The Gen-Zs and the Cockroach Party (CJP)

The first part of this series concluded with a question that goes deeper than the contractual forms employed by conventional or Islamic banks: who should possess the power to create money—society through its sovereign monetary authority, or commercial banks through the expansion of credit? It is impossible to reconstruct a financial order without answering this question. Popular understanding of banking remains surprisingly detached from the way modern money actually comes into existence. The conventional explanation suggests that people first deposit their savings with banks and banks subsequently lend part of those deposits to borrowers. Banks thus appear principally as intermediaries between savers and investors. Modern banking does not operate quite like this. The Bank of England, explaining the process in unusually clear terms, acknowledges that most money in a modern economy is created by commercial banks when they make loans. A bank granting financing normally credits the borrower’s account and simultaneously records a corresponding asset on its own balance sheet.  The deposit is created through the act of lending rather than necessarily representing money previously deposited by another saver. When the loan principal is repaid, the corresponding bank-created money is extinguished. This requires an important correction to the familiar expression “fractional-reserve banking”.  Banks are certainly required to maintain reserves, liquidity and regulatory capital, but contemporary money creation cannot accurately be understood as a mechanical process in which every rupee of reserves is successively multiplied into a predetermined number of rupees of loans.  Lending is constrained by capital requirements, liquidity, creditworthiness, profitability, regulation, settlement requirements and ultimately monetary policy. It nevertheless remains true that deposit-taking commercial banks create a substantial part of the money used by society. Pakistan is no exception. State Bank of Pakistan’s monetary data show that at end-June 2026 broad money was about Rs. 46.46 trillion. Currency in circulation was about Rs. 11.94 trillion, while deposits with banks were approximately Rs. 34.47 trillion. The greater part of what Pakistanis use as money does not consist of notes issued by the State Bank. It consists of claims recorded in the banking system. This distinction has profound consequences for our discussion of riba. Commercial-bank creation of deposit money should not automatically be declared riba. The Quran does not prescribe a reserve ratio, a central-bank structure or a particular technique for creating currency.  To equate fractional-reserve banking itself with riba would unnecessarily turn a question of monetary system into a theological declaration. The real objection is different. A society must ask whether the privilege of creating generally accepted purchasing power should be exercised primarily through private debt contracts; who receives the initial benefit of newly created purchasing power; towards which activities the new credit is directed; who absorbs the losses when excessive credit creation produces instability; and whether private institutions can earn a predetermined return from money whose creation depends ultimately upon the sovereign monetary and payment system. These are questions of political economy and distributive justice. Pakistan provides an especially revealing example. SBP’s provisional monetary aggregates at end-June 2026 recorded net government-sector borrowing of more than Rs. 37 trillion.  Net borrowing from scheduled banks was overwhelmingly larger than direct borrowing from SBP, while credit to the private sector stood at around Rs. 11.4 trillion. The precise categories require care in interpretation, but the broad structural message is difficult to miss: the banking system has become deeply intertwined with financing the State itself. Banks operate within an extraordinary circle. The State confers the banking licence, provides the settlement infrastructure, regulates deposits, maintains monetary stability and acts ultimately as guardian of systemic stability. Banks create deposit money through their financing operations and then deploy enormous resources in government securities carrying returns ultimately serviced through public revenues. The citizen appears at both ends of the transaction by providing deposits to the banking system and later pays taxes from which sovereign financial obligations are serviced. The arrangement may be perfectly lawful under the existing system, but a project seeking elimination of riba cannot ignore its structural implications. Conversion of conventional banks into Islamic banks does not, by itself, answer this problem. An Islamic deposit-taking institution can participate in the same process of deposit creation when it extends financing. If its balance sheet remains concentrated in sovereign instruments and if its returns remain indirectly anchored to the prevailing interest-rate structure, conversion of contractual terminology leaves the underlying monetary structure substantially intact. This is one reason why the proposal recently advanced by Muhammad Munir Ahmad for an alternative riba-free system deserves serious consideration. It correctly asks whether money creation and commercial financing should be separated. Its criticism of the privileges inherent in the existing banking structure identifies a problem much larger than the replacement of an interest-bearing loan with murabaha or ijarah. The proposed solution, however, requires considerable refinement. One possibility is a system under which transaction money is fully backed by sovereign money.  Current accounts used for salaries, business payments and ordinary transactions would represent money held for payment and safekeeping. Banks would not be permitted to use these balances to create additional financing. Investment would take place through an entirely different window. A person seeking a return would knowingly place funds in an investment account. Those funds could be employed in mudarabah, musharakah, leasing, trade finance and other genuine commercial arrangements. Return would arise from investment, ownership, enterprise or service rather than merely from allowing a bank to create a debt against a transaction deposit. This idea is neither historically unprecedented nor uniquely associated with Islamic economics. During the Great Depression, economists associated with what became known as the Chicago Plan proposed 100 per cent reserve backing for transaction deposits, expressly separating the monetary function of banks from their credit function. Irving Fisher became one of its prominent advocates.  Decades later, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper by Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof revisited the proposal and modelled potential effects including greater control over credit cycles and reductions in private and public debt. The paper was research rather than IMF policy, but

The true measure of a society is not its skyscrapers, motorways, economic statistics or political slogans. It is revealed by something much simpler: how safe its children are. If a child cannot feel safe at home, in the neighbourhood, at a madrassa, at school or even on the street, then all our claims of progress deserve to be questioned. The growing number of cases of child abuse in Pakistan is not merely a matter of crime statistics. It reflects our collective indifference, weak institutions and a social culture that too often chooses silence over justice. Behind every reported case is a childhood that has been stolen, a family that has been shattered and an innocent mind carrying wounds that may never fully heal. According to the material available for this article, 1,914 cases of child abuse were reported across Pakistan during the first six months of 2026. Meanwhile, Sahil’s report recorded 3,630 cases of child abuse across the country in 2025, an increase of eight per cent over 2024. These figures were compiled from reports published in 81 newspapers across the four provinces, Islamabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. According to the report, more than nine children were subjected to some form of abuse every day in 2025. But is this the complete picture? Probably not. These figures represent only the cases that were reported. Countless incidents never reach the police or the courts because of fear, social stigma, family pressure, financial difficulties and the long, exhausting process of seeking justice. The reported numbers, therefore, should not be mistaken for the full scale of the problem. There is also a widespread assumption that children are mainly at risk from strangers. The reality is far more complicated. Long-term analyses of child abuse cases have repeatedly shown that a significant number of incidents involve people known to the child or the family. This is an uncomfortable truth, but one that parents must acknowledge. Teaching children simply to avoid strangers is no longer enough. They must also be taught that if a relative, teacher, neighbour, family acquaintance or influential person makes them uncomfortable or pressures them into doing something they do not want to do, they have the right to speak up. They should know that they can tell their parents or another trusted adult without fear of being blamed or punished. Such education is not about frightening children. It is about giving them confidence.Perhaps the most painful aspect of this crisis is that danger sometimes comes from the very place that should be a child’s safest refuge. Home is a child’s first shelter. The family environment is supposed to provide love, security and protection. But if that space becomes unsafe, where does a child go? Parents also need to pay close attention to sudden and unexplained changes in a child’s behaviour. Fear of a particular person, refusing to go to school, unusual silence, anger, withdrawal or a sudden change in behaviour may sometimes be warning signs. Not every behavioural change means that a child has been abused, but ignoring every unusual change is certainly not wise. Pakistan does not lack laws relating to child protection. The Zainab Alert, Response and Recovery Act 2020, the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 and various provincial laws and policies provide a legal framework for protecting children. The real problem, however, is not the absence of laws. It is the failure to translate those laws into effective action. During a hearing at the Islamabad High Court in June 2026 concerning the implementation of the Zainab Alert law, the court was informed that some important provisions, including the practical operation of an immediate alert mechanism for missing children, had yet to be implemented as intended. The court was also told that 562 criminal cases relating to missing children and child abuse had been registered in Islamabad between 2022 and 2025. These figures raise a fundamental question: how seriously do we monitor the implementation of laws after passing them? The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Human Rights also expressed concern in February 2026 over the performance of government institutions responsible for child protection and the lack of coordination between departments. It pointed out that several policies appeared to remain largely confined to official documents. We also need to understand that registering an FIR is not justice. It is merely the beginning of the process. If a child is abused, a case is registered and the accused is arrested, but the trial continues for years, witnesses come under pressure, evidence becomes weaker and the family eventually loses hope, then where is the justice despite the existence of laws? Cases involving children require a particularly sensitive approach to investigation and prosecution. Making a child repeatedly recount a traumatic incident, subjecting them to unnecessary questioning or taking their statement in an intimidating environment can deepen the trauma. Every district should therefore have properly trained child protection units where police officers, prosecutors, social workers and psychologists can work together. Specially trained investigators and prosecutors should deal with child abuse cases, while unnecessary delays in trials must be eliminated. We teach our children mathematics, science, English and computers. But do we teach them what to do if someone touches them inappropriately? Do they know that they have the right to say no? Do they understand that they are not obliged to obey an adult when something is wrong? Do they know whom to approach if someone threatens or intimidates them? Age-appropriate child safety education is no longer a luxury. It is a necessity. The purpose of such education should not be to frighten children but to give them a basic understanding of personal boundaries, appropriate and inappropriate touch, online risks and ways of seeking help. Parents and teachers also need training because children often communicate distress through changes in behaviour rather than directly asking for help. The dangers facing children today are not confined to streets, schools and neighbourhoods. Mobile phones and the internet have created another world in which children can

Distrust in Azad Jammu and Kashmir is linked to a small but organized group that allegedly used social media manipulation, propaganda, and genuine public grievances to create an impression of widespread support disconnected from reality, deepening divisions within society and straining relations between the state and its citizens. The Rawalakot protests are said to have involved only a small fraction of AJK’s population of about four million, with fewer than 40,000 participants at peak attendance and likely around 10,000–15,000 overall, while more than five times that number reportedly traveled from Rawalakot to Rawalpindi on June 6 and 7. Many families moved weddings to Rawalpindi and Islamabad, sick people and schoolchildren left the town, and hundreds of families delayed school and college admissions until August because of the disruption. Most residents remained away from the protests to protect their families, forming a “silent majority,” while around 90 percent of people in other districts are said not to support the protesters’ agenda. Large political rallies in Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Dhirkot, and Bhimbar are taken as evidence of stronger support for the constitutional political process than for the Rawalakot sit-in. Around 10,000–15,000 protesters are held responsible for disrupting daily life, damaging the economy, creating fear and uncertainty, and causing disorder over an issue that could have been resolved through legislation, dialogue, and democratic institutions rather than confrontation and violence. Aided by a few journalists acting as propagandists, the movement is accused of using manipulated images, fake news, and emotional appeals to create the impression that the whole of Azad Kashmir supports it, even though the participants are said to constitute less than 10 percent of Rawalakot’s own population.   The government has addressed many demands by reducing electricity and flour prices, abolishing refugee ministries, reducing the number of ministers, halving the property transfer tax, completing the Rathwa Hariyam Bridge, withdrawing FIRs and legal cases, compensating the families of those killed and 56 injured people, providing a government job to Azhar’s brother, approving a Rs. 5.5 billion PC-1 for MRI facilities, and approving a Rs. 9 billion PC-1 to improve the power transmission system.   The application to make Azad Kashmir Bank a scheduled bank has been submitted to the State Bank of Pakistan, a move that will strengthen the financial sector and provide greater access to banking services for the people. The health card has been restored, a vital social safety net program that provides access to medical care for those who cannot afford it, and its restoration was a major victory for the people. Two new boards of education have been established, decentralizing the education system and allowing for more focused and effective administration of schools. The Mansehra, Muzaffarabad and Mangla expressways are included in the CPEC project, a game-changing development that will bring massive investment, improve connectivity, and create economic opportunities for the region. The establishment of Mirpur Airport was announced by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on live television, a major milestone that will open up the region to the world and facilitate trade and tourism, and work on the feasibility has started, with the project now moving from the planning stage to reality. The quota system has ended, a long-standing demand that was seen as discriminatory and unjust, and its abolition was a major step towards equality and fairness. Additional departments were abolished and merged with existing departments, a move that reduced bureaucracy and made the government more efficient. The e-tendering of electricity meters was approved, a reform that will ensure transparency and fairness in the procurement process. The demand for 30 KVA for schools and colleges was approved, and the notification has been issued, ensuring that educational institutions will have access to a reliable power supply. Now, among the remaining demands, there is a demand for 4 tunnels and bridges, infrastructure projects that are undeniably needed and would greatly benefit the people, but in reality one single tunnel is estimated to be completed in 10 billion rupees, and the total development budget of Azad Kashmir is less than 40 billion rupees, meaning that these projects cannot be built overnight. The government or no one has any magical capabilities, and no airport, bridges, and tunnels can be built overnight, as they require years of planning, feasibility studies, environmental assessments, and massive financial outlays that must be spread over many years.   In fact, after approving so many demands, after demonstrating such a clear willingness to address the grievances of the people, to insist on only one remaining demand and to lay siege to the entire region and paralyze the lives of millions, one must ask a crucial question: is it the stubborn government or the action committee that is being unreasonable?   The so-called peaceful revolutionary sit-in of the banned Joint Action Committee has been completely exposed for what it really is, and the mask of peaceful protest has slipped to reveal the ugly face of violent insurgency. Their so-called rational teams, which were presented as peaceful negotiators and organizers, are in fact positioned on rooftops with state-of-the-art SMG guns and ultra-expensive military binoculars, and their purpose is not to maintain order but to monitor the security forces on the ground, tracking their movements and planning for a confrontation. This is not a political sit-in, which is a legitimate form of protest in a democracy, but a planned military confrontation against the security forces of the state, a deliberate strategy to provoke a reaction and to create martyrs. Recently a banned Action Committee’s leader made a revealing statement, admitting to the supply of modern US-made M4 rifles to troublemakers, a serious accusation that confirms the armed nature of the group and its intent to use violence against the state. The banned JAAC is using fake and AI generated videos and posts to get the support of the people, manufacturing evidence and creating a false reality to manipulate public opinion, and these fabricated materials are spread widely on social media to create a sense of crisis and to incite hatred.

Elections are currently being held in Pakistani-administered Kashmir (POK), and their results have already become controversial at the very first stage. Gilgit-Baltistan, which is essentially also part of Kashmir, held elections recently. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won there, while the Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party also received some seats, and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) won fewer seats. Despite this, the PML-N accepted the results and fully cooperated in the formation of the government. In the first phase of elections in Mirpur, however, the PML-N won nine seats, while Bilawal’s PPP secured four. Despite winning four seats, the PPP immediately began raising allegations of rigging. Even more painful is the fact that these elections have been marked by bloodshed. During clashes surrounding the long march of the banned Awami Action Party, one Rangers personnel was killed and five police officers were confirmed injured. The Awami Action Committee, meanwhile, claims that its protesters came under firing, resulting in the deaths of 14 of its workers. The number of people killed or injured from the Awami Action Committee has not been officially confirmed. However, if government personnel have been killed and injured, it is reasonable to assume that protesters also suffered casualties. The question now is what should be made of the rigging allegations being levelled by the PPP and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. If one side refuses to accept the election results and uses such harsh language against the other side, could the situation not deteriorate further? From a strategic perspective, it would have been better to hold the entire election on a single day. The total number of voters is not so large that the process needed to be stretched out in this manner. The second phase is scheduled for August 2, followed by the third phase on August 10, as if this were a battlefield. Bilawal should also think beyond repeatedly raising the issue of rigging. At present, his own party is in power in Kashmir. The deputy commissioners, assistant commissioners and other officials were appointed by the ruling party. So who has greater opportunities to influence elections—the ruling party or the opposition? Nawaz Sharif and Maryam Nawaz conducted an effective election campaign during the final days. However, the writer believes it was not befitting of a three-time elected Pakistani prime minister to say words to the effect of: “I will ask my brother Shehbaz Sharif to make me the prime minister of Kashmir, and I will solve all its problems.” Instead, he should have said that whichever member from their party is elected to the assembly, he and his party would fully cooperate with that representative in resolving the problems of the people of Kashmir. Maryam Nawaz also sent air-conditioned buses for the people of Kashmir, but they were stopped on the instructions of the Election Commission. Nevertheless, the message reached the people of Kashmir that the PML-N was in a position to do something to address their deprivation. This thinking could help the PML-N achieve further success in the next two phases as well. But the real decisions, after all, remain in the hands of those who possess the power and influence. In our country, writing and speaking the truth has become extremely difficult. There is immense pressure not only from powerful circles but also from violent and extremist mindsets. Their proxies can be found roaming freely in the streets. In normal states, something that would be considered ordinary or insignificant was used as a pretext to shut down the country’s largest media organisation, Geo, for two weeks. This alone gives an idea of the pressure facing the Jang newspaper and the national media. For this reason, the writer says he tries to avoid writing about national and domestic affairs and mostly focuses on international issues. Even there, however, he has to be careful not to write anything critical of China, Iran or certain other countries. Likewise, he says he cannot write anything supportive of India, Israel or certain other countries that might highlight a positive aspect or truth about them. This, he says, is the pressure he faces every moment. When it comes to Indian-administered Kashmir, we can freely write and speak about alleged government abuses without facing difficulty or objection. We can exaggerate as much as we want and add as much colour as we like. The violent militants there are portrayed as victims under all circumstances. But when it comes to our own Kashmir, we are expected to portray the movement for public rights as anti-state, Indian-sponsored and terrorist, regardless of how strongly its members insist that they are simply demanding rights for ordinary people. The organisation is not even named after any military or jihadist group. It is called the Jammu and Kashmir Joint Action Committee. It consists of local Kashmiri traders, transporters, workers, students and lawyers. These are ordinary citizens of the region. They demand rights for ordinary Kashmiris. They speak against rising inflation and call for reductions in the prices of wheat and flour. They oppose excessive privileges for the elite, misuse of public resources and corruption. They also demand an end to what they consider unjust taxes. Despite this, the organisation has not only been banned, but its workers have allegedly been arrested and subjected to violence in ways that are deeply disturbing. While witnessing all this, writers like us sometimes adopt deliberate ignorance and tell the members of the Awami Action Committee: “You make allegations against our sacred institutions. How could they possibly commit excesses against you?” We are told that these institutions are the reason this small part of Kashmir remains with us. We are also told that they have kept the Kashmir issue alive so that the entire region can eventually be recovered. Therefore, according to this argument, their praise and appreciation are justified. If, according to protesters, 30 or 35 people have so far been killed and around 300 injured during demonstrations, then we are also told to consider how many of our security personnel have

“Federalism is self-rule plus shared rule”—Daniel J. Elazar The recurring demand for creating new provinces in Pakistan resurfaces with remarkable regularity. Whenever governance falters, regional disparities widen or perceptions of neglect become politically expedient, voices emerge advocating the redrawing of provincial boundaries. Southern Punjab, Hazara, Bahawalpur and other regions are periodically cited as compelling examples of territories whose aspirations can supposedly be fulfilled only through separate provincial status.  The proposition appears deceptively simple: smaller provinces would bring government closer to the people and consequently ensure better governance. Yet constitutional questions are seldom answered by geographical arithmetic. Before redrawing Pakistan’s political map, we must first answer a more fundamental question: what is the constitutional purpose of a province within a federation? The quote by Daniel J. Elazar, one of the foremost scholars of federalism is a simple expression that encapsulates the philosophy underlying every successful federation. A federation is neither a unitary state nor a loose confederation of independent entities. It is a constitutional partnership in which constituent units voluntarily participate in the exercise of shared sovereignty while retaining their distinct political identities. The essence of federalism, therefore, lies not in the number of constituent units but in the constitutional balance between unity and diversity. Pakistan’s provinces were never intended to function merely as administrative divisions. Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan represent historical regions possessing distinct linguistic, cultural and political identities. Their constitutional status cannot be viewed solely through the lens of administrative convenience. They constitute a federal compact upon which Pakistan’s constitutional structure rests. Altering provincial boundaries is therefore not merely a question of improving governance; it involves reconsidering the architecture of the federation itself. None of this implies that demands for new provinces are devoid of merit. Those advocating separate provincial status often point towards genuine grievances. Regions distant from provincial capitals frequently complain of inadequate public investment, poor infrastructure, unequal employment opportunities, weak political representation and an enduring sense of neglect. Such concerns deserve neither dismissal nor ridicule. Every federation must continuously reassess whether its institutions are responding equitably to the aspirations of all its citizens. There are, undoubtedly, persuasive arguments in favour of creating additional provinces. Smaller administrative units may improve governmental accessibility, reduce bureaucratic distance, strengthen regional representation and permit more focused development planning.  India’s creation of states such as Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Telangana was largely justified on similar considerations. In certain instances, administrative decentralisation has indeed facilitated more responsive governance. It would therefore be intellectually dishonest to dismiss the proposal merely because it challenges existing boundaries. Yet comparative constitutional experience also counsels caution. Nigeria expanded from three regions to thirty-six states without eliminating corruption, insecurity or administrative inefficiency. India itself continues to witness demands for further statehood despite repeated territorial reorganisation. The number of constituent units has never, by itself, guaranteed good governance. Effective administration ultimately depends upon the quality of institutions rather than the quantity of provinces. This distinction is often overlooked in Pakistan’s public discourse. Governance failures are frequently attributed to geography when they are, in reality, institutional. Weak local governments, politicised bureaucracies, uneven fiscal distribution, inadequate accountability and inconsistent policy implementation cannot be remedied simply by drawing new boundaries upon a map. Multiplying provinces without simultaneously strengthening constitutional institutions merely reproduces existing weaknesses on a smaller scale. Perhaps the most neglected dimension of this debate is local government. Modern constitutional democracies recognise that genuine democracy begins not in distant capitals but within local communities. The closer government remains to the citizen, the greater its responsiveness and accountability.  Unfortunately, Pakistan has historically oscillated between centralisation and reluctant decentralisation, often treating elected local governments as temporary administrative experiments rather than permanent constitutional institutions. Before concluding that additional provinces constitute the solution, we ought first to ask whether meaningful local self-government has ever been sincerely allowed to flourish. Equally important is the constitutional process itself. The creation of new provinces cannot become an instrument of transient political expediency or electoral bargaining. It must emerge from broad constitutional consensus, careful economic evaluation, administrative necessity and, above all, the informed consent of those directly affected. Constitutional engineering undertaken without social consensus has rarely strengthened federations; more often, it has deepened existing divisions. The debate, therefore, should not be framed as one between those who favour additional provinces and those who oppose them. The real issue is whether territorial reorganisation genuinely addresses the underlying causes of poor governance or merely offers an attractive political slogan. A federation derives its strength not from the number of provinces appearing on its map but from the confidence its citizens repose in the fairness of its institutions. Where constitutional principles are respected, resources distributed equitably and local governments empowered, both large and small provinces can flourish. Where these foundations are absent, no amount of territorial rearrangement can compensate for institutional decay. Pakistan’s future will ultimately be determined less by the cartography of its provinces than by the constitutional maturity of its federation. If new provinces emerge through genuine constitutional consensus and demonstrable administrative necessity, they may well strengthen the federal structure. If, however, they arise merely as instruments of political convenience or regional rivalry, they risk replacing the promise of federalism with the peril of fragmentation.  The challenge before Pakistan, therefore, is not simply to decide how many provinces it should have. It is to determine whether the federation can faithfully uphold the constitutional promise of self-rule and shared rule upon which every enduring federal democracy ultimately depends. _____________________________________________________________________________ The writer, lawyer and author, is former Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), a member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) 

Post-Doctorate (Peace Education) International Islamic University Islamabad The trilateral relationship between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia represents one of the most significant geopolitical partnerships in the Islamic world, with the potential to reshape regional dynamics and contribute meaningfully to global peace and stability. These three nations, each wielding considerable influence in their respective spheres, share common interests rooted in Islamic solidarity, strategic cooperation, and mutual security concerns. As the world navigates increasingly complex challenges including terrorism, economic instability and geopolitical tensions, the collaboration between these three countries offers a pragmatic pathway toward addressing regional conflicts and fostering sustainable development. This essay examines the historical foundations of this trilateral relationship, analyzes the contemporary opportunities and challenges facing these nations, and proposes a comprehensive vision for how Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia can work collectively to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in their regions and beyond. The relationship between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia is deeply rooted in shared Islamic heritage and Cold War-era strategic alliances. Pakistan and Türkiye have maintain diplomatic relations since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, with both nations viewing themselves as guardians of Islamic values while navigating the complexities of secular governance and regional stability. Saudi Arabia, as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites and a major regional power, has historically served as a financial and ideological anchor for both Pakistan and Türkiye. These connections intensified during the Soviet-Afghan War when all three nations collaborated to support Afghan resistance movements, establishing patterns of military cooperation and intelligence sharing that persist today. The geographical positioning of these three nations makes their cooperation particularly valuable. Pakistan serves as a bridge between the Middle East and South Asia, Türkiye controls critical waterways and straddles Europe and Asia, while Saudi Arabia dominates the Arabian Peninsula and maintains substantial economic influence globally. Together, they represent a population exceeding 250 million people and combined GDP that makes them economically significant actors in the Islamic world. Their combined military capabilities, particularly Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and Türkiye’s advanced defense industry, provide them with considerable strategic weight in global affairs. The three nations face remarkably similar security challenges that necessitate coordinated responses. Terrorism, particularly extremist groups operating across borders, poses a persistent threat to all three countries. Pakistan has struggled with militant organizations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Türkiye faces challenges from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and various Islamist extremist groups, while Saudi Arabia confronts threats from Al-Qaeda affiliated organizations and Iranian-backed militias. A coordinated counterterrorism strategy that shares intelligence, coordinates military operations, and implements joint training programs could significantly enhance the security of all three nations while reducing opportunities for terrorist organizations to exploit jurisdictional gaps. Beyond security concerns, these nations share substantial economic interests. The growing middle class in Pakistan, Türkiye advanced manufacturing sector, and Saudi Arabia’s renewable energy ambitions create complementary opportunities for trade and investment. Regional infrastructure projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the proposed Middle Corridor connecting Central Asia to Europe through Türkiye, offer avenues for economic cooperation that could benefit all three countries. Additionally, all three nations recognize the importance of energy security in an increasingly multipolar world, creating opportunities for cooperation in renewable energy development, particularly given Saudi Arabia’s commitment to transitioning away from oil dependency and Türkiye strategic location for energy transit. Recent developments demonstrate growing momentum toward deeper trilateral cooperation The Economic Cooperation Organization, which includes all three nations along with others on the region, has emerged as a platform for discussing trade facilitation and infrastructure development. Pakistan and Türkiye have strengthened military-to-military ties through joint exercises and defense cooperation agreements, while Saudi Arabia has increased its defense: e procurement from both countries and hosted significant diplomatic summits bringing the three nations together. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization also provides a forum where these nations increasingly coordinate on regional security matters. Cultural and educational exchanges have expanded considerably, with increasing numbers of students from all three nations studying in each other’s universities and growing tourism facilitating people-to-people connections. Turkish media has gained significant popularity in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while Pakistani cultural products have found audiences in the other two countries, creating soft power synergies that strengthen bilateral ties. These cultural connections help build constituencies within each country that support deeper cooperation and mutual understanding. However, challenges remain in translating political will into concrete outcomes. Bureaucratic inefficiencies, trade barriers, and inconsistent policy implementation have hindered some cooperative initiatives. Additionally, each nation faces domestic political pressures that sometimes constrain their ability to fully commit to trilateral projects. Pakistan’s ongoing economic challenges, Türkiye internal political dynamics, and Saudi Arabia’s regional rivalry with Iran create competing priorities that sometimes divert attention and resources from trilateral initiatives.