Babarloi Bypass: Sindh’s Strait of Hormuz

When rain descends from the folds of clouds, it assumes the form of divine mercy for the earth—reviving parched soil and spreading smiles across the weary faces of farmers. Yet, when this very rain turns unbridled and the administrative apparatus built to welcome it pulls a heavy shroud of negligence over its eyes, this descent of mercy transforms into a harrowing shape of torment and sudden calamity. Gujrat, a historic and industrial city of Punjab that holds a unique global identity through its civilizational expanse, skilled artisans, and proximity to the Chenab River, presents the terrifying spectacle of a pond and a swamp every monsoon season. Here, urban flooding is no longer merely a climatic accident; rather, it has become a chilling confession of administrative apathy, unscientific planning, and a criminal denial of historical geographical realities. When the hydrological management of cities is evaluated on a global scale, the concepts of “Sponge Cities” are put into practice, but our reality stands in stark opposition. When the state of urban drainage in Gujrat is objectively reviewed through the corridors of history, one’s eyes are opened to the bitter truth that the rulers and elements who dominated this city consciously hollowed out its roots at every level for the gratification of greed. The city’s drainage and sewerage system, in particular, fell prey to the plunder of commission agents belonging to the corruption mafia. It is an immensely agonizing chapter of history that two decades ago, when a renowned international Japanese company completed a detailed survey of Gujrat, officially announced its complete reconstruction on modern lines, and promised a world-class drainage system, the hungry brokers sitting in the echelons of power burnt this magnificent project in the fire of personal lust. The people of Gujrat can never forget the actors who sacrificed the Japanese company’s dream at the altar of kickbacks. Later, when times changed and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi assumed the helm of this region as Chief Minister, he released heavy, voluminous funds amounting to billions of rupees to radically improve and modernize Gujrat’s decrepit and worn-out drainage system. Yet the tragedy was that these billions of rupees in Gujrat’s history remained restricted to a few specific and powerful pockets, and to openly divide these funds, the entire system was mortgaged to a fostered contractor mafia. With an exceptionally substandard, superficial, and unprofessional approach, this mafia played a game of window-dressing that instead of fixing Gujrat’s sewerage system, ruined it permanently and turned the entire city into an artificial swamp. Today, the agony of drainage dancing through the city’s streets and roads offers no hope of deliverance from this terrifying urban flood unless a severe accountability of these true, deceitful culprits is carried out. The political leadership that followed also made efforts suited to their respective statures for the betterment of the city; and although their own technical errors consistently hampered this improvement, every resident of Gujrat continues to carry the heavy burden of those primary sinners who devastated Gujrat’s history, civilization, and urbanity. Last year, when urban flooding once again descended upon the city as a mortal torment, uproar echoed everywhere, the wheel of life halted, and the situation reached a point where the Chief Minister of Punjab had to personally make an emergency visit to Gujrat to rescue the district administration from this storm of incompetence. During this visit, a heavy downpour of announcements and promises took place, accompanied by the release of special funds worth billions for complete and sustainable improvement next year. Despite the sincere efforts and financial provisions of Honorable Maryam Nawaz Sharif, the district administration—entrenched in a colonial mindset—spent all its energies throughout the year on personal image-building and photo sessions rather than the timely completion of this vital sewerage project. As ill luck would have it, as soon as the monsoon season arrived once again this year, the colorful balloon of good governance and claims deflated entirely, exposing the bitter reality that this malaise of flawed planning persists and rainwater continues to rain down as a torment upon citizens’ lives. And when this rainwater has already devastated citizens’ lives, wounding their homes and businesses, only then do the traditional efforts of WASA and district institutions begin to bear fruit, with water finally receding from the streets after prolonged suffering. Success drums are then beaten over this very temporary performance, adding salt to the injuries of the citizens. A profound study of Gujrat’s urban geography reveals that its foundations and topography are deeply embedded in its centuries-old historical backdrop. Built during the Mughal era, the Akbari Fort serves as the greatest metaphor for the region’s military, political, and administrative history. Viewed from a geographical and topographical standpoint, the Akbari Fort is situated on a relatively high mound or plateau, and the city’s older structural layout spreads outward from this height in gradual slopes in all directions. Principally and naturally, this elevation of the fort and the surrounding natural slopes should have stood as an exceptional geographical blessing for a drainage system—provided the natural pathways of water flow had been preserved and left unmolested by grotesque tampering. The tragedy, however, is that over time, unbridled urban expansion and a flood of encroachments mutilated this natural sloping system so ruthlessly that today, that very height and slope have turned into a bane for the city. Unchecked commercialization and illegal constructions in and around the Akbari Fort and its adjoining low-lying areas have blocked all traditional water routes in such a manner that water finds no outlet. The consequence is that when rainwater flows down from the elevated parts of the fort, instead of finding an open path or paved drain ahead, it encounters dead alleys, narrow sewage pipelines, and an endless siege of encroachments. Consequently, this water accumulates in lower regions to form a permanent lake, leaving city residents weeping over their helplessness. Gujrat’s tragedy is not merely the accumulation of rainwater; it is a reflection of that collective apathy and corruption which wakes up with the arrival

The preceding five parts of this series have argued that elimination of riba cannot be achieved by changing the vocabulary of finance. We began with definition, moved to creation of money, separated transaction deposits from investment capital, examined productive finance based on ownership and genuine risk, and then placed Bait-ul-Mal, waqf, zakat and qard hasan within a wider system of social protection. The final question is no longer conceptual. It is legislative. Pakistan now has a date. The Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2024 substituted Article 38(f) with the direction to “eliminate riba completely before the first day of January, two thousand twenty-eight”. The constitutional deadline reinforces the Federal Shariat Court’s 2022 judgment in the Riba cases, reported as PLD 2023 FSC 47. The problem is that a deadline does not itself create a new financial order. The Finance Division’s Post-2027 Financial System in Pakistan contains useful work on Sukuk, liquidity facilities, legislation, safety nets, technology and capacity building. It nevertheless remains a strategy, not a Prohibition of Riba law. More importantly, some of its transitional assumptions sit uneasily with the word “completely”. Majority foreign-owned institutions may decide voluntarily whether to convert; conventional obligations contracted before the deadline may continue according to their terms until maturity; and fresh foreign financing is contemplated through Shariah-compliant modes subject to availability of reasonable options. These concerns are understandable from the perspective of financial stability. They cannot become permanent legal exceptions. Pakistan therefore needs an umbrella Prohibition of Riba Act, enacted well before the constitutional cut-off, accompanied by consequential federal and provincial amendments [Who will draft Riba Prohibition Law? Minute Mirror, April 7, 2026]. Its first task must be the one identified in Part I: define what is prohibited. The law should distinguish a loan or debt carrying a stipulated increase because of time from lawful consideration arising from genuine sale, lease, service, partnership or productive risk. Courts and regulators should be empowered to examine connected contracts as one economic arrangement. A murabaha, ijarah, musharakah or Sukuk should not become immune from scrutiny merely because recognised Islamic terminology appears in its documents. The second requirement is a clear cut-off rule. No bank, financial institution, government agency or other regulated person should be permitted to originate a new interest-bearing financial contract in Pakistan after December 31, 2027. The prohibition must be activity-based, not ownership-based. A transaction cannot change its constitutional character because shareholders of the institution happen to be foreign. This is also the weakness we identified earlier in examining the Government’s strategy paper. Existing liabilities require different treatment. Pakistan cannot simply repudiate sovereign bonds, multilateral obligations or private contracts. That would replace one problem with default, litigation and financial isolation. The law should instead require a complete register of every conventional obligation extending beyond the cut-off: principal, return, maturity, governing law, creditor, refinancing possibility and proposed conversion date. Contracts capable of consensual refinancing should be converted. Those that cannot immediately be altered should continue only under a transparent transitional schedule with definite sunset dates, rather than receiving an indefinite exemption merely because they were signed before 2028. The third issue concerns money itself. Part II argued that commercial-bank money creation is not automatically riba. The power to create purchasing power through credit is nevertheless too important to remain outside reform. Parliament should require a time-bound examination of sovereign transaction money, reserve arrangements and separation of monetary creation from productive financial intermediation. This question should be decided upon economic evidence and institutional consequences, not theological assertion. Part III then demonstrated why payment accounts and investment accounts require legal separation. Money held for immediate payment and nominal safety should not be treated as risk capital. Funds deliberately invested for commercial return should carry transparent exposure to the enterprises and assets from which that return arises. Deposit protection against institutional failure must similarly be distinguished from a State guarantee against every commercial investment loss. The fourth area is productive finance. The law should protect genuine murabaha, ijarah, salam, istisna, musharakah, mudarabah and other permissible arrangements while prescribing minimum standards of ownership, possession, disclosure and risk. Shariah audit should examine economic substance rather than merely documentation. Taxation must also become neutral. Equity participation, leasing and genuine asset transactions should not suffer additional fiscal costs merely because legislation was historically designed around conventional debt. Public finance cannot remain outside this discipline. Government should not treat Sukuk merely as a technique for reproducing conventional borrowing against whatever public assets can be placed in a registry. The official strategy itself proposes an Assets Registry Company and expanded hybrid Sukuk issuance. Sovereign instruments must confer genuine economic rights and corresponding responsibilities rather than provide documentary assets solely to support a predetermined financial return. Fiscal reform is inseparable from elimination of riba. No monetary arrangement can remain sound where governments continuously borrow merely to finance structural deficits. Monetary policy requires the same intellectual honesty. The Government’s strategy envisages Shariah-compliant open-market operations, standing facilities and liquidity arrangements. These are necessary developments, but changing contractual forms will not be enough if their sole objective becomes mechanical reproduction of the existing interest-rate corridor. SBP ultimately needs a transparent post-riba monetary framework explaining liquidity creation and absorption, lender-of-last-resort assistance, foreign-exchange operations and monetary transmission. The fifth element takes us beyond banking altogether. Part V argued that riba flourishes not only because creditors seek gain but also because human beings are compelled by need. A successful transition must therefore strengthen Bait-ul-Mal, professionally governed public waqf lillah, independently administered zakat and revolving qard hasan funds. Essential healthcare, education, disability support and subsistence during genuine incapacity should never become markets for financial extraction. Local cooperative institutions should provide the bridge from protection to participation. The lesson drawn from Rabobank was not that Pakistan should import a Dutch banking model. It was that communities can mobilise their resources and build productive institutions from below. Properly regulated cooperatives can gradually shift economic power away from patrons and concentrated financial interests towards citizens themselves. Governance is consequently as important as Shariah nomenclature. Pakistan

Pakistan has never lacked economic advice. Since independence, successive governments have experimented with socialist planning, import substitution, nationalisation, structural adjustment, privatization, fiscal decentralisation, value added taxation, documentation drives, digital governance and, most recently, artificial intelligence in tax administration.  Almost every reform has been presented as the missing ingredient that would place the country on the path of sustained prosperity. However, Pakistan continues to oscillate between balance-of-payments crises, external dependence, fiscal instability and repeated recourse to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This persistent failure raises a more fundamental question. Is Pakistan’s crisis primarily economic, or are economists asking the wrong questions? For decades, the dominant explanation has remained remarkably consistent. Pakistan is said to suffer from a narrow tax base, inadequate domestic resource mobilisation, weak public institutions, poor governance and inconsistent implementation of otherwise sound policies. According to this view, if taxes were broadened, exemptions withdrawn, administration digitalised and markets allowed to function efficiently, sustainable growth would eventually follow. There is much truth in these observations. They identify many of the symptoms. But they do not fully explain why technically sound reforms repeatedly fail in Pakistan while producing very different outcomes elsewhere. The reason, as suggested in earlier writings, is that Pakistan cannot be understood through the conventional assumptions of public finance alone. Economic policy does not operate in a constitutional vacuum; it reflects the incentives created by the political and legal institutions within which governments function. Orthodox economics generally assumes a constitutional order within which governments seek, however imperfectly, to maximise public welfare. Fiscal policy, taxation and expenditure are analysed as instruments for correcting market failures, financing public goods and promoting economic growth. Political constraints are acknowledged but usually treated as external distortions rather than integral components of economic analysis. Pakistan presents a different reality. Here, constitutional arrangements, political incentives, strategic considerations and informal institutions have shaped fiscal outcomes as much as, and often more than, economic policy itself. Taxation has frequently reflected the distribution of political power rather than principles of efficiency or equity.  Public expenditure has often been determined by strategic imperatives rather than developmental priorities. External assistance has repeatedly substituted for difficult domestic reforms. Elite bargains have preserved privilege while transferring the burden of adjustment to documented businesses, salaried individuals and ordinary consumers. These outcomes cannot be adequately explained by models that assume an impartial state pursuing coherent economic objectives. The analytical framework itself, therefore, requires reconsideration. This series proceeds from a simple but powerful proposition: before analysing taxes, budgets or debt, one must first understand the constitutional rules that shape political incentives. This is the central insight of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE).  Unlike conventional public finance, CPE begins not with taxes or budgets but with the constitutional rules, institutional incentives and political structures that determine how economic decisions are actually made. It asks a prior question: Who designs the rules under which economic policy operates, whose interests do those rules serve, and how do they shape incentives for both governments and citizens? Once that question is asked, many of Pakistan’s recurring puzzles begin to appear less mysterious. Why do technically sound tax reforms repeatedly fail? Why do successive governments rely on indirect taxation while avoiding politically influential sectors? Why has documentation remained elusive despite extraordinary advances in digital technology? Why does every external crisis quickly become a fiscal crisis? Why has debt expanded despite repeated stabilisation programmes? The answers lie not merely in economics but in the constitutional and political environment within which economics operates. This series proposes a different approach. Rather than examining taxation, debt or fiscal federalism as isolated subjects, it will analyse them as interconnected manifestations of Pakistan’s constitutional political economy. Future parts will explore how colonial legacies, post-independence constitutional choices, geopolitical dependency, elite capture, federal arrangements, judicial interpretation and administrative incentives have combined to shape Pakistan’s economic trajectory. The purpose is not to reject orthodox economics. Public finance remains indispensable. Sound taxation, efficient expenditure and macroeconomic stability are essential for any modern state. However, these instruments cannot achieve their intended objectives when the institutional environment within which they operate generates incentives that systematically frustrate reform. Pakistan’s crisis is not simply a fiscal crisis. Nor is it merely a crisis of governance. It is, more fundamentally, a crisis of constitutional political economy. Unless that deeper reality is understood, technical reforms, however well designed, will continue to produce disappointing results because they address the symptoms rather than the constitutional incentives that generate them. In the next part, we shall examine why the assumptions of orthodox public finance differ fundamentally from those of constitutional political economy, and why that distinction matters profoundly for understanding Pakistan. [To be continued]  ____________________________________________________________________ Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996. 

Pakistan stands as a living testament to an enduring spiritual and ideological conviction. From its very inception, the rallying cry that unified millions were both simple and profound: “What does Pakistan mean? La ilaha illallah.” Under this banner of faith in the Oneness of Allah, the nation emerged on the world map in 14 August 1947, as a homeland for Muslims of the Subcontinent, guided by the vision of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the philosophical foresight of Allama Iqbal. It was not merely a political endeavour but the realisation of a distinct national identity rooted in Islamic ideals of justice, sovereignty, and unity. Yet the path was fraught with peril. Even before the new state could draw breath, formidable obstacles arose—economic collapse, mass migrations, and external scepticism. Many predicted that its borders would soon dissolve under pressure, but divine will ordained otherwise. Like a ship battling turbulent seas, Pakistan endured and reached the shores of stability through resilience and faith. As the country gained its footing, a landmark gathering in Lahore in February 1974 marked a turning point. The Second Islamic Summit Conference brought together leaders from 38 Muslim nations, including King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and Muammar Gaddafi. Hosted by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, this assembly transformed individual aspirations into collective strength. Muslims, like fingers joining to form a mighty fist, stood united on a common platform. The summit addressed the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, supported Palestinian and Arab causes, and elevated Pakistan’s stature as a bridge among Islamic nations. From this unity flowed a shared mission that propelled the country forward. Throughout its history, Pakistan has answered calls for global security and the stability of the Islamic world. It earned the honourable distinction of the Fortress of Islam, particularly through its longstanding commitment to safeguarding the Haramain Sharifain. Pakistani troops have served in Saudi Arabia since the 1970s, with deployments in training, advisory, and protective roles—often numbering over 10,000 at peaks, including during the 1990-91 Gulf War. This sacred duty reflects not mere strategy but a religious obligation deeply felt by the nation.  Adversaries, notably neighbouring India, seized every opportunity to portray Pakistan as a failing state. Yet at moments of trial, unseen help arrived. In May 2025, Pakistan demonstrated military prowess that astonished observers, restoring its lost prestige through resolute leadership that honoured the divine trust placed upon it. A landmark Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed on 17 September 2025 in Riyadh by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, formalised decades of brotherhood. This pact declares that any aggression against one is an aggression against both, encompassing comprehensive cooperation in defence, training, technology, and joint deterrence. Reports suggest potential deployment of up to thousands of Pakistani personnel and assets, including JF-17 aircraft, underscoring Pakistan’s role as a steadfast guardian.  Building upon this success, Pakistan has played a constructive mediating role in Gulf tensions, earning widespread appreciation for its balanced diplomacy. Cooperation with Turkey has deepened through bilateral deals in defence and trade, while Kuwait and other regional states have expressed interest in similar partnerships. Pakistan’s armed forces, with approximately 650,000–685,000 active personnel—one of the world’s largest standing armies—alongside an estimated hundreds of nuclear warheads and modern platforms like JF-17 fighters and advanced missiles, provide credible strength to these endeavours.  Looking to the future, Pakistan’s perspective remains one of hope anchored in unity and good intentions. The day is not distant when an alliance of Islamic countries, forged through mutual respect and shared values, may emerge—bearing precedents in the European Union or NATO yet rooted firmly in Islamic principles of solidarity. Such a framework would face formidable obstacles: historical differences, external influences, and economic disparities. Yet with the spirit that carried Pakistan through partition, the 1971 trials, and recent triumphs, it remains achievable. Pakistan, with its strategic location, military capability, and diplomatic bridges—linking South Asia, the Gulf, and beyond—can serve as a pivotal node in this vision. It continues to champion economic cooperation within the OIC, advocate for peace with justice on issues like Palestine and Kashmir, and promote connectivity that benefits the wider ummah. Pakistan’s journey, from ideological birth to its current resurgence, exemplifies faith sustained against the odds. As it advances, the nation carries not only the aspirations of its 250 million people but the hopes of many who see in its endurance a beacon for the Muslim world. With trust in Allah, unity among its ranks, and steadfast resolve, Pakistan is poised to fulfil a greater role in fostering stability, prosperity, and brotherhood across Islamic lands. The future beckons with challenge and opportunity alike; guided by its founding principles, the nation shall meet both with honour.

The signing of the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Türkiye defence agreement in Makkah on August 7 marks a significant moment in the changing security architecture of the Middle East and South Asia. Its declaration that an armed attack against one member would be treated as an attack against all three has immediately raised questions about the future balance of power. Is the region moving towards two competing strategic formations — an emerging India-Iran axis on one side and the Pakistan-Saudi-Türkiye triangle on the other? The answer is not yet definitive, but the direction of regional politics is becoming increasingly visible. The most surprising element of this equation is Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Relations between Riyadh and Ankara have not always been comfortable. The rivalry and mistrust of the past, particularly during the period when Saudi and Turkish regional interests sharply diverged, made the two capitals appear more like competitors than strategic partners. Yet geopolitics has a way of bringing former rivals together when their security calculations begin to converge. For Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, security has become inseparable from economic transformation. Saudi Arabia’s ambitious Vision 2030 projects require uninterrupted energy exports, stable maritime routes and a predictable regional environment. The continuing threat to Red Sea shipping and the vulnerability of energy infrastructure have demonstrated that geographical distance is no longer sufficient protection. Türkiye offers Riyadh a valuable strategic instrument. Ankara possesses NATO experience, an expanding defence industry and significant diplomatic access across the region. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can communicate with actors that may remain difficult for Riyadh or Washington to approach directly. Türkiye can therefore serve not merely as a military partner but potentially as a diplomatic bridge. This is where the role of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan becomes particularly important. His experience in intelligence and diplomacy could provide Ankara with the capacity to pursue difficult negotiations involving regional conflicts, including the unresolved Saudi-Houthi security dilemma. For Riyadh, reducing the threat to the Red Sea and ensuring uninterrupted oil and trade routes is not simply a military objective; it is an economic necessity. Türkiye, meanwhile, also has its own economic calculations. Ankara needs investment, economic stability and stronger international partnerships. A closer relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United States and Western financial institutions could provide economic and strategic dividends. Thus, the partnership is not based on sentiment but on converging interests. Pakistan’s position is even more complicated. Islamabad has historically enjoyed close defence and political relations with Saudi Arabia while maintaining strong ties with Türkiye. Its military credibility and longstanding relationship with Riyadh make it a natural participant in such an arrangement. Pakistan can potentially emerge as the facilitator connecting the Gulf with South Asian security calculations. But there is a price. Pakistan’s traditional diplomatic strength has partly rested on its ability to maintain communication with opposing camps. Formal participation in a collective-defence arrangement may make Islamabad appear less like a neutral mediator and more like a contestant in an emerging regional confrontation. The question therefore arises: can Pakistan protect its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye without damaging its relations with Iran? The Iranian response will be crucial. Tehran is unlikely to accept a new security architecture surrounding it without attempting to construct diplomatic counterweights. Here, India could become an important part of the equation. Iran and India possess longstanding economic and strategic interests, particularly around connectivity, energy and the Chabahar corridor. Their cooperation does not automatically constitute a military alliance, but strategic circumstances could push their interests closer. Iran also possesses diplomatic instruments of its own. Oman and Qatar remain particularly important because of their ability to communicate with multiple competing powers. Rather than immediately creating a formal counter-alliance, Tehran could seek to use diplomacy, maritime negotiations and regional mediation to prevent isolation. This is why the emerging equation should not be reduced to a simple military confrontation. It is a contest of diplomacy, technology, economics, energy security and strategic geography. The United States also remains an unavoidable factor. Washington’s relationships with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and India mean that any emerging regional architecture will inevitably intersect with American interests. Yet it would be premature to describe the Makkah agreement as an anti-American bloc. Saudi Arabia remains deeply connected to the United States, Türkiye remains a NATO member, and Pakistan continues to maintain important relations with Washington. The real transformation may therefore be something more subtle: regional powers are increasingly seeking strategic autonomy instead of relying exclusively on one external guarantor. For Pakistan, this is a moment of both opportunity and danger. Islamabad can gain diplomatic weight from its position within the Pakistan-Saudi-Türkiye triangle, but it must avoid becoming trapped in a zero-sum regional rivalry. Its relationship with Iran cannot simply be sacrificed, nor can its longstanding partnership with Saudi Arabia be ignored. The emerging India-Iran axis and Pakistan-Saudi-Türkiye triangle may never become formal opposing blocs. But if regional tensions continue to deepen, the strategic calculations of these countries could increasingly move in opposite directions. The region is entering a new chess game — one in which missiles and drones matter, but diplomacy, energy routes, economic leverage and political alliances may matter even more. The challenge for Pakistan is therefore not merely to choose a side. It is to ensure that, while standing with its strategic partners, it retains enough diplomatic space to speak to everyone. Because in the new regional order, the strongest player may not be the one with the largest alliance — but the one capable of preventing the chessboard from becoming a battlefield.

Pakistan has entered a crucial phase in its constitutional and administrative journey. With a population exceeding 250 million, the governance model that served the country decades ago is increasingly being questioned. Recent public discussions, including remarks by Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi advocating a debate on administrative reforms in light of Pakistan’s growing population, have reignited an important national conversation: Is it time to rethink how Pakistan is governed? In my view, the answer is yes. The real challenge is not simply whether Pakistan should create more provinces. The real challenge is how governance can be brought closer to the people. A modern state cannot be effectively administered through excessive centralization when its population, economy, and urban centers have expanded dramatically over the past several decades. The first and most important reform should be the empowerment of local governments. District administrations, metropolitan authorities, and municipal governments should be given genuine constitutional authority, financial autonomy, and administrative independence. Citizens interact with government primarily through local institutions. Therefore, healthcare, education, sanitation, water supply, transport, municipal planning, and public safety should be managed by empowered local governments rather than through an overly centralized administrative structure. Karachi represents the strongest example of why governance reform has become a necessity rather than a choice. As Pakistan’s largest city and economic engine, Karachi deserves a governance model specifically designed for a modern global megacity. Despite its enormous contribution to the national economy, the city continues to face serious challenges in urban planning, infrastructure, traffic management, public transport, water supply, waste management, and municipal administration. In my opinion, simply placing Karachi under direct federal control would not automatically solve these problems. The federal government already carries enormous national responsibilities, and transferring administrative authority without structural reforms may simply relocate existing governance challenges. Instead, Karachi requires a metropolitan governance model comparable to internationally recognized cities such as New York, where professional city administration, clearly defined institutional responsibilities, strong municipal leadership, effective policing coordination, urban planning, and financial autonomy work together under a comprehensive metropolitan framework. Such a model could improve service delivery while ensuring greater accountability and long-term planning. Governance reform should not stop at strengthening local governments. Pakistan should also seriously consider creating additional provinces wherever there is genuine administrative need, broad public consultation, and constitutional consensus. Smaller provinces can improve administrative efficiency, strengthen regional representation, and make governments more responsive to local communities. More representative provincial structures can also help ensure that the concerns of both urban and rural populations receive greater attention at the national level. Equally important is the devolution of administrative authority to districts and local institutions. Excessive concentration of political and administrative power often limits opportunities for ordinary citizens to influence decisions that directly affect their lives. A stronger local government system would enable communities to participate more effectively in governance while improving transparency, accountability, and public service delivery. This debate should never be viewed as an attempt to weaken Sindh or divide its people. On the contrary, I believe these reforms would strengthen Sindh by ensuring that development and decision-making reach every corner of the province. Whether someone lives in Kandhkot, Larkana, Mithi, Islamkot, Mirpurkhas, Badin, Hyderabad, Thatta, or Karachi, every citizen deserves equal access to quality healthcare, education, infrastructure, clean drinking water, municipal services, and economic opportunities. An equally important aspect of this reform process is public awareness and civic education. Pakistan needs a network of credible academics, constitutional experts, economists, retired civil servants, educationists, and respected members of civil society who can engage directly with communities across Sindh, particularly in rural and underserved areas where access to balanced political information may be limited. Their role should be to explain, in Sindhi and other local languages, the constitutional, administrative, and economic implications of decentralization, stronger local governments, and, where appropriate, the creation of additional provinces. Many citizens hear conflicting political narratives about these proposals. In my view, people should be encouraged to evaluate reforms on the basis of evidence, administrative efficiency, and public welfare rather than fear or political rhetoric. If these reforms genuinely improve representation, accountability, and service delivery, they should be supported regardless of political interests. Ultimately, the objective should not be to benefit any political party but to empower every citizen and ensure that governance serves the people instead of entrenched centers of power. Unfortunately, discussions about administrative reform are often overshadowed by political narratives that generate fear and misunderstanding. In my opinion, governance reforms should be evaluated on their administrative merits rather than through the lens of partisan politics. Citizens should be encouraged to examine whether decentralisation would improve their quality of life instead of viewing every proposal as a political contest. Meaningful reform also requires strengthening independent institutions, ensuring merit-based appointments, improving accountability, and modernising public administration. Whether Pakistan ultimately retains its parliamentary system or chooses another constitutional framework, lasting success will depend upon transparent institutions, professional governance, and effective local administration. Pakistan’s future does not depend merely on drawing new boundaries on a map. It depends upon building a governance system that places citizens—not bureaucracy or political centralization, at the center of public administration. Strong local governments, empowered districts, efficient metropolitan administrations, and, where constitutionally appropriate, additional provinces can together create a stronger federation, a more prosperous Sindh, and a better future for every Pakistani. A prosperous Pakistan will be built not through the concentration of power, but through the fair and effective distribution of power to the people.