government was restored in 1990, and a three-tier system was established in 1998-99: the municipality (Gmina), the county or district (Powiat), and the region (Voivodeship). Municipalities became responsible for water, sanitation, local roads, primary education, and local development. Districts managed services that were too large for one municipality but too limited for an entire region. Regional governments took responsibility for economic development, regional planning, and the management of European development funds. The reform succeeded because it was phased, local institutions were prepared, elected representatives were trained, professional administrations were developed, budgets were transferred, and responsibilities were defined. The continuing challenge is that not every municipality or district has equal administrative capacity. Some smaller units remain weak in planning, data, financial management, and specialist staffing. Lesson for Pakistan: Rather than creating many provinces overnight, Pakistan should begin with administrative pilots, stronger districts, digital systems, training, and independent audit in selected areas. 4. France: Gradual Decentralization from a Centralized State France was historically a highly centralized state, but beginning in the 1980s it gradually transferred authority from the central government to regions, departments, and communes. Regional governments manage economic development, transport, and some education and training functions. Departments play major roles in social welfare, certain roads, and local services, while communes provide day-to-day municipal services. Small municipalities often cooperate through joint institutions to manage water, waste, transport, and territorial planning. France’s challenge has been that responsibilities across different layers sometimes overlap or remain unclear,

There is a moment in every negotiation when the mask slips and the real hierarchy of loyalties reveals itself. It happened again recently, in the quiet grammar of a policy condition. If a deal with Iran is good for America, if it stops a war, secures a region, spares American blood and treasure, then it should be pursued on its own terms. It should not need to be laundered through a second question, but what does Israel get out of it? The moment that second question enters the room, the first one has already been answered, and not in America’s favour. This is not a rhetorical trick. It is a structural tell. A foreign policy genuinely organised around American interests does not require the ratification of an ally before it proceeds. It calculates costs, weighs risks, and acts. The insertion of an Israeli veto, soft, implicit, but unmistakable, into decisions that are framed as being about American security is not an alliance functioning normally. It is a client relationship wearing the costume of a partnership, and increasingly, the costume does not fit. I do not say this as someone hostile to alliances. Alliances are the ordinary furniture of statecraft, and no serious analyst begrudges Washington its relationships. What I begrudge, what any honest observer of the last two decades of American foreign policy must eventually begrudge, is the peculiar one-directionality of this particular relationship, in which American strategic autonomy is perpetually available for negotiation, but Israeli strategic autonomy is not. Successive administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, have discovered that the fastest way to kill a sound policy is to let it wander anywhere near Jerusalem’s objections. The Biden administration played this game with a kind of practiced fluency, dressing subservience in the language of “shared values” and “unbreakable bonds.” That the current administration appears to be playing the identical game, merely with a different set of talking points, should trouble anyone who once believed that a change in party might also mean a change in posture. The deeper dishonesty, though, sits beneath the day-to-day theatre of negotiation. It is the elephant that everyone in the room has agreed, by unspoken consensus, not to see. Iran is treated as the singular proliferation emergency of the Middle East, the country whose enrichment levels must be monitored down to the percentage point, whose every centrifuge is a matter of international alarm, whose nuclear ambitions justify sanctions regimes, covert sabotage, and the standing threat of military strikes. And yet a few hundred kilometers away sits a state that has possessed nuclear weapons for more than half a century, has never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has never submitted to an inspection regime of any kind, and whose arsenal is discussed in Western capitals only in the passive voice, if it is discussed at all. Israel’s bomb is an open secret that everyone has agreed to keep. This is not a minor inconsistency. It is the load-bearing hypocrisy of the entire non-proliferation architecture in West Asia. You cannot credibly claim to be pursuing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free Middle East while exempting, by unspoken convention, the one state in the region that actually has the weapons in question. Every argument marshalled against Iran’s nuclear programme, that a nuclear-armed state destabilizes its neighbors, that it invites arms races, that it holds regional security hostage to the judgment of a single government, applies with at least equal force to Israel, and applies to a country that has, unlike Iran, already used overwhelming force against multiple neighbors within living memory. The asymmetry is not a technical oversight. It is a choice, made and remade by every administration that has declined to place Israel’s arsenal on the table. What this reveals, I think, is that the “Iran obsession,” as it might fairly be called, was never really about proliferation at all. If it were, the conversation would begin with disarmament architecture applied evenhandedly across the region, inspections offered and demanded in both directions, and a serious reckoning with the double standard that has calcified into policy over fifty years. Instead, the Iran file functions as a proxy for a different question entirely, whose security calculus gets to define American Middle East policy. And on that question, the answer has been remarkably consistent regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. None of this is a case for indulging Tehran’s own record, which carries its own list of grievances worth prosecuting honestly, its human rights abuses, its regional proxies, its own history of destabilizing behavior. Clear-eyed criticism of Iran is entirely compatible with clear-eyed criticism of the double standard applied to Israel; the two are not in tension, and pretending otherwise is its own kind of evasion. But a foreign policy that claims the mantle of principle while practicing this degree of selective vision is not principled. It is theatre, and increasingly unconvincing theatre, performed for a domestic audience that is growing visibly tired of the script. The unpopularity of this arrangement is no longer a fringe sentiment. It shows up in polling, in generational splits within America’s own political coalitions, in the rising discomfort even among constituencies that have historically been the most reliable defenders of the relationship. People are noticing the pattern: that policies justified as serving American interests keep bending, at the last moment, toward a different set of interests altogether. They are asking, reasonably, who is actually driving the car. There is also a historical dimension to this that deserves more attention than it usually receives. The pattern of conditioning American policy on Israeli comfort did not begin with Iran, and it will not end there. It runs through decades of vetoed resolutions at the United Nations, through arms transfers that continued uninterrupted even amid documented humanitarian catastrophe, through the quiet understanding that certain questions simply are not to be raised in polite Washington company. Each individual instance can be explained away with its own set of justifications, security concerns, historical debts, domestic political realities. But taken together, across administrations

By Qashf Aizdi Justice delayed is justice denied. This phrase has become almost cliché in Pakistan and it unfortunately remains painfully true for millions of litigants who are waiting for their day in court. Every year hundreds of new cases are filed while thousands remain undecided and as a result courtrooms continue to grow more congested and hearings become more infrequent. The unfortunate consequence is that justice moves further out of reach. Time is perhaps the only thing Pakistan’s justice system can no longer afford to lose. The scale of the crisis is reflected in the numbers. According to the Judicial Statistics of Pakistan 2023, more than 2.25 million cases remain pending before courts of Pakistan. During the same year, 4.48 million new cases were instituted while 4.41 million were disposed of, resulting in a 5 percent increase in the overall backlog. The district judiciary alone accounts for 82 percent of all pending cases. With just over 3,100 working judges and judicial officers, each is responsible for more than 700 pending cases, even before accounting for the thousands of new cases filed every year. These figures do not suggest that Pakistan’s judges are idle; rather, they point to a justice system struggling to keep pace with an ever-growing caseload. Civil disputes in Pakistan can often take 10 to 15 years and in some instances even longer, before reaching its conclusion. Court proceedings are routinely delayed by repeated adjournments, cumbersome procedures, paper-based case management and multiple tiers of appeal. Difficulties in serving notices, delays in recording evidence and frequent adjournment requests often leave litigants waiting months before their cases are heard again. Additionally, the consequences of delayed justice extend beyond the courtroom. By the time a case is finally decided, litigants find themselves in a morass of mounting legal costs, lost opportunities and prolonged uncertainty. Every adjournment adds to the financial and emotional burden borne by litigants. A favorable judgment delivered after years of litigation can never fully restore the time, financial stability or peace of mind that has already been obliterated. Article 37(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan obliges the State to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. Yet, for many litigants, this constitutional promise often rings hollow. As mounting caseloads continue to overwhelm the judiciary, lengthy delays have become an accepted and vexatious feature of the legal system rather than an exception. Justice that arrives years too late often fails to provide meaningful relief. The immediate explanation is ostensibly straightforward; the number of judges is insufficient to handle the growing caseload. Pakistan has one of the lowest judge-to-population ratios in the region, leaving judges responsible for hundreds and often thousands of matters. Yet the shortage of judges tells only part of the story. Addressing this crisis requires more than appointing additional judges; it demands a more comprehensive approach to resolving disputes. One such reform lies in the greater use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Cases can be resolved out of court using processes like mediation and arbitration, whereby judges can focus on cases which require formal adjudication. Consequently, ADR works in conjunction with the courts in solving disputes outside of court. The potential of ADR is perhaps best illustrated by the Morgah Valley dispute. Despite taking over 42 years to be settled via litigation, the same case took only two months to settle after being referred to mediation. Though not all disputes are suitable for mediation, this case is an example of the value that comes with the application of ADR at the right time. More importantly, it shows that timely justice is not an impossible ideal but an achievable one when the right mechanisms are used. However, for countless litigants, delay remains the norm as the judiciary continues to grapple with overwhelming caseloads. Repeated adjournments leave litigants facing prolonged uncertainty and growing frustration. Cases pass from one generation to the next and some litigants never live to see the final outcome of disputes they initiated and fought for. Justice should not become an inheritance passed from parents to children. The longer that reform is postponed, the greater the cost to litigants, businesses and public confidence. Pakistan’s courts are running out of time and so are the people waiting for justice. If Pakistan is serious about fulfilling the constitutional vision embodied in Article 37(d) of the Constitution, reducing judicial delays can no longer remain an aspiration, it must become a national priority. Reforming the justice system will require efficient case management, greater use of appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms and a collective commitment to ensuring that justice is delivered when it is needed most. Until then, Pakistan’s courts will continue to run out of the one resource they cannot recover: time.  

Like other developing countries around the globe, Pakistan also seeks to optimize a higher and impact-oriented investment rate in order to achieve higher and sustainable economic growth. In this regard, Pakistan’s development partners provide knowledge advisory and financial assistance to support implementation of economic reforms that will spur sustainable economic growth. The priority of the incumbent federal government headed by Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif is to undertake development partners’ engagements around two key objectives: (i) achieve sustainable social and economic growth as envisioned in its development plans to reduce poverty and inequality, and to create equitable access to social services and create employment opportunities for the youth, and (ii) address the external and fiscal imbalances for enhanced macroeconomic stability. The disbursement of Foreign Economic Assistance (FEA) remained low during the financial year 2025-26, as against budgeted figures of Rs 5777654.488 million, foreign assistance received was Rs 5024516.997 million. For the new financial year 2026-27, Pakistan was most likely to receive Rs 6779624.460 million (US $ 23.38 billion) from its development partners. Breakup-wise, Pakistan will be borrowing US $ 400.422 million (Rs 116122.423 million) from bilateral resources, US $ 4866.223 million (Rs 1411204.727 million) from multilateral resources, (US $ 235.000 million) from foreign commercial banks, US $ 12000.00 million (Rs 3480000.000 million) through bilateral deposit, US $ 1122.370 million (Rs 325487.300 million) through Naya Pakistan Certificate, and US $ 530.000 million (Rs 153700.000 million) from International Monetary Fund (IMF). Foreign assistance secured by Pakistan from its development partners also include, as usual, foreign aid for autonomous bodies such as WAPDA (Power), National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC), National Highway Authority (NHA), and Power Division. Higher Education Commission (HEC) and SUPARCO were among the autonomous bodies who also received foreign assistance during the financial year 2025-26, but both of these were not among the foreign assistance beneficiaries somehow for the just commenced fiscal year 2026-27. Figures have been avoided for want of space, please. External resources, as per information available from the official sources, are derived from a combination of financing instruments, including project loans and grants, programme loans and other loans. Project loans and grants are received from specialised International Financial Institutions and friendly countries with specific purposes; project loans and grants for Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) are received for various projects being executed by Federal Government, Provincial Governments and various Autonomous Bodies such as WAPDA, PEPCO, NHA, etc.; there are certain projects which are kept out of PSDP and executed by Federal and Provincial Governments and Autonomous Bodies by receiving project loans and grants; programme loans are provided for budgetary support and are linked/tied with achievement of specific targets and goals; and other loans comprise of loans from Islamic Development Bank, Sovereign Bonds, Sukuk Bonds, etc. raised from non-traditional sources. Bilateral sources included China, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the USA. Multilateral sources included Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), EIB, International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), IsDB, PEC Fund and the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There was no Saudi Arabia Time Deposit and no SAFE China Deposit commitments for the financial year 2026-27. World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and IsDB were the major multilateral development partners who have conducted important diagnostic studies as well as formulated well-aligned medium-term country partnership strategies. Developments in Pakistan’s economy were also being closely monitored and rated by important rating agencies like Fitch, Moody’s and S & P which help Pakistan in accessing capital markets. Support from development partners and international financial institutions is critical to implementing the federal government’s agenda for sustained and balanced development for the people. The aim and objective of seeking foreign or external financial assistance can be stated as “promoting economic and social development in the developing countries.” It can also be defined as “Administered transfer of resources from a donor country or international financial agency to the developing countries with a view to encourage economic growth.” Foreign aid can be in the form of money, goods or technical assistance and can also be between two (bilateral) or many (multilateral) countries/institutions. Foreign aid is also looked for to meet both the economy’s balance of payments gap and investment gap. That is why project and technical assistance alone are not sufficient.

By Ali Hiader A certain segment in Pakistan has been gaining momentum in arguing that had dictator General Pervez Musharraf—like Imran Khan—said “Absolutely Not” to Washington, Pakistan might have been spared the scourge of terrorism and the subsequent economic hardships. However, such an argument attempts to view the decision made in 2001 through the lens of circumstances that emerged years later. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shook the United States and sent shockwaves through the global order; approximately 3,000 people lost their lives, and institutions regarded globally as symbols of American economic and military might were targeted. These attacks challenged the security of the world’s sole superpower and generated intense public pressure on the President George W. Bush’s administration to take retaliatory action. For the United States, inaction had become politically almost impossible. Responsibility for these attacks was attributed to Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden—a Saudi national who was living in Afghanistan under Taliban protection. Initially, Bin Laden denied responsibility for the attacks, but his later statements increasingly portrayed as a retaliatory response to American policies. Regardless of how these statements were interpreted politically, by the end of 2001, it was clear to Washington that Al-Qaeda was the primary enemy and that Afghanistan was the hub of its operations. This context holds particular significance for Pakistan because the Taliban government was harboring Osama bin Laden. Pakistan was not merely a distant spectator to this crisis; it shared a long border with Afghanistan and had spent two decades during the Cold War establishing an extensive political and intelligence network there. Consequently, the United States had no better option than Pakistan. Therefore, the fundamental question is: Did Pakistan truly have the option to simply say “absolutely not,” instead of joining the American war? Pakistan was already grappling with severe economic and diplomatic vulnerabilities during the post-9/11 crisis, as the United States and other Western nations had imposed harsh economic sanctions following the 1998 nuclear tests. These sanctions slowed the pace of development, hampered foreign investment, and strained relations with global financial institutions, leaving the country already burdened by heavy debt. The situation became further complicated when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in October 1999, overthrowing an elected government. The military coup added fuel to the fire, further damaging Pakistan’s global reputation and leaving the country diplomatically weakened at a time when it needed international support the most. Following the September 11 attacks, Washington made its expectations absolutely clear. According to Musharraf’s own account, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage delivered a stern message to Pakistan: it had to stand either with the United States or against it. Another remark widely attributed to the US position was that if Pakistan refused to cooperate, it could be sent “back to the Stone Age.” Although the exact wording of that phrase was never officially substantiated, the intensity of US pressure was undeniable. Did the United States have the capability to inflict devastating damage on Pakistan, despite Pakistan being a nuclear power? The answer to this is “yes.” Pakistan’s nuclear capability was primarily developed to deter India. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal provided Islamabad with a strategic deterrent against its key regional rival, but this did not mean Pakistan was immune to American economic, diplomatic, or technological pressure. Pakistan lacked the long-range military capabilities to directly strike the U.S. mainland—located 7,000 miles away—whereas the United States held an overwhelming advantage in air power, naval strength, intelligence, technology, financial resources, and global diplomatic influence. Therefore, nuclear weapons were not synonymous with strategic parity with the United States. Pakistan could deter certain types of aggression from India, but realistically, it lacked the capability to inflict the same level of damage upon the United States. Another major reason for Pakistan’s importance to the United States was the intelligence network present in Afghanistan. During the Cold War, Pakistan was one of the United States’ key regional partners in supporting the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation. Pakistani intelligence agencies established extensive networks among Afghan groups, while the United States and Saudi Arabia provided arms and financial support for the resistance. Pakistan served as a crucial conduit for channeling this aid to the Afghan resistance. This historical relationship gave the United States a unique strategic advantage after 9/11. Pakistan possessed a combination of geography, intelligence networks, logistical routes, and institutional experience—assets that would have been extremely difficult to replace. Its cooperation could significantly facilitate U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Consequently, Islamabad chose the path it deemed relatively less damaging. Pakistan provided assistance through logistical support, access to airspace and facilities, intelligence cooperation, and other means, but did not directly join the war; in return for this strategic support, US sanctions were eased, economic aid increased, and Pakistan regained special diplomatic significance in Washington. This does not mean that the decision was without negative consequences. Pakistan itself became a major target of terrorism, resulting in the deaths of nearly 70,000 civilian and military personnels and economic losses of approximately $150 billion; Pakistan paid a very heavy price for this war. Furthermore, the repercussions of the strategic policies adopted during the 1980s and 1990s later manifested as problems for Pakistan—issues that perhaps could not have been fully foreseen in 2001. However, there is an important distinction here: criticizing the consequences of a decision and claiming that a different realistic course of action existed at the time are two separate things. A major irony of the Afghan war is that U.S. officials and analysts have repeatedly cited Pakistan as one of the primary reason for the failure to achieve American objectives in Afghanistan. When the question arises as to why the world’s most powerful military failed to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan, the answer is sometimes given in a single word: Pakistan. This should not necessarily be viewed as a badge of honor; rather, it reflects a complex relationship in which Washington needed Pakistan yet lacked trust in it, while simultaneously accusing certain Pakistani elements of supporting forces that were undermining