can pakistan live

Can Pakistan live on a Borrowed Revolution?

The most pitiable creature I know is not the beggar who asks for bread but the gentleman who must borrow a personality. He dresses in another man’s taste, speaks in another man’s phrases and mistakes imitation for refinement. He is everywhere respectable and nowhere original. Nations occasionally acquire the same unfortunate habit. Their politics become echoes, their ideals reflections, and their revolutions little more than borrowed costumes.

There was a time when borrowing was the necessity of poverty. We borrowed machines because we had no factories, medicines because we had no laboratories, and books because we had no presses. Such borrowing was neither shameful nor unusual; indeed, civilisation itself advances through exchange. The Greeks borrowed from Egypt, the Arabs preserved and enlarged the inheritance of Greece, Europe rediscovered Aristotle through Muslim Spain, and Japan modernised by learning from the West without surrendering its soul. Borrowing knowledge is the beginning of wisdom.

Borrowing identity is the beginning of decline.

There is another form of borrowing that no customs official can intercept and no tariff can discourage. It enters silently through the imagination. A society begins by borrowing opinions, then aspirations, then indignation. Before long, it borrows its heroes, its villains, its vocabulary and, eventually, its revolutions. It ceases to ask, “What does our history require?” and instead asks, “Whose history should we imitate?”

That, I fear, is the predicament into which much of Pakistan’s public discourse has drifted.

During the past several weeks, social media has been flooded with admiration for the recent political resistance witnessed across the border in India. Video clips have travelled faster than thoughtful analysis. Slogans have crossed the Wagah frontier with greater ease than ideas. Among countless young Pakistanis one question has become almost fashionable, Why can’t Pakistan have a movement like this?

The question is understandable.

It is also profoundly revealing.

Hidden within it is an assumption that our political future must resemble somebody else’s present; that history unfolds according to a universal script; that every nation matures by repeating the experience of another. It is an assumption born not of confidence but of intellectual dependency.

The tragedy, therefore, is not that Pakistanis admire another people’s courage. Every decent society can appreciate courage wherever it appears. The tragedy is that many have become convinced that courage itself must now be imported.

We seem increasingly unable to recognise our own political inheritance unless it first receives foreign approval.

This habit is hardly confined to politics. It has become the defining condition of our intellectual life. We borrow theories from European universities before examining our own social realities. We borrow ideological fashions from America before asking whether they illuminate Pakistani society. We borrow debates from social media and mistake them for scholarship. We consume outrage manufactured elsewhere and wear it as though it were tailored for our own circumstances.

We have become, in the deepest sense of the phrase, tenants in the house of our own imagination.

The irony is painful.

No civilisation lacking confidence in itself has ever become creative. Creation begins where imitation ends. Shakespeare borrowed stories but produced Hamlet. Iqbal studied Nietzsche and Bergson yet remained unmistakably Iqbal. Muhammad Ali Jinnah mastered the constitutional traditions of Britain but transformed them into a political movement rooted in the aspirations of Indian Muslims. Great minds borrow raw material; they do not borrow finished identities.

The same principle governs nations.

Civilisations borrow in order to create.

Declining societies borrow in order to imitate.

Perhaps nowhere is this confusion more visible than in our understanding of resistance.

Resistance has become one of the most romantic words in modern political vocabulary. It evokes images of heroic crowds, defiant slogans, dramatic confrontations and triumphant victories. Social media, with its appetite for spectacle, has transformed resistance into a global performance. Every protest becomes a cinematic narrative; every confrontation seeks an audience; every slogan aspires to immortality through a hashtag.

But history is not written in hashtags.

Nor are nations transformed by theatrical moments alone.

The anthropologist Leila Abu-Lughod offered an important warning nearly three decades ago in her influential essay The Romance of Resistance. She argued that scholars often romanticise resistance as though every act of opposition were inherently emancipatory. Such a view, she suggested, ignores the complex relationships of power, culture and history within which resistance acquires meaning. Acts of dissent cannot be detached from the societies that produce them. They are rooted in particular institutions, historical memories and cultural conditions.

Her insight deserves careful attention today.

To ask why Pakistan does not produce resistance identical to India’s is rather like asking why the Indus refuses to flow like the Ganges. Rivers obey their own geography. Nations obey their own history.

Every meaningful political movement is shaped by its unique historical circumstances. The French Revolution emerged from fiscal collapse and aristocratic privilege. The American Revolution arose from disputes over representation and imperial authority. South Africa’s democratic transition was forged in the struggle against apartheid. None of these experiences can simply be photocopied for another society.

History does not distribute identical examinations to different nations.

Each country answers its own questions.

Yet we continue searching for borrowed answers.

Perhaps this is because borrowed revolutions are emotionally satisfying. They spare us the difficult labour of self-examination. It is always easier to admire another nation’s struggle than to confront the unfinished responsibilities of our own. Admiration demands nothing. Citizenship demands everything.

That distinction has become blurred in contemporary Pakistan.

Our public imagination has fallen in love with the romance of beginning anew. Every few years another movement captures our attention. We invest it with almost mythical expectations. We hope it will accomplish what institutions, constitutions and patient political reform have failed to achieve. We long for redemption through spectacle.

But mature nations are not built upon permanent excitement.

They are built upon permanent institutions.

Hannah Arendt observed in On Revolution that the enduring achievement of successful revolutions lies not in the destruction of an old order but in the establishment of a durable constitutional one. The measure of a revolution is therefore not the noise it creates but the institutions it leaves behind.

Measured by that standard, Pakistan’s history appears very different from the one commonly narrated on social media.

For Pakistan is not a nation deprived of revolutions.

It is a nation afflicted by historical amnesia.

We remember the slogans of others while forgetting the constitutional milestones of our own. We celebrate borrowed heroes while neglecting those who transformed our own political landscape. We behave like the heir to a great library who spends his days borrowing books from neighbours because he has forgotten the shelves inside his own house.

The greatest crisis facing Pakistan today is therefore not political.

It is a crisis of memory.

And until a nation remembers what it has already achieved, it will forever search for its future in the borrowed dreams of others.

The French historian Ernest Renan remarked in his celebrated 1882 lecture, What Is a Nation?, that a nation is built as much upon “the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories” as upon the desire to live together in the future. Memory, in Renan’s formulation, is not antiquarian nostalgia; it is political capital. A society that forgets the struggles through which it became itself gradually loses confidence in the institutions those struggles produced.

Pakistan’s present mood invites precisely such reflection.

For several years, our public discourse has increasingly behaved as though history began yesterday. Every political crisis is treated as unprecedented, every protest as entirely novel, every generation as uniquely burdened. This historical short-sightedness is reinforced by digital media, whose memory seldom extends beyond the latest viral clip. What trends on a Monday is forgotten by Friday. Nations, however, cannot afford such amnesia. They are not sustained by algorithms but by accumulated memory.

Walter Benjamin, writing in his Theses on the Philosophy of History, warned against what he called a complacent understanding of history that merely celebrates one dramatic event after another while overlooking the deeper struggles embedded within them. Although Benjamin’s philosophical concerns were very different from Pakistan’s contemporary politics, his caution remains relevant. If we remember only spectacles and neglect institutions, we inherit excitement without wisdom.

This, perhaps, explains why Pakistanis increasingly ask why they cannot have another nation’s movement while seldom asking what became of the movements they themselves created.

The answer is uncomfortable.

Pakistan has never lacked revolutionary moments.

It has often lacked revolutionary memory.

Our first great transformation was the creation of Pakistan itself.

The Pakistan Movement was not a spontaneous uprising. It was among the twentieth century’s most remarkable constitutional and political mobilisations. Under Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s leadership, a constitutional lawyer rather than a military commander, a dispersed political aspiration was translated into a sovereign state. Negotiation, electoral politics, legal advocacy, public organisation and constitutional argument proved capable of altering the political geography of South Asia.

There is an important lesson in that history.

Not every revolution announces itself through barricades.

Some are accomplished through constitutional imagination.

To describe 1947 merely as independence is to understate its magnitude. It represented a profound reordering of political sovereignty, territorial authority and collective identity. It was, in every meaningful sense, a foundational political revolution.

Yet nations do not live indefinitely upon founding moments.

They must continually redefine the constitutional relationship between citizen and state.

Pakistan attempted precisely that in 1973.

The Constitution of 1973 remains one of the rare moments in our history when deeply divided political forces chose consensus over confrontation. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto provided the political leadership that made the constitutional process possible, but the document itself was not the property of a single party. It emerged through negotiation among government and opposition alike and was adopted unanimously by the National Assembly. That broad parliamentary consensus is precisely what gives the Constitution its enduring legitimacy.

Constitutions are among history’s least dramatic revolutions.

They unfold not upon battlefields but across committee tables, parliamentary debates and legal drafts. They rarely produce unforgettable photographs, yet they determine how power shall be acquired, exercised and restrained long after the crowds have dispersed.

Hannah Arendt argued that the distinctive achievement of the American Revolution lay less in the struggle against Britain than in the successful establishment of constitutional institutions capable of preserving political freedom. Whether or not one accepts her comparison with the French Revolution, her broader insight remains compelling—the highest purpose of a revolution is institution-building.

By that measure, the Constitution of 1973 deserves to be remembered not merely as a legal document but as one of Pakistan’s genuine revolutionary achievements.

Unfortunately, we have treated it less as a living covenant than as a ceremonial relic.

The pattern repeated itself a quarter of a century later in a different sphere.

In May 1998, Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests at Chagai. The event is often discussed exclusively in military or strategic terms, yet it also represented a profound transformation of Pakistan’s place within the regional balance of power. The intellectual origins of that programme stretched back decades. Following the trauma of 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made the strategic decision to pursue a nuclear capability. Over subsequent governments, hundreds of scientists, engineers, administrators and military planners contributed to that effort. Munir Ahmad Khan, Abdul Qadeer Khan and numerous less celebrated researchers became part of a long national enterprise. In 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ultimately took the decision to authorise the nuclear tests despite substantial international pressure and the prospect of economic sanctions.

History rarely belongs to individuals alone.

It belongs to generations.

To reduce Pakistan’s nuclear capability either to one political leader or to one scientist is to misunderstand how states accomplish strategic transformations. Chagai was the culmination of decades of institutional continuity across changing governments.

It altered not merely Pakistan’s military posture but its strategic identity.

That, too, was a revolution—quiet in preparation, decisive in consequence.

Yet once again we commemorated the event annually while neglecting the larger lesson it embodied that national achievements of enduring significance are seldom completed within a single government, a single movement or a single generation.

They require continuity.

Continuity, however, has never been Pakistan’s strongest political virtue.

It is precisely this absence of continuity that would soon provoke another constitutional struggle—one not for the creation of a new state or a new strategic capability, but for the restoration of constitutional order itself.

If the Constitution of 1973 demonstrated Pakistan’s capacity to create consensus, the Lawyers’ Movement reminded the nation that constitutions do not defend themselves. They survive only when citizens are willing to defend the principles they embody.

When Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was suspended in March 2007, few anticipated that the event would evolve into one of the most significant constitutional movements in Pakistan’s history. What began as a dispute over judicial independence gradually expanded into a broader national conversation about constitutionalism, the rule of law and the limits of executive authority.

History often surprises us by choosing unexpected protagonists.

In England, the struggle for constitutional liberty was shaped not only by kings but by parliamentarians and jurists. In the United States, lawyers occupied a disproportionate place among the architects of the republic. Pakistan, too, discovered that black coats could sometimes exercise greater moral influence than uniforms.

The Lawyers’ Movement was never the achievement of a single individual. It belonged to thousands of lawyers, bar associations, judges, journalists, students, political workers and ordinary citizens who sustained public pressure over many months. Among its most visible and articulate leaders was Aitzaz Ahsan, whose constitutional advocacy gave the movement intellectual coherence and national visibility. Yet its enduring significance lay precisely in its collective character. It demonstrated that constitutional politics could mobilise society without abandoning constitutional methods.

That distinction deserves emphasis.

Too often we equate resistance with disorder. The Lawyers’ Movement suggested another possibility of resistance in defence of institutions rather than resistance against institutions. It was not a rejection of constitutional order but a demand for its restoration.

The movement contributed to the democratic transition of 2008, but its constitutional legacy reached further. In 2010, Parliament enacted the Eighteenth Amendment, perhaps the most substantial constitutional reform since 1973. The amendment repealed many provisions introduced under military rule, restored significant parliamentary authority, strengthened provincial autonomy through the federal structure and reaffirmed the constitutional balance originally envisioned in 1973.

Once again, history resists simplistic narratives.

The Eighteenth Amendment was enacted under the Pakistan People’s Party government led by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, but its legitimacy rested upon something larger than partisan success. It was crafted through the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms under Senator Raza Rabbani and ultimately passed with overwhelming support across party lines. Government and opposition alike recognised that constitutional stability demanded political compromise.

Consensus, though less dramatic than confrontation, is often the higher form of statesmanship.

That is why I regard the Eighteenth Amendment not merely as legislation but as a constitutional revolution. It fundamentally redefined the distribution of power within the federation while reaffirming parliamentary democracy as the preferred framework of governance.

How curious, then, that these revolutions rarely appear in contemporary political conversations.

We speak endlessly about the revolution yet to come while remaining strangely indifferent to those already accomplished.

This selective memory reveals something deeper than historical ignorance.

It reveals a misunderstanding of revolution itself.

A revolution is not simply the moment when crowds occupy a street.

It is the moment when the relationship between citizens, institutions and power is permanently transformed.

Measured against that definition, Pakistan has experienced several revolutions within a single lifetime. The creation of the state transformed sovereignty. The Constitution transformed legitimacy. Nuclear deterrence transformed strategic equilibrium. The Lawyers’ Movement and the Eighteenth Amendment transformed constitutional politics.

The question, therefore, is not whether Pakistan has had revolutions.

The question is why Pakistan has failed to cultivate a culture that protects the fruits of those revolutions.

Edmund Burke’s reflections on the French Revolution remain instructive in this respect. Burke feared not reform itself but the destruction of institutions without regard for continuity. His argument has often been simplified into a defence of tradition, but its deeper insight concerns political inheritance. Institutions are accumulated achievements. They embody the experience, compromises and hard-earned wisdom of generations. To destroy them casually is easier than to rebuild them.

Pakistan’s recurring dilemma has not been an absence of transformative moments. It has been an inability to convert transformative moments into enduring political habits.

We are fascinated by beginnings.

We tire quickly of maintenance.

A constitution is celebrated on the day it is signed but neglected during the decades that follow. A democratic victory excites public imagination until routine governance replaces political drama. Strategic achievements inspire national pride until they become ordinary facts of statecraft. We inherit institutions as though they were permanent monuments, forgetting that institutions resemble gardens far more than statues. They survive only through continuous cultivation.

It is here that our obsession with borrowed revolutions becomes particularly dangerous.

Every new foreign movement appears exciting because it is still unfinished. Every domestic achievement appears ordinary because we already possess it. Novelty triumphs over memory. Spectacle triumphs over substance.

The ancient Greeks told of the River Lethe, whose waters caused souls to forget their past before beginning another existence. Modern societies have discovered a digital equivalent. Endless streams of information wash away historical memory with astonishing speed. Yesterday’s constitutional struggle disappears beneath today’s trending video. A generation raised upon permanent novelty begins to believe that nothing of significance occurred before its own lifetime.

A nation that drinks too deeply from Lethe eventually loses more than memory.

It loses perspective.

And a people without perspective soon become vulnerable to the oldest temptation in politics—the illusion that salvation always lies somewhere else.

That illusion is precisely what Pakistan must now overcome.

The temptation to borrow another nation’s destiny is not unique to Pakistan. History offers many examples of societies that mistook imitation for progress. Yet the nations that eventually flourished were seldom those that copied most faithfully; they were those that adapted most intelligently.

The Meiji leaders of Japan studied Europe with extraordinary diligence. Missions travelled across the continent, examining constitutions, universities, railways and industries. Yet Japan did not become a second Britain or a smaller Germany. It absorbed foreign knowledge while preserving a distinctly Japanese political and cultural identity. Likewise, post-war Germany rebuilt itself through democratic institutions borrowed in part from Western constitutional traditions, but it anchored those institutions within its own historical reckoning. South Korea embraced global markets without surrendering its language or civilisational confidence. The lesson is remarkably consistent that successful nations borrow techniques, not identities.

Pakistan must learn the same distinction.

Our predicament is not that we look outward. Every healthy civilisation does. The problem arises when looking outward becomes a substitute for looking inward. We have become more familiar with foreign political metaphors than with our own constitutional journey. We debate the revolutions of Paris, Moscow and Tehran with impressive confidence while remaining uncertain about the constitutional debates that shaped our own republic.

A nation that cannot narrate its own story will inevitably begin living inside someone else’s.

The Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges once observed that every writer creates his own precursors. Nations do something similar. They choose which memories to elevate and which to neglect. Through that choice they define the story they tell themselves about who they are.

Pakistan, unfortunately, has often narrated itself through crises rather than achievements.

Our textbooks devote far more attention to conflict than to institution-building. Public discourse celebrates personalities more readily than processes. We remember speeches more vividly than constitutions. We commemorate victories while overlooking the painstaking labour required to preserve them.

This imbalance has consequences.

Citizens begin to expect politics to consist entirely of extraordinary moments. Elections, legislation, judicial reform, local government, administrative competence and constitutional continuity appear dull by comparison. Yet these unglamorous routines are precisely what distinguish durable states from fragile ones.

Thomas Carlyle famously wrote that history is the biography of great men. Modern historians have rightly complicated that view. History is also the biography of institutions. Courts, universities, legislatures, civil services and constitutions possess histories of their own. They mature, weaken or recover according to how successive generations treat them.

The maturity of a nation, therefore, is measured less by its capacity to produce moments of outrage than by its capacity to preserve institutions after the outrage has subsided.

This is where Pakistan stands today.

Our challenge is no longer to prove that we can mobilise. We have repeatedly demonstrated that capacity. The challenge is to prove that we can institutionalise. Can we strengthen constitutional culture rather than merely invoke it? Can we value parliamentary deliberation even when it produces compromise instead of victory? Can we protect judicial independence without transforming judges into political symbols? Can we debate fiercely while accepting that political opponents remain constitutional participants rather than existential enemies?

These questions are less dramatic than revolutionary slogans.

They are also more important.

There is another transformation, however, that deserves attention.

Pakistan was created through an ideological movement. The demand for a separate homeland rested upon political ideas concerning representation, identity and constitutional safeguards. That ideological foundation remains an integral part of the country’s origin. Yet no nation remains frozen at the moment of its birth. As states mature, they inevitably discover deeper layers of historical belonging.

The territory that constitutes Pakistan today has witnessed the rise and fall of extraordinary civilisations. The cities of the Indus Valley flourished millennia before many of the world’s classical empires. Gandhara became a meeting place of Greek, Persian, Central Asian and South Asian traditions. Buddhist monasteries, Hindu kingdoms, Islamic sultanates, Sikh rule and the colonial period each left enduring marks upon the landscape. None of these histories diminishes Pakistan’s founding ideals. Rather, they enrich the civilisational inheritance available to its citizens.

Confident nations do not fear the complexity of their past.

They embrace it.

To acknowledge the antiquity of the Indus Valley or the cosmopolitan legacy of Gandhara is not to weaken Pakistan’s ideological foundations. It is to recognise that nations often stand upon several historical layers simultaneously. France is both the heir of Gaul and the French Revolution. Britain is both medieval and modern. Egypt belongs equally to the Pharaohs and the contemporary republic. Civilisations accumulate; they do not erase themselves.

Pakistan can draw strength from the ideals that inspired 1947 while also recognising the civilisational depth of the land on which the republic stands.

Such confidence carries practical implications.

A nation secure in its own history is less tempted by borrowed identities. It studies other societies without envying them. It welcomes ideas without surrendering judgment. It admires foreign achievements without questioning its own legitimacy.

That is the difference between imitation and confidence.

The former seeks approval.

The latter seeks understanding.

Perhaps this is the revolution that remains unfinished—not another upheaval in the streets, but a revolution in civic temperament. A revolution that prizes constitutional fidelity over constitutional convenience, institutional continuity over perpetual disruption, historical literacy over selective memory and national self-confidence over borrowed political theatre.

This revolution requires no barricades.

It requires classrooms that teach constitutional history honestly. Universities that cultivate original scholarship rather than fashionable repetition. Newspapers that reward thoughtful disagreement instead of manufactured outrage. Political parties that strengthen internal democracy. Citizens who recognise that constitutional government is sustained not by occasional heroism but by everyday responsibility.

Such work rarely becomes viral.

History, however, suggests that it is this quieter labour that ultimately endures.

There is an old story in Greek mythology about Janus, the god with two faces. One looked towards the past; the other towards the future. Neither face was sufficient by itself. A nation that looked only backwards would become imprisoned by nostalgia. A nation that looked only forwards would lose the wisdom that memory provides. Civilisation required both.

Pakistan today stands before a similar choice.

One path leads towards perpetual dissatisfaction—a politics permanently searching for the next movement, the next slogan, the next borrowed revolution that promises instant redemption. The other leads towards a quieter but more demanding destination of constitutional confidence, institutional maturity and historical self-knowledge.

The first path is emotionally gratifying.

The second is historically productive.

The temptation to romanticise revolution is understandable. Revolutions possess drama. They produce unforgettable images, stirring speeches and larger-than-life personalities. Constitutions, by contrast, appear tedious. Institutions rarely trend. Parliamentary committees seldom inspire poetry. Yet when the applause fades and the banners are folded away, it is constitutions—not slogans—that determine whether liberty survives.

This is precisely why Leila Abu-Lughod’s warning remains so valuable. Resistance should never be treated as a romantic abstraction detached from its social and historical context. To admire resistance without understanding the conditions that produced it is to mistake appearance for reality. Every nation must answer its own historical questions. There is no universal script for political maturity.

Pakistan’s question is not whether it can produce another movement.

History has already answered that.

The Pakistan Movement answered it.

The Constitution of 1973 answered it.

The strategic resolve demonstrated in 1998 answered it.

The Lawyers’ Movement and the constitutional reforms that followed answered it once more.

Our challenge is different.

Can we preserve what earlier generations struggled to build?

Can we improve institutions without destroying public trust in them?

Can we disagree without reducing politics to permanent warfare?

Can we cultivate citizens rather than merely spectators?

These questions may lack the excitement of revolutionary rhetoric, but they possess something far more valuable—the possibility of endurance.

The Irish statesman Edmund Burke wrote that society is a partnership between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are yet to be born. Whether one agrees with every aspect of Burke’s philosophy is beside the point. His central insight deserves careful reflection. Each generation inherits institutions that it did not create and bears responsibility for improving rather than squandering them. Constitutional government is not a gift received once and for all; it is a trust renewed by every generation.

That trust cannot survive upon borrowed memories.

Nor can it flourish upon borrowed grievances.

Least of all can it endure upon borrowed revolutions.

If Pakistan is to play a constructive role in South Asia and the wider world, it will not do so by becoming an imitation of another nation. Its contribution will arise from something more difficult and more original. It would demonstrate that a diverse federal republic can strengthen constitutional governance, deepen democratic culture, invest in knowledge, protect its strategic stability and pursue regional peace without abandoning its own historical identity.

Peace, after all, is not the absence of strength.

It is strength disciplined by wisdom.

A nation secure in itself does not require perpetual enemies to sustain its confidence. It does not measure its worth by the turbulence of its politics or the volume of its slogans. It draws confidence from institutions that function, laws that command respect, universities that produce knowledge, and citizens who understand both the privileges and obligations of freedom.

That is the revolution still awaiting completion.

Not a revolution against the state, but a revolution in the quality of the state.

Not a revolution against the Constitution, but a revolution in constitutional fidelity.

Not a revolution of borrowed passions, but one of original purpose.

We often ask what history will remember about our generation. Perhaps the better question is what our generation chooses to remember about its history. Memory is not merely an archive of the past; it is the compass of the future. A nation that forgets its own constitutional milestones will forever search for borrowed landmarks. A nation that neglects their own achievements will inevitably exaggerate those of others.

The most pitiable creature, then, remains the gentleman who borrows a personality. He may appear fashionable for a season, but he never discovers who he is. Nations are no different. They may borrow technology, learn from foreign institutions and exchange ideas across continents. Indeed, they should. But they cannot borrow memory. They cannot borrow identity. They cannot borrow destiny.

Those must be earned.

Pakistan’s future will not be secured by living on borrowed existence. It will be secured by recovering the confidence to inhabit its own history, to improve its own institutions, to honour its own constitutional inheritance and to imagine its own future.

For only a nation that remembers itself can truly renew itself.

The writer is a PhD scholar in English Literature, a Lawyer, and an International Relations analyst.

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    Pakistan does not have a shortage of governments. It has a shortage of governance. The Constitution promises power to the people, but the money and the decisions stay in provincial capitals. A mother in Khuzdar waits for a hospital that Quetta forgot to fund. A father in Sahiwal sends his child to a school that Lahore never inspects. The distance between the citizen and the state is not measured in miles. It is measured in signatures, files, and political mood. The Constitution already knows this is wrong. Article 140A says every province must devolve power to elected local representatives. But that is all it says, a skeletal clause with no fixed tenure, no election deadline, and no guaranteed funding. It is a promise written in smoke. A single signature can dissolve a local government, elections can be postponed indefinitely, and local budgets can be reduced to zero overnight. When the rules are this fragile, governance becomes impossible. A mayor who can be fired by ordinance cannot sign a contract to build a road. A council that may not exist next year cannot hire a professional to run a hospital. A budget that arrives only if the provincial finance minister is in a good mood cannot pay for textbooks or vaccines. The fix is not complicated. Article 140A must be strengthened to include three guarantees. Every elected local government must serve a full five-year term, synchronized with the provincial assembly. It cannot be dissolved by ordinance or executive order. The only way to remove it is a two-thirds vote of the provincial assembly, a high threshold that ensures broad consensus. When tenure is secure, local leaders can plan beyond the next political season. Local elections must happen on the same day as provincial assembly polls. When you vote for your MPA, you vote for your local councilor on the same ballot. The mayor is then elected by those councilors. The only difference is that the election actually happens, on time, every five years, without delay or discretion. And a fixed percentage of provincial development funds must flow to districts through a transparent formula, population plus backwardness plus performance. The money moves automatically to the local government account. No approval required. No delay permitted. With these three guarantees in place, the district becomes what it was meant to be: the place where governance actually happens. A mayor with a real budget and real time can fix the sewer on your street because he needs your vote in five years. A council with secure tenure can hire an engineer to repair the school roof instead of waiting for a file to move through a provincial secretariat. A health budget that arrives automatically can keep a doctor at the rural clinic six days a week. This matters across thousands of union councils and hundreds of tehsil and municipal bodies that already exist under provincial local government acts, from the largest metropolitan corporations to the smallest town committees. Each one represents citizens who currently have a vote but no voice, a representative but no revenue. In districts where this works, where roads get built, schools get roofs, clinics get medicine, and the accounts are published, citizens will see something they have never seen before: a government that delivers because it is close enough to hear them and accountable enough to fear them. In districts where it fails, where the money disappears, the projects stall, and the accounts are blank, citizens will know exactly who failed, because the mayor’s name is on the ballot and the audit is on the website. This is how governance evolves in stable democracies. You empower the unit that already exists, let it prove its competence, and let the people decide what follows. If a district can educate its children, heal its sick, and pave its roads better than a distant capital can, the argument makes itself. Pakistan has spent decades concentrating power in a few hands and complaining about the results. Whether or not new provinces are created, the answer begins in the same place: with the districts that already exist. Let them prove what better governance looks like. Amend Article 140A. Give the district its money, its term, and its election. The people deserve better than promises that dissolve with a signature. They deserve a government that earns its authority by delivering results, starting where they live.

  • 276th Corps Commanders Conference highlights unifi…

    The 276th Corps Commanders’ Conference, chaired by Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, brought together the Pakistan Army’s senior corps commanders to deliberate on national security, sovereignty, and the country’s complex geopolitical environment. The conference commenced with a Fateha for the Shuhada of the Armed Forces, personnel of the Law Enforcement Agencies, and civilians who lost their lives in the fight against terrorism, reaffirming the significance of their sacrifices for Pakistan’s security, unity, and resilience. The commanders also paid tribute to the fallen heroes and their families, acknowledging their enduring contributions to the nation. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, serving as Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces, led the conference with a focus on national security and counterterrorism. His leadership has been appreciated by the military and the country’s political leadership, including the President and the Prime Minister, while also is a source of national pride. The conference highlighted ongoing efforts by the military leadership to strengthen Pakistan against internal and external threats and stated that these efforts have also received recognition from international leaders and diplomats for promoting regional diplomacy, peace, and stability, contributing to Pakistan’s international standing and diplomatic influence. A primary and dominating focus of the 276th Corps Commanders’ Conference was the comprehensive and exhaustive review of the country’s prevailing and evolving security environment. The forum expressed extremely serious and grave concerns over the continued and blatant use of territory that remains under the effective control of the Afghan Taliban regime. This territory, according to the military leadership, is being actively utilized by Indian-sponsored terrorist groups to orchestrate and launch attacks inside Pakistani territory. These groups, which include the notorious Fitna al Khawarij and the newly emerged Fitna al Hindustan, are allegedly being used as proxies to destabilize Pakistan. The commanders presented detailed intelligence briefings that outlined the specific routes, hideouts, and funding mechanisms being employed by these hostile elements. It was made unequivocally clear that lasting peace and sustainable stability in the entire South Asian region are contingent upon the immediate and effective prevention of the misuse of Afghan soil by these terrorist proxies. The conference affirmed with absolute clarity that the Afghan Taliban regime bears a direct, non-negotiable, and primary responsibility for ensuring that its territory is not used as a launchpad for attacks against its neighbors, particularly Pakistan. In a significant and indeed rare declaration that sent a strong message to the region, the forum reaffirmed Pakistan’s unequivocal and inherent right to defend its people against the menace of terrorism. The leadership announced that intelligence-based operations, commonly known as IBOs, would continue with even greater intensity and precision against these threats. Under the ambit of Operation Ghazab-lil-Haq, which is a comprehensive and aggressive counter-terrorism campaign, these operations will be meticulously planned and executed to target terrorist networks that are operating from Afghan territory. This signaled a clear and firm posture that Pakistan is prepared to take the fight to the enemy’s sanctuaries if diplomatic efforts and bilateral agreements continue to be violated with impunity. Beyond the realm of kinetic military operations and direct firefights, the conference underscored the absolutely critical importance of adopting a holistic, multi-dimensional, and comprehensive approach to the problem of counter-terrorism. The senior commanders stressed the immediate and pressing need for putting in place robust, transparent, and effective governance structures in the restive and formerly tribal areas of the country. These structures must be directed towards the rapid and efficient delivery of public services and the implementation of welfare initiatives. The objective is to win the hearts and minds of the local population, who have long been caught in the crossfire between the state and militant groups. The forum highlighted the urgent and indispensable need to dismantle the nefarious and symbiotic nexus that exists between terrorism and organized crime. This criminal-terrorist syndicate, they said, continues to thrive under the patronage of certain vested political interests and corrupt elements within the system. This acknowledgment is crucial because it recognizes the complex reality that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military means alone, no matter how effective they are. It requires effective governance, the speedy completion of socioeconomic development projects, the establishment of public confidence in the integrity of state institutions, and the provision of swift justice. The conference’s heavy emphasis on this integrated and multi-pronged strategy reflects a mature, sophisticated, and nuanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of modern conflict. It also highlights the military’s recognition that a purely kinetic approach is insufficient and that a comprehensive national response, involving all pillars of the state and society, is the only viable path to lasting peace and prosperity. The forum also took very careful and deliberate note of the rapidly evolving strategic landscape, particularly the increased and sophisticated reliance on externally supported hybrid warfare and disinformation campaigns. This was identified as a new and dangerous front in the ongoing conflict. Following what it described as Pakistan’s comprehensive and decisive defeat inflicted on the enemy in the Mark-e-Haq, which was a major military and ideological battle, hostile elements have been forced to shift their tactics. These adversarial actors are now attempting to destabilize Pakistan through more insidious means. These include the widespread propagation of false propaganda, the state-sponsored financing of local proxies and militant groups, the manipulation of social media to create ethnic and sectarian divides, and the persistent efforts to sow discord among the different segments of Pakistani society. The conference strongly condemned all such forms of state-supported financing, facilitation, or sponsorship of subversive proxies. It underscored that any attempts to use these hybrid means to create internal unrest and destabilize the country would be countered with strategic clarity, institutional resilience, and an unshakeable firm resolve. This robust and proactive stance against hybrid warfare demonstrates the military’s acute awareness of the non-traditional threats facing the nation. It also shows the military’s preparedness to counter them effectively using both defensive and offensive measures in the information and cyber domains. By publicly recognizing and clearly articulating

  • The Future of Provinces in Pakistan

    The debate over the creation of new administrative units and provinces in Pakistan has once again occupied the national discourse after Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi declared that the country’s existing governance system had “collapsed” and argued that governance must be brought closer to the people through new administrative units. His remarks have revived an issue that has periodically surfaced since independence but has rarely moved beyond political rhetoric. While some interpreted his statement as a call for creating additional provinces, others argued that he was advocating broader administrative restructuring. Regardless of terminology, the debate has exposed the structural weaknesses of Pakistan’s governance architecture and compelled policymakers, constitutional experts and political parties to revisit an important question: can Pakistan continue to be governed effectively under its existing administrative framework, or has demographic growth, urban expansion and governance complexity made institutional restructuring unavoidable?  Pakistan today is home to more than 250 million people, yet it continues to function primarily through four provinces established under historical rather than administrative considerations. At independence in 1947, the population and governance challenges were dramatically different. Since then, urbanisation, economic diversification, internal migration and increasing demands for public services have transformed governance requirements. Provincial capitals often remain geographically and administratively distant from citizens living in peripheral districts. Residents of South Punjab, Hazara, southern Balochistan, merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and interior Sindh frequently complain that decision-making remains concentrated in provincial capitals, resulting in unequal development, delayed service delivery and inadequate representation. Mohsin Naqvi’s argument rests on the proposition that governance has become excessively centralised and that citizens are compelled to travel long distances merely to access basic government services, courts and administrative offices. He further argued that countries with expanding populations have responded by creating additional administrative units rather than maintaining outdated structures. Whether one agrees with his assessment or not, his central observation deserves serious consideration because governance effectiveness is measured not by the size of government but by the accessibility, responsiveness and accountability of institutions.  The debate itself is not new. Successive governments have proposed South Punjab Province, Bahawalpur Province, Hazara Province and even administrative restructuring in Karachi and Balochistan. Parliamentary resolutions regarding South Punjab have previously been adopted, yet constitutional consensus has remained elusive. Political parties have often supported new provinces while in opposition but have shown considerably less enthusiasm after assuming power. Consequently, proposals have become election slogans rather than governance reforms.  Critics of creating new provinces argue that administrative fragmentation alone cannot solve governance failures. They point out that Pakistan’s primary problem is not necessarily the number of provinces but weak institutions, bureaucratic inefficiency, political interference, corruption and inconsistent implementation of laws. According to this perspective, multiplying provinces without institutional reform merely replicates existing inefficiencies across additional administrative boundaries. New provincial governments would require assemblies, governors, chief ministers, secretariats, police structures, judicial infrastructure and enormous recurring financial expenditures. Unless accompanied by governance reforms, decentralisation may simply increase administrative costs without improving public service delivery. Supporters, however, contend that administrative proximity improves governance outcomes. Comparative international experience demonstrates that countries such as India have periodically reorganised states to improve administrative efficiency and political representation. Smaller administrative jurisdictions often enable faster decision-making, improved monitoring, stronger accountability and more equitable distribution of development resources. Citizens generally experience better governance when government institutions are physically and administratively closer to them. These arguments have gained renewed attention following Naqvi’s intervention.  However, the current debate suffers from one significant omission. It largely ignores Pakistan’s weakest democratic institution: local government. Before creating additional provinces, policymakers must honestly evaluate why local governments have repeatedly failed. Pakistan has experimented with local government systems under different constitutional and political arrangements, yet these institutions have rarely been allowed to function independently and consistently. Elected local governments are frequently dissolved, elections are delayed and financial autonomy remains severely restricted. Provincial governments often resist devolving meaningful authority because local governments are perceived as political competitors rather than governance partners. This brings the issue of local body elections to the centre of the discussion. The Constitution envisions democratic decentralisation, yet local government elections have remained irregular across several provinces. In many cases, elected councils complete only partial terms or remain financially dependent upon provincial governments. Consequently, citizens seeking municipal services, sanitation, water supply, local roads, building regulation or community development frequently confront administrative paralysis. A country that struggles to sustain functioning local governments cannot realistically expect that merely creating additional provinces will automatically improve governance. The experience of Pakistan’s devolution reforms provides valuable lessons. The Local Government reforms introduced in the early 2000s attempted to decentralise authority by empowering districts and local councils. Although those reforms had weaknesses and generated political controversy, they demonstrated that bringing government closer to citizens can improve responsiveness when accompanied by fiscal authority, administrative autonomy and institutional accountability. Unfortunately, subsequent governments reversed or weakened many of these arrangements, resulting in repeated cycles of centralisation and decentralisation. Political reactions to Mohsin Naqvi’s proposal reflect Pakistan’s broader constitutional divisions. Some leaders have welcomed discussion on governance reform while supporting greater administrative decentralisation. Others have questioned both the timing and constitutional implications of the proposal, expressing concerns that restructuring provinces without broad political consensus could intensify ethnic, linguistic and regional sensitivities. There are also concerns that debates over provincial boundaries could distract attention from more immediate governance priorities, including economic recovery, inflation, institutional reforms and electoral credibility. The political diversity of these reactions demonstrates that constitutional restructuring cannot succeed through executive statements alone; it requires sustained parliamentary dialogue, provincial participation and national consensus.  The constitutional dimension cannot be overlooked. Creating new provinces requires constitutional amendments and political agreement among federal and provincial stakeholders. Such reforms inevitably involve questions relating to resource distribution, National Finance Commission allocations, Senate representation, civil service restructuring, judicial jurisdictions and provincial assets. Therefore, any attempt to redraw administrative boundaries without extensive consultation risks generating political instability rather than administrative efficiency. The opportunities nevertheless remain significant. Properly designed administrative restructuring could reduce regional disparities, improve public service delivery, enhance

  • Beyond Public Finance: Towards Constitutional Poli…

    The preceding parts of this series began with a simple question: why do technically sound economic and tax reforms repeatedly fail in Pakistan? The answer cannot be found in tax rates, revenue targets or administrative capacity alone. Pakistan’s fiscal failures arise from the constitutional and political order within which taxation, expenditure, borrowing and distribution take place.  The country does not merely have an inefficient tax system. It has a fiscal state whose incentives favour immediate extraction, selective enforcement, negotiated privilege and recurring external dependence. The previous part IX applied this framework to contemporary proposals for closing Pakistan’s tax gap. Empirical estimates of untaxed capacity, sectoral inequality and revenue potential are valuable.  Data tell us where disparities exist and what additional resources might theoretically be mobilised. However, data do not explain why those disparities have survived repeated reform efforts, nor why the same burdens continue to fall upon documented businesses, salaried persons and ordinary consumers. That explanation lies beyond public finance. Constitutional Political Economy (CPE) begins from the recognition that the state is not an abstract guardian automatically pursuing collective welfare. It consists of institutions and individuals responding to incentives, protecting authority, bargaining over resources and operating within formal and informal rules.  Fiscal outcomes reflect the distribution of political power as much as principles of efficiency or equity. Pakistan’s tax crisis is the fiscal expression of that political order. Revenue without a fiscal compact A sustainable tax system rests upon a fiscal compact between citizen and state. Citizens contribute according to lawful and reasonably distributed burdens. The state, in return, provides security, justice, education, healthcare, infrastructure, economic opportunity and protection against vulnerability.  Pakistan has progressively weakened both sides of that compact. The state demands more from those already visible while tolerating privileges for those capable of political resistance.  Citizens encounter taxes in electricity bills, fuel prices, banking transactions, telecommunications, imports, contracts and ordinary consumption. Much of this extraction occurs without determining their actual income or ability to pay. Public services remain inadequate and uneven. Taxpayers are then told that services cannot improve because revenue is insufficient. The state responds to the resulting mistrust with more withholding, surveillance and coercion.  This creates a destructive cycle: weak services reduce consent; declining consent increases reliance on coercive collection; coercion deepens mistrust; mistrust encourages informality; and informality becomes the justification for still more transaction-based taxation. A fiscal compact cannot be created through fear. Restoring income taxation The first requirement is to restore the meaning of income tax. Income taxation should ordinarily measure net income after legitimate costs and losses and impose liability according to capacity to pay. Pakistan has instead constructed a vast structure of advance, minimum, final, presumptive and withholding taxes imposed upon transactions, turnover and gross receipts. This structure is administratively convenient. It allows the state to collect through banks, employers, utilities, import authorities and private businesses without developing the institutional capacity to determine real income. Its convenience is precisely the problem. Withholding should remain where deduction at source is logically connected with the recipient’s income and operates as an adjustable advance—principally salaries, dividends and profit on debt. It should not function as a substitute for return-based taxation, proper assessment and intelligent audit. Turnover cannot permanently replace income. A business earning a narrow margin cannot justly be taxed in the same manner as one earning extraordinary profits merely because both record similar receipts. Minimum and presumptive regimes penalise investment, distort business structures and convert losses into taxable events. The objective should not be abolition of withholding overnight. It should be a legislated transition towards a system in which withholding becomes limited, adjustable and subordinate to final determination of income. A genuine value added tax The second requirement is restoration of sales tax as a genuine value added tax. Pakistan has retained the vocabulary of VAT while repeatedly breaking its chain through exemptions, special schedules, blocked credits, fixed regimes, multiple rates and arbitrary restrictions. The result is cascading, litigation, refund accumulation and a bias against documented production. A genuine VAT should apply through a broad and coherent base, a substantially lower standard rate and unrestricted adjustment of legitimate input tax.  Exemptions should be confined to carefully identified necessities and public-interest activities. Refunds should be treated as taxpayers’ money, not as an unofficial source of financing for the state. The constitutional division between sales tax on goods and services need not condemn businesses to fragmented administration. Harmonised definitions, a common return, integrated registration, shared information and an agreed clearing mechanism can preserve provincial taxing authority while reducing compliance costs. Coordination is essential. Re-centralisation is not. Pakistan’s federation was not designed solely for administrative convenience. Article 160 of the Constitution protects the distribution of specified revenues between the Federation and provinces, while Article 140A requires devolution of political, administrative and financial responsibility to elected local governments.  Fiscal reform must strengthen all three levels of constitutional government rather than treating provinces and local bodies as spending agencies dependent upon federal discretion.  Ending taxation through labels A constitutional fiscal order must also respect the actual nature of each levy. Parliament cannot convert a provincial tax into a federal tax merely by attaching a different label. Nor can the executive create a new taxable event through rules, notifications or administrative directions where the legislature has not imposed one. Article 77 requires federal taxation to rest upon parliamentary authority. Articles 4, 24 and 25 bring legality, protection against arbitrary deprivation and equality into the same constitutional inquiry. Legislative enactment is indispensable, but enactment alone does not validate a levy that exceeds legislative competence, discriminates irrationally or denies due process.  The annual Finance Act should not be used as a container for major structural changes receiving limited parliamentary examination. Essential elements of a tax—the subject, person liable, measure, rate and taxable event—must be stated clearly in primary legislation. Delegated legislation may implement the law. It cannot become an alternative legislature. Expenditure is the other side of taxation The debate over Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio often proceeds as though every additional rupee

  • The Crisis of Leadership and Fading National Prior…

    ​To diagnose the profound structural, intellectual, and economic stagnation gripping contemporary Pakistani society, one cannot analyze it merely through the lens of conventional lamentation or superficial moralizing. This pervasive crisis of the state and society is not the byproduct of a sudden natural calamity, but rather the logical culmination of a long-standing political economy where the unequal distribution of state resources, flawed policymaking mechanisms, and elite capture have systematically closed off all avenues for collective intellect. The devastating budget cuts inflicted on the social sector—specifically education, healthcare, and research institutions—under the relentless guise of International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout packages and structural adjustment have compounded this crisis. When foundational pillars of a state are subordinated to personal self-interest, temporary political loyalties, and non-productive extravagances instead of fostering a productive economy, a leadership crisis ceases to be an accidental anomaly and entrenches itself as a permanent, systemic reality. The roots of this historical tragedy undeniably lie in the colonial state apparatus engineered by the British Empire to secure its subjugation over this region; yet the tragic reality is that post-independence, the domestic elite simply stepped into the shoes of the white master, retaining this exploitative machinery intact while refining it to serve their own interests. ​A hard look at ground realities and economic indicators reveals a deeply alarming landscape. The state’s warped priorities are laid bare in the fact that the lion’s share of federal and provincial budgets is routinely swallowed by debt servicing, non-productive administrative and defense expenditures, and lavish exemptions for the privileged class. Conversely, human capital development—education, scientific research, and health—languishes at the very bottom of the national agenda, treated as an unwelcome afterthought. Data from the World Bank and UNESCO confirm that Pakistan allocates a mere 0.2 to 0.3 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to Research and Development (R&D), whereas dynamic economies like South Korea invest upwards of 4.8 percent and Israel surpasses 5 percent. This truncated, abysmally low allocation compared to regional peers is a damning indictment. When a nation’s educational budget is starved, and university leadership is appointed through political patronage, personal recommendations, and favoritism rather than merit, vision, and academic pedigree, the system ceases to radiate light, breeding instead sycophancy, boot-licking, and intellectual sterility. Such a decayed framework might churn out compliant manual laborers and clerical cogs for offices, but it will never produce a conscious citizen or independent critic courageous enough to question flawed state policies. ​The most agonizing casualty of this policy paralysis is the relentless brain drain—the systematic migration of our brightest minds abroad. Immigration bureaus and professional research data confirm that Pakistan’s finest intellects—top-tier engineers, specialized surgeons and physicians, global IT experts, scientists, and dedicated researchers—are abandoning their homeland in droves for Europe, North America, and the Gulf states. The state has never paused to calculate the immense national cost of educating and training a youth only to witness that capital, and the future it represents, vanish across borders. When policymakers trample over merit to appease political cronies, the meritocratic class finds itself fighting a losing battle for sheer survival. This is not mere emigration; it is the intellectual execution of an entire generation, sacrificed at the altar of incompetent governance. Nations like Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea reached a historic crossroads where they discarded empty political rhetoric in favor of rigid meritocracy, transparent governance, and rigorous education, whereas our polity cultivated a culture that treats politics as a lucrative enterprise and the state as spoils of war. The dividends of that mindset surround us today. ​Another compounding driver of this societal decline and intellectual regression is the entrenched feudal and imperial character of our state structure, which bars the common human and ordinary citizen from accessing basic constitutional and human rights. In a stratified society where the rule of law is selectively enforced against the weak while endless judicial backdoors remain open for the powerful, justice becomes an elusive mirage. The ordinary citizen must endure decades of legal labyrinths just to secure elementary justice, while the resource-hoarding elite exploit every legislative loophole to remain above the law. This glaring injustice has bred an overwhelming sense of alienation, systemic frustration, and moral decay. When the younger generation observes that honesty, hard work, and integrity hold zero currency in this system, and that influence, corruption, cronyism, and deception are the lone keys to advancement, the moral fabric of society shatters. This ethical erosion metastasizes into a national malignancy when state patronage actively paralyzes intellectual spaces and universities, stifling critical discourse and strangling freedom of thought. ​Escaping this deep quagmire and resolving the crisis of leadership requires courageous structural reforms. First and foremost, the state must fundamentally overhaul its national priorities, elevating scientific self-reliance, research autonomy, and intellectual sovereignty to the core of national security alongside physical defense. Pushing the cumulative budget for education, science, and research to a minimum of four percent of GDP without delay is non-negotiable if we harbor any genuine ambitions of building a knowledge economy. Second, purging public administration, the civil bureaucracy, and state enterprises of political interference while establishing the ironclad supremacy of merit is paramount to ensure decision-making is driven solely by professional capability. We must transition away from traditional public service delivery by handing policy formulation over to empowered task forces composed of domestic and international technocrats. Concurrently, genuine autonomy must be restored to the Higher Education Commission (HEC), backed by stringent constitutional safeguards against political appointments in academia. To stanch the bleeding of brain drain and transform it into a “brain gain,” the state must proactively craft an attractive, enabling ecosystem that leverages the capital and expertise of the overseas Pakistani diaspora through modern remote research initiatives. ​True, visionary leadership rises above the hollow temptation of cheap, temporary popularity to lay enduring foundations for generations unborn. Until those occupying our corridors of power step outside the narrow confines of personal, familial, and factional self-interest, and until society sheds emotional sloganeering in favor of scientific, logical, and critical inquiry, the vicious

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