Opinion

I have lost count of how many times I have written this sentence. Trump announces a possible dialogue with Iran. Iran denies it within hours. Then Pakistan quietly steps in to keep the peace alive. I sit down to write about it again, and I feel a strange mixture of hope and exhaustion. This cycle has repeated itself so many times since this war began that I could write it in my sleep. Let me walk you through what happened this time, because I think you deserve to understand the pattern as clearly as I do. President Donald Trump took to his social media platform Truth Social and declared that Washington and Tehran are talking. He said Iran may not admit it, but both nations are working through a problem that has lingered for decades. He accused Iranian leaders of playing a double game. He said the outcome will be one of two things. Either a deal gets made, or Iran faces what he called complete surrender. He also insisted that America will never let Iran get its hands on a nuclear weapon. Then, right on cue, Iran said no. Foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei stood before reporters and rejected every word of it. He said there are no negotiations happening with the United States. He said the only contact right now involves Oman, and it concerns nothing more than keeping ships moving safely through the Strait of Hormuz. I want you to notice something here. This is not a new argument. I have watched this exact exchange play out again and again. One side claims talks are happening. The other side flatly denies it. And somewhere in the middle, the truth probably sits quietly, waiting for someone honest enough to admit it. This is where Pakistan enters the picture, as it so often does. Turkish news agency Anadolu reported that Pakistan and Qatar are working to arrange a new round of direct talks. Islamabad and Doha are both being considered as possible venues where America and Iran might eventually sit across from each other again. I find this part of the story important, and I do not think it gets enough credit. Pakistan helped broker something called the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, which brought about a ceasefire back in June. That agreement asked both sides to stop military action, keep the Strait of Hormuz open for trade, and begin serious talks on Iran’s nuclear program and American sanctions. Iranian parliamentary spokesman Hassan Gashghavi confirmed that mediating countries are now trying to breathe new life into that same agreement. Deputy Prime Minister and foreign minister Ishaq Dar spoke by phone with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, on Monday. They discussed the broader situation in the region and the ongoing diplomatic efforts across the Middle East. Dar also invited Araghchi to visit Pakistan soon. I keep coming back to one question as I write this. How many more times will I have to write this same story? How many more announcements, denials, and quiet rescues will it take before something actually holds? I will be honest with you. I am tired of writing about tension. I am tired of watching one side hint at peace while the other side pulls back. I am tired of hearing familiar names promise a resolution that never quite arrives. But I still hold onto something, and I think you should too. I hope this is the last time I have to write this cycle. I hope the next headline is not about another denial or another delayed meeting. I hope it is about a real, lasting peace, the kind that does not need Pakistan or Qatar or anyone else to keep rescuing it.

Federal Minister for Planning Ahsan Iqbal announced that the government will place the National Flood Protection Plan IV before the Council of Common Interests for approval. The price tag is now Rs 700 billion. The same plan was approved by the CCI in 2017 at roughly half that amount. The minister was candid: the previous governments failed to implement it, and the 2022 floods forced a revision. Nearly a decade and a half after the plan was first conceived after the 2010 floods that devastated the country, we are back where we started, except the bill has grown by Rs 360 billion. But there is a problem with the numbers, and it is not a small one. In November 2025, Secretary Water Resources Syed Ali Murtaza testified before the Senate Standing Committee on Water Resources that NFPP-IV comprised 375 schemes with a total cost of Rs 824.493 billion. The provincial component alone stood at Rs 746.961 billion, while the federal share was only Rs 77.533 billion. He told the committee that provinces had refused to contribute their shares, escalating the matter to the CCI. Eight months later, the same plan is being presented at Rs 700 billion with a 50-50 federal-provincial split. The total has been trimmed by roughly Rs 124 billion despite inflation and rising cost of construction, and the provinces’ burden has been halved. A plan that shrinks by fifteen percent despite the increased costs and flips its cost-sharing formula in eight months is not rigorously costed. It is still being negotiated politically, not finalized technically. After the 2022 floods, international donors pledged $11 billion for reconstruction and flood protection. Three years later, Pakistan had utilized less than $3 billion. Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb admitted that Pakistan failed to prepare a single credible, bankable project to access the funds. The money sat in files while the people sat in mud and water. It is one thing to lack funds. It is quite another to hold the funds and lack the institutional capacity to spend them. So when the government now asks for Rs 700 billion, the question is not whether we need the plan. We do. The question is whether we have earned the right to spend it, or are simply paying compound interest on a decade of negligence. In 2017, When the CCI approved the National Flood Protection Plan in 2017, the Punjab Assembly had already passed the Flood Plain Regulation Act of 2016. That Act designated flood plains, mandated annual surveys, prohibited all construction without written permission, and criminalized unauthorized building. Section 20 gave it overriding effect over all other laws. It was a good, careful law. And for ten years, we ignored it. Then came the 2022 floods, killing more than 1,700 and displacing 33 million. The 2023 Punjab Irrigation Act, strengthened the framework further. . Then came the Infrastructure Audit Programme of January 2026, promising to inspect and certify every embankment before the rains. The NDMA had warned in November 2025 that the 2026 monsoon would bring 22 to 26 percent above-normal rainfall. In May, Chairman Lt Gen Inam Haider Malik was briefed the Emergency Response Committee. The warnings were not classified. They were reported in media across the country. And still, on July 31, as the Sawan rains continue and Bhadoon approaches, we are told that a Rs 700 billion plan is about to be placed before the CCI. The human cost of this incompetence is measured in lives, not spreadsheets. Between June 26 and July 25, 2026, NDMA recorded 97 deaths and 297 injuries in rain-related incidents. House and roof collapses were the leading cause, with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reporting the highest toll, followed by Punjab. The authority evacuated 3,841 people. These are not abstract figures. They are preventable losses and deaths in a country that had years to prepare. Meanwhile, last year’s federal budget slashed water sector allocations by 27 percent, from Rs 184.6 billion to Rs 133.4 billion for the water sector. Even the flagship Diamer-Basha Dam saw reduced priority. The message is clear: politically visible projects win funding; invisible embankments lose it. We are also building vulnerability into the landscape faster than we are building protection. The hundred-arch bridge near Shahdara was designed a century ago to let Ravi floodwater pass freely. In September 2025, the M5 motorway near Jalalpur Pirwala collapsed after the Sutlej River breached its banks, blocking natural channels with inadequate culverts. Modern infrastructure is failing where century-old engineering succeeded because hydrology is no longer part of the design brief. Every stakeholder knows what needs to be done. District officials know where encroachments choke flood channels. Engineers know where embankments need reinforcement. Satellite imagery can map floodplains with precision. Yet these tools are shelved while development authorities continue to approve new roads, schools and BHUs for permanent dwellings that should not have been there to begin with.  New high profile housing schemes are regularized in natural river basins. The National Water Policy, approved by the CCI in April 2018, promised real-time telemetry by the end of 2021 and a National Water Council chaired by the Prime Minister to meet annually. Seven years later, the Council has convened only once, in October 2018. The telemetry system is five years past its deadline. The unfinished cost of ongoing water schemes stands at approximately Rs 1.27 trillion. What would it take to believe this time will be different? Not more money. We have enough money to drown in. What we lack is accountability that lives on the riverbank. The Infrastructure Audit of 2026 must be opened to the public, if it was ever done. The names of every certifying officer who signed off on an embankment must be known, and if a structure fails, the officer must stand beside it and explain. And if not, we need to ask why not? The early warning system must learn to speak to the village, not the province. Alerts must name villages and localaties, expected water levels, and designated evacuation routes. They

I have stood in places most policymakers only read about in briefing papers. I spent time in Afghanistan during the Ashraf Ghani years, and the whole of 2010 in what was then Ex-FATA — a zone so dangerous that even seasoned aid workers called it the place where devils refuse to go. Later, I worked on rehabilitation efforts in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. None of what I am about to argue is theoretical. It is drawn from villages of EX-FATA I walked through, water I watched women carry for miles on donkeys, and children I saw crossing frozen ground without shoes while, an hour’s drive away, the Afghan elite lived behind walls that looked like fortresses. That contrast is the whole story of why the Taliban won. Over two decades, the Western-backed Afghanistan collapsed not primarily on the battlefield but in the space between Kabul’s donor-funded skyline and the rural provinces that never saw a rupee — or a dollar — of that money trickle down. Billions moved through Kabul. Almost none of it moved past it. Into that vacuum, the Taliban did not need to conquer the countryside. They simply had to show up where the state never had, and offer order where there was only neglect. In 2010, in FATA, I watched the same mechanism recruit teenage boys into suicide bombing — and the driving force was rarely ideology in its purest form. It was poverty, weaponised by men who understood exactly how to turn deprivation into obedience. I say this because Pakistan is now watching its own soldiers and citizens bleed in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and we keep mistaking the symptom for the disease. In Balochistan, it is poor living conditions and the absence of work that push young men toward the BLA and other militant groups — not some inherited hatred of the state, but the calculation of someone with nothing left to lose. In KPK, mining activity that could employ tens of thousands sits frozen, and extremist preachers walk into that economic silence with a ready-made narrative of grievance, exactly as I watched happen in FATA 16 years ago. In Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK), where I subsequently served on the front lines of post-disaster rehabilitation, the work executed under the leadership of General Musharraf and Lieutenant General Nadeem was nothing short of extraordinary. They transformed the region—erecting world-class infrastructure that spanned rural housing, modern hospitals, and state-of-the-art universities. Having witnessed his work firsthand, I can unhesitatingly attest that Lt. Gen. Nadeem exemplified the highest standards of professional integrity and selfless duty in the field. Regrettably, subsequent regimes, particularly the current political regime, failed to capitalize on this monumental achievement. Worse still, political negotiators deliberately suppressed these successes under strict orders to deny General Musharraf the credit he rightly deserved It was neither the foreign conspiracies spun about Modi nor the shadow plays attributed to Netanyahu that brought us to our knees—it was the quiet, deliberate treason of our own. The true architects of our ruin sat comfortably in our own cabinets, presiding over the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Petroleum. Let the record be unsealed, and let the ledger of corruption show the reality of our sabotage. While the global solar revolution was gaining unstoppable, undeniable momentum as far back as 2012, our planners turned a blind eye to the sun. Instead, they peddled dirty imported coal and structurally flawed LNG infrastructure, deceitfully masquerading them as national “game-changers.” They were not mistakes; they were choices. They willfully shackled this nation to predatory FSRU contracts, riddled with toxic force majeure loopholes that bled our public treasury dry to enrich foreign syndicates and domestic middlemen. Their actions expose a chilling, unvarnished truth: capital was never the bottleneck. Financial constraints were a myth. The true poverty of this nation was the shameless, treasonous lack of political will to break free from the payout loop and build a sovereign future. According to Pakistan’s own energy regulator, NEPRA, consumers were burdened with roughly Rs1.81 trillion in capacity payments in fiscal year 2024–25 alone — fixed payments to power producers simply for having plants available, regardless of whether they generated a single unit of electricity. That figure made up 61 percent of the country’s entire power purchase cost. On a per-unit basis, Pakistanis paid roughly Rs14.3 for capacity alone, compared to about Rs9.0 for the energy actually consumed. Multiply that pattern across recent years and the country has handed over trillions of rupees to keep idle machinery on standby, while Pakistani manufacturers pay electricity rates nearly double what their competitors pay in India and Vietnam, hollowing out the very industries that could have employed the young men now being recruited by militants instead. Even a third of what has been paid out in capacity charges over the past five years — redirected honestly into youth employment programs in KPK, Balochistan, and AJK — would have done more to end this insurgency than any military operation conducted so far. This is not sentiment. It is arithmetic that any finance ministry could run in an afternoon. And here the accountability question becomes unavoidable. The man who, as federal minister for petroleum and natural resources from 2013 to 2018, championed the LNG import architecture that helped lock Pakistan into the very capacity-payment structure now crushing consumers, later became Prime Minister of Pakistan. He subsequently faced formal NAB proceedings, an indictment, and questions in court over unexplained deposits connected to that period — a matter of public record, still contested by his supporters as political victimization, but investigated nonetheless by the country’s own anti-graft body. I raise this not to relitigate one man’s guilt or innocence in a courtroom I am not sitting in, but to make a structural point: the same energy policy architecture that produced Pakistan’s capacity-payment crisis was built, negotiated, and defended by people who moved seamlessly from ministry to premiership to private life, largely untouched by the consequences their decisions imposed on

The recently published PRIME Plus report, An Assessment of the FY2026–27 Federal Budget Through the Lens of Economic Freedom, deserves appreciation for shifting the debate beyond conventional budget arithmetic. Rather than asking merely whether taxes have increased or decreased, it examines whether the budget enlarges or restricts the freedom of individuals and businesses to produce, invest, trade and innovate. That alone makes it a valuable contribution to Pakistan’s policy discourse. The report of Policy Research Institute of Market Economy (PRIME) correctly observes that Pakistan’s formal economy bears a disproportionate tax burden while much of the informal sector remains outside the effective tax net. It questions tax expenditures exceeding Rs 2.35 trillion, highlights the crowding out of private investment by government borrowing, welcomes tariff rationalisation and criticises regulatory uncertainty. These issues deserve much wider public attention. PRIME’s analysis also points towards a deeper weakness in Pakistan’s reform discourse: we discuss economic freedom without first securing constitutional governance. The distinction is fundamental. International indices commonly measure economic freedom through taxation, trade openness, government spending, financial markets and regulatory efficiency. These indicators matter. Lower barriers to enterprise can promote investment, innovation and competition. They answer only part of the question. Why do countries with similar tax rates produce very different economic outcomes? Why do investors accept higher taxation in some jurisdictions while avoiding countries with lighter tax burdens? Why do some economies flourish with relatively large governments while others stagnate despite repeated concessions? The answer lies primarily in institutions. James Buchanan argued that public finance cannot be analysed independently of the constitutional rules under which governments operate. Douglass North demonstrated that long-term development depends upon institutions that reduce uncertainty, enforce contracts and create predictable incentives. Centuries earlier, Ibn Khaldun linked prosperity with justice, moderation in taxation and restraint upon arbitrary power. Excessive intervention, unpredictable fiscal demands and rent-seeking, he observed, ultimately weaken both economic activity and state revenues. These intellectual traditions converge on one central proposition: economic freedom is not created simply by lowering tax rates. It emerges from constitutional governance. Pakistan’s experience illustrates this clearly. Successive governments have offered tax holidays, created special economic zones, reduced customs duties and announced investment facilitation mechanisms. Investment nevertheless remains subdued. Investors do not merely compare tax rates; they compare legal systems. They ask whether contracts will be enforced within a reasonable time, whether regulations will survive political transitions, whether tax liabilities can be altered retrospectively and whether executive discretion outweighs parliamentary certainty. These are questions of constitutional governance rather than fiscal engineering. The same principle applies to taxation. Pakistan’s problem is frequently described as one of high taxation. That diagnosis is incomplete. The deeper problem is unequal taxation. The salaried class in formal sector is fully documented, its tax is deducted before income reaches employees, and its compliance burden continues to rise. Large segments of commerce, services and agriculture operate under very different fiscal realities. The issue is not merely how much tax is collected, but whether equal citizens are governed by equal fiscal rules. A system built around withholding taxes, presumptive taxes, minimum taxes and sector-specific exemptions creates unequal citizenship before the law. It also encourages informality. Businesses do not remain undocumented only because rates are high. Formal participation imposes greater compliance costs while offering few institutional benefits. Documentation without trust becomes compulsion rather than reform. The PRIME report also notes that government borrowing crowds out private investment because banks prefer sovereign lending over commercial risk. This is not simply a banking failure. When governments repeatedly finance deficits through domestic borrowing, banks act rationally by purchasing government securities. Financial markets are responding to distorted fiscal incentives created by public policy. Interest payments and defence together consume nearly 94 percent of net federal revenue, leaving little fiscal space for education, healthcare, scientific research, digital infrastructure, justice administration and productive public investment. The challenge is not merely that government spends too much; it is that public priorities have become distorted. Expenditure that strengthens courts, education, digital infrastructure, research, public health and efficient regulation expands future economic freedom because it reduces uncertainty and lowers transaction costs. Spending absorbed by debt servicing and institutional inefficiency does not. Constitutional Political Economy therefore distinguishes between the size of government and the quality of government. Fiscal federalism is another neglected dimension. The Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 reshaped the distribution of fiscal powers. Provincial sales taxes, fragmented administrations and overlapping jurisdictions now influence business decisions daily. Economic freedom cannot be assessed through the federal budget alone. The constitutional structure governing taxation matters as much as the annual Finance Act itself. Pakistan’s economic challenge is consequently larger than budget reform. Markets flourish where laws are predictable, taxation is neutral, contracts are enforceable, property rights are secure and governments remain subject to constitutional restraints. These conditions cannot be created through a single Finance Act. They require a durable commitment to constitutional governance. The value of the PRIME report lies in encouraging this broader conversation. The next step is to recognise that economic freedom rests upon a stronger constitutional foundation. Where constitutional governance is weak, economic reforms remain temporary. Where it is strong, markets can generate prosperity without constant discretionary intervention. Pakistan’s recurring fiscal crises are symptoms rather than the disease. The underlying ailment is institutional. Budgets can redistribute resources, but only constitutional governance can establish equality before law, predictable taxation, secure property rights and meaningful limits on arbitrary state power. Economic freedom, therefore, is neither the starting point of development nor a concession to be distributed through annual Finance Acts. It is the outcome of a constitutional order in which taxation rests on representation, public borrowing is subject to accountability, contracts and property are protected, and executive power remains bounded by law. In a rent-distributing state, freedom is rationed through exemptions, influence and discretion; in a constitutional state, it is secured for all through equal rules. Unless Pakistan reforms the institutions that determine who is taxed, how public money is spent, who bears the cost of debt and how state power is

President Donald John Trump occupies a singular place in the history of American leadership. He is at once a politician, a successful businessman, and an enthusiast of freestyle wrestling. His manner of thinking, planning, and decision-making bears a character distinctly different from that of his predecessors; indeed, many observers contend that it has few, if any, precedents in the annals of modern American politics. Analysts frequently describe him as a man of remarkable flexibility, yet they also acknowledge that a position defended with absolute conviction at one moment may, in the next, be replaced by its very opposite without the slightest hesitation. This characteristic became strikingly evident following the commencement of large-scale military operations against Iran on 28 February 2026. A careful examination of the period, particularly up to the defence of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded in June, reveals no fewer than seven significant shifts in President Trump’s strategic approach. At the outset, he dismissed economic concerns altogether, declaring that the financial difficulties of the American people were of no consequence and that the sole imperative was to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. By the time of the G7 summit, however, his tone had undergone a marked transformation. He began advocating the necessity of an agreement capable of shielding the global economy from a crisis comparable to the Hoover era and the Great Depression, pointing to instability in the financial markets as evidence supporting this revised position. His initial call for regime change in Iran was equally unequivocal. In a video address, he urged the Iranian people to rise against their government, declaring that the moment might represent their final opportunity for generations to come. Yet subsequent statements quietly abandoned this objective. Instead, he began speaking of normalising relations with Iran and cooperating with its existing leadership, occasionally describing those very leaders as more “reasonable” than before. During the early phase of the conflict, the complete destruction of Iran’s missile program, the industries responsible for its production, and the naval forces supporting it was presented as a principal objective. Later, however, his position softened considerably. He observed that while missiles might inflict damage upon limited areas, they were incapable of destroying the world, and since other nations possessed similar capabilities, Iran might also retain a limited missile arsenal. It was for this reason that the Memorandum of Understanding contained no provision requiring the dismantlement of Iran’s missile program. A similar evolution occurred regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Following the military operations of 2025 and again in 2026, it was asserted that Iran’s entire uranium enrichment capability would be eliminated and that the nuclear threat would be extinguished permanently. In time, however, the objective was narrowed simply to ensuring that Iran would not acquire a nuclear weapon. Rather than insisting upon total dismantlement, reliance shifted towards international monitoring and continued negotiations. Control over highly enriched uranium, initially regarded as a non-negotiable and indispensable condition, was subsequently treated as a matter of secondary importance. It was argued that preventing the production of a nuclear weapon remained the essential objective, while questions concerning enriched uranium would be addressed in future negotiations. The instruments of pressure likewise underwent a profound transformation. Economic sanctions and financial restrictions, once regarded as the principal means of coercion, gradually gave way to incentives. Discussions emerged concerning the release of frozen assets, temporary licences for Iranian oil exports, and the possibility of reconstruction assistance amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, with additional concessions to be granted subject to Iran’s future conduct. Likewise, the original determination to terminate Iran’s support for regional proxy groups gradually receded into the background. In its place, greater emphasis was placed upon securing a direct ceasefire and addressing the broader requirements of peace and stability throughout the Middle East. These strategic adjustments were accompanied by repeated tactical oscillations, in which stern threats were frequently followed by the postponement or cancellation of military action. A chronological review compiled up to 3 August reveals numerous announcements of major strikes that were ultimately abandoned. The latest example occurred on 1 and 2 August, when military action was suspended following requests from Iran and several regional parties, together with the emergence of preliminary outlines for a possible understanding involving the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and measures aimed at removing the nuclear threat. On 7 April, shortly before the expiration of an ultimatum in which President Trump had threatened strikes against bridges and power stations, a two-week ceasefire was agreed. He had warned that such attacks could extinguish an entire civilisation. On 21 April, at the request of international mediators, the ceasefire was extended indefinitely, although hostilities resumed at a later stage. On 18 May, a major military operation was deferred to allow serious negotiations to proceed, but when those negotiations faltered, military action recommenced. On the night of 11 June, President Trump threatened an overwhelming assault upon Iran together with the seizure of its oil and gas resources. Yet only hours later, citing what he described as a significant diplomatic breakthrough, he cancelled the operation, thereby paving the way for the Memorandum of Understanding. Signed on 17 June, the Memorandum provided for a ceasefire, the temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, limited economic relief, and a framework for sixty days of negotiations. It nevertheless expressly reserved the right to resume bombing should its provisions prove unsatisfactory. At the beginning of July, following attacks upon commercial shipping, the ceasefire was declared terminated. Military strikes were launched against dozens, and subsequently scores, of targets. Congress was formally notified, and the Administration adopted an increasingly uncompromising public tone. Yet negotiations continued simultaneously. The naval blockade was reimposed, retaliatory operations persisted, and on 27 July the intensive daily bombardment was once again suspended in order to afford diplomacy another opportunity. Even in early August, fresh threats eventually yielded to renewed consideration of a possible political framework. Oil sanctions followed a similarly fluctuating course. Temporary export licences were granted, only to be withdrawn as sanctions were reimposed.

By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Asma Rahmat, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University and Muhammad Ameer Hamza, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, enshrines one of the oldest and most celebrated principles of criminal jurisprudence, namely nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which means there can be neither a crime nor a punishment without prior law. This constitutional guarantee embodies the rule of law by prohibiting retrospective criminal legislation and protecting every individual from arbitrary prosecution or punishment. It ensures that a person may be held criminally liable only for conduct that constituted an offence under the law at the time it was committed, and that no punishment more severe than that then prescribed may subsequently be imposed. The first part of Article 12 prohibits the retrospective creation of criminal offences. A person cannot be convicted for an act or omission which was lawful when committed merely because the legislature subsequently criminalises that conduct. The second part prohibits the retrospective enhancement of punishment. Accordingly, where the law prescribes a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment or two years’ imprisonment at the time of the offence, neither the judiciary nor the legislature may subsequently impose or authorise a more severe penalty for that completed act. The constitutional guarantee thus preserves legal certainty, protects legitimate expectations, and prevents arbitrary exercises of legislative and executive power. Article 12 is founded upon the universally accepted doctrine of legal certainty, which requires that criminal laws be clear, prospective, and predictable. Individuals must be capable of regulating their conduct according to existing law without fear that future legislation will retrospectively criminalise their past actions or increase their punishment. The principle therefore operates as an indispensable safeguard against governmental arbitrariness and political persecution and constitutes a cornerstone of every constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. The constitutional philosophy embodied in Article 12 is consistent with internationally recognised human rights norms. Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, provides that no person shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission that did not constitute a penal offence under national or international law at the time it was committed, nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that applicable at the time of the commission of the offence. Likewise, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Pakistan is a State Party, reiterates the same prohibition against retrospective criminal liability while recognising only the limited exception relating to offences recognised under the general principles of international law. Comparable constitutional protection is also found in the United States Constitution, where Article I, Sections 9 and 10 expressly prohibit Congress and the States from enacting ex post facto laws. This prohibition has long been regarded as a fundamental limitation upon legislative authority and reflects a universal constitutional commitment to fairness in criminal justice. The superior courts of Pakistan have consistently treated Article 12 as an indispensable constitutional safeguard. In Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article 12 embodies the constitutional prohibition against retrospective penal legislation and protects individuals from being subjected to criminal liability or enhanced punishment under laws enacted after the commission of the alleged offence. The Court emphasised that retrospective penal laws offend the rule of law because criminal consequences must always be determined according to the law in force at the relevant time. Similarly, in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, the Supreme Court underscored that fundamental rights must receive a liberal and purposive interpretation so as to prevent arbitrary governmental action and preserve constitutional liberties. Although that case did not directly concern Article 12, its interpretative philosophy has significantly influenced the constitutional protection afforded to penal safeguards. A significant constitutional question concerns the offence of high treason under Article 6 of the Constitution. High treason, comprising the abrogation, subversion, suspension, or holding in abeyance of the Constitution, represents the gravest constitutional offence. Through the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, Parliament expanded Article 6 to include persons who aid, abet, collaborate with, or validate such unconstitutional acts. Nevertheless, Article 12 continues to apply with full constitutional force. Even in prosecutions for high treason, criminal liability and punishment cannot be imposed retrospectively. Any legislative amendment increasing punishment or enlarging criminal liability can operate only prospectively and cannot constitutionally affect acts committed before its enactment. The historical experience of constitutional development further demonstrates the importance of this principle. Following the restoration of the English monarchy, the remains of Oliver Cromwell were exhumed in 1661 upon the orders of Charles II, symbolically hanged, beheaded, and publicly displayed. Although this episode belonged to a different constitutional era, it illustrates the dangers of political vengeance unconstrained by constitutional guarantees. Modern constitutional democracies reject such practices and instead insist that criminal justice must always be governed by legality, due process, and prospective application of penal laws. Article 12, therefore, is not merely a procedural safeguard but a substantive manifestation of constitutionalism itself. It preserves the supremacy of law over arbitrary power, protects individual liberty against retrospective criminal legislation, and strengthens public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system. Together with Articles 4, 9, and 10A of the Constitution, it forms an integral part of Pakistan’s constitutional architecture for the protection of human dignity, legal certainty, and the rule of law. Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is a cornerstone of constitutionalism and the rule of law. By prohibiting retrospective criminal legislation and the retrospective enhancement of punishment, it embodies the fundamental principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, ensuring that no person is punished except in accordance with the law in force at the time of the alleged offence. In conjunction with Articles 4, 9, and 10A, Article 12 protects legal certainty, due process, and individual liberty while preventing arbitrary or politically

Recently, the Pew Research Center released results from a study on global perceptions of China and President Xi. The results also compared China and President Xi with the USA and President Donald Trump. The study was conducted in 36 countries and included 42,151 respondents. The results are quite interesting and show that the overwhelming majority of people strongly favor China and President Xi. For example, respondents from 30 of the 36 countries ranked China and President Xi more positively. Moreover, 67% of respondents from 17 middle-income countries viewed China as a reliable partner. This suggests that China fulfills its commitments and never betrays its partners. And 57% believed that China takes care of the interests of other countries. These findings are in line with China’s philosophy of international relations, win-win cooperation and shared prosperity.   The results also indicated that, among the surveyed countries, all Muslim countries have a positive perception of China. Except for Nigeria (equal confidence in Xi and Trump), all Muslim countries showed confidence in President Xi and his leadership.   It is worth noting that in both categories, Pakistanis ranked China and President Xi highest. According to the results, 90% of Pakistanis held a favorable view of China, and 83% expressed confidence in President Xi’s leadership.   Now, the question is, despite all propaganda and malicious campaigns, why is the positive perception of China and President Xi very high?  The answer is that China believes in common development and development together and for everyone. It also resonates with President Xi’s vision that no one should be left behind on the road of development. Therefore, since its rise as a major economic and global power, China is contributing to global development, especially in the Global South. Simultaneously, China has been working to strengthen the voices of the Global South in global affairs and protect them against the hegemonic aspirations of some powerful countries. Moreover, China is striving to bring sustainable peace and security, and to ensure that everyone’s security and security concerns are treated equally. In the pursuit of these objectives, President Xi has launched numerous initiatives, including global, regional, and country-specific ones.   On the global front, President Xi launched five major initiatives: the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. These initiatives have all the ingredients to help the world solve contemporary challenges and chart a path to peaceful, sustainable development and prosperity through cooperative coexistence.   First, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by adhering to the Chinese philosophy of shared growth through discussion and collaboration. Latest data show that China has invested almost US$ 1.4 trillion to help countries bridge the development gap. Second, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) was introduced in accordance with the vision of shared prosperity. Under GDI, China has invested more than US$ 23 billion. Third, the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which has been built on four pillars: common, comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable security, was presented. Fourth, the Global Civilization Initiative emphasized harmony in diversity and the rejection of the clash of civilizations. Fifth, the Global Governance Initiative recognizes that all countries, regardless of size, strength, or wealth, are equal participants, decision-makers, and beneficiaries in global governance. The five key principles of GCI, proposed by President Xi, include respecting sovereign equality, adhering to the international rule of law, practicing multilateralism, advocating a people-centered approach, and prioritizing concrete actions.   The China International Import Expo (CIIE) is another initiative with global relevance and a vision of sharing prosperity. It is a unique idea, as there is no precedent in history for organizing an import expo. President Xi himself proposed, planned, deployed, and promoted the idea of the China International Import Expo to fulfill his promise of high-level opening up and creating opportunities for the world. CIIE has emerged as a new avenue to introduce new products, share ideas, and promote innovation. It plays a prominent role in promoting new products by helping companies find buyers for their products and vice versa. China’s technology and innovation penetration and diffusion policies encourage companies and investors to join the event. Therefore, it attracts innovators and leading companies from around the world to attend the event and showcase their products and ideas.   In the list of global initiatives, we can also include the construction of ecological civilization as a seventh initiative, as it is highly relevant to the global audience. The construction of ecological civilization is rooted in the philosophy of harmony between the planet and humans and among humans. It is urgently needed in the context of climate change and environmental degradation.   At the regional level, China has also launched numerous initiatives, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Boao Forum, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), among others. AIIB was launched to bridge the investment gap in Asia. AIIB aims to build a prosperous future under the slogan “Building Infrastructure for Tomorrow” by adopting principles of sustainability, innovation, and prosperity for the benefit of its people in Asia. Since its launch, President Xi has ensured that the AIIB develops into a modern, innovative, inclusive, goal-oriented, and rule-based institution that can help bridge the investment gap. Thus, he discourages geopolitics, mainstream economic rationales, and sustainability principles.   The Boao Forum (BF) is another regional initiative for Asia. BF is a non-governmental, nonprofit organization hosted and promoted by China. It provides a platform for dialogue among leaders of national governments, industry and business, and academia from countries in Asia and other continents on important issues facing Asia and the world. An analysis of past forums shows that it has focused on multiple areas and helped bring people closer together. It has created opportunities for cooperation and collaboration. Building on the Boao Forum’s past successes and strengths, China is working to explore how to build a community with a shared future for humanity in Asia by deepening interaction and cooperation.   Second, despite propaganda against

When France first levied a 3% tax on the domestic revenues of large technology companies in 2019, the move was presented as a modest, temporary fix. Five years later, the temporary fix has become a global patchwork. More than 20 countries now operate some form of digital services tax, the United States has threatened retaliatory tariffs, and the multilateral replacement intended to tidy it all up remains unsigned.   The question at the heart of the scramble is disarmingly simple and technically complex: where should a company that sells everywhere but is physically located almost nowhere pay its taxes?   For most of the last century, international tax rules rested on physical presence. A company was taxed where it had offices, factories, or personnel. That principle struggled as companies like Google, Amazon, and Meta built business models in which value is derived from users, data, and online advertising in one country, while profits are booked in another, often lower-tax, jurisdiction.   The scale of the mismatch sharpened after the 2008 financial crisis. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013, estimating that profit-shifting cost governments $100 billion to $240 billion annually in lost revenue. By 2018, public pressure to act on highly visible technology firms accelerated political timelines faster than the OECD process could move.   The result was the rise of the unilateral digital services tax, or DST.   Unlike corporate income taxes, DSTs are typically levied on gross revenues, not profits, generated from specific digital activities online marketplaces, search engines, social media platforms, and targeted advertising within a country’s borders. Rates are low, generally 2% to 5%, but they apply broadly. The United Kingdom’s 2% DST raised over £800 million in 2024-25. France, Italy, Spain, Austria, India, Turkey and others adopted similar measures, each with slightly different thresholds, definitions, and scopes.   Proponents argue DSTs restore a basic link between economic activity and taxation. “If a platform earns substantial revenue from French users watching French ads, the French tax base should reflect that,” a senior official at the French Ministry of Finance said in 2023. For many developing economies, where consumption of digital services is large but physical presence of providers is minimal, DSTs are also a matter of fiscal sovereignty.   Critics, including the technology companies themselves and the U.S. government, point to three problems. First, taxing revenue rather than profit can penalize low-margin businesses and be passed on to small businesses and consumers who use the platforms. Second, the proliferation of different rules creates compliance complexity and the risk of double taxation, where the same income is taxed in multiple jurisdictions. Third, Washington has long argued DSTs are discriminatory by design, targeting predominantly American firms.   That third argument carried trade consequences. Under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) investigated DSTs adopted by France, India, Italy, and others, concluding that several did discriminate against U.S. companies. Tariffs of up to 25% on selected imports were prepared, then suspended pending a global deal.   That deal was meant to be Pillar One.   In October 2021, 136 countries and jurisdictions representing more than 90% of global GDP agreed to a two-pillar framework brokered by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework. Pillar Two, a 15% global minimum corporate tax, has largely moved forward and is now in force in dozens of countries. Pillar One is the more ambitious and more fragile.   Under Pillar One’s Amount A, a portion of the residual profits of the world’s largest and most profitable multinationals  those with global turnover above €20 billion and profitability above 10% would be reallocated to market jurisdictions where their customers and users are located, regardless of physical presence. The scope was deliberately expanded beyond tech; excluding extractive industries and regulated financial services, it would cover roughly 100 multinationals across sectors.   In exchange, countries would be required to withdraw DSTs and similar measures and commit not to introduce new ones. A Multilateral Convention (MLC) would implement the rules, replacing a web of unilateral taxes with a single, coordinated mechanism. The OECD estimated in 2023 that Pillar One would reallocate $200 billion in profits and generate $13 billion to $36 billion in additional global tax revenue annually, a figure comparable in aggregate to existing DST receipts, though distribution would differ markedly by country.   Negotiations have since slowed. The original goal of signing the MLC in 2023 was missed. A target for 2024 was also missed. In 2025 and early 2026, several governments, including the UK, revised their internal planning assumptions to 2027, while confirming that their DSTs “remain in operation” until a convention enters into force.   Several factors explain the delay. The convention requires ratification, including in the United States, where any tax treaty must secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Bipartisan skepticism about ceding taxing rights and concerns about revenue impacts have made ratification uncertain. Some emerging economies have argued that the thresholds for Pillar One are too high and the reallocation too small to benefit them meaningfully, preferring instead to retain DSTs or pursue a parallel negotiation at the United Nations on international tax cooperation that could run until 2027. In Washington, meanwhile, successive administrations have maintained that any acceptable deal must include robust DST withdrawal provisions.   The result is a holding pattern with real costs. In October 2021, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, the UK and the United States announced a transitional agreement: as long as Pillar One progressed, the U.S. would not impose retaliatory tariffs, and European DST liabilities would be creditable against future Pillar One obligations. That truce has largely held, but it depends on continued progress.   For businesses, the uncertainty complicates planning. A multinational may face a DST in India, a diverted profits tax in the UK, a Pillar Two top-up in the EU, and the prospect of Pillar One reallocation all with different calculation bases and documentation requirements.

By Augustine Nasim Gill The debate over new provinces or smaller administrative units in Pakistan should not be reduced to maps, language, identity, or political representation. The central question should be whether new administrative units will improve governance, bring public services closer to citizens, strengthen revenue collection, reinforce the rule of law, and restore public confidence in the state. Many countries have improved administrative performance by transferring authority from the center to states, regions, districts, and local governments. Yet these experiences have not all been equally successful. Where political authority was matched by adequate financing, competent administration, credible elections, the rule of law, and strong oversight, results generally improved. Where governments merely created new boundaries, assemblies, and ministries while corruption, patronage, and weak institutions remained unchanged, costs increased without transforming citizens’ lives. A Basic Distinction Must Come First Creating new provinces and genuinely devolving power are not the same thing. Successful decentralization has at least four dimensions: Four Essential Pillars Political authority: Local and regional governments must be created through regular, free, and fair elections. Administrative authority: They must have genuine authority to manage departments, appoint qualified personnel, and hold officials accountable for performance. Fiscal authority: Their responsibilities must be matched by revenue powers, a predictable share of national taxes, grants, and budgets. Legal and institutional authority: Their powers must be protected by the Constitution or strong legislation so that federal or provincial governments cannot abolish them at will. Why Smaller Administrative Units Can Succeed Smaller, empowered units bring government closer to citizens. Residents of remote districts are less likely to travel hundreds of kilometers to a provincial capital for matters involving land, education, health, policing, courts, or development projects. Regional governments also understand local conditions more clearly. The coastal areas of Balochistan, the agricultural districts of southern Punjab, a major metropolis such as Karachi, and the mountainous or tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa do not face identical challenges. A single policy designed in one provincial capital is often unable to respond effectively to such diversity. Smaller units can also increase political accountability. Citizens can more clearly observe the performance of their chief minister, ministers, mayors, district leaders, and civil administration. This benefit, however, appears only where elections are credible, information is open, and oversight institutions are independent. 1. Germany: Shared Powers, Shared Taxes, and Fiscal Equalization Germany is a federal country composed of sixteen states, known as Länder. Each state has its own constitution, parliament, and government, and enjoys substantial autonomy over its internal organization. The federal government is responsible for national defense, foreign policy, currency, and broad national legislation. The states play central roles in education, policing, culture, public administration, and the implementation of many laws. Municipal governments provide water, sanitation, local transport, urban planning, and many daily services. Major taxes are not retained exclusively by the federal government. Personal income tax, corporate income tax, and value-added tax are shared among the federal government, the states, and, in some cases, municipalities according to established rules. A fiscal equalization system then narrows the gap between wealthier states and those with weaker revenue capacity. Germany’s success is not simply the result of having sixteen states. It rests on clearly defined responsibilities, a strong tax administration, judicial oversight, a professional civil service, and a predictable equalization system. Lesson for Pakistan: Before new provinces are created, the country must decide how income tax, sales tax, customs duties, natural-resource revenue, property taxes, and other revenues will be divided. A permanent, transparent, and publicly understood formula is essential. 2. Spain: Regional Autonomy, Public Services, and Different Fiscal Models Spain is composed of seventeen autonomous communities. These regional governments exercise wide authority over health, education, social services, and regional development. Most regions receive a share of national taxes, limited authority over certain taxes, and equalization grants. The Basque Country and Navarre have broader tax-collection powers: they collect most taxes within their territories and then transfer an agreed contribution to the central government for national services. Regional government strengthened education, health services, and local identity, but Spain has also faced regional debt, fiscal imbalances, and separatist political movements. The lesson is that autonomy is not only a financial issue; national identity, constitutional boundaries, and commitment to the shared state also matter. Lesson for Pakistan: New units should not be designed solely around language. Administrative efficiency, population, economic viability, public consent, and national cohesion must all be considered. 3. Poland: Phased Reform, a Three-Tier System, and Local Development Poland did not devolve authority in a single step after the end of communist rule. Municipal self-government was restored in 1990, and a three-tier system was established in 1998-99: the municipality (Gmina), the county or district (Powiat), and the region (Voivodeship). Municipalities became responsible for water, sanitation, local roads, primary education, and local development. Districts managed services that were too large for one municipality but too limited for an entire region. Regional governments took responsibility for economic development, regional planning, and the management of European development funds. The reform succeeded because it was phased, local institutions were prepared, elected representatives were trained, professional administrations were developed, budgets were transferred, and responsibilities were defined. The continuing challenge is that not every municipality or district has equal administrative capacity. Some smaller units remain weak in planning, data, financial management, and specialist staffing. Lesson for Pakistan: Rather than creating many provinces overnight, Pakistan should begin with administrative pilots, stronger districts, digital systems, training, and independent audit in selected areas. 4. France: Gradual Decentralization from a Centralized State France was historically a highly centralized state, but beginning in the 1980s it gradually transferred authority from the central government to regions, departments, and communes. Regional governments manage economic development, transport, and some education and training functions. Departments play major roles in social welfare, certain roads, and local services, while communes provide day-to-day municipal services. Small municipalities often cooperate through joint institutions to manage water, waste, transport, and territorial planning. France’s challenge has been that responsibilities across different layers sometimes overlap or remain unclear,

Climate change is no longer solely an environmental concern, it has become one of the defining economic and trade challenges of the twenty-first century. Around the world, governments are increasingly using market-based mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while maintaining industrial competitiveness and economic growth. Among these mechanisms, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) has emerged as one of the most effective policy instruments. According to the World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026, there are now 87 carbon pricing instruments operating globally, including emissions trading systems and carbon taxes, covering nearly 30 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. These instruments generated over US$107 billion in public revenues in 2025, demonstrating that carbon pricing has evolved from an environmental policy into an important pillar of economic and fiscal governance. In the case of Pakistan, one that is most vulnerable to climate change, the discourse & discussion on emissions trading has become increasingly pertinent. While Pakistan contributes less than one percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, it remains among the nation’s most severely affected by climate-induced disasters. The catastrophic floods of 2022 alone caused economic losses estimated at more than US$30 billion, highlighting the enormous economic costs of climate vulnerability. As Pakistan seeks to achieve sustainable economic growth while fulfilling its commitments under the Paris Agreement, an Emissions Trading System offers an opportunity to integrate climate action with industrial competitiveness, investment promotion, and long-term economic resilience. An Emissions Trading System, commonly referred to as a cap-and-trade mechanism, establishes a limit on the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions that regulated industries are permitted to emit. Within this overall cap, companies receive or purchase emission allowances that authorize them to emit a specified quantity of carbon dioxide or its equivalent. Firms that reduce their emissions below their allocated limits can sell their unused allowances to companies that exceed their emission caps. This market-based approach creates a financial incentive for industries to invest in cleaner technologies, improve energy efficiency, and reduce emissions while allowing businesses the flexibility to determine the most cost-effective compliance strategy. The success of emissions trading systems across the world demonstrates the growing importance of carbon markets in modern economic management. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), launched in 2005, remains the world’s largest multinational carbon market and has significantly reduced emissions from power generation, manufacturing, and aviation. China now operates the world’s largest ETS by emissions covered, initially focusing on the power sector and gradually expanding to additional industries. South Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, and several states in the United States and Canada have also established operational emissions trading systems tailored to their economic structures. Collectively, jurisdictions accounting for almost two-thirds of global GDP have either implemented or are actively developing direct carbon pricing mechanisms, signalling that carbon markets are rapidly becoming mainstream economic policy rather than experimental environmental initiatives. Across South Asia, governments are increasingly recognising carbon markets as instruments of economic competitiveness rather than solely environmental regulation. India has initiated the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) while expanding its long-standing Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) programme to improve industrial energy efficiency. Bangladesh is developing the institutional and regulatory foundations needed to participate in voluntary carbon markets and future compliance mechanisms. Together, these developments indicate a gradual regional shift towards integrating climate policy with industrial development, trade competitiveness, and sustainable economic growth. Pakistan has also begun laying the foundations for a future carbon market, although the country remains at an early stage of development. The National Climate Change Policy, Pakistan’s updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and the National Adaptation Plan recognise the importance of market-based mechanisms for reducing emissions. The Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination, together with development partners including the World Bank, GIZ, UNDP, and the Asian Development Bank, has initiated policy dialogue and capacity-building initiatives aimed at strengthening Pakistan’s carbon market readiness. At the provincial level, Punjab has emerged as the frontrunner in preparing for emissions trading. With technical support from GIZ, the Environment Protection and Climate Change Department and the Planning and Development Board have initiated collaborative efforts to develop the institutional architecture necessary for an Emissions Trading System. These initiatives include the development of emissions inventories, digital Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems, the Green Credit Initiative, and the strengthening of Punjab’s Climate Watch platform to improve emissions monitoring and support evidence-based climate decision-making. Although these initiatives do not yet constitute a formal ETS, they represent important building blocks for a future provincial pilot that could eventually inform the development of a national emissions trading framework. Despite these encouraging developments, Pakistan faces several institutional and technical challenges before an operational ETS can be introduced. Reliable emissions inventories remain incomplete across many industrial sectors, while comprehensive Monitoring, Reporting and Verification systems are still evolving. Institutional responsibilities for climate policy, industrial regulation, energy management, and environmental protection remain fragmented across multiple federal and provincial agencies, requiring stronger coordination. Furthermore, many industries and institutions have limited experience with greenhouse gas accounting, carbon pricing & reporting, emissions verification that highlight the need for substantial technical capacity building. Nevertheless the opportunities created by ETS are significant, not only due to environmental benefits but formulates holistic markets that contribute to the world economy. Carbon market revenues have already crossed the threshold of almost US$30 billion in 2016 to over US$107 billion in 2025, representing the rapid and robust growth of climate finance and green investments worldwide. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) signals a new era where carbon compliance is becoming integral to international trade. Although Pakistan’s textile exports are not yet covered, global buyers increasingly demand transparent emissions reporting and low-carbon production. Developing an Emissions Trading System (ETS) and robust Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems will help Pakistani industries strengthen compliance and safeguard export competitiveness. Pakistan stands at a crossroads in its climate and economic development. With an estimated greenhouse gas emissions of around 500 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) per year, of which