new security architecture

A New Security Architecture’: Global Analysts As…

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye’s landmark defence agreement draws international attention; Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir play pivotal roles in historic strategic breakthrough

The landmark Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has triggered intense international interest, with analysts viewing the accord as a potentially significant development in the evolving security architecture of the Middle East and wider Muslim world.

Signed in Makkah by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the agreement establishes a collective-defence principle under which an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three.

The pact brings together three strategically important states with highly complementary capabilities: Saudi Arabia’s economic and energy weight, Türkiye’s powerful conventional military and expanding defence industry, and Pakistan’s extensive military experience and strategic deterrent.

The combination has prompted international analysts to examine whether the Makkah agreement could become the foundation of a more autonomous, regionally driven security framework.

Ishaq Dar: agreement is defensive, not directed against any country

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Senator Ishaq Dar has sought to clarify the scope and purpose of the agreement amid growing international interest.

Dar described the Makkah Accord as “purely defensive in nature” and “not targeted against any country”, stressing that its purpose is to strengthen collective security and promote peace and stability.

He said the agreement does not replace or undermine existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements maintained by the three countries with each other, other states or international organisations.

Under the accord, Dar explained, an external armed attack against any one of the three countries would be considered an attack against all, consistent with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Dar also said the framework remains open to other countries that share its principles and are prepared to resolve differences through mutual respect, cooperation and peaceful means.

His clarification is strategically important because it positions the Makkah framework as a mechanism of deterrence rather than confrontation, without identifying Iran, Israel or any other state as a permanent adversary.

Hakan Fidan compares mutual-defence provision with NATO Article 5

The most significant international description of the agreement’s collective-defence provision has come from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

Fidan said the provision is technically comparable to NATO’s Article 5, under which an attack against one member is treated as an attack against all.

The comparison does not mean that the Makkah framework has NATO’s integrated command structure or institutional architecture. The practical response to any attack would be determined according to the circumstances.

Fidan said a ministerial committee would be established and a general secretariat based in Saudi Arabia would oversee the framework, with further operational details to be developed.

He also indicated that Türkiye wants the framework to expand, identifying Egypt as a potential future member.

The prospect of expansion is potentially significant because it could transform a trilateral arrangement into a wider regional security mechanism.

OIC welcomes agreement as an ‘important strategic step’

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has welcomed the agreement, with Secretary General Hissein Brahim Taha expressing strong support and describing the pact as an “important strategic step” reflecting the commitment of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to strengthening cooperation.

The OIC response gives the agreement significance beyond the three signatories and places it within the wider context of cooperation among Muslim-majority countries.

The development comes at a time when several regional states are reassessing existing security arrangements and seeking greater strategic autonomy.

Saudi Arabia: strengthening security without abandoning existing partnerships

Riyadh has emphasised that the new defence framework does not replace its existing security arrangements.

Saudi Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy Rayed Krimly said the agreement does not supersede or replace existing bilateral or multilateral agreements involving the three countries.

The position reflects Saudi Arabia’s broader foreign-policy strategy of strategic diversification.

The Kingdom continues to maintain a major relationship with the United States while simultaneously deepening strategic, economic and defence ties with Türkiye, Pakistan, China and other powers.

The Makkah pact therefore appears less a replacement for existing alliances than an additional layer of regional deterrence.

Chatham House: Türkiye pursuing strategic ‘hedging’

The Makkah agreement has also given renewed significance to earlier analysis by Chatham House.

Tim Chattell of the International Security Programme at Chatham House examined the prospect of a Turkish strategic arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan before the trilateral agreement was signed.

He argued that such cooperation formed part of Ankara’s wider strategy of “hedging” — developing alternative strategic partnerships while retaining its NATO commitments.

Chattell also identified potential synergy between the three countries, particularly because Türkiye and Pakistan possess complementary defence capabilities while Saudi Arabia has significant financial resources that could support defence cooperation and industrial development.

What had previously been examined as an emerging strategic alignment has now become a formal defence commitment.

Atlantic Council: a ‘double deterrence tool’

The Atlantic Council has also examined the evolving Saudi-Pakistan security relationship.

Analyst Eleonora Ardemagni described the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact as a “double deterrence tool”, arguing that the relationship reflected both immediate security concerns and Saudi Arabia’s longer-term drive towards greater defence autonomy.

Her analysis highlighted military training, capacity building, defence-industry cooperation, technology transfer and potential co-production as important elements of the emerging partnership.

The inclusion of Türkiye adds another major military and defence-industrial dimension to that relationship.

A strategic triangle of complementary power

The significance of the Makkah pact lies partly in the capabilities each country brings to the partnership.

Saudi Arabia contributes enormous economic and energy influence, strategic geography and financial resources.

Türkiye contributes a major conventional military, NATO experience and an increasingly sophisticated indigenous defence industry.

Pakistan contributes one of the region’s largest and most experienced armed forces, longstanding military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, and a nuclear deterrent.

The three-way combination therefore creates a strategic partnership in which each member contributes capabilities that complement those of the others.

That is why analysts are examining whether the agreement could eventually develop into a permanent regional security institution.

Shehbaz Sharif’s pivotal diplomatic role

For Pakistan, the agreement represents a major diplomatic achievement and the culmination of sustained engagement with both Riyadh and Ankara.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s participation in the Makkah summit places Pakistan at the centre of a strategic framework connecting South Asia, the Gulf and the wider Muslim world.

The diplomatic challenge for Islamabad has been to deepen its defence relationships while avoiding becoming part of a confrontation between rival regional powers.

The defensive language of the agreement provides Pakistan with room to pursue that balance.

Sharif’s role has therefore been pivotal in helping create the political environment in which Pakistan’s longstanding relationships with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye could be brought together under a formal trilateral framework.

Field Marshal Asim Munir and the military dimension

The political significance of the agreement is reinforced by the military relationship underpinning it.

Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces of Pakistan, has played a pivotal role in strengthening Pakistan’s strategic and defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have decades of military cooperation, including training, professional exchanges and defence coordination.

Pakistan-Türkiye defence relations have also expanded substantially, covering military technology, naval cooperation, training and defence production.

The Makkah framework provides an opportunity to bring these strands of cooperation into a broader strategic structure.

Its future credibility will depend on military interoperability, intelligence cooperation, joint exercises, defence technology, institutional coordination and contingency planning.

Field Marshal Munir’s role will consequently be central to translating the political commitment made in Makkah into practical military cooperation.

Iran: deterrence without confrontation

Iran is likely to remain one of the most important considerations in international assessments of the agreement, although Tehran is not identified as an adversary.

The pact was signed against the backdrop of heightened regional tensions, making its potential implications for the Gulf particularly significant.

However, both Türkiye and Pakistan have stressed that the agreement is not directed against Iran.

Saudi Arabia has also pursued diplomatic engagement with Tehran, while Pakistan shares a border with Iran and has consistently sought regional stability.

Türkiye maintains its own complex relationship with Iran, combining competition, economic engagement and cooperation in selected areas.

The strategic objective therefore appears to be deterrence without formally designating an enemy.

India watching the development closely

India is another major regional power assessing the implications of the agreement.

The emergence of a formal defence framework linking Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia introduces a new variable into India’s strategic calculations.

Türkiye has close defence relations with Pakistan, while Saudi Arabia remains an important economic and strategic partner for India.

New Delhi is therefore likely to maintain its engagement with Riyadh while closely monitoring how the trilateral defence framework develops.

The immediate Indian response has been cautious, reflecting the complexity of its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the wider Gulf.

Israel faces a new strategic calculation

Israel also faces a more complicated regional environment.

Türkiye and Pakistan have adopted strong positions on the Gaza conflict, while Saudi Arabia remains one of the most influential Arab and Muslim states.

The immediate military implications of the Makkah agreement for Israel remain uncertain.

Much will depend on whether the framework remains focused on territorial defence or develops into broader political, intelligence and military coordination.

The possibility of additional countries joining could make the arrangement considerably more significant.

Egypt could transform the framework

The possibility of Egyptian participation is among the most consequential developments surrounding the agreement.

Egypt is one of the Arab world’s major military powers and occupies a strategically vital position linking the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Africa.

Türkiye has indicated that Egypt could potentially join the framework once technical issues are resolved.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt already cooperate through the R4 mechanism, creating an existing platform for strategic consultation.

If Egypt joins the defence framework, the geographical and military significance of the arrangement would increase substantially, potentially connecting major powers across South Asia, the Gulf, Anatolia, the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.

Not NATO — but potentially the beginning of something bigger

International analysts caution against describing the Makkah agreement as a new NATO.

NATO has decades of institutional development, an integrated military command and established operational mechanisms.

The Makkah framework is at an early stage.

Its strategic significance, however, does not depend solely on whether it immediately develops NATO-style institutions.

Collective-defence agreements alter strategic calculations by increasing the potential cost of aggression.

If an adversary believes that an attack against one country could trigger military, intelligence, economic and diplomatic consequences involving two additional major powers, the calculation changes.

That is the essence of deterrence.

The United States factor

The agreement also raises questions about the future role of the United States in regional security.

The Makkah pact should not automatically be interpreted as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye or Pakistan turning away from Washington.

Türkiye remains a NATO member.

Saudi Arabia maintains a major strategic relationship with the United States.

Pakistan also has a long history of engagement with Washington.

The more accurate interpretation is strategic diversification.

Regional powers increasingly want multiple security partnerships rather than dependence on a single external guarantor.

The Makkah framework fits within that broader transformation.

Pakistan’s strategic importance rises

For Pakistan, the agreement represents a significant expansion of its role in regional security.

Islamabad now finds itself at the intersection of South Asian, Gulf and wider Muslim-world strategic affairs.

Its longstanding defence relationship with Saudi Arabia provides historical depth, while its growing partnership with Türkiye offers access to an increasingly sophisticated defence-industrial ecosystem.

The political leadership of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and the strategic and military leadership of Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir have been central to positioning Pakistan within this emerging framework.

The agreement could also create opportunities for expanded joint exercises, intelligence cooperation, defence production and military technology partnerships.

The nuclear dimension

Pakistan’s nuclear capability inevitably adds another dimension to international assessments of the pact.

However, the publicly described terms of the Makkah agreement do not establish a formal Pakistani nuclear guarantee to Saudi Arabia.

It would therefore be premature to describe the agreement as creating a nuclear umbrella.

Pakistan’s nuclear capability nevertheless contributes to the overall strategic weight of its participation and inevitably forms part of the deterrence calculations surrounding the agreement.

The real test begins now

The signing in Makkah is only the beginning.

The credibility of the agreement will ultimately depend on implementation.

The three countries will need to establish practical mechanisms for military coordination, intelligence sharing, joint exercises, defence-industrial cooperation and crisis consultation.

The proposed ministerial committee and Saudi-based secretariat will be important first steps.

The future direction of the framework will also depend on whether Egypt or other regional states eventually join.

Why Makkah matters

The significance of the agreement lies in the convergence of political will, military capability and strategic geography.

For the first time, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have placed their collective security relationship within a formal trilateral defence framework.

The location of the signing adds exceptional symbolic importance.

The agreement was concluded in Makkah, Islam’s holiest city, at a time when the wider region is facing profound geopolitical uncertainty.

But the significance is not merely symbolic.

The three countries possess substantial economic, military and diplomatic weight, and their cooperation could influence strategic calculations well beyond their borders.

A new era of strategic autonomy

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement should therefore be viewed as part of a broader transformation in regional geopolitics.

Saudi Arabia is seeking greater strategic autonomy.

Türkiye is expanding its independent regional influence while retaining its NATO membership.

Pakistan is seeking a stronger role in regional security and Muslim-world diplomacy while maintaining its wider international relationships.

All three increasingly recognise that the international system is becoming more fragmented and that regional powers must develop greater capacity to protect their own interests.

The Makkah pact is therefore potentially the beginning of a new regional security architecture.

Its ultimate success will depend on implementation, political cohesion and the ability of the three countries to reconcile their different threat perceptions.

But the strategic message from Makkah is already clear:

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are signalling their determination to strengthen collective deterrence, increase strategic autonomy and assume a greater role in shaping the security future of the region and the wider Muslim world.

For Pakistan, the diplomatic leadership of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, reinforced by the strategic and military role of Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, has been pivotal in bringing the country to the centre of this emerging geopolitical equation.

What began in Makkah as a trilateral defence commitment could, if successfully institutionalised and expanded, become one of the most consequential new security frameworks in the wider region.

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  • Can Pakistan live on a Borrowed Revolution?

    The most pitiable creature I know is not the beggar who asks for bread but the gentleman who must borrow a personality. He dresses in another man’s taste, speaks in another man’s phrases and mistakes imitation for refinement. He is everywhere respectable and nowhere original. Nations occasionally acquire the same unfortunate habit. Their politics become echoes, their ideals reflections, and their revolutions little more than borrowed costumes. There was a time when borrowing was the necessity of poverty. We borrowed machines because we had no factories, medicines because we had no laboratories, and books because we had no presses. Such borrowing was neither shameful nor unusual; indeed, civilisation itself advances through exchange. The Greeks borrowed from Egypt, the Arabs preserved and enlarged the inheritance of Greece, Europe rediscovered Aristotle through Muslim Spain, and Japan modernised by learning from the West without surrendering its soul. Borrowing knowledge is the beginning of wisdom. Borrowing identity is the beginning of decline. There is another form of borrowing that no customs official can intercept and no tariff can discourage. It enters silently through the imagination. A society begins by borrowing opinions, then aspirations, then indignation. Before long, it borrows its heroes, its villains, its vocabulary and, eventually, its revolutions. It ceases to ask, “What does our history require?” and instead asks, “Whose history should we imitate?” That, I fear, is the predicament into which much of Pakistan’s public discourse has drifted. During the past several weeks, social media has been flooded with admiration for the recent political resistance witnessed across the border in India. Video clips have travelled faster than thoughtful analysis. Slogans have crossed the Wagah frontier with greater ease than ideas. Among countless young Pakistanis one question has become almost fashionable, Why can’t Pakistan have a movement like this? The question is understandable. It is also profoundly revealing. Hidden within it is an assumption that our political future must resemble somebody else’s present; that history unfolds according to a universal script; that every nation matures by repeating the experience of another. It is an assumption born not of confidence but of intellectual dependency. The tragedy, therefore, is not that Pakistanis admire another people’s courage. Every decent society can appreciate courage wherever it appears. The tragedy is that many have become convinced that courage itself must now be imported. We seem increasingly unable to recognise our own political inheritance unless it first receives foreign approval. This habit is hardly confined to politics. It has become the defining condition of our intellectual life. We borrow theories from European universities before examining our own social realities. We borrow ideological fashions from America before asking whether they illuminate Pakistani society. We borrow debates from social media and mistake them for scholarship. We consume outrage manufactured elsewhere and wear it as though it were tailored for our own circumstances. We have become, in the deepest sense of the phrase, tenants in the house of our own imagination. The irony is painful. No civilisation lacking confidence in itself has ever become creative. Creation begins where imitation ends. Shakespeare borrowed stories but produced Hamlet. Iqbal studied Nietzsche and Bergson yet remained unmistakably Iqbal. Muhammad Ali Jinnah mastered the constitutional traditions of Britain but transformed them into a political movement rooted in the aspirations of Indian Muslims. Great minds borrow raw material; they do not borrow finished identities. The same principle governs nations. Civilisations borrow in order to create. Declining societies borrow in order to imitate. Perhaps nowhere is this confusion more visible than in our understanding of resistance. Resistance has become one of the most romantic words in modern political vocabulary. It evokes images of heroic crowds, defiant slogans, dramatic confrontations and triumphant victories. Social media, with its appetite for spectacle, has transformed resistance into a global performance. Every protest becomes a cinematic narrative; every confrontation seeks an audience; every slogan aspires to immortality through a hashtag. But history is not written in hashtags. Nor are nations transformed by theatrical moments alone. The anthropologist Leila Abu-Lughod offered an important warning nearly three decades ago in her influential essay The Romance of Resistance. She argued that scholars often romanticise resistance as though every act of opposition were inherently emancipatory. Such a view, she suggested, ignores the complex relationships of power, culture and history within which resistance acquires meaning. Acts of dissent cannot be detached from the societies that produce them. They are rooted in particular institutions, historical memories and cultural conditions. Her insight deserves careful attention today. To ask why Pakistan does not produce resistance identical to India’s is rather like asking why the Indus refuses to flow like the Ganges. Rivers obey their own geography. Nations obey their own history. Every meaningful political movement is shaped by its unique historical circumstances. The French Revolution emerged from fiscal collapse and aristocratic privilege. The American Revolution arose from disputes over representation and imperial authority. South Africa’s democratic transition was forged in the struggle against apartheid. None of these experiences can simply be photocopied for another society. History does not distribute identical examinations to different nations. Each country answers its own questions. Yet we continue searching for borrowed answers. Perhaps this is because borrowed revolutions are emotionally satisfying. They spare us the difficult labour of self-examination. It is always easier to admire another nation’s struggle than to confront the unfinished responsibilities of our own. Admiration demands nothing. Citizenship demands everything. That distinction has become blurred in contemporary Pakistan. Our public imagination has fallen in love with the romance of beginning anew. Every few years another movement captures our attention. We invest it with almost mythical expectations. We hope it will accomplish what institutions, constitutions and patient political reform have failed to achieve. We long for redemption through spectacle. But mature nations are not built upon permanent excitement. They are built upon permanent institutions. Hannah Arendt observed in On Revolution that the enduring achievement of successful revolutions lies not in the destruction of an old order but in the establishment of a

  • Increasing Pakistan’s Water Resilience

    Stockholm Resilience Centre defines resilience as the capacity of a system to deal with change and continue to develop. System can be an individual, a forest, a city or an economy. In simple words, resilience refers to the ability of an ecosystem to deal with disturbances and returns to its former state. When it comes to water resource management in Pakistan, unfortunately, we are not managing our water resource as sustainably as we should. WWF Pakistan points out a robust difference in water consumption between communities in Pakistan. Those who can afford uses 10 times more water than global average that stands at 10 gallons a day. On the contrary, poor lacks access to water in Pakistan. How sad it is that there exist two different water realities in Pakistan. On one hand, we have people that uses 100 gallons of water each day. On the other hand, we have masses that don’t even have access to water. We must put an end to existing water inequality in Pakistan. Water forms the backbone of our society and economy and without sustainable water management practices in place, we can neither have socially equitable society nor can we achieve sustainable economic growth for Pakistan. We must ensure that each person in Pakistan should have access to clean water regardless of geographical location and financial resources at disposal. If we really want to achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for Pakistan, we must end water inequality in Pakistan. An access to clean water is a basic human right and thus it should be available to all in the country. It is important to mention here that each of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is strongly coupled with how we manage water as a natural resource. If we mange water wisely (with tomorrow in mind), we can easily achieve all 17 SDGs for Pakistan. However, an unsustainable water resource management will act as Achilles heel and prevent us in realizing Sustainable Development Goals. We certainly need a paradigm shift in managing water as a resource in Pakistan. Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives (Government of Pakistan) highlights that at the time of independence, per capita water availability in Pakistan was over 5000 cubic meters each year. Unfortunately, today, per capita water availability in Pakistan is sharply reduced to roughly 1000 cubic meters per person each year. In other words, each person in Pakistan now only has 1/5 of the water available every year, when compared to 1947 (at the time of independence). Public policy makers in Pakistan must tackle decreasing per capita water availability in Pakistan with utmost seriousness and do all it takes to tackle it in the most sustainable manner. Before we head on to solutions, we must understand the root causes of decreasing per capita water availability in Pakistan. According to Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), population in Pakistan has increased 7-fold since independence in 1947. Naturally, when we distribute the same amount of water we have each year on 7 times more population, the per capita water availability in Pakistan would then sharply reduce. ACIAR then stresses on the fact that irrigated agriculture in Pakistan consumes 95% of surface water supply in the country. Another report from Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) highlights that irrigated agriculture consumes 93% of the available water resource and acts as the single largest sector of economy employing 44% of the labour force, generating 60% of the foreign exchange earnings and produces roughly a quarter of Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP). The already spoken report from PCRWR then points out that Pakistan waste 60% of water from canals to farm gates. Do you know that per capita water storage ability of Pakistan is roughly 159 m3? On the contrary, the per-capita water storage ability of USA and Australia is over 5000m3, followed by China with a per-capita water storage ability of 2200m3, Egypt 2362 m3, Turkey 1402 m3 and Iran with 492m3. PCRWR further indicates that inadequate water storage ability has forced Pakistan to lose 120 BCM of water during floods of 2010, 2012 and 2014. If Pakistan had ample surface water storage infrastructure in place, it could had saved at least half of 120 BCM of surface water that could then be used to increase per-capita water availability in the country. The remaining 60 BCM of floodwater could restore Indus River Delta where many species are fighting for their survival due to reduced river flow. There is a dire need for Pakistan to build small, medium and large dams to store surface water. Doing so, will increase surface water availability on year-round basis, decrease flood related damage to agricultural lands and infrastructure, increase per-capita water availability, reduce reliance on underground water, recharge aquifers and mitigate their depletion. We have what it takes to build a series of small, medium and large dams in Pakistan to harvest floodwater during monsoon season. Do you know that 1 billion cubic meters of water has 1 trillion litres of water? Now imagine, if 50 litres of water cost 1 USD, the price tag of 1 billion cubic meters (or 1 trillion litres) of water would be 20 billion USD. Thus, a cumulative cost for 60 BCM of floodwater would roughly be USD 1200 billion. Now, if we would sharply reduce the already spoken figure to its one-tenth, the cost would still be a whooping USD 120 billion for 60 BCM of floodwater. We must understand that this is just the price of water. It is crucial to mention here that water forms the basis of all sorts of social and economic development, and we must learn to manage water sustainably to ensure a resilient Pakistan for all. We must invest heavily in constructing dams of all sizes to increase surface water availability and to enhance per-capita water in Pakistan. Here is an example. Do you know that Sweden has roughly 10,000 dams to manage surface water. It is quite simple, the

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