can pakistan8217s students

Can Pakistan’s Students Compete in an AI-Dri…

Artificial Intelligence is transforming the world at an unprecedented pace. From healthcare and agriculture to finance, education, and manufacturing, AI is changing how people work, learn, and solve problems. Countries across the globe are redesigning their education systems to prepare students for a technology-driven future. They are investing in coding, robotics, digital literacy, critical thinking, and innovation. Outdated Curriculum, Untrained Teachers, and Obsolete Classrooms Are Holding Back the Nation’s Future

Pakistan, however, appears to be moving at a much slower pace. While developed nations are preparing children for careers that may not even exist today, millions of Pakistani students continue to study from outdated textbooks, rely on rote memorization, and learn in classrooms equipped with little more than blackboards and chalk. This growing disconnect raises an important question: How can Pakistan expect its youth to compete globally when they are being educated with a curriculum designed for the past?

Education is the engine of economic growth and national development. Every successful nation has built its progress on a strong education system that evolves with changing times. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s school curriculum has not kept pace with technological advancement or the demands of the modern labour market. Although some reforms have been introduced over the years, many textbooks still contain outdated examples, obsolete concepts, and teaching methods that fail to develop analytical thinking and creativity.

The world no longer rewards students simply for memorizing information. Search engines and AI can provide facts within seconds. What employers increasingly value are skills that machines cannot easily replace critical thinking, creativity, communication, collaboration, leadership, emotional intelligence, and the ability to solve complex problems. Yet our examination system still rewards memorization more than understanding.

One of the biggest weaknesses of Pakistan’s education system is the gap between classroom learning and market needs. Universities and employers frequently complain that graduates lack practical knowledge and workplace skills. Many young people spend years earning degrees only to discover they are not prepared for modern careers. This mismatch contributes to unemployment despite rising educational qualifications.

School curricula should therefore be redesigned around future skills. Coding, artificial intelligence, robotics, data literacy, entrepreneurship, financial education, climate science, environmental sustainability, cybersecurity, and digital citizenship should become part of mainstream education. These are no longer luxury subjects reserved for elite schools; they are becoming basic requirements for the global economy.

Equally important is the way children are taught. Modern education encourages students to ask questions, conduct experiments, work in teams, debate ideas, and solve real-life problems. Unfortunately, many Pakistani classrooms continue to rely on one-way lectures where students quietly copy notes from the blackboard. Such methods may help children pass examinations, but they do little to prepare them for innovation or leadership.

This is why teacher training deserves urgent national attention.

Teachers cannot be expected to teach twenty-first-century skills using twentieth-century training. Continuous professional development should become mandatory for all teachers. They should receive regular training in digital learning, classroom technology, student-centred teaching, project-based learning, and modern assessment methods. A well-trained teacher can transform even a modest classroom, while an untrained teacher may struggle despite having excellent textbooks.

Technology must also become an integral part of learning. Around the world, interactive digital boards, multimedia presentations, educational software, virtual laboratories, and online learning platforms are making classrooms more engaging and effective. In contrast, many government schools in Pakistan still depend on blackboards, chalk, and outdated teaching aids.

There is nothing inherently wrong with blackboards they have educated generations of students. However, they cannot be the only teaching tool in an era when digital technology dominates every profession. Students who have never interacted with computers, digital content, or smart classrooms are already at a disadvantage before they enter higher education or the job market.

Modernizing classrooms does not necessarily require replacing every blackboard overnight. Pakistan can adopt a phased approach. Schools should first be provided with reliable electricity, internet connectivity where possible, projectors, computers, and digital learning resources. Low-cost technology can significantly improve learning outcomes if combined with trained teachers and updated curricula.

Education must also become more relevant to Pakistan’s own challenges. Students should learn about water scarcity, climate change, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, disaster management, public health, financial planning, and responsible citizenship. Such knowledge not only strengthens the economy but also helps communities solve local problems.

The government must increase investment in education. For many years, Pakistan has allocated a relatively small share of its national resources to education compared with what experts recommend for developing countries. Without sustained investment in schools, teacher development, educational technology, and curriculum reform, meaningful progress will remain difficult.

Parents, educators, policymakers, universities, and the private sector all have a role to play. Education should not be shaped solely by examination boards. Industry leaders, technology experts, researchers, and experienced teachers should contribute to curriculum development so that what children learn reflects the realities of today’s world.

Pakistan’s greatest resource is not its minerals or natural wealth, it is its young population. Millions of talented children possess the intelligence, curiosity, and determination to succeed. What they need is an education system that unlocks their potential instead of limiting it.

Artificial Intelligence will reshape every sector of society during the coming decades. Countries that prepare their children today will lead tomorrow’s global economy. Those that continue teaching outdated syllabi will struggle to keep pace.

The choice before Pakistan is clear. We can continue relying on obsolete textbooks, examination-driven learning, blackboards, and chalk while the rest of the world embraces AI and digital innovation. Or we can modernize our curriculum, invest in teachers, equip classrooms with appropriate technology, and prepare our children for the future.

The future cannot be built with yesterday’s education. If Pakistan truly wants its youth to compete on the global stage, the time to reform our schools is not tomorrow it is today.

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  • Makkah Joint Defence Agreement – opportuniti…

    Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA) to strengthen their defense cooperation. The agreement was signed at a critical juncture in history, both globally and regionally. On the global front, the old order is in disarray, and conflicts are breaking out one after another. The West’s dominance and hegemony are fading. Economic power, which the West once used to rule the world, is in decline. Western control over weapons of destruction has weakened. Simultaneously, Western diplomatic influence has softened, and their grip on the UN and decision-making has weakened.    This has destabilized global peace, and in 2025 alone, 50 countries were engaged in conflicts or wars. As a result, new powerhouses, in economic, diplomatic, and defense production, have emerged. On a regional level, the Middle East and South Asia have emerged as flashpoints, where conflict or war can break out at any time due to the reckless behavior of Israel and India in their respective regions.    In this context, the signing of the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement has raised many questions, and people are exploring possible answers. First, what does the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement include? According to available information at this time, the three Muslim countries have joined hands to strengthen their defense cooperation. It sends a strong message to opponents and enemies that any attack on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Turkey will be treated as an attack on all. The aggressor will have to face the wrath of three powers.    Second, why is it important? It is important for two reasons. First, three countries are in hostile regions and face numerous security challenges. Let’s start with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is in a region where Israel is committing the worst genocide in modern history. The genocide in Gaza has destabilized the whole region. Unconditional support from the USA and the West allows Israel to continue the genocide in Gaza with complete immunity. They are providing all types of weapons of mass destruction and financial support to Israel. Even the USA and some Western countries are threatening the International Court of Justice or other UN agencies for asking for accountability of Israel. The USA and Israel’s attack on Iran has further complicated the situation. Iranian attacks on regional countries in the context of US bases are threatening a wide-scale war in the region. Saudi Arabia is also facing direct attacks by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia, especially on oil installations, which pose serious threats to the whole region.     For Pakistan, it has two hostile neighbors, India and Afghanistan. In 2025, India attacked Pakistan based on self-assumed allegations. However, a strong, full-scale retaliation from Pakistan compelled India to come to its knees. Pakistan destroyed many Indian fighter jets and missile systems. India rushed to the USA to beg for a ceasefire. On the other border, Pakistan is facing terrorism originating from Afghanistan. Afghanistan, with the support of India and Israel, has launched a full-scale proxy and terrorism war. It is also harboring terrorist groups such as BLA, TTP, etc. India, acting as a proxy of Israel, is providing full support to terrorists and fueling terrorism in Pakistan.   In the case of Turkey, it is facing multiple threats, including direct threats from Israel, Greece, and some regional proxies. Over the past few months, Israel has begun to portray Turkey as a new threat to Israel. Greece has also been encouraged by Israel and other Western powers to create problems for Turkey. Some Western countries also have historical grievances with Turkey and are seeking opportunities to harm it.    Therefore, this agreement is extremely important for the three countries and for both regions, the Middle East and South Asia.    Third, how will regional countries react, and what impact will the MJDA have on the region? First, Israel will not like it at all. Why? Because it will view it as a hurdle to creating a Greater Israel. Therefore, Israel will do everything to sabotage the agreement. It can use this agreement to create a sectarian divide in the region by portraying Iran as the enemy. It can conspire to instigate sectarian violence in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. The USA and Western countries can also join hands to facilitate Israel. President Trump’s recent statement on the potential role of Syria in tackling the issue of Hezbollah is a strong indication of this strategy. He is urging Israel to stop attacking Lebanon and let the Syrian government fight Hezbollah. Lastly, Israel can also exploit the civilizational context and emotions of the custodians of the Arab, Iranian, and Turkish civilizations. It can trigger feelings of self-greatness and urge each civilization to pursue past glory.     Simultaneously, some elements in Iran, especially those pro-Israel or influenced by Israel, can propagate the MJDA against Iranian interests. They can argue that it will undermine Iran’s status and create hurdles for Iran to become the region’s major power. Proponents of this view can argue that, in the presence of this alliance, it will be difficult for Iran to dominate the region. It would be an ideal situation for Israel and other elements to create a divide along sectarian lines and fan sectarian violence in the region and in respective countries. Therefore, all countries (Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) need to be extremely vigilant and coordinate closely.     Fourth, what would be the reaction of the global community, especially from the USA and China? China and the USA are important because they are major powers at this point in time. First, I do not believe the USA will have an independent view or reaction. It is strongly suspected, rather sure, that Israel will dictate the American response. It is an open secret that Israel does not want peace and stability in the region. Thus, the USA will follow this policy.    It is also in the USA’s interest. How and why? The USA considers the Middle East and South Asia vital to

  • Beyond Riba: Reconstruction of Just Financial Orde…

    The preceding five parts of this series have argued that elimination of riba cannot be achieved by changing the vocabulary of finance. We began with definition, moved to creation of money, separated transaction deposits from investment capital, examined productive finance based on ownership and genuine risk, and then placed Bait-ul-Mal, waqf, zakat and qard hasan within a wider system of social protection. The final question is no longer conceptual. It is legislative. Pakistan now has a date. The Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2024 substituted Article 38(f) with the direction to “eliminate riba completely before the first day of January, two thousand twenty-eight”. The constitutional deadline reinforces the Federal Shariat Court’s 2022 judgment in the Riba cases, reported as PLD 2023 FSC 47. The problem is that a deadline does not itself create a new financial order. The Finance Division’s Post-2027 Financial System in Pakistan contains useful work on Sukuk, liquidity facilities, legislation, safety nets, technology and capacity building. It nevertheless remains a strategy, not a Prohibition of Riba law. More importantly, some of its transitional assumptions sit uneasily with the word “completely”. Majority foreign-owned institutions may decide voluntarily whether to convert; conventional obligations contracted before the deadline may continue according to their terms until maturity; and fresh foreign financing is contemplated through Shariah-compliant modes subject to availability of reasonable options. These concerns are understandable from the perspective of financial stability. They cannot become permanent legal exceptions. Pakistan therefore needs an umbrella Prohibition of Riba Act, enacted well before the constitutional cut-off, accompanied by consequential federal and provincial amendments [Who will draft Riba Prohibition Law? Minute Mirror, April 7, 2026]. Its first task must be the one identified in Part I: define what is prohibited. The law should distinguish a loan or debt carrying a stipulated increase because of time from lawful consideration arising from genuine sale, lease, service, partnership or productive risk. Courts and regulators should be empowered to examine connected contracts as one economic arrangement. A murabaha, ijarah, musharakah or Sukuk should not become immune from scrutiny merely because recognised Islamic terminology appears in its documents. The second requirement is a clear cut-off rule. No bank, financial institution, government agency or other regulated person should be permitted to originate a new interest-bearing financial contract in Pakistan after December 31, 2027. The prohibition must be activity-based, not ownership-based. A transaction cannot change its constitutional character because shareholders of the institution happen to be foreign. This is also the weakness we identified earlier in examining the Government’s strategy paper. Existing liabilities require different treatment. Pakistan cannot simply repudiate sovereign bonds, multilateral obligations or private contracts. That would replace one problem with default, litigation and financial isolation. The law should instead require a complete register of every conventional obligation extending beyond the cut-off: principal, return, maturity, governing law, creditor, refinancing possibility and proposed conversion date. Contracts capable of consensual refinancing should be converted. Those that cannot immediately be altered should continue only under a transparent transitional schedule with definite sunset dates, rather than receiving an indefinite exemption merely because they were signed before 2028. The third issue concerns money itself. Part II argued that commercial-bank money creation is not automatically riba. The power to create purchasing power through credit is nevertheless too important to remain outside reform. Parliament should require a time-bound examination of sovereign transaction money, reserve arrangements and separation of monetary creation from productive financial intermediation. This question should be decided upon economic evidence and institutional consequences, not theological assertion. Part III then demonstrated why payment accounts and investment accounts require legal separation. Money held for immediate payment and nominal safety should not be treated as risk capital. Funds deliberately invested for commercial return should carry transparent exposure to the enterprises and assets from which that return arises. Deposit protection against institutional failure must similarly be distinguished from a State guarantee against every commercial investment loss. The fourth area is productive finance. The law should protect genuine murabaha, ijarah, salam, istisna, musharakah, mudarabah and other permissible arrangements while prescribing minimum standards of ownership, possession, disclosure and risk. Shariah audit should examine economic substance rather than merely documentation. Taxation must also become neutral. Equity participation, leasing and genuine asset transactions should not suffer additional fiscal costs merely because legislation was historically designed around conventional debt. Public finance cannot remain outside this discipline. Government should not treat Sukuk merely as a technique for reproducing conventional borrowing against whatever public assets can be placed in a registry. The official strategy itself proposes an Assets Registry Company and expanded hybrid Sukuk issuance. Sovereign instruments must confer genuine economic rights and corresponding responsibilities rather than provide documentary assets solely to support a predetermined financial return. Fiscal reform is inseparable from elimination of riba. No monetary arrangement can remain sound where governments continuously borrow merely to finance structural deficits. Monetary policy requires the same intellectual honesty. The Government’s strategy envisages Shariah-compliant open-market operations, standing facilities and liquidity arrangements. These are necessary developments, but changing contractual forms will not be enough if their sole objective becomes mechanical reproduction of the existing interest-rate corridor. SBP ultimately needs a transparent post-riba monetary framework explaining liquidity creation and absorption, lender-of-last-resort assistance, foreign-exchange operations and monetary transmission. The fifth element takes us beyond banking altogether. Part V argued that riba flourishes not only because creditors seek gain but also because human beings are compelled by need. A successful transition must therefore strengthen Bait-ul-Mal, professionally governed public waqf lillah, independently administered zakat and revolving qard hasan funds. Essential healthcare, education, disability support and subsistence during genuine incapacity should never become markets for financial extraction. Local cooperative institutions should provide the bridge from protection to participation. The lesson drawn from Rabobank was not that Pakistan should import a Dutch banking model. It was that communities can mobilise their resources and build productive institutions from below. Properly regulated cooperatives can gradually shift economic power away from patrons and concentrated financial interests towards citizens themselves. Governance is consequently as important as Shariah nomenclature. Pakistan

  • Riyadh’s Strategic Triangle: Security, Stabi…

    The visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister and Chief of Defence Staff to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 6–7 August 2026 was officially presented as a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), accompanied by the performance of religious rituals in Islam’s holy cities. Yet, diplomacy is often conducted between the lines rather than in official communiqués. French newspapers, Indian news agencies, and Israeli media all reported that Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia were working toward a defence agreement expected to be signed on Friday. While no official confirmation has emerged, the reports have generated an important strategic debate. If such an agreement is indeed under discussion, what is its real agenda? Would it amount to a military alliance, and if so, against whom would it operate? More fundamentally, why would Pakistan and Türkiye, both facing considerable economic pressures, seek to enter such an arrangement? Or are we witnessing the gradual birth of a new regional security architecture in the vacuum created by the declining American military footprint in the Middle East, with Pakistan assuming an anchoring role?   The first narrative comes from Pakistan. Political analyst Parveen Sawamy argues that Pakistan is gradually emerging as the principal anchor of a broader Muslim strategic framework. According to this view, Islamabad has evolved from being merely a facilitator of dialogue to becoming a mediator and now potentially a guarantor of regional security. Among the members of the OIC, Pakistan enjoys a unique diplomatic position. It maintains working relations with almost every important regional actor, consistently supports the Palestinian cause, and remains outside the circle of states that have normalized relations with Israel. This balanced diplomacy provides Islamabad with credibility across the Muslim world.   Pakistan also possesses one of the most experienced armed forces in the Islamic world, capable of contributing to Gulf security should regional circumstances demand it. At the same time, Washington may not necessarily oppose such a role, particularly given the perception that General Asim Munir enjoys constructive relations with the Trump administration. Pakistan’s geographic proximity to Iran further strengthens its credentials, allowing it to maintain channels of communication with Tehran while preserving strategic partnerships with Gulf monarchies. If Islamabad succeeds in converting this diplomatic leverage into economic opportunity, a defence understanding with Riyadh and Ankara could mark the beginning of a new Muslim security framework based on deterrence, mediation, and regional peace rather than confrontation.   The second narrative revolves around Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, despite facing domestic economic challenges, brings decades of NATO experience, an advanced defence industry, and diplomatic flexibility. Türkiye remains a NATO member, maintains dialogue with the United States, preserves working relations with Israel, and simultaneously engages actively with Asian and Muslim nations. Such strategic diversity enables Ankara to serve as a bridge between competing geopolitical camps.   From Türkiye’s perspective, participation in a trilateral framework would capitalize on its military technology and defence manufacturing capabilities while expanding economic cooperation with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Ankara also offers valuable diplomatic experience and could serve as a neutral venue for negotiations during future regional crises. If such cooperation enjoys quiet support from Washington, Türkiye would strengthen both its strategic autonomy and its influence across the Muslim world.   The third and perhaps most decisive narrative belongs to Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) seeks durable security guarantees to preserve investor confidence in Vision 2030 and mega-projects such as NEOM. Economic transformation cannot succeed without regional stability. Recent conflicts have exposed the vulnerability of Gulf infrastructure to missile and drone attacks, prompting Riyadh to reassess its long-term security strategy. MBS increasingly recognizes that American military bases alone cannot guarantee the Kingdom’s security in an era of rapidly changing regional dynamics.   Pakistan and Türkiye therefore emerge as relatively affordable yet credible strategic partners. Saudi energy sustains both economies, while Islamabad and Ankara can provide military expertise, training, and strategic reassurance. More importantly, MBS appears less interested in confronting Iran through perpetual military rivalry than in managing competition through diplomacy backed by credible deterrence. If this approach succeeds, it could reduce regional tensions while safeguarding Saudi Arabia’s ambitious economic transformation.   Whether the reported defence agreement materializes or remains diplomatic speculation, the convergence of Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia reflects an important geopolitical trend. All three states require economic stability, strategic autonomy, and a more reliable regional security framework. Their interests intersect around the need to protect trade, investment, energy infrastructure, and political stability. If this strategic triangle evolves into a formal partnership, its true success will not be measured by the strength of its military capabilities but by its ability to prevent conflict, encourage dialogue, and foster prosperity. In a region long defined by rivalry, the most enduring alliance may ultimately be the one built not for war, but for peace.

  • The 60-Day Window in Hormuz: Oil, Sanctions, and t…

     On the morning of June 23, 2026, oil traders watching screens in London and Singapore saw a rare combination: the price of Brent crude falling and tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz rising. The trigger was a one-page notice from the U.S. Treasury. Effective immediately, the United States would authorize the production, delivery and sale of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products through August 21, a 60-day general license issued as American and Iranian officials concluded a first round of talks in Switzerland.   For a waterway that carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil consumption, the shift was significant. After months in which oil had spiked above $100 on fears of a closure of the Strait, Brent fell back below $85. European shares opened August higher on hopes that diplomacy would hold. The question now confronting energy markets and foreign ministries alike is whether this “Hormuz Corridor” arrangement marks the beginning of a stabilization of global energy security, or merely a tactical pause in a longer confrontation.   From Maximum Pressure to Managed De-escalation   To understand the current opening, it is necessary to recall how the Strait became a flashpoint. The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow channel 21 miles wide at its narrowest point between Iran and Oman, has long been the world’s most important oil chokepoint. About 20 million barrels of oil per day transit it, along with a third of global liquefied natural gas trade.   U.S.-Iran tensions over the waterway escalated sharply after 2018, when the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and reimposed sweeping sanctions on Iranian oil exports. Iran, whose economy relies heavily on crude sales, responded by threatening to impede shipping and, at times, seizing tankers. The cycle repeated in late 2025 and early 2026, with a series of attacks and counter-threats that pushed insurance premiums for Gulf shipping to multi-year highs and forced major refiners in China, India, and South Korea to seek alternative barrels.   The talks that began in Switzerland in late June followed that period of acute risk. Mediated by Oman, Qatar and Pakistan, according to official statements, the first round concluded with what U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance described as a “good foundation for a successful final deal.” The resulting U.S. general license does not lift sanctions permanently. It is a temporary waiver, valid through August 21, designed to allow Iranian oil to flow legally while negotiators pursue a final peace framework within 60 days. Iran’s Foreign Ministry, for its part, said it was discussing a temporary safe route through the Strait and denied that direct bilateral talks were continuous, underscoring the fragility of the process.   For Washington, the calculus is twofold. Domestically, lower energy prices ahead of the autumn reduce inflationary pressure. Crude futures had risen sharply earlier in the year on supply fears, contributing to volatility in equities. Strategically, a temporary de-escalation allows the U.S. to reallocate diplomatic and military resources and to test whether Tehran is willing to agree to constraints on its nuclear program and regional activities in exchange for sanctions relief.   For Tehran, the incentive is economic. Iran holds the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves, but its exports had been curtailed to well below capacity. Even under sanctions, Iranian-linked tankers continued to move oil, according to tracking data, but at steep discounts and with high transaction costs. A legal channel to sell crude through August 21 provides immediate revenue and a measure of relief for an economy facing high inflation and currency pressure.   Market Relief and Market Skepticism   The initial market reaction has been cautiously optimistic. After reports that both sides had agreed on a roadmap, oil prices settled down more than 3 percent in a single session, with the more active August Brent contract settling around $73.86 to $79.04 per barrel in late June trading, down from earlier highs near $93. European equities, sensitive to energy costs, began August higher.   Analysts interviewed for this article point to two competing interpretations of this relief.   The optimistic view holds that the waiver creates a positive feedback loop. By allowing Iranian oil back into the formal market estimated at 1 to 1.5 million barrels per day of additional supply if fully utilized it eases global balances at a time when OPEC+ is managing voluntary cuts first announced in April 2023 and set to continue into August 2026. Lower prices reduce the incentive for further escalation, giving negotiators space to discuss the more difficult issues: the future of uranium enrichment, the status of Iranian support for armed groups, and verification mechanisms for any corridor through Hormuz that would give Iran a role in monitoring inbound traffic, as suggested in one proposal reported by Reuters.   The skeptical view, which currently dominates private commentary among Gulf-based energy executives, is that the structure of the deal itself reveals its limits. A 60-day license is, by design, reversible. It does not resolve the underlying lack of trust, nor does it provide long-term certainty for refiners and shippers to sign term contracts. Tanker operators continue to price in risk, and traffic data showed an initial uptick as talks progressed, but not a full normalization. One proposal that would give Iran formal control over inbound traffic through the Strait has alarmed some Gulf states, who have privately warned that such an arrangement could be used as leverage in the future.   Stakeholders Beyond Washington and Tehran   The implications extend far beyond the two principal parties.   For Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Hormuz arrangement presents a dilemma. They benefit from lower oil prices and reduced risk of a regional war that could target their own infrastructure, but they are wary of any deal that enhances Iran’s ability to control shipping lanes or that is reached without binding security guarantees. Iran’s recent warning that it could target Gulf states if the U.S. launches new strikes has reinforced that anxiety.   For

  • Beyond Riba: Reconstruction of Just Financial Orde…

    The preceding parts of this series have gradually separated concepts that modern banking has merged. Money used for payments is not the same thing as investment capital. A current account is not economically identical to funds deliberately committed to enterprise. Commercial-bank money creation is not automatically riba, but neither should monetary privilege remain beyond scrutiny. Once these distinctions are accepted, an obvious question arises: how will productive activity actually be financed? No modern economy can function merely by condemning interest. Farmers require seasonal finance. Manufacturers need machinery and working capital. Exporters must bridge the period between production and receipt of foreign proceeds. Families need housing. Governments require infrastructure. Entrepreneurs need capital before their businesses begin earning revenue. A serious alternative to riba must finance all of these activities (see the model of Robobank). The answer is not to replace every conventional loan with musharakah. Nor is it to rename a predetermined financial return as “profit”. Islamic commercial jurisprudence developed several different contractual forms precisely because economic transactions differ. Sale, lease, partnership, advance purchase and manufacturing contracts perform different functions and allocate ownership and risk differently. The real task is to connect financial return with an identifiable economic basis. A useful starting principle is simple: money should not generate a guaranteed return merely because money has been advanced. Return should arise from trade, ownership, service, productive participation or genuine exposure to commercial risk. This does not mean that every legitimate return must fluctuate. A trader may sell an asset for a fixed profit. A landlord may agree a fixed rent. A contractor may charge a predetermined price. A manufacturer may agree in advance to produce goods for a specified consideration. The prohibition of riba does not abolish prices. What matters is what stands behind the price. State Bank of Pakistan itself explains murabaha as a sale rather than a loan: the seller acquires a commodity, discloses its cost and sells it at an agreed profit. SBP similarly recognises mudarabah, musharakah, ijarah, salam and istisna as distinct Islamic financing structures. Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) maintains separate Shariah standards for murabaha, ijarah, salam, istisna and musharakah precisely because each represents a different legal and commercial relationship. The distinction is fundamental. Consider machinery required by an industrial enterprise. A conventional bank may lend Rs.100 million and require repayment of principal plus interest. Under a genuine murabaha structure, the financier purchases identified machinery, assumes ownership during the relevant period and subsequently sells it to the customer at an agreed deferred price. The return is then legally attached to a sale. This difference has substance only if the financier actually acquires what it claims to sell. Ownership cannot be reduced to a momentary paper entry while every risk, liability and practical responsibility remains with the customer from beginning to end. The same principle applies to ijarah. A financier that purchases machinery, vehicles or other productive assets and leases them to a business may legitimately earn rent because it owns an asset whose use is being transferred. Ownership, however, carries obligations. Structural ownership risks cannot simply be transferred wholesale to the lessee while the financier retains only the right to receive money. The issue is thus not whether rent happens to resemble an interest payment in amount. Economic prices often converge. The decisive issue is whether a genuine lease exists. Housing illustrates the point particularly well. Diminishing musharakah has become one of the major financing techniques used in Islamic banking. Under its proper conception, the financier and customer acquire a property jointly. The customer pays rent for the financier’s share and progressively purchases units of that share until sole ownership is achieved. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has long maintained specific Shariah standards governing Sharikat-ul-Milk and diminishing musharakah. This can provide a defensible alternative to an interest-bearing mortgage. Its legitimacy, however, depends upon genuine co-ownership. If the customer bears every cost and risk from the first day, if the bank’s capital is effectively guaranteed irrespective of what happens to the asset, and if the entire arrangement merely reproduces principal plus benchmarked return, the partnership becomes increasingly formal rather than substantive. The same scrutiny is required in agriculture. Agriculture is ill-suited to rigid debt repayment because its returns depend upon weather, crop disease, market prices, water availability and timing. A farmer may incur losses despite diligence and competence. Classical commercial law contains an instrument remarkably suited to this problem: salam. Under salam, the purchaser pays the price in advance for specified goods to be delivered later. The farmer obtains working capital before harvest. The purchaser acquires a commercial claim to the future crop and assumes the market risk associated with buying it in advance. This is not charity. It is trade. Properly developed agricultural salam markets could provide farmers with liquidity without forcing them into compounding debt when crops fail. Warehousing, quality certification, crop insurance or takaful, commodity exchanges and transparent market information would be necessary to make such financing scalable. Istisna can similarly serve manufacturing, construction and infrastructure. A textile mill, irrigation facility, industrial machine and housing project need not be forced into one universal debt contract. Partnership financing becomes important where future returns are uncertain. Musharakah permits parties to combine capital and share results. Mudarabah separates capital from enterprise: one party provides funds and another skill and management. Return is connected with actual economic performance. Their difficulty is equally obvious. Profit-and-loss sharing cannot work where accounts are unreliable, sales remain hidden, related-party transactions are opaque and litigation takes years. A financier unable to determine actual profit will naturally prefer a fixed receivable. Financial reform requires credible accounts, meaningful audit, digital documentation, effective insolvency laws, reliable registries and quick commercial adjudication. Risk sharing cannot flourish where information itself cannot be trusted. There is, however, another question we rarely ask: why must productive finance remain concentrated in a few large banks? History offers an instructive example. Rabobank did not begin as the international institution known today. Its origins were local Dutch farmers’

  • Power Behind the Scenes

    By Tuba Khan Informal networks represent an extremely important yet widely ignored aspect of governance, especially within developing nations whose formal administrative apparatus is either weak or disputed. Informal institutions refer to uncodified norms and traditions that influence decision-making processes in ways beyond the reach of legal processes. As far as the informal networks are concerned, they can include networks of patronage, kinship and alliances based on personal connections. In countries with hybrid governance structures such as Pakistan where formalized democratic mechanisms co-exist with informal structures, a clear distinction between formal institutions from informal institutions must be made for effective governance. In Pakistan, informal networks do not exist in parallel with institutionalized structures of governance; they actually become the central point around which power operates. Despite having formal governmental structures intact, the informal networks become quite important and influential. There exists a high level of interaction between political, military, bureaucratic and commercial elites. The origins of the informal networks in Pakistan’s governance system are rooted in the colonial era when the governance system of the British was based mainly on the principles of indirect governance. Alongside formal institutionalized structures of governance, the colonial rulers gave powers to local intermediaries in the form of local landlords, tribal chieftains and other local power-brokers. This led to the development of patronage systems and kinship power, which were based on caste and biradari relations. Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has experienced a very weak governance system. In the absence of stable and fully consolidated democratic institutions, the informal networks took on greater importance in political activities. These informal networks were strengthened by the repeated involvement of the powerful actors in political matters. The periods of outright military takeover or indirect control through civilian regimes cemented a structure where important decisions were frequently taken without recourse to institutionalized processes. The military, along with bureaucrats and politicians, established networks that could affect the policy agenda, political succession and even national interests. Resultantly, this trend continued to blur the lines between formal and informal authority. Islamization strategies of the 1970s and 1980s further broadened the informal networks by involving religious figures in the politics of Pakistan. Religious leaders can trigger religious sentiments and thus influence public opinion according to the needs of influential networks. So, in many cases, the government depended on the clergy and their organizations to mobilize mass support, which gave rise to interchanges of mutual benefits between religious and political authorities. Since the 1990s, liberalization in the economy and growth of the media industry have introduced new players into informal networks. Informal networks have several mechanisms within Pakistan through which they exercise their authority. Patronage stands out as one such mechanism where rewards and resources, such as employment opportunities within the public sector, campaign financing and even electoral loyalty are offered in exchange for support. On the other hand, back-channel negotiations conducted outside formal channels, such as Parliament and cabinet meetings, are vital in influencing the decision-making process of the state. Furthermore, elites are capable of hijacking policy-making processes and diverting resources in ways beneficial to themselves. Additionally, the media often mobilize people and give political power some form of moral legitimacy through propaganda. There are many implications of the existence of informal networks on the efficiency of the governance process. One of the major impacts is the undermining of formal institutional structures and electoral practices. Checks and balances, as well as the legislative process itself are often ignored or used solely for show purposes, while the real process of decision-making is handled through the use of private contacts and backdoor diplomacy. Another important implication is that the culture of corruption and inefficiency continues to persist. Patronage-driven systems tend to give preference to loyalty as opposed to competence, which leads to the appointment of people and the distribution of resources in a manner that is unrelated to development and the needs of the people at large. Policies tend to be revised according to changes in the interests of those in positions of authority, ultimately hindering the way to stability. To counter the effects of informal networks in Pakistan, the gradual development of formal institutions needs to take place instead of abruptly altering the current political environment. The starting point for designing a reform package is to redefine the role of the state. It is critical to ensure institutional independence, transparency of decision-making processes, meritocracy, citizen participation, press freedom and the accountability for the excessive influence of religious and economic elites to decrease dependence on informal institutions. Prevalence of informal political institutions in Pakistan causes several problems for the country’s political system. Formal institutions are often sidelined or rendered symbolic, leading to policy inconsistency and the undermining of democratic accountability. Nevertheless, the existence of informal groups is entrenched in the system and cannot be completely eliminated, their impact can be progressively restricted. This serves as an indication that reforms should be incremental and continuous

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