global experience dividing

The Global Experience of Dividing Large Provinces …

By Augustine Nasim Gill

The debate over new provinces or smaller administrative units in Pakistan should not be reduced to maps, language, identity, or political representation. The central question should be whether new administrative units will improve governance, bring public services closer to citizens, strengthen revenue collection, reinforce the rule of law, and restore public confidence in the state.

Many countries have improved administrative performance by transferring authority from the center to states, regions, districts, and local governments. Yet these experiences have not all been equally successful. Where political authority was matched by adequate financing, competent administration, credible elections, the rule of law, and strong oversight, results generally improved. Where governments merely created new boundaries, assemblies, and ministries while corruption, patronage, and weak institutions remained unchanged, costs increased without transforming citizens’ lives.

A Basic Distinction Must Come First

Creating new provinces and genuinely devolving power are not the same thing. Successful decentralization has at least four dimensions:

Four Essential Pillars

  • Political authority: Local and regional governments must be created through regular, free, and fair elections.
  • Administrative authority: They must have genuine authority to manage departments, appoint qualified personnel, and hold officials accountable for performance.
  • Fiscal authority: Their responsibilities must be matched by revenue powers, a predictable share of national taxes, grants, and budgets.
  • Legal and institutional authority: Their powers must be protected by the Constitution or strong legislation so that federal or provincial governments cannot abolish them at will.

Why Smaller Administrative Units Can Succeed

Smaller, empowered units bring government closer to citizens. Residents of remote districts are less likely to travel hundreds of kilometers to a provincial capital for matters involving land, education, health, policing, courts, or development projects.

Regional governments also understand local conditions more clearly. The coastal areas of Balochistan, the agricultural districts of southern Punjab, a major metropolis such as Karachi, and the mountainous or tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa do not face identical challenges. A single policy designed in one provincial capital is often unable to respond effectively to such diversity.

Smaller units can also increase political accountability. Citizens can more clearly observe the performance of their chief minister, ministers, mayors, district leaders, and civil administration. This benefit, however, appears only where elections are credible, information is open, and oversight institutions are independent.

1. Germany: Shared Powers, Shared Taxes, and Fiscal Equalization

Germany is a federal country composed of sixteen states, known as Länder. Each state has its own constitution, parliament, and government, and enjoys substantial autonomy over its internal organization.

The federal government is responsible for national defense, foreign policy, currency, and broad national legislation. The states play central roles in education, policing, culture, public administration, and the implementation of many laws. Municipal governments provide water, sanitation, local transport, urban planning, and many daily services.

Major taxes are not retained exclusively by the federal government. Personal income tax, corporate income tax, and value-added tax are shared among the federal government, the states, and, in some cases, municipalities according to established rules. A fiscal equalization system then narrows the gap between wealthier states and those with weaker revenue capacity.

Germany’s success is not simply the result of having sixteen states. It rests on clearly defined responsibilities, a strong tax administration, judicial oversight, a professional civil service, and a predictable equalization system.

Lesson for Pakistan: Before new provinces are created, the country must decide how income tax, sales tax, customs duties, natural-resource revenue, property taxes, and other revenues will be divided. A permanent, transparent, and publicly understood formula is essential.

2. Spain: Regional Autonomy, Public Services, and Different Fiscal Models

Spain is composed of seventeen autonomous communities. These regional governments exercise wide authority over health, education, social services, and regional development.

Most regions receive a share of national taxes, limited authority over certain taxes, and equalization grants. The Basque Country and Navarre have broader tax-collection powers: they collect most taxes within their territories and then transfer an agreed contribution to the central government for national services.

Regional government strengthened education, health services, and local identity, but Spain has also faced regional debt, fiscal imbalances, and separatist political movements. The lesson is that autonomy is not only a financial issue; national identity, constitutional boundaries, and commitment to the shared state also matter.

Lesson for Pakistan: New units should not be designed solely around language. Administrative efficiency, population, economic viability, public consent, and national cohesion must all be considered.

3. Poland: Phased Reform, a Three-Tier System, and Local Development

Poland did not devolve authority in a single step after the end of communist rule. Municipal self-government was restored in 1990, and a three-tier system was established in 1998-99: the municipality (Gmina), the county or district (Powiat), and the region (Voivodeship).

Municipalities became responsible for water, sanitation, local roads, primary education, and local development. Districts managed services that were too large for one municipality but too limited for an entire region. Regional governments took responsibility for economic development, regional planning, and the management of European development funds.

The reform succeeded because it was phased, local institutions were prepared, elected representatives were trained, professional administrations were developed, budgets were transferred, and responsibilities were defined.

The continuing challenge is that not every municipality or district has equal administrative capacity. Some smaller units remain weak in planning, data, financial management, and specialist staffing.

Lesson for Pakistan: Rather than creating many provinces overnight, Pakistan should begin with administrative pilots, stronger districts, digital systems, training, and independent audit in selected areas.

4. France: Gradual Decentralization from a Centralized State

France was historically a highly centralized state, but beginning in the 1980s it gradually transferred authority from the central government to regions, departments, and communes.

Regional governments manage economic development, transport, and some education and training functions. Departments play major roles in social welfare, certain roads, and local services, while communes provide day-to-day municipal services.

Small municipalities often cooperate through joint institutions to manage water, waste, transport, and territorial planning.

France’s challenge has been that responsibilities across different layers sometimes overlap or remain unclear, increasing administrative complexity and costs.

Lesson for Pakistan: The responsibilities of every level of government must be defined in law so that the federation, provinces, districts, and municipalities are not all nominally responsible for the same service.

5. India: New States, Constitutional Revenue Sharing, and Mixed Results

India has repeatedly altered state boundaries and created new states since independence. Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Telangana were established in response to regional, administrative, and economic demands.

An independent Finance Commission periodically recommends the share of divisible national taxes to be transferred from the Union to the states and the formula for distributing those resources among states. Population, income disparities, area, forests, tax effort, and other needs are considered.

Some new states achieved better administrative attention, infrastructure, and economic growth. In others, corruption, political instability, capture of mineral resources, weak institutions, and social inequality persisted.

The central lesson is that a smaller province does not automatically eliminate corruption; it may simply relocate corruption to a lower level.

Lesson for Pakistan: Before new provinces are created, public-service commissions, police, accountability systems, auditors, courts, elections, and public procurement must be protected from political interference.

Conditions That Make Decentralization Successful

1. Confront Corruption First

In Pakistan’s context, this is the most important condition. If new units are handed to the same corrupt political, administrative, and commercial networks, new governments will become new sources of patronage rather than institutions of public service.

Anti-corruption reform must not become political revenge. It requires independent accountability bodies, open contracting, digital payments, declarations of assets and conflicts of interest, an independent auditor general, access to information, prompt but fair judicial proceedings, and comprehensive e-procurement.

2. Free and Fair Elections

Governments in new administrative units will be legitimate only if elections are free, transparent, and credible. Constituency boundaries, candidate eligibility, voting, counting, results, and government formation must all be open to verification.

Manufactured or predetermined referendums will not create legitimacy. Public consultation must be genuine, free, informed, and independently verifiable.

3. Strict Merit and Competent Appointments

New provinces will require thousands of civil servants, police officers, teachers, doctors, engineers, financial experts, and administrators. These appointments must not be based on clan, family, marriage or personal relationships, religious affiliation, political loyalty, or civilian or military patronage.

Independent provincial public-service commissions, open examinations, standardized interviews, published merit lists, background checks, and a right of judicial appeal will be essential.

4. Resources Must Follow Responsibilities

If a district or province is responsible for schools, hospitals, and policing but lacks the money to operate them, decentralization will fail. Every transferred responsibility must be matched by adequate, secure, and predictable financial resources.

5. Local Revenues

Every new unit should have some own-source revenues, such as property tax, an effective agricultural income tax, motor-vehicle tax, local service fees, building permits and development charges, and selected business or tourism levies.

Tax rates, collection procedures, exemptions, audit, and appeal mechanisms must be transparent and consistent.

6. A Predictable Share of National Taxes

A share of personal income tax, corporate tax, general sales tax, customs duties, and natural-resource revenue should be transferred to provinces through a predictable formula.

The formula should consider not only population, but also poverty, area, underdevelopment, tax effort, health and education needs, environmental responsibilities, and border and security costs.

7. Fiscal Equalization

Large industrial and commercial centers will naturally collect more revenue, while remote, mountainous, or underdeveloped regions may have weaker tax capacity. A fiscal equalization system is therefore necessary to ensure that every Pakistani receives a minimum standard of education, health, policing, water, and infrastructure.

8. Limits on Borrowing

New provincial governments should not have unlimited borrowing authority. Each province should be subject to a debt ceiling, a fiscal-responsibility law, annual independent audits, deficit limits, and full disclosure of the liabilities of provincial public enterprises.

9. Education, Technology, and Training

Constructing new buildings is easy; building a competent administration is difficult. Pakistan must prepare public-administration academies, digital land records, integrated tax systems, e-procurement, police data systems, school and health dashboards, and continuous professional training before large-scale restructuring.

10. An Independent Justice System and the Rule of Law

New provinces will succeed only where courts are independent, police are professional, prosecutors are effective, and the law applies equally. If powerful landlords, business interests, politicians, bureaucrats, or institutions remain above the law, administrative restructuring will not benefit ordinary citizens.

A Proposed Roadmap for Pakistan

Phase One: Build Trust

The government should first reduce its own privileges, begin merit-based appointments, take impartial action against corruption and smuggling, and demonstrate initial reforms in policing and justice.

Phase Two: Establish an Independent National Commission

Pakistan should create an independent National Commission on Administrative and Fiscal Reform, including constitutional experts, economists, former civil servants, tax specialists, universities, the business community, women, young people, minorities, and representatives of every region.

Phase Three: Conduct Open Public Consultation

Every proposed new unit should hold public hearings, commission expert reports, invite digital submissions, obtain district-level resolutions, and conduct independent surveys. All evidence should be publicly available.

Phase Four: Publish a Fiscal Viability Assessment

Each proposal should disclose expected own-source revenue, federal transfers, administrative costs, staffing requirements, the cost of a capital and infrastructure, spending on education, health, and policing, and at least a ten-year financial plan.

Phase Five: Implement Gradually

Rather than creating many units simultaneously, reform could begin in two or three areas in phases, provided that constitutional, political, and public agreement exists.

Phase Six: Require Independent Evaluation

After five years, an independent review should measure education, health, revenue collection, policing, employment, corruption, local investment, citizen satisfaction, and fiscal discipline.

Final Word

International experience does not prove that smaller provinces always succeed. It shows that government which is closer to the people, accountable, and fiscally empowered can produce better results.

Success requires much more than changing a map. Elections must be fair, appointments must be based on merit, the law must apply equally, taxation and spending must be transparent, the judiciary must be independent, local governments must be empowered, and corruption must have no safe haven.

New provinces could become a historic opportunity for Pakistan, but only if they transfer power to citizens rather than merely create positions for a new group of rulers.

If the old system is simply placed inside new boundaries, Pakistan will gain new provinces but not new governance. The country must first clean the system, prove its intentions, prepare competent people, define fiscal rules, and involve the public. Administrative restructuring can then make Pakistan more organized, more just, and more resilient.

Selected References

  • Council of Europe: European Charter of Local Self-Government and the principle of subsidiarity.
  • German Federal Ministry of Finance: Federal fiscal relations, shared taxes, and fiscal equalization.
  • Government of Spain, Ministry of Finance: Financing of the Autonomous Communities.
  • OECD: Decentralisation, local governance, and Poland’s territorial reforms.
  • OECD: Inter-municipal cooperation and local service delivery in France and other OECD countries.
  • Finance Commission of India: Constitutional tax devolution and grants to states and local governments.

    About the Author

    Augustine Nasim Gill is a Pakistani-American author and an international development, governance, humanitarian, and disaster-management professional. Over more than three decades, he has served in leadership and management roles across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and North America. He is the founder of the Hope Dialogue platform, which promotes civil, constructive, and evidence-based discussion on Pakistan and global affairs, and he writes regularly on governance, democracy, institutional reform, and national development in Pakistan.

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Freedom of expression remains the cornerstone of every democratic society, but using that freedom to damage individuals or institutions without credible evidence serves neither journalism nor democracy. Pakistan, like many other countries, faces the challenge of preserving free expression while preventing the misuse of digital platforms. The objective should never be to silence legitimate criticism or suppress dissent. Instead, it should be to ensure that freedom is exercised with honesty, evidence, and accountability.   Freedom of expression is the soul of democracy. Yet when it is separated from truth, integrity, and responsibility, it no longer remains freedom—it becomes disorder. A civilized society is one where the law protects those who speak the truth while holding accountable those who knowingly spread falsehoods. That balance represents the true spirit of free expression and remains the hallmark of every democratic, civilized, and dignified nation.    

  • A new wave of youth activism in Asia

    By : Amir Ismaiel ( London based pakistani student )  A new youth-led protest movement in India, known as the Cockroach Janata Party has become the focus of global attention. In recent days students associated with the movement attempted to march towards Parliament, but police used baton charges and force to stop them. The movement’s founder, Abhijeet Dabke, is currently studying in the United States while several of its other leaders are enrolled at leading universities in India and the United Kingdom. The movement is primarily driven by young students. The movement began after the Chief Justice of India reportedly referred to young people as “cockroaches.” Students adopted the term as a symbol of resistance and established the Cockroach Janata Party. According to its leaders, the recent examination paper leak scandal has exposed deep weaknesses and corruption within India’s education system. They argue that corruption in examinations and the erosion of merit are allowing unqualified individuals to enter key institutions, ultimately damaging the country’s future. Protesters are therefore demanding the resignation of the Education Minister, whom they hold responsible for the crisis. Thousands of students continue to demonstrate across different cities while pressing for a wider set of demands. Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi has expressed solidarity with the protesting students. Meanwhile, allegations of police mistreatment of both protesters and opposition leaders have sparked a nationwide debate. Several Indian actors, artists, and public figures have also condemned the use of force against students, adding to the growing political and public pressure on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government. India often presents itself as the world’s largest democracy and a champion of democratic values. While its large youth population is one of its greatest strengths, it can also become a significant challenge. Because of its distinctive identity and objectives, this movement has attracted the attention of young people not only across India but throughout Asia and beyond. Its growing popularity on social media has encouraged increasing numbers of young Indians to join. If the protests spread further and gain broader public support, they could become a serious political challenge for the government. In response to the latest developments, Prime Minister Narendra Modi released a late-night video message appealing to young people for patience. He stated that investigations into the paper leak scandal were already underway and assured the public that those responsible would be held accountable. However, student leaders insisted that their sit-in would continue until the Education Minister resigned. Some observers believe that the Prime Minister’s body language during the address reflected political pressure and unease. A government that has previously responded firmly to numerous protests now appears to be facing unprecedented pressure from a youth-led movement. Over the past few decades, Asian politics has undergone significant change, with young people emerging as an increasingly influential political force. Even before the current protests in India, youth movements in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal had already played decisive roles in shaping political developments. In March 2022, Sri Lanka was engulfed by mass protests triggered by a severe economic crisis. Young people stood at the forefront of the demonstrations and led protests that continued for weeks. The government imposed a state of emergency, enforced curfews, and attempted to restrict access to social media, but these measures failed to weaken the protesters’ determination. Eventually, demonstrators surrounded the Presidential Palace, forcing the President to resign. Similarly, Bangladesh witnessed a student-led protest movement that fundamentally reshaped the country’s political landscape. As demonstrations intensified, then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina left office and departed the country. Security forces attempted to suppress the protests, resulting in the deaths of numerous young demonstrators. Despite this, the movement expanded across the country. Student activism ultimately dominated national politics, the government collapsed, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunusassumed leadership of the interim administration. The intensity of public anger was evident in the actions of some protesters, who set fire to a statue of Bangladesh’s founding leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, burned his residence, and removed his image from banknotes. Many young protesters viewed these acts as a response to what they considered years of political repression and believed that every sacrifice was necessary to achieve their objectives. Nepal also witnessed strong youth mobilization against corruption, weak governance, and restrictions on social media. As a generation raised in the digital era, young activists relied heavily on social media to organize, coordinate, and build public support. Issues were first highlighted online, public consensus was gradually developed, and protest calls were then issued. The same strategy transformed local demonstrations into a nationwide movement. The protests became so significant that the country’s political leadership resigned, with Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli and his cabinet stepping down. The new interim administration subsequently accepted several of the protesters’ demands. Young people have likewise organized movements in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines to demand political, social, and economic reforms. Together, these examples demonstrate that the youth of Asia are no longer passive observers but have become powerful and influential agents of political change. Pakistani media is currently giving extensive coverage to the student protests in India. Reports highlight the Indian government’s use of force against students and the growing political pressure facing the Modi administration. This naturally raises an important question: if young people in Pakistan were to launch a similar peaceful movement for their rights, would our own government respond with the same level of restraint? Would protesters avoid police violence, criminal charges, house raids, blocked identity cards, or accusations of disloyalty? The reality is that as a society, we have yet to build a strong culture of tolerance for dissent. Too often, we are more accustomed to silencing critical voices than listening to them. Pakistani youth face not only unemployment and economic uncertainty but also an environment shaped by fear. Even those who have jobs frequently hesitate to raise legitimate concerns, fearing that doing so could cost them their employment, personal freedom, or future opportunities. For this reason, before commenting on developments elsewhere,

  • A Habit of Second Thought

    President Donald John Trump occupies a singular place in the history of American leadership. He is at once a politician, a successful businessman, and an enthusiast of freestyle wrestling. His manner of thinking, planning, and decision-making bears a character distinctly different from that of his predecessors; indeed, many observers contend that it has few, if any, precedents in the annals of modern American politics. Analysts frequently describe him as a man of remarkable flexibility, yet they also acknowledge that a position defended with absolute conviction at one moment may, in the next, be replaced by its very opposite without the slightest hesitation. This characteristic became strikingly evident following the commencement of large-scale military operations against Iran on 28 February 2026. A careful examination of the period, particularly up to the defence of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded in June, reveals no fewer than seven significant shifts in President Trump’s strategic approach. At the outset, he dismissed economic concerns altogether, declaring that the financial difficulties of the American people were of no consequence and that the sole imperative was to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. By the time of the G7 summit, however, his tone had undergone a marked transformation. He began advocating the necessity of an agreement capable of shielding the global economy from a crisis comparable to the Hoover era and the Great Depression, pointing to instability in the financial markets as evidence supporting this revised position. His initial call for regime change in Iran was equally unequivocal. In a video address, he urged the Iranian people to rise against their government, declaring that the moment might represent their final opportunity for generations to come. Yet subsequent statements quietly abandoned this objective. Instead, he began speaking of normalising relations with Iran and cooperating with its existing leadership, occasionally describing those very leaders as more “reasonable” than before. During the early phase of the conflict, the complete destruction of Iran’s missile program, the industries responsible for its production, and the naval forces supporting it was presented as a principal objective. Later, however, his position softened considerably. He observed that while missiles might inflict damage upon limited areas, they were incapable of destroying the world, and since other nations possessed similar capabilities, Iran might also retain a limited missile arsenal. It was for this reason that the Memorandum of Understanding contained no provision requiring the dismantlement of Iran’s missile program. A similar evolution occurred regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Following the military operations of 2025 and again in 2026, it was asserted that Iran’s entire uranium enrichment capability would be eliminated and that the nuclear threat would be extinguished permanently. In time, however, the objective was narrowed simply to ensuring that Iran would not acquire a nuclear weapon. Rather than insisting upon total dismantlement, reliance shifted towards international monitoring and continued negotiations. Control over highly enriched uranium, initially regarded as a non-negotiable and indispensable condition, was subsequently treated as a matter of secondary importance. It was argued that preventing the production of a nuclear weapon remained the essential objective, while questions concerning enriched uranium would be addressed in future negotiations. The instruments of pressure likewise underwent a profound transformation. Economic sanctions and financial restrictions, once regarded as the principal means of coercion, gradually gave way to incentives. Discussions emerged concerning the release of frozen assets, temporary licences for Iranian oil exports, and the possibility of reconstruction assistance amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, with additional concessions to be granted subject to Iran’s future conduct. Likewise, the original determination to terminate Iran’s support for regional proxy groups gradually receded into the background. In its place, greater emphasis was placed upon securing a direct ceasefire and addressing the broader requirements of peace and stability throughout the Middle East. These strategic adjustments were accompanied by repeated tactical oscillations, in which stern threats were frequently followed by the postponement or cancellation of military action. A chronological review compiled up to 3 August reveals numerous announcements of major strikes that were ultimately abandoned. The latest example occurred on 1 and 2 August, when military action was suspended following requests from Iran and several regional parties, together with the emergence of preliminary outlines for a possible understanding involving the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and measures aimed at removing the nuclear threat. On 7 April, shortly before the expiration of an ultimatum in which President Trump had threatened strikes against bridges and power stations, a two-week ceasefire was agreed. He had warned that such attacks could extinguish an entire civilisation. On 21 April, at the request of international mediators, the ceasefire was extended indefinitely, although hostilities resumed at a later stage. On 18 May, a major military operation was deferred to allow serious negotiations to proceed, but when those negotiations faltered, military action recommenced. On the night of 11 June, President Trump threatened an overwhelming assault upon Iran together with the seizure of its oil and gas resources. Yet only hours later, citing what he described as a significant diplomatic breakthrough, he cancelled the operation, thereby paving the way for the Memorandum of Understanding. Signed on 17 June, the Memorandum provided for a ceasefire, the temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, limited economic relief, and a framework for sixty days of negotiations. It nevertheless expressly reserved the right to resume bombing should its provisions prove unsatisfactory. At the beginning of July, following attacks upon commercial shipping, the ceasefire was declared terminated. Military strikes were launched against dozens, and subsequently scores, of targets. Congress was formally notified, and the Administration adopted an increasingly uncompromising public tone. Yet negotiations continued simultaneously. The naval blockade was reimposed, retaliatory operations persisted, and on 27 July the intensive daily bombardment was once again suspended in order to afford diplomacy another opportunity. Even in early August, fresh threats eventually yielded to renewed consideration of a possible political framework. Oil sanctions followed a similarly fluctuating course. Temporary export licences were granted, only to be withdrawn as sanctions were reimposed.

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