Opinion

Pakistan’s growing diplomatic influence has entered a new phase as Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir lead the country’s strategic engagement with the world, strengthening alliances and projecting Pakistan as an important voice in regional peace and security. The signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye represents a major milestone in Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. The agreement brings together three influential nations through a framework of collective defence, enhanced military cooperation and a shared commitment to regional stability. In recent months, Pakistan’s defence capabilities and strategic importance have received increased international attention. The role of the Pakistan Army in national security and regional stability has been a central factor in shaping Pakistan’s strategic partnerships, while Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s engagement with international counterparts has highlighted the importance of defence diplomacy in promoting peace and cooperation. The global perception of Pakistan’s strategic role has evolved as Islamabad has continued to demonstrate its capacity to engage with major powers and regional stakeholders. Under Field Marshal Asim Munir’s leadership, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has focused on strengthening partnerships, supporting stability and advancing dialogue as a pathway to resolving regional challenges. Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif has complemented these efforts through active diplomatic outreach, engaging world leaders and strengthening Pakistan’s relationships with key allies. Whenever Pakistan’s leadership has engaged internationally, these visits have increasingly focused on expanding cooperation, improving economic ties and promoting peace initiatives. Pakistan’s diplomatic role in encouraging dialogue during tensions involving the United States and Iran also attracted international attention. US President Donald Trump acknowledged Pakistan’s leadership efforts in supporting peace and dialogue, reflecting the country’s potential role as a constructive bridge between nations. Pakistan continues to maintain strong strategic relations with major international partners, including China, while also enjoying deep historical and security ties with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and other Middle Eastern countries. Iran has repeatedly highlighted the importance of its relationship with Pakistan and recognised the value of regional cooperation. The Makkah Declaration further strengthens this strategic momentum. The agreement reflects the shared commitment of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan to collective security and regional stability. It establishes that any armed attack against one of the three states will be regarded as an attack against all, while enhancing defence cooperation, military coordination and strategic collaboration. Built on historic relations, Islamic solidarity and common interests, the declaration aims to strengthen collective deterrence and contribute towards peace, security and prosperity. The emerging partnership between Pakistan’s political and defence leadership is being viewed by supporters as a coordinated national effort to protect Pakistan’s interests and expand its international role. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s diplomatic engagement and Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s strategic approach have together shaped a more proactive foreign policy outlook. The Makkah summit could become a defining moment in Pakistan’s international journey—strengthening its alliances, enhancing its strategic relevance and reinforcing its message that Pakistan seeks peace through cooperation, dialogue and responsible global engagement.

These days, one phrase echoes throughout our country: “Pakistan’s system has collapsed.” If we translate the word collapse into plain, colloquial language, it means that our so-called system has completely broken down, gone to ruin, or become utterly dysfunctional. Therefore, the argument goes, the country now needs a new system. This, they claim, can only happen if, instead of the existing four provinces, Pakistan is reorganized into thirty or thirty-two new provinces. Such a restructuring, they believe, would push aside the traditional politicians and allow a new generation of political leaders to emerge. Otherwise, they warn, just as in India, there will be an uprising of the “cockroaches”—that is, the youth—which will force this collapsed, rotten system to surrender. At first glance, these words appear attractive and appealing. They express not only frustration and disgust with our current political situation but also offer hope to the younger generation, particularly Generation Z. It is as if they are saying: “Dear frustrated young people! We are opening the doors to your future. You will rise, dominate the scene, and sweep away all the debris of the past—that is, the traditional politicians—with the force of your determination and enthusiasm.” However, this humble writer sees, behind these beautiful words, not a bright future but the same worn-out and ugly mirage of the past. In reality, those who are truly responsible—the real culprits—cleverly distance themselves from blame, divert the attention of the youth toward others, and then present themselves as the young people’s sympathizers and supporters. In our poetry, it is through such tricks that the beloved murderer becomes an innocent beloved, and the criminal appears as the trusted confidant. But this humble writer calls it what it really is: “the thief making the loudest outcry.” Our national poet, Iqbal, once wrote: There is an outcry that Muslims have vanished from the world; We ask: Were true Muslims ever really present? In appearance you resemble Christians, in civilization the Hindus; These are the Muslims before whom even the Jews would feel ashamed. If, in today’s circumstances, you replace the word “Muslims” with “system,” the verses take on a striking new meaning: There is an outcry that the system has vanished from the country; We ask: Was there ever really a system to begin with? If we were to parody the remaining verses, they might be difficult for some to digest. Suffice it to say that those in power never truly allowed a genuine system to develop here. And whenever, after much struggle, some semblance of a system did emerge, there were always certain “respectable gentlemen” who seemed to have taken an invisible oath—or perhaps a vow of deliberate silence—that it must never be allowed to function. In the eyes of this humble writer, our system truly collapsed on 16 August 1946, when, under the guidance of the British establishment, the Direct Action Day was observed, reducing the foundations of any future system to rubble. From that point onward, the struggle was no longer for a functioning system but for personal rule. That struggle strangled democracy, human rights, liberty, and freedom, and instead built a grand highway of coercion and dictatorship. Anyone who dared to step off that path or disagree with it was labeled a traitor, an enemy of the nation, an Indian agent, or part of the so-called “Fitna-e-Hind” (the Indian conspiracy). These labels were then applied to whomever those in power wished. The first victim was Dr. Khan Sahib’s democratically elected provincial government in the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), which was dismissed within the very first week. Soon afterward, the same authoritarian mentality struck the government of Ayub Khuhro in Sindh. It was also decided that any cabinet member who failed to say “Yes, Sir” to the Governor-General would be considered dispensable. Once the founding generation established such principles of governance, why would later generations lag behind in following them? Thereafter, the race for personal power was inevitable. In the end, victory was bound to go to whoever possessed the greater force—whether the power of the stick or the gun. How could it be otherwise? If, instead of making the Constitution and the rule of law your source of authority, you rely on personal superiority, intimidation, prestige, and the power of office, then someone carrying a gun will inevitably dominate the throne of personal power. And once that happens, the cycle simply continues. It is a law of nature that the bigger fish eats the smaller fish. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Muhammad, and Iskander Mirza all played their respective roles. Later, when greater power confronted lesser power, the result was the rise of powerful military rulers such as Ayub Khan, Agha Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Qamar Javed Bajwa. (To be continued)

A rise of anti immigration policies have been emerging rapidly across North America and Europe, especially in the United Kingdom and USA. The blue collar politicians and white people living there have expressed their concerns over these often labeled “illegal” immigrants causing crime and stealing the jobs of the “rightful” citizens. If looked closely upon, this is not about illegal immigration, rather it is a form of racism against the blacks, the Indians and rather anyone who is not white.   The United Kingdom had colonized a great part of the world which included the Indian subcontinent and a vast part of Africa along with other European colonizers whom they wanted to “civilize” as for them they were a “savage” race. This colonization resulted in thousands of black and Indian families migrating to Europe, especially the upper class who ought to receive English education and work in the British government.   This seems like a normal history dilemma where colonization led to great migrations and mixing, which the Europeans have now mayhaps forgotten. All over the UK, many rallies of white people have emerged in which they protested against immigration- however they in reality spread their similar racist views. These citizens may not realize the extent to which immigrants aided in growing the economy. If kicked out, the economy will collapse and suffer tremendously.   In recent years these anti immigration policies have caused major hurdles for students all over Asia, South America and Africa who are ambitious enough to study in the ivy leagues and settle abroad- however their visas being rejected have deteriorated their ambitions otherwise. This is being seen as a great disadvantage all over the world especially for the students who are forced into putting a hold on their education.   No more than the student, this poses a great threat to the Western countries themselves. Without the hands and minds of these students who are the future workforce who help stabilize and grow the economy, the countries will often suffer. Unlike most nations, Germany is seen as offering free education to these immigrants which has definitely bore the result making Germany one of the most powerful economies despite the restrictions imposed on them (after world war II).   The other side of this argument initiates from the government of respective countries like Pakistan whom the students and workers emigrate from- their government stating that they are much needed to support their own respective economies. Nevertheless, the great amount of corruption, instability and discrimination are the reasons in the first place for workers to emigrate seeking better secure jobs abroad. It is hard to revive the patriotic heart of civilians when the governments do not work in favour of them.   “France for the French” was said by Jean-Marie Le Pen since the immigrants are apparently threatening the French identity. The same french is spoken in 20 African countries who were forcefully colonized and turned into slaves, the countries who had their own languages (hundreds of them), cultures and identities. So it often seems extremely hypocritical to hear statements such as these.   Consequently, the immigrants framed as criminals are the result of centuries old racist ideologies. They pose no threat but the threat of looking different, which is again ironically hypocritical since white race is a minority in the world. Hence, even in the ripe year of 2026 racism thrives and the rest of the world suffers. Comments like “Immigration is not an opportunity. It is a tragedy.” ( by Marine Le Pen) are made openly without facing any backlash- instead receive grave support. Mayhaps immigration can stop once the British return the koh-e-noor, jewels and trillions of dollars worth of resources stolen from the sub continent.

Calling Babarloi Bypass the “Strait of Hormuz of Sindh” would not be an exaggeration. In Sindh’s nationalist political discourse, the name Babarloi Bypass has repeatedly resurfaced in connection with the “Babarloi Dharna” (sit-in). Babarloi is an ancient settlement in Khairpur district. According to historical accounts, including Tareekh-e-Masoomi and Tarkhan Nama, this was the place where Mughal Emperor Humayun, after being defeated by Sher Shah Suri and forced into exile, stayed for nearly six months before heading towards Iran. Today, Babarloi Bypass has emerged as a crucial junction on the National Highway N-5. This strategic corridor connects Sindh with Punjab, Balochistan and upper Sindh, making it a vital artery for trade and transportation. Economically, Punjab and Sindh are deeply interdependent. On one hand, Punjab relies on Sindh for imported goods arriving through Karachi’s ports, including machinery, industrial raw material, chemicals and electronics. It also depends on Sindh for the transportation of oil and petroleum products, as some of Pakistan’s major oil refineries and import terminals are located in Sindh. On the other hand, Sindh depends heavily on Punjab for wheat, flour, sugar, textiles, engineering goods, agricultural products, poultry, dairy and other food supplies. However, in comparative terms, blocking Babarloi Bypass on the N-5 route would cause a far greater economic disruption to Punjab than to Sindh because of Punjab’s larger dependence on this transit corridor for trade flows. Whether the issue is the controversial six-canal project or the debate over the creation of new provinces, some political stakeholders in Sindh view Babarloi Bypass as a pressure point against Punjab and the federal government. Their strategy has been to send a message that before raising questions about the division of Sindh, Punjab and the federation must recognise the consequences of alienating the province. For these groups, Babarloi Bypass has become Sindh’s equivalent of a strategic pressure point — a place through which pressure can be exerted on the federal centre. Last year, a major protest was staged at Babarloi Bypass (Khairpur, Sindh) against the federal government’s proposed project to construct six new canals from the Indus River. The eleven-day sit-in, organised by lawyers, nationalist parties, farmers’ organisations and civil society groups, continued from April 18 to April 29, 2025. As a result, the National Highway N-5 remained blocked at Babarloi Bypass, disrupting movement between Sindh and Punjab. The transportation of goods was almost suspended, affecting supplies of vegetables, fruits, cotton, rice and other agricultural commodities to Punjab. Several industries faced delays in receiving raw materials, while hundreds of trucks remained stranded for days, causing losses worth millions of rupees to transporters and traders. The protest eventually ended after negotiations between a delegation of the Sindh government and the lawyers’ action committee. The agreement included the following assurances: The Council of Common Interests (CCI) would decide the future of the controversial canal project, and no progress would be made without consensus among all provinces. The government assured the issuance of an official notification addressing the lawyers’ demands and promised to provide relevant legal documents. The Babarloi Dharna was considered one of the significant political protests of 2025 because it increased pressure on the federal government, disrupted the land link between Sindh and Punjab for several days, and played a role in bringing the canal issue back to the platform of the Council of Common Interests.   The following year, Babarloi Bypass once again became the centre of a major protest. On July 23, 2026, a second sit-in was staged, this time not against the canal project but to demand the recovery of 27 missing children from Sindh, including the high-profile case of Priya Kumari. The protest was attended by lawyers, civil society activists, nationalist political workers, families of missing children and ordinary citizens. During the protest, the debate over the creation of new provinces, particularly from Karachi and federal circles, once again gained momentum. As a result, Sindh’s nationalist politics was once again seen aligning itself with anti-centre and anti-Punjab sentiments during the demonstration. Moreover, some separatist elements reportedly raised slogans such as “Pakistan Na Khappe” (We do not want Pakistan) and “Pakistan Murdabad” (Down with Pakistan) during the sit-in. However, unlike the previous year, the protest was brought to an end by the Sindh government with the assistance of police authorities. The Babarlo police, in their own account of the incident, accused the protesters of obstructing police vehicles, resorting to stone-pelting, and raising anti-Pakistan slogans during the standoff. According to reports, police took action to disperse the protesters, several individuals were arrested, and later cases were registered against 13 named persons and around 150 unidentified individuals under various provisions, including anti-terrorism laws. The manner in which the Sindh government dealt with this year’s sit-in suggests a different political approach compared to nationalist leaders. It indicates that the provincial government was reluctant to escalate tensions with either the Punjab government or the Pakistan Peoples Party’s political partners at the federal level. The Sindh government also appeared unwilling to allow the closure of Babarloi Bypass to turn the issue into a larger confrontation. The PPP leadership is aware that preventing child abductions and ensuring the recovery of missing children is primarily the responsibility of the Sindh government; neither Punjab nor the federal government can be held directly accountable for such matters. Therefore, before nationalist groups could create a situation that might politically embarrass the PPP at the federal level, the Sindh government moved to end the sit-in and restrict the influence of protest organisers. Whether the two major political parties have reached an understanding behind closed doors under the spirit of the Charter of Democracy remains a matter of speculation. However, the way both parties continue to engage in verbal confrontations during the Azad Jammu and Kashmir elections appears, to some observers, to be part of a broader political strategy.

Pakistan has debated the elimination of riba—a Quranic term subjected to judicial interpretation and theological discourse but still lacking a precise statutory definition—for decades. Judicial decisions have been delivered, commissions constituted, reports prepared, appeals filed and withdrawn, deadlines announced and Islamic banking expanded. The central intellectual and legislative task, however, remains incomplete. We have not developed a precise, comprehensive and operational definition of the economic practices that must be prohibited. This omission is not merely academic. No financial system can be reconstructed around a prohibition that is expressed only as a moral declaration. A law [Who will draft Riba Prohibition Law? Minute Mirror, April 7, 2026] must identify the transaction, the prohibited increment, the parties affected, the substance to be examined and the consequences of violation. It must also distinguish an unlawful return on money from lawful earnings arising from trade, labour, services, ownership and commercial risk. The first requirement of a serious programme for the elimination of riba is clarity. Riba is commonly translated as interest/usury. This translation is useful but incomplete. Modern interest is one of its most important manifestations, particularly where a lender advances money and contractually claims an additional amount merely because the borrower is allowed time to repay. The prohibition, however, cannot be confined to instruments carrying the label “interest”. Nor can every commercial gain, deferred price or fixed payment be declared riba. The distinction lies in the legal and economic substance of the transaction. Where money is advanced as a loan and the lender is guaranteed an increase over the principal, the return does not arise from ownership of a productive asset, provision of a service, participation in business or exposure to commercial loss. It arises from the loan itself and the passage of time. The borrower must pay the increase whether the borrowed funds generate profit, produce loss, meet a medical emergency or finance bare survival. This asymmetry lies at the heart of the problem. Capital is protected; return is predetermined; risk is shifted to the borrower. Trade operates differently. A trader purchases or produces an asset, assumes the risks of ownership, incurs costs, faces the possibility of loss and sells the asset at a profit. The profit is not earned merely because money has been unavailable to another person for a period. It is connected with property, exchange, enterprise and market risk. Lease income also rests upon a different foundation. An owner permits another person to use an asset while retaining the liabilities associated with ownership. Rent represents consideration for the use of the asset. The arrangement becomes questionable when the supposed owner bears no meaningful ownership risk and the entire structure is merely a cash loan disguised through documents. Partnership profit has another character. Partners combine capital, work, expertise or enterprise. Profit is divided according to an agreed formula permitted by the applicable juristic principles, while financial loss follows the capital placed at risk. A partner cannot lawfully guarantee himself a fixed return upon capital and compel the other partner to bear every commercial loss. These distinctions are recognised, with variations, across the major Muslim schools. They differ on matters such as the permissible relationship between capital contribution and profit-sharing ratios, conditions attached to contracts, possession, agency and the allocation of particular risks. They do not treat every profit as riba. Nor do they permit a partner to convert genuine risk participation into a guaranteed return on money. A modern Prohibition of Riba law must preserve these distinctions. The difficulty is that contemporary finance has developed techniques through which a loan can be divided into several formally separate contracts. An institution may purchase an asset for a few moments, sell it to the customer at a marked-up price, obtain comprehensive security, transfer every economic risk to the customer and calculate its return by reference to the prevailing interest rate. The transaction may satisfy documentary requirements while reproducing the economic substance of conventional lending. The institution receives a predetermined return; the customer bears the commercial risk; and the institution’s temporary ownership exists mainly to legitimise the financing charge. This does not mean that murabaha, ijarah or diminishing musharakah are inherently invalid. Each can serve a legitimate commercial purpose. Murabaha can facilitate an actual purchase where the financier genuinely acquires and assumes responsibility for the asset before selling it. Ijarah can finance the use of an asset where the lessor retains real ownership obligations. Diminishing musharakah can support home ownership where the parties genuinely share ownership and the customer gradually acquires the financier’s units. The problem arises when these contracts are treated as legal devices for guaranteeing the same return that would have been received under an interest-bearing loan. A workable definition must therefore contain both a formal and a substantive test. The formal test will examine the legal category of the contract. The substantive test will determine whether the financier has provided an asset, service or productive participation and whether it has assumed a genuine risk corresponding to its return. This test should not be misunderstood as hostility towards fixed prices. A lawful sale price may be fixed. Rent may be determined in advance. A service fee may be agreed. The existence of a fixed amount does not by itself establish riba. The decisive question is what the payment represents. A fee charged for maintaining an account, transferring funds, valuing property, arranging documentation or providing an identifiable professional service may be legitimate. A “service fee” calculated as a percentage of a loan, increasing with time and unrelated to the actual cost or nature of the service may be interest under another name. The same care is required in relation to delayed payment. A seller, who supplies goods on deferred payment, may charge a price higher than the immediate cash price, provided one price is finally agreed when the contract is concluded. Once the debt has been created, however, an additional amount cannot ordinarily be imposed merely because the debtor requires more time. This is where many modern systems institutionalise exploitation. A

Every few months, someone declares that people no longer need literature. The argument usually sounds convincing enough. We live in a world of instant news, endless social media, podcasts, and artificial intelligence. Information arrives faster than ever before. Why spend days with a novel when an opinion can be delivered in mere seconds? Yet the strange thing is that the more information we have, the more relevant literature seems to become. Hand someone a novel written a century ago, and they might discover their own world reflected in its pages, including many of the same fears and uncertainties they face today. That is more than a coincidence. It is literature doing exactly what it has always done, peering beyond the moment in which it was written. Literature offers more than a compelling story and reminds us why it continues to resonate till date. Many admire literature for its alluring language and craft. Others value it for the evolutionary nature and futuristic tendencies. That’s the side this leans toward. Literature stays with us because it explains the world we’re still trying to make sense of. Every generation believes its experiences are unique. Pandemics feel unprecedented, propaganda seems like a modern invention and the world today evolves at a pace that feels unlike anything before it. Yet long before any of this dominated the headlines, writers had already imagined it, warned about it, or lived through versions of it themselves. Literature does not simply reflect its own era. It reaches far beyond it, exploring aspects of human nature that continue to surface despite changing circumstances. When COVID-19 hit in 2020, thousands of readers picked up a novel from 1947 and discovered echoes of the present. Albert Camus’s The Plague, set in the Algerian city of Oran, seemed to describe their own lives with strange precision; the empty streets, the panic-buying, the denial before the lockdowns, and that eerie numbness that emerged as the crisis dragged on. Camus never saw a pandemic like this coming. What he understood, decades before any of us lived through one, was how people respond when disruption takes hold. George Orwell did something similar, except his warning arrived even earlier. Nineteen Eighty-Four gave us words we now use so casually and forget they came from fiction: surveillance, doublethink, thoughtcrime. Orwell imagined a state where truth could be manipulated and every move was watched. Decades later, in a world run by data and constant tracking, his descriptions still feel eerily familiar. Pakistani writers were making this same point long before it became the world’s concern. Saadat Hasan Manto’s Toba Tek Singh imagined a man stranded between two countries decades before the world started talking about refugees and border crises. Qurratulain Hyder’s Aag Ka Darya traced the same cycle of displacement and rebuilding that we’re still watching today, whether in Gaza, Ukraine, or Afghanistan, revealing how human beings survive conflict no matter which war or which century it happens to be. What makes literature so accurate over time is not mysticism. Writers were not fortune-tellers. They were keen observers of human nature. They sensed that while the world keeps reinventing itself, people rarely do. A writer who understands these instincts deeply enough, produces literature that seems to anticipate futures it was never meant to witness. That same power demands caution. Literature can expose hidden truths just as easily as it can be used as a tool of persuasion. Throughout history, poems, novels, and stories have been used to shape how people think, feel, and behave. Rudyard Kipling’s The White Man’s Burden is a reminder of how easily powerful narratives can turn domination into duty. It shows how persuasive language can make unequal power structures appear virtuous and troubling ideas sound noble. The same dynamic persists today, whenever power seeks a more palatable language to conceal itself. The Soviet Union promoted an entire genre known as socialist realism, where literature was not expected to explore human complexity but to glorify the state and inspire loyalty. Even something as ordinary as a school curriculum works the same way. The books chosen for students are never just neutral stories. They are early lessons that shape young minds, teaching them which histories to trust and which values to hold onto. This is the quiet, manipulative side of literature that doesn’t need to announce itself, yet still decides how an entire generation views the world. Literature deserves more than passive consumption. The same stories that broaden our understanding can also be used to influence and persuade. That makes reading critically, asking who wrote something and why, not just an academic skill, but a way of navigating a world built on narratives. What keeps literature alive is not tradition, nostalgia, or academic praise. It is the moment of recognition it still delivers. When a writer long gone can describe anxieties, conflicts, and dilemmas that feel unmistakably current, how many of our modern concerns are merely old questions in new disguises?

Pakistan and the United States have maintained one of the most consequential yet complex bilateral relationships in South Asia. Over more than seven decades, the relationship has witnessed periods of close strategic cooperation, moments of mutual disappointment, and repeated efforts at rebuilding trust. Today, amid shifting geopolitical realities, economic transformation, and emerging technological opportunities, both countries have a rare chance to redefine their partnership based on equality, mutual respect, and long-term shared interests rather than short-term strategic expediency. Pakistan recognized the United States soon after its independence in 1947, and diplomatic relations were formally established in 1948. During the Cold War, Pakistan emerged as an important security partner, joining U.S.-backed regional alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. The relationship deepened further during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when both countries cooperated closely in support of the Afghan resistance. Following the end of the Cold War, however, strategic priorities diverged. The imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment, differences over nuclear policy, and declining geopolitical convergence created a period of mistrust. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Pakistan again became a frontline partner in global counterterrorism efforts. While this cooperation produced significant security outcomes, it also imposed enormous economic, human, and social costs on Pakistan. Differences over regional security, Afghanistan, drone operations, and counterterrorism strategies periodically strained bilateral ties. Despite these fluctuations, the relationship never completely lost its strategic relevance. Both countries continued cooperation in defense, education, health, agriculture, energy, and people-to-people exchanges. Millions of Pakistani-Americans have served as an enduring bridge between the two societies, making valuable contributions to American economic, academic, technological, and public life while strengthening bilateral understanding. Recent diplomatic engagement indicates that both Islamabad and Washington recognize the need to move beyond a security-centric relationship. The visit of senior members of the U.S. Congress and American business leaders to Pakistan, alongside growing high-level diplomatic exchanges, demonstrates renewed interest in expanding cooperation across multiple sectors. Pakistan’s leadership has correctly emphasized that mature strategic partnerships are increasingly measured not by military cooperation alone but by the depth of economic, technological, and commercial engagement. Economic cooperation offers perhaps the greatest untapped potential. The United States remains Pakistan’s largest single-country export destination, while bilateral trade has continued to grow steadily. Pakistan imports American cotton, soybeans, advanced technology, and industrial equipment, while exporting textiles, apparel, surgical instruments, sporting goods, agricultural products, and information technology services. However, the current trade volume remains far below its potential. Expanding bilateral trade toward the proposed target of $20 billion over the coming years would benefit businesses, workers, and consumers in both countries. Pakistan’s improving macroeconomic stability, structural reforms, investment facilitation through the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), expanding digital economy, growing technology sector, critical minerals, renewable energy projects, and improved logistics infrastructure provide new opportunities for American investors. The recent financing support for the Reko Diq mining project demonstrates that confidence in Pakistan’s long-term economic prospects is increasing. At the same time, the relationship should not overlook cooperation in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, higher education, climate resilience, healthcare, agricultural modernization, clean energy, semiconductor supply chains, and digital entrepreneurship. These areas represent the future of global competitiveness and can become new pillars of bilateral cooperation. Yet lasting partnerships require addressing historical shortcomings. For decades, Pakistan-U.S. relations have often been shaped by transactional calculations linked to immediate regional crises. This cyclical engagement has produced recurring trust deficits whenever strategic priorities shifted. Both sides should now avoid allowing temporary geopolitical developments to define a relationship with far broader potential. Several steps can help transform bilateral relations into a more durable partnership. First, both governments should institutionalize regular strategic dialogue covering trade, investment, technology, education, climate, and regional security. Second, expanding private-sector investment should become a central objective alongside government-to-government cooperation. Third, greater parliamentary exchanges, academic collaboration, and cultural diplomacy can reduce misconceptions and strengthen public understanding. Fourth, both countries should respect each other’s sovereignty, security concerns, and national priorities while managing differences through sustained dialogue. Finally, cooperation should increasingly be guided by equality, transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit rather than dependency or short-term geopolitical calculations. The Pakistan-United States relationship has survived changing global orders because it rests on shared interests that extend beyond any single issue or region. In today’s interconnected world, economic resilience, technological innovation, and regional stability require partnerships built on trust and consistency. By embracing a forward-looking agenda centered on trade, investment, innovation, and people-to-people ties, Islamabad and Washington can transform a relationship shaped by history into one driven by shared opportunity. The future of Pakistan-U.S. relations need not be defined by the ups and downs of the past. It can instead become a model of pragmatic cooperation—one based on sincerity, equality, mutual respect, and a common commitment to peace, stability, and shared prosperity.  Author: Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan,  Sinologist – Diplomat – Advisor – Consultant, Founding Chair, Global Silk Route research Alliance.

By Asma Rahmat, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University and Muhammad Ameer Hamza, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University   The legal profession has long been regarded as one of the most respected and tradition-bound institutions in society, founded on human intellect, ethical judgment, and the pursuit of justice. Yet, like every other profession, it is now experiencing the profound impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Across the globe, AI is transforming industries by automating routine tasks, enhancing productivity, and improving decision-making. The legal sector is no exception. While countries with advanced legal systems have already begun integrating AI into legal practice and judicial administration, Pakistan is only beginning to explore its potential. The challenge before us is not whether AI will become part of the legal profession, but whether we are prepared to embrace this technological revolution while preserving the fundamental values of justice, fairness, and the rule of law. Artificial Intelligence has the ability to process vast amounts of information within seconds, making it an invaluable tool for legal professionals. Today, AI-powered software can conduct legal research, review contracts, summarize lengthy case files, identify relevant judicial precedents, and even assist in drafting legal documents. These are tasks that traditionally consumed hours or even days of a lawyer’s time. By automating repetitive and time-consuming work, AI enables lawyers to focus on the more complex aspects of their profession, including legal strategy, courtroom advocacy, negotiation, and client counseling. Rather than replacing legal professionals, AI has the potential to become a reliable assistant that enhances both efficiency and accuracy. For Pakistan, where the judicial system continues to struggle with delays and an ever-growing backlog of cases, the responsible use of AI could bring much-needed reform. Thousands of litigants wait years for the resolution of their disputes, often because courts are overburdened and administrative processes remain largely manual. AI can assist in organizing digital records, managing court schedules, classifying legal documents, and simplifying legal research for judges and lawyers alike. These improvements could significantly reduce delays, improve case management, and make the justice system more efficient without compromising judicial independence. Importantly, AI should support judicial decision-making rather than replace it, as the final responsibility for interpreting the law must always remain with judges. Beyond improving efficiency, AI also offers an opportunity to strengthen access to justice. A significant portion of Pakistan’s population cannot afford legal representation or lacks access to basic legal information. AI-powered legal assistance platforms, particularly those available in Urdu and regional languages, could provide citizens with preliminary guidance on their legal rights, court procedures, and available remedies. Such tools would not replace qualified lawyers but could empower individuals by helping them understand the legal system before seeking professional assistance. In a country where legal awareness remains limited, technology can become a powerful means of promoting legal literacy and strengthening public confidence in the justice system. The emergence of AI is equally significant for legal education. Law students now have access to intelligent research tools that can summarize judgments, explain complex legal principles, compare international legal systems, and assist in legal writing. These technologies can make legal education more interactive and research-oriented. However, they also present a challenge. Students must avoid becoming overly dependent on AI-generated content, as legal education is ultimately designed to develop analytical reasoning, critical thinking, and independent judgment. Future lawyers must learn not only how to use AI responsibly but also how to question its outputs, verify legal authorities, and apply legal principles thoughtfully. Despite its many advantages, Artificial Intelligence raises several legal and ethical concerns that cannot be ignored. AI systems are not infallible. They may generate inaccurate information, misinterpret legal authorities, or reflect biases contained within the data on which they were trained. A lawyer who relies solely on AI without verifying its results risks providing incorrect legal advice or presenting flawed arguments before the court. Furthermore, the use of AI raises important concerns regarding client confidentiality and data protection. Lawyers have a professional and ethical obligation to protect sensitive client information, and any use of AI must ensure that confidential data is handled securely. These concerns highlight the importance of developing ethical guidelines governing AI’s use within the legal profession. Pakistan currently lacks a comprehensive legal framework specifically regulating Artificial Intelligence. While existing laws address cybercrime and certain aspects of electronic transactions, they do not adequately address issues such as AI accountability, transparency, liability, algorithmic bias, or the protection of personal data in AI-assisted legal services. As AI becomes more prevalent, policymakers must establish a clear regulatory framework that encourages technological innovation while safeguarding constitutional rights, including privacy, equality before the law, and the right to due process. Such regulation will be essential to ensuring that AI serves society without undermining public trust in legal institutions. Perhaps the greatest misconception surrounding AI is the belief that it will eventually replace lawyers. In reality, the legal profession depends upon qualities that no machine can fully replicate. Lawyers do not merely apply legal rules; they exercise judgment, interpret complex factual situations, negotiate settlements, understand human emotions, and advocate persuasively before courts. Similarly, judges must balance competing rights, interpret legislation in light of constitutional principles, and deliver reasoned decisions based on justice and equity. These responsibilities require wisdom, experience, empathy, and moral reasoning—qualities that remain uniquely human. AI can provide information and support, but it cannot replace the conscience, ethical responsibility, and professional judgment that define the legal profession. The future of the legal profession in Pakistan therefore lies in collaboration rather than competition between humans and technology. Law schools should introduce courses on Artificial Intelligence, legal technology, and digital ethics to prepare future lawyers for an increasingly technology-driven profession. Bar councils and regulatory authorities should establish professional standards governing the ethical use of AI in legal practice, while the judiciary should continue investing in digital infrastructure to improve the administration of justice. At the same time, legal professionals must embrace lifelong learning so they can adapt to technological advancements without compromising the integrity

Pakistan’s electricity sector is witnessing a quiet revolution. Between January 2024 and June 2026, the country imported more than 6 GWh of lithium-ion batteries, with monthly imports rising to 652 MWh in April 2026, according to the latest commentary by the Policy Research Institute of Market Economy (PRIME). The data confirms what many consumers already know: battery storage is rapidly becoming an integral component of Pakistan’s emerging distributed energy system. Against this backdrop, the proposal reportedly advanced by the Adviser to the Power Division, Syed Faizan Ali, to introduce Time-of-Use (ToU) net billing with an additional compensation of Rs18–22 per kWh for electricity discharged between 5 pm and 10 pm deserves serious attention. It represents one of the first attempts by policymakers to recognise battery storage as an active participant in the electricity market rather than merely a backup power source. PRIME has welcomed this initiative in its recent Prime Comment #44, “Turning Pakistan’s Battery Boom into a Grid Asset”, arguing that battery storage can transform millions of privately owned batteries into valuable grid resources capable of reducing evening peak demand and improving overall system efficiency. The think tank also reminds readers that in its April 2026 Prime Plus edition, PRIME  had advocated accelerated investment in Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) as part of Pakistan’s response to regional geopolitical tensions and growing concerns over energy security. The proposal is intellectually attractive. It recognises a simple economic truth: electricity stored during periods of abundant solar generation becomes considerably more valuable when discharged during the evening peak. Properly designed price signals can therefore encourage consumers to invest in storage while simultaneously reducing pressure on the national grid. The underlying economics are difficult to dispute. The policy conclusions, however, deserve far closer scrutiny. Pakistan’s electricity crisis has never been merely a shortage of technology. It has always been a crisis of institutions. For decades, governments have attempted to resolve structural failures through new incentives while leaving untouched the governance failures that created those problems in the first place. Capacity payments, guaranteed returns, fuel subsidies, cross-subsidies, circular debt financing and administratively determined tariffs all originated as seemingly sensible policy responses. Over time, they evolved into a complex web of distortions that now define Pakistan’s power sector. The battery revolution should not become the latest chapter in this history. The most immediate question concerns the proposed compensation itself. Every additional rupee paid for exported battery electricity ultimately has a source. If the payment is financed through higher consumer tariffs, ordinary electricity users subsidise battery owners. If financed through public resources, taxpayers assume another fiscal obligation. Unless the proposed payment reflects demonstrable savings through lower capacity utilisation, reduced reliance on expensive peaking generation, avoided transmission investments and lower fuel imports, it risks becoming another subsidy disguised as reform. The second issue concerns Pakistan’s peculiar electricity economics. The country simultaneously suffers from surplus installed generation capacity and shortages during particular hours of the day. Consumers continue paying enormous capacity charges even when power plants remain idle. Before introducing payments for battery discharge, policymakers should demonstrate whether distributed storage actually reduces these fixed obligations or merely shifts electricity from one time period to another while capacity payments continue unchanged. This distinction is fundamental. If batteries merely redistribute electricity without lowering total system costs, consumersmay simply end up paying twice: once for idle generating plants and again for battery incentives. PRIME’s analysis correctly highlights the dramatic increase in battery imports. Nevertheless, imports alone cannot determine public policy. Customs statistics reveal the volume of batteries entering Pakistan but not how they are ultimately deployed. Many imported batteries are likely destined for residential solar systems, telecommunications infrastructure, commercial backup systems, electric vehicles and industrial facilities rather than grid-support applications. Policy requires greater precision. Residential battery storage serving a single household differs fundamentally from utility-scale storage capable of providing ancillary grid services. The regulatory treatment, compensation mechanisms and operational obligations cannot be identical. Perhaps the most important omission concerns the electricity market itself. Time-of-Use pricing presupposes the existence of a reasonably competitive electricity market where prices reflect actual system conditions. Pakistan, however, continues to operate largely through administratively determined tariffs, long-term power purchase agreements and regulatory pricing decisions. Introducing another administratively determined premium without competitive price discovery risks creating fresh opportunities for regulatory arbitrage instead of improving market efficiency. The proposal also raises important questions of distributive justice. Battery storage remains concentrated among relatively affluent households and commercial consumers who have already invested in rooftop solar systems. Additional payments for exported electricity may transfer resources from ordinary grid-dependent consumers to wealthier “prosumers” capable of producing electricity themselves. A sound public policy must ask not only whether incentives improve efficiency but also who ultimately pays for them. Fiscal sustainability presents another challenge. Pakistan’s public finances remain under extraordinary pressure. Circular debt continues to impose significant costs upon the national exchequer while electricity subsidies consume scarce fiscal space. Every new incentive introduced into the power sector should be accompanied by transparent estimates of its medium-term fiscal consequences. Without such analysis, even economically desirable policies may produce unsustainable budgetary commitments. The environmental dimension deserves equal attention. Large-scale deployment of lithium-ion batteries inevitably raises questions concerning recycling, disposal, fire safety and hazardous waste management. Pakistan presently lacks a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework governing battery end-of-life management. Encouraging rapid battery adoption without simultaneously addressing environmental responsibilities merely postpones another policy problem for the future. Cybersecurity also enters the equation. As distributed storage becomes increasingly integrated with smart meters, digital communication systems and automated dispatch mechanisms, cybersecurity standards become an essential component of electricity regulation rather than an afterthought. The broader lesson extends beyond batteries. Pakistan’s remarkable solar revolution demonstrates that citizens and businesses are increasingly solving their own energy problems because the formal electricity system has become prohibitively expensive and unreliable. International observers have correctly described this transformation as one of the world’s most significant examples of consumer-led energy transition rather than state-led planning. Public policy should seek to complement—not constrain—this transition. However, complementing it

For much of the past half-century, the Middle East was described in binaries: Arab and Israeli, Sunni and Shia, American ally and adversary. That framework is no longer sufficient. In the span of 18 months, two events have forced a fundamental reassessment of regional order: a Chinese-brokered handshake between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, and the eruption of war in Gaza in October 2023. Together, they have set in motion a realignment that is testing old alliances, elevating new mediators, and leaving the future of American-backed normalization efforts deeply uncertain.   The significance extends well beyond the region. How power is distributed between Riyadh, Tehran, Ankara, Cairo and Tel Aviv shapes global energy markets, maritime security in the Red Sea, nuclear non-proliferation, and great-power competition between the United States and China. What emerges is not a new stable order, but a fluid period of transactional diplomacy in which ideology is increasingly subordinated to regime survival and economic interest.   A Rapprochement Brokered in Beijing   The agreement announced on March 10, 2023, that Saudi Arabia and Iran would restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year rupture was remarkable less for its content than for its venue. The deal was negotiated over four days in Beijing, with China acting as guarantor.   The context was pragmatic. For Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, foreign policy has become inseparable from Vision 2030, an ambitious plan to diversify the economy away from oil. That vision requires regional calm. The years preceding the deal saw drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure at Abqaiq and Khurais, a costly and inconclusive war in Yemen where Tehran backed the Houthi movement, and rising oil price volatility. De-escalation with Iran offered a path to contain those risks.   For Iran, the calculus was equally material. Facing stringent international sanctions, inflation above 40 percent at the time, and domestic unrest following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, Tehran sought diplomatic breathing room and economic openings, particularly with Gulf states that could provide investment and trade channels.   China’s role was both opportunistic and strategic. As the largest buyer of both Saudi and Iranian crude, Beijing had unique leverage and a direct interest in the stability of Gulf shipping lanes. The mediation allowed China to present itself as a responsible alternative to the United States, a power broker capable of delivering outcomes Washington could not, given its lack of diplomatic ties with Iran. Analysts in Washington and Brussels were quick to note the limits of this shift: China did not replace the U.S. security umbrella that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states continue to rely on, nor did it offer a framework for resolving deeper sectarian and strategic rivalries. The agreement did not settle disputes over Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, or Iran’s nuclear program. It did, however, establish that regional rivals were willing to manage competition through dialogue rather than direct confrontation, and that Beijing was willing to facilitate it.   The Abraham Accords on Hold   If the Saudi-Iran détente represented one vector of realignment, the Abraham Accords represented another. Signed in 2020, the U.S.-brokered agreements that normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco marked a paradigm shift. They rested on the premise that shared concerns over Iran and shared economic interests could advance Arab-Israeli normalization even without resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   By mid-2023, attention had turned to the potential prize of Saudi-Israeli normalization. U.S. officials pursued an ambitious package that would have linked a Saudi-Israel deal with U.S. security guarantees for Riyadh and support for a civilian nuclear program, alongside concessions toward the Palestinians.   The war in Gaza, triggered by Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed approximately 1,200 people and led to the abduction of more than 250 hostages, and followed by Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, which Gaza health authorities report has killed tens of thousands, has fundamentally altered that trajectory.   Saudi Arabia has not abandoned the idea of normalization, but it has recalibrated its public conditions. Riyadh has stated repeatedly that any deal now requires a credible, irreversible path toward a Palestinian state. This position reflects both genuine concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza and a reading of domestic and wider Arab public opinion, where images from the war have generated widespread anger.   For the UAE and Bahrain, which maintained their embassies in Israel throughout the war, the Accords have endured but become more subdued. Economic and security cooperation, particularly on technology, trade, and air defense against Iranian drones, has continued behind closed doors. Public-facing celebration of the accords, however, has largely been suspended. The experience has highlighted a duality: the Accords have proven resilient as state-to-state security arrangements, but fragile as instruments of broader regional integration without progress on the Palestinian question.   Gaza and the Redistribution of Influence   The prolonged conflict in Gaza has accelerated several regional trends. First, it has restored the centrality of the Palestinian issue to Arab diplomacy, after a period when many policymakers assumed it could be sidelined.   Second, it has empowered non-state actors and redefined deterrence. The near-daily exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah until a late-2024 ceasefire, attacks on international shipping by the Houthis in the Red Sea that disrupted an estimated 12 percent of global trade at its peak, and direct Iranian-Israeli missile exchanges in April 2024 demonstrated that escalation management has become the defining security challenge of the region.   Third, it has created space for middle powers to mediate. Qatar, alongside Egypt and the United States, emerged as a central mediator in hostage and ceasefire negotiations due to its channels to Hamas. Turkey has sought to leverage its political support for the Palestinian cause while maintaining economic ties with Israel. Oman has continued its quiet role as a back-channel facilitator.   For the United States, the war has illustrated both its indispensability and its constraints. Washington remains the only power capable