Nelson Mandela: The Statesman Who Transformed the …

By Qashf Aizdi Justice delayed is justice denied. This phrase has become almost cliché in Pakistan and it unfortunately remains painfully true for millions of litigants who are waiting for their day in court. Every year hundreds of new cases are filed while thousands remain undecided and as a result courtrooms continue to grow more congested and hearings become more infrequent. The unfortunate consequence is that justice moves further out of reach. Time is perhaps the only thing Pakistan’s justice system can no longer afford to lose. The scale of the crisis is reflected in the numbers. According to the Judicial Statistics of Pakistan 2023, more than 2.25 million cases remain pending before courts of Pakistan. During the same year, 4.48 million new cases were instituted while 4.41 million were disposed of, resulting in a 5 percent increase in the overall backlog. The district judiciary alone accounts for 82 percent of all pending cases. With just over 3,100 working judges and judicial officers, each is responsible for more than 700 pending cases, even before accounting for the thousands of new cases filed every year. These figures do not suggest that Pakistan’s judges are idle; rather, they point to a justice system struggling to keep pace with an ever-growing caseload. Civil disputes in Pakistan can often take 10 to 15 years and in some instances even longer, before reaching its conclusion. Court proceedings are routinely delayed by repeated adjournments, cumbersome procedures, paper-based case management and multiple tiers of appeal. Difficulties in serving notices, delays in recording evidence and frequent adjournment requests often leave litigants waiting months before their cases are heard again. Additionally, the consequences of delayed justice extend beyond the courtroom. By the time a case is finally decided, litigants find themselves in a morass of mounting legal costs, lost opportunities and prolonged uncertainty. Every adjournment adds to the financial and emotional burden borne by litigants. A favorable judgment delivered after years of litigation can never fully restore the time, financial stability or peace of mind that has already been obliterated. Article 37(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan obliges the State to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. Yet, for many litigants, this constitutional promise often rings hollow. As mounting caseloads continue to overwhelm the judiciary, lengthy delays have become an accepted and vexatious feature of the legal system rather than an exception. Justice that arrives years too late often fails to provide meaningful relief. The immediate explanation is ostensibly straightforward; the number of judges is insufficient to handle the growing caseload. Pakistan has one of the lowest judge-to-population ratios in the region, leaving judges responsible for hundreds and often thousands of matters. Yet the shortage of judges tells only part of the story. Addressing this crisis requires more than appointing additional judges; it demands a more comprehensive approach to resolving disputes. One such reform lies in the greater use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Cases can be resolved out of court using processes like mediation and arbitration, whereby judges can focus on cases which require formal adjudication. Consequently, ADR works in conjunction with the courts in solving disputes outside of court. The potential of ADR is perhaps best illustrated by the Morgah Valley dispute. Despite taking over 42 years to be settled via litigation, the same case took only two months to settle after being referred to mediation. Though not all disputes are suitable for mediation, this case is an example of the value that comes with the application of ADR at the right time. More importantly, it shows that timely justice is not an impossible ideal but an achievable one when the right mechanisms are used. However, for countless litigants, delay remains the norm as the judiciary continues to grapple with overwhelming caseloads. Repeated adjournments leave litigants facing prolonged uncertainty and growing frustration. Cases pass from one generation to the next and some litigants never live to see the final outcome of disputes they initiated and fought for. Justice should not become an inheritance passed from parents to children. The longer that reform is postponed, the greater the cost to litigants, businesses and public confidence. Pakistan’s courts are running out of time and so are the people waiting for justice. If Pakistan is serious about fulfilling the constitutional vision embodied in Article 37(d) of the Constitution, reducing judicial delays can no longer remain an aspiration, it must become a national priority. Reforming the justice system will require efficient case management, greater use of appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms and a collective commitment to ensuring that justice is delivered when it is needed most. Until then, Pakistan’s courts will continue to run out of the one resource they cannot recover: time.  

The most pitiable creature I know is not the beggar who asks for bread but the gentleman who must borrow a personality. He dresses in another man’s taste, speaks in another man’s phrases and mistakes imitation for refinement. He is everywhere respectable and nowhere original. Nations occasionally acquire the same unfortunate habit. Their politics become echoes, their ideals reflections, and their revolutions little more than borrowed costumes. There was a time when borrowing was the necessity of poverty. We borrowed machines because we had no factories, medicines because we had no laboratories, and books because we had no presses. Such borrowing was neither shameful nor unusual; indeed, civilisation itself advances through exchange. The Greeks borrowed from Egypt, the Arabs preserved and enlarged the inheritance of Greece, Europe rediscovered Aristotle through Muslim Spain, and Japan modernised by learning from the West without surrendering its soul. Borrowing knowledge is the beginning of wisdom. Borrowing identity is the beginning of decline. There is another form of borrowing that no customs official can intercept and no tariff can discourage. It enters silently through the imagination. A society begins by borrowing opinions, then aspirations, then indignation. Before long, it borrows its heroes, its villains, its vocabulary and, eventually, its revolutions. It ceases to ask, “What does our history require?” and instead asks, “Whose history should we imitate?” That, I fear, is the predicament into which much of Pakistan’s public discourse has drifted. During the past several weeks, social media has been flooded with admiration for the recent political resistance witnessed across the border in India. Video clips have travelled faster than thoughtful analysis. Slogans have crossed the Wagah frontier with greater ease than ideas. Among countless young Pakistanis one question has become almost fashionable, Why can’t Pakistan have a movement like this? The question is understandable. It is also profoundly revealing. Hidden within it is an assumption that our political future must resemble somebody else’s present; that history unfolds according to a universal script; that every nation matures by repeating the experience of another. It is an assumption born not of confidence but of intellectual dependency. The tragedy, therefore, is not that Pakistanis admire another people’s courage. Every decent society can appreciate courage wherever it appears. The tragedy is that many have become convinced that courage itself must now be imported. We seem increasingly unable to recognise our own political inheritance unless it first receives foreign approval. This habit is hardly confined to politics. It has become the defining condition of our intellectual life. We borrow theories from European universities before examining our own social realities. We borrow ideological fashions from America before asking whether they illuminate Pakistani society. We borrow debates from social media and mistake them for scholarship. We consume outrage manufactured elsewhere and wear it as though it were tailored for our own circumstances. We have become, in the deepest sense of the phrase, tenants in the house of our own imagination. The irony is painful. No civilisation lacking confidence in itself has ever become creative. Creation begins where imitation ends. Shakespeare borrowed stories but produced Hamlet. Iqbal studied Nietzsche and Bergson yet remained unmistakably Iqbal. Muhammad Ali Jinnah mastered the constitutional traditions of Britain but transformed them into a political movement rooted in the aspirations of Indian Muslims. Great minds borrow raw material; they do not borrow finished identities. The same principle governs nations. Civilisations borrow in order to create. Declining societies borrow in order to imitate. Perhaps nowhere is this confusion more visible than in our understanding of resistance. Resistance has become one of the most romantic words in modern political vocabulary. It evokes images of heroic crowds, defiant slogans, dramatic confrontations and triumphant victories. Social media, with its appetite for spectacle, has transformed resistance into a global performance. Every protest becomes a cinematic narrative; every confrontation seeks an audience; every slogan aspires to immortality through a hashtag. But history is not written in hashtags. Nor are nations transformed by theatrical moments alone. The anthropologist Leila Abu-Lughod offered an important warning nearly three decades ago in her influential essay The Romance of Resistance. She argued that scholars often romanticise resistance as though every act of opposition were inherently emancipatory. Such a view, she suggested, ignores the complex relationships of power, culture and history within which resistance acquires meaning. Acts of dissent cannot be detached from the societies that produce them. They are rooted in particular institutions, historical memories and cultural conditions. Her insight deserves careful attention today. To ask why Pakistan does not produce resistance identical to India’s is rather like asking why the Indus refuses to flow like the Ganges. Rivers obey their own geography. Nations obey their own history. Every meaningful political movement is shaped by its unique historical circumstances. The French Revolution emerged from fiscal collapse and aristocratic privilege. The American Revolution arose from disputes over representation and imperial authority. South Africa’s democratic transition was forged in the struggle against apartheid. None of these experiences can simply be photocopied for another society. History does not distribute identical examinations to different nations. Each country answers its own questions. Yet we continue searching for borrowed answers. Perhaps this is because borrowed revolutions are emotionally satisfying. They spare us the difficult labour of self-examination. It is always easier to admire another nation’s struggle than to confront the unfinished responsibilities of our own. Admiration demands nothing. Citizenship demands everything. That distinction has become blurred in contemporary Pakistan. Our public imagination has fallen in love with the romance of beginning anew. Every few years another movement captures our attention. We invest it with almost mythical expectations. We hope it will accomplish what institutions, constitutions and patient political reform have failed to achieve. We long for redemption through spectacle. But mature nations are not built upon permanent excitement. They are built upon permanent institutions. Hannah Arendt observed in On Revolution that the enduring achievement of successful revolutions lies not in the destruction of an old order but in the establishment of a

By Misbah Naz   Democracy derives its legitimacy from the principle that political power belongs to the people. Every citizen, regardless of family background, wealth, or social status, should have an equal opportunity to participate in governance and compete for public office. Yet, across many democracies, political power often remains concentrated within a handful of influential families. This phenomenon, commonly known as dynastic politics, raises an important question: can democracy truly flourish when leadership becomes a family inheritance? Political dynasties are not unique to one country or region. They exist in established and emerging democracies alike. From South Asia to North America, prominent political families have shaped electoral politics for decades. While family members have every democratic right to contest elections, democracy suffers when political succession depends more on lineage than merit. One of the greatest strengths of democracy is political equality. Elections are intended to provide a level playing field where ideas, competence, and public service determine electoral success. Dynastic politics undermines this principle by granting inherited political advantages. Established family names often enjoy greater access to party leadership, campaign financing, media exposure, and political networks than ordinary citizens. Consequently, capable individuals without influential backgrounds frequently struggle to enter mainstream politics. Dynastic politics also weakens internal democracy within political parties. Instead of selecting candidates through transparent and competitive processes, leadership positions may be concentrated within a single family or close associates. This discourages talented young leaders, limits political innovation, and reduces accountability. Political parties become personality-driven rather than institution-driven, making leadership transitions more dependent on family succession than democratic competition. Another concern is the weakening of public trust. Citizens expect elected representatives to prioritize national interests over personal or family influence. When political office appears to be inherited across generations, many voters begin to question whether democratic institutions genuinely offer equal opportunities. Declining trust in political institutions can reduce electoral participation, increase political polarization, and create public frustration with democratic governance. Political dynasties may also influence policymaking. Long-standing political families often develop extensive patronage networks that reward loyal supporters through appointments, contracts, or political favors. Such systems can encourage nepotism and undermine merit-based governance. Public institutions function most effectively when appointments are based on competence rather than political loyalty or family connections. Young people are particularly affected by dynastic politics. Across many developing democracies, youth constitute a significant proportion of the population, yet they remain underrepresented in political leadership. When political pathways are dominated by established families, emerging leaders with innovative ideas face structural barriers to participation. This disconnect between political leadership and demographic realities limits democratic renewal and policy innovation. However, it is equally important to avoid oversimplification. Belonging to a political family does not automatically make an individual an ineffective leader. Democratic principles do not prohibit relatives of politicians from contesting elections. The fundamental issue is whether they compete under fair conditions and remain accountable to voters. If political success is achieved through transparent elections, strong institutions, and genuine public support, democratic legitimacy remains intact. Problems arise when inherited influence consistently outweighs merit and competition. Strengthening democracy therefore requires institutional reforms rather than targeting individuals. Political parties should adopt transparent candidate selection procedures, encourage internal elections, and provide opportunities for grassroots leadership. Independent election commissions, campaign finance regulations, and stronger parliamentary oversight can further reduce undue political concentration. Equally important is an informed electorate that evaluates candidates on integrity, competence, policy vision, and public service instead of family legacy alone. Democracy is sustained not merely by regular elections but by equal political opportunity. Societies flourish when leadership emerges through merit, accountability, and public confidence rather than inheritance. Political dynasties may continue to exist in democratic systems, but they should never become substitutes for democratic competition. Ultimately, the health of any democracy depends on whether every citizen—not just those born into influential families—has a genuine chance to lead.

Dr. Abdul Jabbar Sahito Karachi, Pakistan The debate over creating new provinces in Pakistan has existed for decades, yet one crucial question remains unanswered: how can the public be convinced that administrative provinces are intended to improve governance rather than increase the burden on the country? Today, public trust in the state is already fragile. People are frustrated by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and excessive government expenditure. Whenever the idea of creating new provinces is raised, many immediately assume that it will only produce more chief ministers, more governors, more provincial assemblies, more secretaries, chief secretaries, inspectors general (IGs), deputy inspectors general (DIGs), assistant commissioners, deputy commissioners, and an even larger bureaucracy. The public perception is straightforward: if corruption and inefficiency already exist with four provinces, what will happen if Pakistan has thirty-two or even thirty-six provinces? This concern must be addressed before any constitutional or administrative reform is proposed. The government should first present a clear governance model explaining exactly how these new provinces would function. People deserve to know whether these provinces will have provincial assemblies or whether they will operate through a compact administrative structure. Will each province be headed by a governor directly elected by the people? Will representation be limited according to population? These questions must be answered before asking the public for support. The objective of creating administrative provinces should never be to expand the bureaucracy. On the contrary, the government should explain that the existing administrative system can simply be reorganized. Unnecessary bureaucratic positions can be reduced, provincial cabinets can remain small, and major ministries can continue to operate under the federal government to avoid duplication. There should be only one chief executive for each province—either a governor or a chief minister, not both. Representation should remain limited and population-based instead of creating large provincial assemblies. The government must reassure the public that administrative reform will not increase financial burdens. Existing administrative and police structures can be reorganized instead of creating entirely new departments. A lean administrative structure is far more likely to gain public confidence than one that appears expensive and oversized. The purpose of administrative provinces is to bring governance closer to the people. Smaller administrative units can improve healthcare through new hospitals, strengthen education by establishing more schools and universities, expand road networks, and accelerate local infrastructure development. They can also encourage the emergence of new leadership, empower citizens to demand their rights, and make governments more responsive because they will be closer and more accountable to the people. Greater accountability should also become a central feature of this model. Institutions responsible for oversight, including NAB and other accountability bodies, would be able to monitor governance more effectively within smaller administrative units. Better administration can also attract greater investment, encourage industries and factories to expand, bring more businesses and brands into different regions, and create employment opportunities for local communities. The government should particularly engage the younger generation and begin this conversation in Sindh. It must make it absolutely clear that this proposal is not about creating provinces on ethnic or linguistic lines. It is not about separating Muhajirs from Sindhis or dividing communities. The proposal is purely administrative and aims to improve governance for every citizen. Instead of creating a province only for Karachi, every administrative division could become a province. Hyderabad, Nawabshah, Larkana, Mirpurkhas, Sukkur, Bahawalpur, and other divisions can each function as separate administrative provinces. If necessary, even the names of these provinces can be changed to prevent unnecessary political controversy. The purpose is not division—it is better administration. Such administrative provinces would encourage the establishment of more schools, universities, hospitals, IT parks, industries, factories, and businesses. They would provide young people with better educational opportunities, create employment, stimulate local economies, improve tax collection, strengthen infrastructure, support clean drinking water projects, facilitate the construction of dams, and promote environmental development through better local planning. However, none of these reforms can succeed unless the public fully understands the proposed governance structure. The government must organize seminars in universities, engage students and young professionals, and use the media to educate citizens about the objectives and practical benefits of administrative provinces. Public awareness must come before implementation. Ultimately, people will support administrative provinces only when they are convinced that the reforms are designed to create a government that is smaller, more efficient, more accountable, and closer to the people—not a larger bureaucracy with greater costs. Winning public trust is therefore the first and most essential step toward any successful administrative reform.  

The preceding parts of this series began with a simple question: why do technically sound economic and tax reforms repeatedly fail in Pakistan? The answer cannot be found in tax rates, revenue targets or administrative capacity alone. Pakistan’s fiscal failures arise from the constitutional and political order within which taxation, expenditure, borrowing and distribution take place.  The country does not merely have an inefficient tax system. It has a fiscal state whose incentives favour immediate extraction, selective enforcement, negotiated privilege and recurring external dependence. The previous part IX applied this framework to contemporary proposals for closing Pakistan’s tax gap. Empirical estimates of untaxed capacity, sectoral inequality and revenue potential are valuable.  Data tell us where disparities exist and what additional resources might theoretically be mobilised. However, data do not explain why those disparities have survived repeated reform efforts, nor why the same burdens continue to fall upon documented businesses, salaried persons and ordinary consumers. That explanation lies beyond public finance. Constitutional Political Economy (CPE) begins from the recognition that the state is not an abstract guardian automatically pursuing collective welfare. It consists of institutions and individuals responding to incentives, protecting authority, bargaining over resources and operating within formal and informal rules.  Fiscal outcomes reflect the distribution of political power as much as principles of efficiency or equity. Pakistan’s tax crisis is the fiscal expression of that political order. Revenue without a fiscal compact A sustainable tax system rests upon a fiscal compact between citizen and state. Citizens contribute according to lawful and reasonably distributed burdens. The state, in return, provides security, justice, education, healthcare, infrastructure, economic opportunity and protection against vulnerability.  Pakistan has progressively weakened both sides of that compact. The state demands more from those already visible while tolerating privileges for those capable of political resistance.  Citizens encounter taxes in electricity bills, fuel prices, banking transactions, telecommunications, imports, contracts and ordinary consumption. Much of this extraction occurs without determining their actual income or ability to pay. Public services remain inadequate and uneven. Taxpayers are then told that services cannot improve because revenue is insufficient. The state responds to the resulting mistrust with more withholding, surveillance and coercion.  This creates a destructive cycle: weak services reduce consent; declining consent increases reliance on coercive collection; coercion deepens mistrust; mistrust encourages informality; and informality becomes the justification for still more transaction-based taxation. A fiscal compact cannot be created through fear. Restoring income taxation The first requirement is to restore the meaning of income tax. Income taxation should ordinarily measure net income after legitimate costs and losses and impose liability according to capacity to pay. Pakistan has instead constructed a vast structure of advance, minimum, final, presumptive and withholding taxes imposed upon transactions, turnover and gross receipts. This structure is administratively convenient. It allows the state to collect through banks, employers, utilities, import authorities and private businesses without developing the institutional capacity to determine real income. Its convenience is precisely the problem. Withholding should remain where deduction at source is logically connected with the recipient’s income and operates as an adjustable advance—principally salaries, dividends and profit on debt. It should not function as a substitute for return-based taxation, proper assessment and intelligent audit. Turnover cannot permanently replace income. A business earning a narrow margin cannot justly be taxed in the same manner as one earning extraordinary profits merely because both record similar receipts. Minimum and presumptive regimes penalise investment, distort business structures and convert losses into taxable events. The objective should not be abolition of withholding overnight. It should be a legislated transition towards a system in which withholding becomes limited, adjustable and subordinate to final determination of income. A genuine value added tax The second requirement is restoration of sales tax as a genuine value added tax. Pakistan has retained the vocabulary of VAT while repeatedly breaking its chain through exemptions, special schedules, blocked credits, fixed regimes, multiple rates and arbitrary restrictions. The result is cascading, litigation, refund accumulation and a bias against documented production. A genuine VAT should apply through a broad and coherent base, a substantially lower standard rate and unrestricted adjustment of legitimate input tax.  Exemptions should be confined to carefully identified necessities and public-interest activities. Refunds should be treated as taxpayers’ money, not as an unofficial source of financing for the state. The constitutional division between sales tax on goods and services need not condemn businesses to fragmented administration. Harmonised definitions, a common return, integrated registration, shared information and an agreed clearing mechanism can preserve provincial taxing authority while reducing compliance costs. Coordination is essential. Re-centralisation is not. Pakistan’s federation was not designed solely for administrative convenience. Article 160 of the Constitution protects the distribution of specified revenues between the Federation and provinces, while Article 140A requires devolution of political, administrative and financial responsibility to elected local governments.  Fiscal reform must strengthen all three levels of constitutional government rather than treating provinces and local bodies as spending agencies dependent upon federal discretion.  Ending taxation through labels A constitutional fiscal order must also respect the actual nature of each levy. Parliament cannot convert a provincial tax into a federal tax merely by attaching a different label. Nor can the executive create a new taxable event through rules, notifications or administrative directions where the legislature has not imposed one. Article 77 requires federal taxation to rest upon parliamentary authority. Articles 4, 24 and 25 bring legality, protection against arbitrary deprivation and equality into the same constitutional inquiry. Legislative enactment is indispensable, but enactment alone does not validate a levy that exceeds legislative competence, discriminates irrationally or denies due process.  The annual Finance Act should not be used as a container for major structural changes receiving limited parliamentary examination. Essential elements of a tax—the subject, person liable, measure, rate and taxable event—must be stated clearly in primary legislation. Delegated legislation may implement the law. It cannot become an alternative legislature. Expenditure is the other side of taxation The debate over Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio often proceeds as though every additional rupee

By Dr. Shahzad Ali Gill There are two numbers Pakistan’s policymakers should learn to say in the same breath. The first is USD 100 billion, which the Ministry of Maritime Affairs (MoMA) believes the blue economy could be worth every year if the country’s coastline, fisheries, shipping lanes and offshore basins were properly developed. The second is USD 5.8 bn, what a single badly handled investment agreement, in a mining project nowhere near the sea, once cost the national exchequer in an international arbitration award. Until we learn to think about these two numbers together, the first will remain a slogan and the second will remain a warning we keep failing to heed. Pakistan’s maritime endowment is not in question. The country has a coastline of 1,001 kilometres along Sindh and Balochistan, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 240,000 square kilometres, expanded by a further 50,000 square kilometres continental shelf claim that the United Nations approved back in 2015. And yet, by the MoMA’s own reckoning, the blue economy, shipping, fisheries, offshore energy, coastal tourism and the activity that clusters around them contribute barely 0.4 per cent to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or about USD 1bn a year. The same ministry has set its sights on USD 100 bn annually through “Maritime@100”, a roadmap to reach that target by 2047, at a time when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) projects the global ocean economy will exceed USD 3 trillion by 2030. According to the 2026 report of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the ocean trade has already reached USD 2.5 tn in 2025. The gap between what Pakistan has and what it is leaving on the table is, by any measure, enormous. Closing that gap will not happen through speeches. It will happen, almost entirely, through two unglamorous legal instruments that include concession agreements and implementation agreements. A concession agreement grants a private party the right to finance, build, and operate a public asset – a port, most often – for a fixed term in exchange for tariffs or a share of revenue, with the asset reverting to the state once the term ends, a model commonly called build-operate-transfer or build-own-operate-transfer (BOT/BOOT). An implementation agreement works differently. It is a direct undertaking between the government and a project company, sitting alongside a commercial contract such as a power purchase agreement (PPA), through which the state offers sovereign guarantees, regulatory consents and tax assurances without handing over rights to any public asset. Every deep-sea port, LNG terminal, and offshore drilling concession Pakistan signs over the next two decades will be built on one or the other. That is precisely why getting their terms right matters the most. What Gwadar already taught us We do not need to imagine how this plays out; we have Gwadar. The original Gwadar Port Concession Agreement, signed in 2007 between the Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) and a foreign operator, Singapore Port Authority (SPA), and later transferred to the China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHC) in 2013, carried a 20-year corporate tax exemption and a government revenue share of 9% of port income plus 15% from the adjoining Special Economic Zone (SEZ). That should have been the ceiling. Instead, between 2015 and 2020, the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of the cabinet extended the income tax holiday to 23 years, widened it to cover contractors and sub-contractors as well, and granted the 923-hectare Gwadar Free Zone a land lease running up to 99 years. Each renegotiation made the deal more generous to the investor, never less. That is the pattern to watch for since the concessions in Pakistan rarely tighten once signed. They only ever loosen. This should trouble us more than it does, because Article 77 of the Constitution reserves the power to levy federal taxes exclusively for Parliament. Yet most of these concession-era tax holidays and customs exemptions are not legislated at all; they arrive through Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) and amendments to existing tax schedules, executive instruments that nonetheless bind the state for 20 to 40 years at a stretch. And Gwadar is not the exception; it is the template. The number of special economic zones (SEZs) has surged from seven to 44, under the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), carrying broadly similar concession packages. Every one of them represents a slice of fiscal sovereignty quietly signed away by the executive, on terms that no future Parliament will find easy to unwind. The warning we already received If Gwadar shows how concessions deepen, Reko Diq shows what happens when they collapse, and although it is a mining dispute, not a maritime one, the lesson is structural, not sectoral. After Balochistan denied a mining lease to the Tethyan Copper Company (TCC) in 2011 and the Supreme Court of Pakistan voided the underlying exploration agreement in 2013, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) ruled against Pakistan in 2019 under the Pakistan-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), awarding damages of roughly USD 5.8 bn, one of the largest sums in the history of ICSID. A separate dispute brought by the Turkish power producer Karkey under the Pakistan-Turkey BIT had already cost the country USD 760 million the year before. Both were eventually settled out of court. Reko Diq in 2022, with Barrick Gold taking a 50 per cent stake alongside federal state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the Balochistan government, each holding 25%, but the exposure that produced those numbers in the first place has not gone away. Every offshore exploration block, port concession, and LNG agreement Pakistan signs carries almost the same treaty protections and the same risk of ending up before the same arbitration tribunals. The other half of the bargain There is a second risk that rarely gets discussed alongside the first. The Foreign Exchange Manual issued by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1947, governs how the profits, dividends, and disinvestment proceeds promised under these agreements can actually leave the country.