The Transferability Paradox: Skills, Borders and t…

We often speak of professional skills as though they were assets that can be packed into a suitcase and carried effortlessly across borders. In reality, skills do not all travel in the same way. A computer language remains a computer language whether one works in Pakistan, Singapore, the United Kingdom or the United States. Engineering principles, mathematics, manufacturing techniques and many scientific disciplines retain much of their relevance regardless of geography. The environment may change, but the fundamental language of the profession remains largely intact.

The situation becomes more complicated with professions that operate within national regulatory and institutional frameworks. Accounting principles may be broadly understood internationally, but taxation, reporting requirements and corporate regulations can differ substantially between jurisdictions. The same is true of law and medicine. A lawyer who has spent decades mastering one country’s legal system cannot simply assume that the same statutes, procedures and precedents apply elsewhere. A doctor may possess years of clinical experience yet still be required to pass examinations and satisfy licensing requirements before being permitted to practise in another country. The knowledge has not disappeared. What has changed is the framework within which that knowledge is recognised and allowed to operate.

This distinction is important because we sometimes confuse the transferability of skills with the transferability of credentials. They are not the same thing. A seasoned CFO does not forget how to evaluate risk, allocate capital, establish financial controls or understand a balance sheet upon crossing an international border. A doctor does not lose diagnostic ability at immigration, nor does a lawyer suddenly lose the capacity for legal reasoning. Yet the receiving country’s institutions may place conditions on recognising those abilities. What is being restricted is often not the skill itself, but the right, opportunity or credibility required to exercise it.

For C suite professionals, however, there is another layer to the problem. As people rise through organisations, their professional value increasingly consists of much more than technical competence. Over twenty or thirty years, an executive accumulates reputation, relationships, cultural understanding, institutional knowledge and credibility. He or she learns how decisions are actually made, which relationships matter, how regulators think, how capital moves and how to navigate the unwritten rules of a particular business environment. This social and institutional capital can become as important as the technical skills that originally built the career.

Crossing a border can dramatically alter the value of that accumulated capital. A CEO, CFO or senior executive who is well known and respected in one country may arrive in another market where few people recognise the organisations he or she worked for, understand the scale of previous responsibilities or appreciate the complexity of the environment in which those responsibilities were exercised. The person has not become less capable, but the ecosystem that validated that capability has been left behind.

This is perhaps one of the least discussed dilemmas of international mobility at senior levels. The higher one climbs within a particular ecosystem, the more deeply one’s professional identity may become connected with that ecosystem. A young engineer may be assessed largely on technical competence and therefore move relatively easily between markets. A senior executive is assessed on a much broader collection of attributes, many of which are difficult to demonstrate on a CV. Reputation, networks, judgement and influence cannot always be exported as easily as qualifications.

Then there is the uncomfortable issue of regional bias. Professional experience is not always evaluated purely on merit. Employers and institutions can consciously or unconsciously attach different values to experience depending on where it was acquired. A senior position in one part of the world may not automatically be regarded as equivalent to a similar position in another. Accent, nationality, familiarity with local business culture and perceptions about the sophistication of the previous market can all affect how a professional is judged. Regulation can create a formal wall, while perception can create an invisible one.

Perhaps professional capital should therefore be thought of in three forms. There is skill capital, meaning what a person actually knows and can do. There is credential capital, meaning what institutions formally recognise or permit that person to do. Finally, there is social capital, meaning the network of people and institutions that know, trust and are prepared to place responsibility in that person’s hands. Skill capital can often travel. Credential capital may require rebuilding. Social capital can sometimes have to be recreated almost from the beginning.

This brings me to the question that I find much harder to answer. If a country’s most capable professionals conclude that their talents will produce greater opportunities elsewhere, should they leave? Or should they remain and use their abilities, experience and influence to improve the environment that is encouraging them to leave in the first place?

There is an obvious argument for mobility. A professional has a responsibility to his or her own life and family and cannot reasonably be expected to sacrifice decades waiting for institutions to improve. Talent naturally seeks environments where it can grow, where merit is recognised and where opportunities allow ability to compound. If those conditions exist elsewhere, moving may be entirely rational.

Yet there is an equally uncomfortable consequence. When capable professionals, entrepreneurs, academics and executives continually leave weaker institutional environments for stronger ones, the countries they leave behind lose precisely the human capital that might have helped strengthen those institutions. Weak systems cause talent to leave, and the departure of talent can make those systems even harder to improve.

We then arrive at something resembling the old question of the chicken and the egg. Do strong institutions create successful people, or do successful people create strong institutions? Do countries first need better systems to retain talent, or must talented people remain long enough to build those systems? If everyone waits for the environment to improve before contributing to it, who creates the improvement? But if individuals spend their lives fighting systems that are resistant to change, what happens to their own potential?

Perhaps the choice is not as binary as it initially appears. Leaving one’s country does not necessarily mean abandoning it. Professionals can move abroad, acquire knowledge, capital, networks and exposure to stronger institutions, and later transmit some of those advantages back through investment, mentoring, entrepreneurship, professional collaboration or eventually returning home. History offers many examples of countries benefiting not only from the people who stayed, but also from those who left, learned elsewhere and remained connected.

There is also a linguistic irony hidden inside the question. Should I change my country, meaning contribute towards transforming the place where I was born, or should I change my country, meaning move somewhere else? The words are identical. The consequences could hardly be more different.

Perhaps neither choice is inherently courageous or selfish. Staying does not automatically make someone a nation builder, just as leaving does not automatically make someone disloyal. Much depends on what a person is capable of accomplishing from either position. Sometimes staying may provide the influence required to create change. Sometimes leaving may provide the knowledge, independence and resources that eventually make a greater contribution possible.

So perhaps the question I should be asking is not whether one person can single handedly change the fate of a country. That may place an impossible burden on any individual. A more useful question might be: Where can my abilities compound most effectively, and from that position, what can I realistically change for myself, my family, my profession and perhaps eventually my country?

I am still looking for the answer. Perhaps there is no universal one. Every professional, particularly those who have spent decades building careers within a particular institutional environment, will calculate the equation differently. But as skills, capital and people become increasingly mobile while recognition, regulation and belonging remain stubbornly local, it is a dilemma that more senior professionals will eventually have to confront.

And perhaps that is why the chicken and the egg are still arguing.

 

Syed Muhammad Ijaz, FCA (ICAP), ACA (ICAEW), LL.B., is a distinguished financial and legal expert with a comprehensive educational background and over 25 years of professional excellence. A Fellow Chartered Accountant (ICAP) and Advocate of the High Court, Ijaz also holds the ACA designation from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) and an LL.B. degree, enhancing his multifaceted expertise in finance, tax, and corporate laws.

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Statements by political actors—including repeated interventions by Maulana Fazlur Rehman on constitutional and provincial questions—must be evaluated through the prism of constitutionalism rather than political confrontation. Democratic disagreement is legitimate, but constitutional discourse should unite rather than inflame an already polarised polity. The Constitution provides lawful mechanisms for reform. Political mobilisation should reinforce those mechanisms, not substitute for them.

  • Nawaz Sharif’s political revival has begun — a…

    In my view, Nawaz Sharif’s political revival is no longer just a possibility; it is clearly taking shape. His decision to return to the political frontline and personally lead the Pakistan Muslim League (N)’s campaign in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shows a leader who understands timing, patience and political strategy. The massive rallies in Muzaffarabad and Mirpur were not just election gatherings; they carried a much bigger political message. They demonstrated, in my opinion, that Nawaz Sharif still has the ability to attract large crowds and energise his supporters. For many party workers and voters who had been missing his direct presence, his return to the campaign stage created renewed confidence and enthusiasm. At the same time, these rallies sent a strong message to his political opponents and to those analysts who had predicted that Nawaz Sharif had retired from active politics. His presence on the ground has challenged that narrative and shown that he remains a central figure in Pakistan’s political landscape. During my last two meetings with Nawaz Sharif — one in the Galyat hills near Murree and another at Jati Umra, Raiwind — I observed a leader who appeared to be carefully planning his political revival. My impression was that he was not looking for a short-term political comeback but working on a long-term strategy. I have seen this before — not once, but twice. The first time was in 2006, when Nawaz Sharif came to London after leaving Saudi Arabia following his years in exile. I observed how he patiently rebuilt his political network, reconnected with party workers and gradually prepared the ground for his return to Pakistan’s political arena. The second time was before the 2024 general elections. During the more than three years he spent in London, I saw a similar approach — careful planning, political consultations and a gradual strategy to return at the right moment. In my opinion, the current phase follows the same pattern. Nawaz Sharif has relied on a team approach. At the centre, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has focused on managing difficult economic, diplomatic and political challenges. His supporters believe his administration has helped improve Pakistan’s international engagement and presented the country as an important voice on global issues. On the other hand, Maryam Nawaz Sharif has emerged as a key part of this political strategy. As Chief Minister of Punjab, she has focused on development projects, infrastructure, public service delivery and administrative reforms. In my view, her performance has helped create the perception of a new generation of leadership within the PML-N. Punjab has, in my assessment, become an important example of the party’s governance message — that provinces can deliver through development, better infrastructure, improved administration and stronger public services. Nawaz Sharif’s political strength is also linked to his record as Prime Minister. His supporters highlight his focus on infrastructure development, including motorways, energy projects and large-scale national schemes. They argue that during his governments Pakistan moved towards economic stability, with greater emphasis on investment, connectivity and development. While political opinions about his governments differ, there is no doubt that Nawaz Sharif remains one of Pakistan’s most experienced political figures. With decades of experience in public life, he is among the most senior leaders in the region and has maintained relationships with world leaders. His experience in governance, diplomacy and international affairs remains one of his biggest political assets. Today, in my view, Nawaz Sharif is attempting another carefully planned political comeback. His direct involvement in the Azad Kashmir election campaign suggests that he is once again taking command of the political direction of his party. I believe his strategy is working because he is repeating a formula he has used before: patience, organisation, strengthening his team and returning to the people when he believes the political environment is favourable. History will ultimately be judged by the voters, but from my observations over the past two decades, Nawaz Sharif’s political revival appears to be following a familiar and carefully planned path.

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