Second Darkest Day For Kashmiris

The first part of this series argued that Pakistan’s recurring fiscal crises cannot be understood through conventional economic analysis alone. The distinction between public finance and Constitutional Political Economy (CPE) must now be explained. Both examine the role of the state in economic life, but they begin from different assumptions and ask fundamentally different questions. Traditional public finance is primarily concerned with what governments ought to do. In the classical framework associated with Richard Musgrave, fiscal policy performs three principal functions: allocation of resources, redistribution of income and macroeconomic stabilisation. Governments provide public goods, correct market failures, reduce unacceptable inequalities and use taxation and expenditure to promote stability and growth. This framework remains indispensable for analysing budgets, taxes and public expenditure. The International Monetary Fund’s discussion of Musgrave’s framework confirms its enduring influence on fiscal analysis. The difficulty arises when the state is treated as a single, impartial institution pursuing social welfare. In the real world, governments consist of politicians, bureaucrats, legislators, judges, regulators and numerous organised interests. Each operates under incentives and constraints. Political actors do not cease to pursue power, institutional advantage or personal interest merely because they enter public office. A tax system may therefore be inefficient not because its designers misunderstood economic theory, but because inefficiency benefits influential constituencies. An exemption may survive not because it promotes investment, but because its beneficiaries possess political power. Public expenditure may be allocated not according to social need, but according to the ability of institutions and groups to influence the budgetary process. Public finance generally asks: what tax would be efficient, equitable and productive? CPE asks a prior question: what political and constitutional arrangements will cause those in authority to adopt and administer such a tax fairly? This difference emerged most clearly in the work of James M. Buchanan, who was awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize for developing the contractual and constitutional foundations of economic and political decision-making. Buchanan argued that economists must specify their model of politics before recommending policies. They should examine the “constitution of economic polity”—the rules and constraints within which political actors make decisions—rather than assuming that government automatically acts as a benevolent guardian of collective welfare. In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Gordon Tullock applied economic reasoning to collective decision-making. They distinguished between choices made within existing rules and choices concerning the rules themselves. Ordinary politics concerns decisions taken under established constitutional arrangements. Constitutional political economy examines how those arrangements should be designed, whose consent they require and what incentives they create. The distinction may be understood through the analogy of a game. Public finance often studies the moves made by players: whether a tax rate should be increased, expenditure reduced, subsidies withdrawn or borrowing limited. CPE examines the rules of the game: who may impose a tax, who may approve expenditure, how revenues are distributed, what majorities are required, which institutions are accountable and what remedies exist when power is abused. The rules determine the range of possible outcomes. Replacing one finance minister, tax administrator or economic adviser cannot fundamentally alter results if the institutional incentives remain unchanged. Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan developed this insight further in The Reason of Rules. Their focus was not merely upon particular policy choices but upon the rules governing political and market interaction. CPE therefore does not ask only whether a government policy appears desirable. It asks whether the institutional process through which it is adopted protects citizens against arbitrary, discriminatory or predatory use of power. This approach does not imply hostility towards the state. A capable state is essential for education, healthcare, infrastructure, environmental protection, social security and economic development. CPE merely refuses to assume that state power will automatically be exercised for these purposes. A strong state without constitutional restraints may become strong against ordinary citizens while remaining weak before powerful interests. These insights are neither exclusively modern nor exclusively Western. Centuries before the emergence of public choice theory, Ibn Khaldun analysed taxation as part of the broader rise and decline of states. He observed that governments in their earlier stages could obtain substantial revenues from relatively moderate assessments, whereas later rulers frequently imposed heavier burdens but collected less as incentives weakened, production contracted and coercive expenditure expanded. Arthur B. Laffer subsequently acknowledged that the proposition associated with the Laffer Curve was not his invention and specifically identified Ibn Khaldun as an important precursor. Ibn Khaldun’s contribution, however, went far beyond a relationship between tax rates and revenue: he connected fiscal policy with political legitimacy, administrative expansion, elite consumption and institutional decline. The Constitution of Pakistan itself demonstrates that taxation is not merely an economic instrument. Article 77 provides that no federal tax may be levied except by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament. The provision embodies the constitutional principle that taxation requires lawful legislative authority; it is not simply an administrative technique for raising revenue. Article 160 creates the National Finance Commission and provides the framework for distributing specified revenues between the Federation and the provinces. Article 160(3A) further protects the provincial share by declaring that it cannot be lower than that provided under the preceding Award. These provisions represent a constitutional bargain concerning political authority, federalism and access to public resources. Revenue distribution is consequently not just an accounting exercise. It forms part of the structure of the federation itself. Article 140A requires the provinces to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility to them. Fiscal policy cannot produce accountable public services when decision-making remains remote from citizens and constitutionally required devolution is treated as optional. Articles 37 and 38 contain important commitments regarding social justice, education, economic well-being, reduction of inequality and provision of basic necessities. They are Principles of Policy rather than directly enforceable Fundamental Rights, and Article 30 limits their judicial enforceability. Their inclusion nevertheless demonstrates that the constitutional purposes of revenue collection extend beyond achievement of numerical tax targets. The state collects resources to fulfil social and economic obligations, not

I have lived long enough, and travelled enough, to know that a buggy ride is royal. This week, a buggy ride was held in Islamabad and that ride has become a centre of all drawing room discussions. Let me start with what I have seen with my own eyes, many times over, on the streets of London. I walk those streets often, and I see mounted police there almost every week. Big handsome horses, officers sitting tall in the saddle, moving through crowds at football matches, at protests, at royal parades. But here is the thing I want you to notice. Those horses are working. The officer on that horse is doing a job. He is controlling a crowd, keeping an eye on trouble, making sure that thousands of people move safely through narrow streets. Nobody in London looks at a mounted police officer and thinks of him as a king. They think of him as a policeman who happens to have four legs helping him do his job better than two legs could. Then there is the other side of the horse story in London, the royal family. Once or twice a year, you will see the King or a prince ride out in a grand carriage, gold trim, footmen in uniform, the whole show. And it is exactly that, a show. It is theatre, built on centuries of tradition, and everybody watching knows exactly what it is. Royalty is a different breed. Nobody expects the King to explain why he has running water or why the country’s roads have potholes. He was born into that role, and the carriage is part of a costume that comes with the job. People do not confuse that costume with the daily business of government. Now bring me back home, to Islamabad, on our own Independence Day. I watched the video like everybody else did. The chairman of the Capital Development Authority and the inspector general riding in a horse drawn carriage, arriving grandly at the ceremony. And I felt they were not kings. This was not centuries of tradition. This was a serving civil servant and a serving police officer, the very same officers who are supposed to answer to the public every single day, arriving like they were opening a coronation. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi explains the story behind that ride. He said what happened was not appropriate, but insisted it was not the fault of the IG or the chief commissioner. He says that he and the chief guest were delayed because of the president’s meeting with the prime minister, and that the crowd had been waiting since five in the evening. Around six, when it was clear they would be late, he says he told the officers to start the programme so the public would not have to wait any longer. The buggy, he said, had been arranged for the chief guest, and the officers were only supposed to ride with him, but due to unavoidable circumstances they ended up using it alone. He added that both officers had initially resisted starting the program without him, and that he personally instructed them to proceed, for the convenience of the public. I keep thinking about that journalist who asked a simple, honest question. Have you ever seen the police commissioner of London ride around in a royal buggy? The answer, of course, is no. Because he knows his job is to serve, not to be served. That is the whole difference in one sentence. A horse carriage is a fine thing, in the right hands, for the right reason. In London, it either works, or it performs. In Islamabad this week, it did neither. It simply left a bad taste in everybody’s mouth.

July 26th marks the birthday of an political prisoner who spend 1.5 decade in prison without conviction meaning he was innocent but was kept in prison unlawfully. But from prison torture cell he stood by the state. He is son of soil. His non-violent legacy is worth following by all political prisoners of world. This is the beauty of the modern world era that you can not hide anything from anyone. Welcome to present world best known as modern world era. This s all about technology and methods of gathering information compiling it and ultimately relaying it in more authenticated way. It took decades to evolve technology from computing, internet, gadgets and mobile revolution to the present world modern world era of artificial intelligence. Gen Z and Gen Alpha highly rely on AI tools. If you go through Google and AI tools and start searching term ‘political prisoners’ then you will find incumbent President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari as the one and only political prisoner in the history of world, who spent fourteen years and eight months in prison without any conviction. His tongue was cut and botched attempt was made to cut his neck and throat to kill him. He faced worst third degree torture in prison. He never gave a single call to his party workers to protest or attack the institutes. In 1990s and onwards United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) and Tokyo declaration were in place for necessary remedial but kudos to Asif Ali Zardari, he never opt for agitation. Asif Ali Zardari faced all kinds of tortures with patience and bravery and stood by the state of Pakistan under any circumstances, even when his wife two-times prime minister of Pakistan was assassinated in broad daylight in Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007, he gave he hope to nation ‘Pakistan Khappay’ Pakistan Zindabad Pakistan long live. He pledged that He with help of people of Pakistan and state institutions will make greater and stronger Pakistan. In 2008, when Asif Ali Zardari, assumed the charge of Presidency, he forgave all of his enemies and he announced general amnesty for all, in fact he also took initiatives to stop unfair and degrading treatment and third degree torture with others which he faced during his imprisonment. In year 2010, The President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and later it was his political party Pakistan Peoples Party which brought legislation Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022 to prohibit torture and other acts of cruel, Inhumane and degrading treatment. In year, 2023, It was also Sindh assembly/government to bring the legislation of the medico legal Act 2023. In his previous tenure of Presidency (2008-2013). He saved world from nuclear war in the wake of Mumbai attacks, strengthened ties with china and ensured revival of ties with Russia and Iran and started new era of relations with US and west on the grounds of equality as good friends. And his current tenure of Presidency is more vibrant and productive for people of Pakistan coupled with iron first lady Aseefa Bhutto Zardari’s input. Under his visionary leadership Pakistan is heading towards his dream of Greater Pakistan. May his 71st birthday bring Pakistan prosperity, peace and hub of global economy. Happy birthday Asian Nelson Mandela!

By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Asma Rahmat, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University Introduction: The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement was always likely to generate a degree of unease in Tehran – actually, this is not the case. Any emerging collective-security arrangement involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye was bound to attract scrutiny in Iran, particularly against the backdrop of longstanding strategic rivalries in the Persian Gulf, shifting regional alignments, and uncertainty regarding the eventual scope, institutional structure, and strategic trajectory of the agreement. Nevertheless, Iran’s official response has so far been notably measured, restrained, and constructive. This approach deserves particular recognition at a time when the Middle East is already experiencing profound geopolitical uncertainty and strategic volatility. Iran’s Measured Diplomatic Response: Some degree of skepticism among Iranian politicians, commentators, and strategic analysts is neither surprising nor inherently problematic. What is considerably more significant, however, is the position adopted by the Iranian government itself. Rather than immediately portraying the agreement as an emerging threat or an instrument of strategic encirclement, Tehran has adopted a comparatively cautious and pragmatic interpretation. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei has characterized recent regional developments as indicative of a broader transformation in the way Middle Eastern states perceive and pursue their security interests. In particular, he has suggested that regional countries are increasingly recognizing that their long-term security cannot remain excessively dependent upon external powers, particularly the United States. This interpretation is strategically significant. It enables Tehran to acknowledge the emergence of new regional security arrangements without necessarily interpreting them through an exclusively confrontational lens. More importantly, it creates diplomatic space for Iran to engage with the evolving regional security architecture without prematurely positioning itself in opposition to the emerging arrangement. Not an Anti-Iran Arrangement: Perhaps even more consequential is Tehran’s indication that it sees no compelling reason, at least at this stage, to regard the Makkah Agreement as being directed against Iran. By emphasizing the deep historical, cultural, civilizational, economic, and diplomatic ties connecting Iran with Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has sought to place the agreement within the broader context of regional developments rather than reducing it to a zero-sum strategic competition. This diplomatic framing is important. At a particularly sensitive juncture in Middle Eastern politics, the manner in which states interpret one another’s strategic initiatives can be almost as consequential as the initiatives themselves. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye have emphasized the defensive character of the agreement and have maintained that it is not directed against any particular state. Tehran’s apparent willingness to acknowledge that position reduces the possibility that the agreement will become the subject of an unnecessary cycle of suspicion, countermeasures, and strategic miscalculation. This, however, does not mean that Iran will disregard the agreement or refrain from carefully assessing its potential implications. Tehran will undoubtedly examine its institutional structure, military dimensions, strategic objectives, operational capabilities, and possible future trajectory. Every major regional actor is likely to do the same. Diplomatic reassurance and strategic calculation are not mutually exclusive: states can remain vigilant regarding developments affecting their national security while simultaneously choosing diplomacy over confrontation. A Critical Formative Stage: The Makkah Agreement remains at a relatively early stage of development. Its eventual character, institutional capacity, strategic purpose, and regional consequences will depend substantially upon how its participating states define, institutionalize, and implement it over time. At this formative stage, responsible rhetoric and prudent diplomacy are therefore particularly important. Prematurely treating the agreement as an instrument of confrontation could create precisely the tensions that its participating states claim they seek to avoid. Conversely, maintaining strategic ambiguity alongside diplomatic reassurance may provide sufficient space for the arrangement to evolve without immediately becoming embedded within the region’s existing patterns of rivalry. Iran could have responded with immediate hostility, framing the agreement as a direct threat to its national security and thereby contributing to another cycle of regional polarization. Instead, at least for the present, Tehran has chosen a different course. By maintaining a measured tone, recognizing the possibility of legitimate regional security concerns, and leaving open the possibility of dialogue, Iran has preserved diplomatic space for engagement rather than confrontation. This approach should be welcomed by all concerned. Towards a Regionally Owned Security Architecture: The emergence of new regional security arrangements does not necessarily have to produce new geopolitical divisions. If Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Iran can resist the temptation to interpret every strategic development exclusively through the lens of rivalry, the present moment could provide an opportunity to develop a more genuinely regionally owned security architecture. Such an architecture should not rest exclusively upon military deterrence. It should also incorporate dialogue, confidence-building measures, mutual reassurance, economic interdependence, diplomatic engagement, and respect for the legitimate security concerns of neighboring states. The long-term objective should be to reduce, rather than institutionalize, the structural mistrust that has historically characterized relations among major regional actors. Pakistan’s Emerging Strategic Role: The broader geopolitical context is equally significant. Pakistan appears to be assuming a more consequential role in regional affairs, supported by what its proponents regard as the dynamic and assertive leadership of Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. At the same time, India is confronting significant diplomatic challenges in its regional and international engagement. This changing strategic environment provides Pakistan with an opportunity to pursue a more confident, balanced, and strategically autonomous foreign policy. Pakistan’s greatest diplomatic advantage may lie not in becoming another participant in a rigid bloc system, but in positioning itself as a bridge between competing regional interests. Its relationships with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Iran, China, and other regional actors provide Pakistan with diplomatic space that could potentially be used to promote communication and confidence-building among states whose strategic interests do not always converge. The Changing Role of the United States: Another important dimension of the Makkah Agreement concerns the evolving role of the United States in the Middle East. The agreement may, at least from the perspective of some regional observers, be understood as part of

The Part VI of this series argued that Pakistan cannot escape dependency merely by improving tax administration. Better value added taxation, digital integration and fiscal coordination are necessary, but they cannot substitute for constitutional restraints, accountable government and dismantling of systems of privilege. The same intellectual caution must be applied to the history of economic thought. Conventional accounts often move from Greek philosophy to European scholasticism, mercantilism, Adam Smith and modern economics, leaving several centuries of Muslim intellectual activity in an unexplained gap. This omission creates the false impression that systematic thinking about taxation, markets, money, public expenditure, state responsibility and economic justice developed almost exclusively in the West. Muslim scholars did not describe their work as “economics” in the modern sense. Economic questions appeared within jurisprudence, ethics, administration, history and political philosophy. Imposing contemporary categories upon them would be anachronistic. Excluding their contributions from the history of economic ideas is equally indefensible. Modern scholarship has documented a substantial body of Muslim economic thought that conventional textbooks have frequently overlooked. The purpose is not to replace a Western monopoly with a Muslim one. Knowledge has always travelled across cultures as common heritage of mankind. Muslim thinkers drew upon Islamic sources, practical experience and Greek, Persian, Roman and Indian traditions. Their works were subsequently transmitted, debated and transformed in other intellectual settings. The proper objective is to restore missing pages to a shared human history. One of the earliest important works on public revenue was Abu Yusuf’s Kitab al-Kharaj. It did not treat taxation as a ruler’s unrestricted right to maximise extraction. Tax liability had to take account of productive capacity, conditions of the land and the taxpayer’s ability to bear the burden. Abu Yusuf preferred proportional agricultural taxation where a fixed assessment would become oppressive in a poor harvest and unduly favourable during exceptional production. He insisted that collectors should be honest, collection economical and taxpayers treated justly. He opposed arrangements capable of turning revenue collection into tyranny and also emphasised irrigation, transportation and other infrastructure necessary for production. This was more than tax administration. It was an early recognition that revenue depends upon institutions, incentives and the conduct of public officials. A tax may be lawful in form and oppressive in operation. The character of the collector, method of assessment and use of revenue are therefore integral to the legitimacy of taxation. Pakistan’s fiscal debate still struggles to absorb this elementary insight. In the Land of Pure, tax laws are judged by the amounts they collect, while blocked refunds, arbitrary demands, compliance costs and damage to productive capacity are treated as secondary matters. Revenue obtained by weakening the taxpayer is celebrated as administrative success. Abu Yusuf’s approach reverses the perspective: the state must preserve the source from which sustainable revenue arises. Al-Ghazali examined markets, exchange, specialisation, division of labour, money and the interdependence of economic activities. He explained that production of even an ordinary item required the cooperation of numerous workers performing specialised functions. His examples involving bread and needle-making appeared centuries before Adam Smith’s famous pin factory. He also recognised that markets emerge from mutual need and voluntary exchange, while public authority remains necessary to maintain justice and prevent harmful practices. Economic development was not separated from education, security, infrastructure and public welfare. Prosperity, justice and legitimate political authority formed parts of an interdependent social order. This understanding is richer than the artificial contest often presented between state and market. Markets require rules, trust, reliable money and protection against fraud. The state must provide these conditions without converting regulation into a mechanism for distributing arbitrary favours. Ibn Taymiyyah similarly distinguished between price increases produced by changes in supply and demand and those caused by injustice, hoarding or monopoly. Not every increase in price justified administrative interference. Market forces had to be understood before intervention was attempted. Intervention became necessary where concentrated power allowed monopolists to exploit the public. Ibn Taymiyyah therefore combined recognition of market mechanisms with restraint upon abuse—an approach far removed from both indiscriminate price control and unregulated private coercion. Pakistan repeatedly swings between these extremes. Governments interfere through administered prices, selective subsidies and discretionary regulation, while tolerating cartels, protected industries and barriers to competition. The result is not a free market or an effective developmental state. It is a negotiated market in which access to authority frequently determines economic advantage. Al-Maqrizi’s analysis of monetary debasement and inflation provides another striking antecedent. Writing in the context of monetary disorder, scarcity and maladministration, he connected the excessive issue of inferior money with rising prices, disruption of exchange and hardship for the population. Ibn Taymiyyah had also warned that circulation of currencies with different intrinsic values could drive better money out of use. The instruments have changed. Modern states no longer depend upon metallic coins in the same manner. The underlying warning remains relevant: governments cannot conceal fiscal disorder indefinitely through manipulation of money. Inflation transfers resources without transparent legislative approval and imposes its harshest burden upon those least able to protect their savings and incomes. The most comprehensive contribution came from Ibn Khaldun. His Muqaddimah connected taxation with state formation, political authority, incentives, production, public expenditure, urban development, elite luxury and dynastic decline. Ibn Khaldun observed that during the earlier stages of a dynasty, moderate assessments could generate substantial revenue because economic activity remained vigorous. As ruling establishments expanded, expenditure increased and elites became accustomed to luxury, new taxes and higher rates were imposed. Productive incentives weakened, the tax base contracted and larger assessments produced smaller revenues. Arthur Laffer expressly acknowledged this antecedent in 2004, writing: “The Laffer Curve, by the way, was not invented by me”. He immediately referred to Ibn Khaldun’s analysis of high assessments and declining revenue. Laffer also mentioned other predecessors, so historical accuracy requires us to describe Ibn Khaldun as a major antecedent rather than the sole originator of the idea. Reducing Ibn Khaldun to the Laffer Curve would nevertheless diminish his contribution. His argument was not merely that tax cuts

By Ali Hiader A certain segment in Pakistan has been gaining momentum in arguing that had dictator General Pervez Musharraf—like Imran Khan—said “Absolutely Not” to Washington, Pakistan might have been spared the scourge of terrorism and the subsequent economic hardships. However, such an argument attempts to view the decision made in 2001 through the lens of circumstances that emerged years later. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shook the United States and sent shockwaves through the global order; approximately 3,000 people lost their lives, and institutions regarded globally as symbols of American economic and military might were targeted. These attacks challenged the security of the world’s sole superpower and generated intense public pressure on the President George W. Bush’s administration to take retaliatory action. For the United States, inaction had become politically almost impossible. Responsibility for these attacks was attributed to Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden—a Saudi national who was living in Afghanistan under Taliban protection. Initially, Bin Laden denied responsibility for the attacks, but his later statements increasingly portrayed as a retaliatory response to American policies. Regardless of how these statements were interpreted politically, by the end of 2001, it was clear to Washington that Al-Qaeda was the primary enemy and that Afghanistan was the hub of its operations. This context holds particular significance for Pakistan because the Taliban government was harboring Osama bin Laden. Pakistan was not merely a distant spectator to this crisis; it shared a long border with Afghanistan and had spent two decades during the Cold War establishing an extensive political and intelligence network there. Consequently, the United States had no better option than Pakistan. Therefore, the fundamental question is: Did Pakistan truly have the option to simply say “absolutely not,” instead of joining the American war? Pakistan was already grappling with severe economic and diplomatic vulnerabilities during the post-9/11 crisis, as the United States and other Western nations had imposed harsh economic sanctions following the 1998 nuclear tests. These sanctions slowed the pace of development, hampered foreign investment, and strained relations with global financial institutions, leaving the country already burdened by heavy debt. The situation became further complicated when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in October 1999, overthrowing an elected government. The military coup added fuel to the fire, further damaging Pakistan’s global reputation and leaving the country diplomatically weakened at a time when it needed international support the most. Following the September 11 attacks, Washington made its expectations absolutely clear. According to Musharraf’s own account, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage delivered a stern message to Pakistan: it had to stand either with the United States or against it. Another remark widely attributed to the US position was that if Pakistan refused to cooperate, it could be sent “back to the Stone Age.” Although the exact wording of that phrase was never officially substantiated, the intensity of US pressure was undeniable. Did the United States have the capability to inflict devastating damage on Pakistan, despite Pakistan being a nuclear power? The answer to this is “yes.” Pakistan’s nuclear capability was primarily developed to deter India. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal provided Islamabad with a strategic deterrent against its key regional rival, but this did not mean Pakistan was immune to American economic, diplomatic, or technological pressure. Pakistan lacked the long-range military capabilities to directly strike the U.S. mainland—located 7,000 miles away—whereas the United States held an overwhelming advantage in air power, naval strength, intelligence, technology, financial resources, and global diplomatic influence. Therefore, nuclear weapons were not synonymous with strategic parity with the United States. Pakistan could deter certain types of aggression from India, but realistically, it lacked the capability to inflict the same level of damage upon the United States. Another major reason for Pakistan’s importance to the United States was the intelligence network present in Afghanistan. During the Cold War, Pakistan was one of the United States’ key regional partners in supporting the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation. Pakistani intelligence agencies established extensive networks among Afghan groups, while the United States and Saudi Arabia provided arms and financial support for the resistance. Pakistan served as a crucial conduit for channeling this aid to the Afghan resistance. This historical relationship gave the United States a unique strategic advantage after 9/11. Pakistan possessed a combination of geography, intelligence networks, logistical routes, and institutional experience—assets that would have been extremely difficult to replace. Its cooperation could significantly facilitate U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Consequently, Islamabad chose the path it deemed relatively less damaging. Pakistan provided assistance through logistical support, access to airspace and facilities, intelligence cooperation, and other means, but did not directly join the war; in return for this strategic support, US sanctions were eased, economic aid increased, and Pakistan regained special diplomatic significance in Washington. This does not mean that the decision was without negative consequences. Pakistan itself became a major target of terrorism, resulting in the deaths of nearly 70,000 civilian and military personnels and economic losses of approximately $150 billion; Pakistan paid a very heavy price for this war. Furthermore, the repercussions of the strategic policies adopted during the 1980s and 1990s later manifested as problems for Pakistan—issues that perhaps could not have been fully foreseen in 2001. However, there is an important distinction here: criticizing the consequences of a decision and claiming that a different realistic course of action existed at the time are two separate things. A major irony of the Afghan war is that U.S. officials and analysts have repeatedly cited Pakistan as one of the primary reason for the failure to achieve American objectives in Afghanistan. When the question arises as to why the world’s most powerful military failed to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan, the answer is sometimes given in a single word: Pakistan. This should not necessarily be viewed as a badge of honor; rather, it reflects a complex relationship in which Washington needed Pakistan yet lacked trust in it, while simultaneously accusing certain Pakistani elements of supporting forces that were undermining