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Musharraf and ‘Absolutely Not’: The My…

By Ali Hiader

A certain segment in Pakistan has been gaining momentum in arguing that had dictator General Pervez Musharraf—like Imran Khan—said “Absolutely Not” to Washington, Pakistan might have been spared the scourge of terrorism and the subsequent economic hardships. However, such an argument attempts to view the decision made in 2001 through the lens of circumstances that emerged years later.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shook the United States and sent shockwaves through the global order; approximately 3,000 people lost their lives, and institutions regarded globally as symbols of American economic and military might were targeted. These attacks challenged the security of the world’s sole superpower and generated intense public pressure on the President George W. Bush’s administration to take retaliatory action. For the United States, inaction had become politically almost impossible.

Responsibility for these attacks was attributed to Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden—a Saudi national who was living in Afghanistan under Taliban protection. Initially, Bin Laden denied responsibility for the attacks, but his later statements increasingly portrayed as a retaliatory response to American policies. Regardless of how these statements were interpreted politically, by the end of 2001, it was clear to Washington that Al-Qaeda was the primary enemy and that Afghanistan was the hub of its operations.

This context holds particular significance for Pakistan because the Taliban government was harboring Osama bin Laden. Pakistan was not merely a distant spectator to this crisis; it shared a long border with Afghanistan and had spent two decades during the Cold War establishing an extensive political and intelligence network there. Consequently, the United States had no better option than Pakistan.

Therefore, the fundamental question is: Did Pakistan truly have the option to simply say “absolutely not,” instead of joining the American war?

Pakistan was already grappling with severe economic and diplomatic vulnerabilities during the post-9/11 crisis, as the United States and other Western nations had imposed harsh economic sanctions following the 1998 nuclear tests. These sanctions slowed the pace of development, hampered foreign investment, and strained relations with global financial institutions, leaving the country already burdened by heavy debt.

The situation became further complicated when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in October 1999, overthrowing an elected government. The military coup added fuel to the fire, further damaging Pakistan’s global reputation and leaving the country diplomatically weakened at a time when it needed international support the most.

Following the September 11 attacks, Washington made its expectations absolutely clear. According to Musharraf’s own account, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage delivered a stern message to Pakistan: it had to stand either with the United States or against it. Another remark widely attributed to the US position was that if Pakistan refused to cooperate, it could be sent “back to the Stone Age.” Although the exact wording of that phrase was never officially substantiated, the intensity of US pressure was undeniable.

Did the United States have the capability to inflict devastating damage on Pakistan, despite Pakistan being a nuclear power?

The answer to this is “yes.” Pakistan’s nuclear capability was primarily developed to deter India. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal provided Islamabad with a strategic deterrent against its key regional rival, but this did not mean Pakistan was immune to American economic, diplomatic, or technological pressure. Pakistan lacked the long-range military capabilities to directly strike the U.S. mainland—located 7,000 miles away—whereas the United States held an overwhelming advantage in air power, naval strength, intelligence, technology, financial resources, and global diplomatic influence.

Therefore, nuclear weapons were not synonymous with strategic parity with the United States. Pakistan could deter certain types of aggression from India, but realistically, it lacked the capability to inflict the same level of damage upon the United States.

Another major reason for Pakistan’s importance to the United States was the intelligence network present in Afghanistan.

During the Cold War, Pakistan was one of the United States’ key regional partners in supporting the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation. Pakistani intelligence agencies established extensive networks among Afghan groups, while the United States and Saudi Arabia provided arms and financial support for the resistance. Pakistan served as a crucial conduit for channeling this aid to the Afghan resistance.

This historical relationship gave the United States a unique strategic advantage after 9/11. Pakistan possessed a combination of geography, intelligence networks, logistical routes, and institutional experience—assets that would have been extremely difficult to replace. Its cooperation could significantly facilitate U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

Consequently, Islamabad chose the path it deemed relatively less damaging. Pakistan provided assistance through logistical support, access to airspace and facilities, intelligence cooperation, and other means, but did not directly join the war; in return for this strategic support, US sanctions were eased, economic aid increased, and Pakistan regained special diplomatic significance in Washington.

This does not mean that the decision was without negative consequences. Pakistan itself became a major target of terrorism, resulting in the deaths of nearly 70,000 civilian and military personnels and economic losses of approximately $150 billion; Pakistan paid a very heavy price for this war. Furthermore, the repercussions of the strategic policies adopted during the 1980s and 1990s later manifested as problems for Pakistan—issues that perhaps could not have been fully foreseen in 2001.

However, there is an important distinction here: criticizing the consequences of a decision and claiming that a different realistic course of action existed at the time are two separate things.

A major irony of the Afghan war is that U.S. officials and analysts have repeatedly cited Pakistan as one of the primary reason for the failure to achieve American objectives in Afghanistan. When the question arises as to why the world’s most powerful military failed to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan, the answer is sometimes given in a single word: Pakistan. This should not necessarily be viewed as a badge of honor; rather, it reflects a complex relationship in which Washington needed Pakistan yet lacked trust in it, while simultaneously accusing certain Pakistani elements of supporting forces that were undermining American objectives.

Therefore, the fundamental lesson of this entire affair relates more to the politics of power than to the contest between Musharraf and Khan.

A state formulates its foreign policy decisions based on the resources it actually possesses, rather than the power it aspires to wield. In 2001, Pakistan was economically weak, diplomatically isolated, and—while strategically significant regarding Afghanistan—vulnerable due to its dependencies and vastly weaker than the United States.

When the available options do not lie between benefit and harm, but rather between greater and lesser harm, governments typically conduct a cost-benefit analysis and select the path expected to result in the least damage. Twenty-five years later, it is easy to imagine Musharraf standing up to Washington and saying “Absolutely Not.” The difficult question is: did the Pakistan of September 2001 truly have the capacity to say that

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