cultivating peace instead

Cultivating Peace, Instead of Controlling Violence

Pakistan today stands at a defining moment where acts of intolerance, hate speech, mob violence, sectarian divisions and ideological polarisation are increasingly visible across both physical and digital spaces. While not every expression of intolerance translates into terrorism, history demonstrates that violent extremism rarely appears overnight; it gradually develops through unchecked prejudice, manipulated narratives and the normalisation of hatred. Every incident of mob lynching, religious intolerance, political violence or online radicalisation serves as a reminder that extremism is fundamentally a societal challenge before it becomes a security challenge. This reality demands a fundamental shift in national thinking from merely controlling violent behaviour after it erupts to cultivating a culture of peace, critical thinking, social cohesion and democratic values that prevents extremism from taking root in the first place.

The controlling approach has historically dominated Pakistan’s national security doctrine. Following the Army Public School tragedy in December 2014, the National Action Plan (NAP) became the country’s principal counterterrorism framework. Security operations such as Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad significantly weakened organised terrorist networks and restored the writ of the state in several conflict-affected regions. These achievements cannot be underestimated. However, extremism is not merely a security problem; it is a social, psychological, educational and communication challenge. Arresting militants may eliminate immediate threats, but it does not necessarily eliminate the narratives, grievances and social environments that produce future extremists.

Modern countering violent extremism (CVE) literature increasingly supports prevention over reaction. International experience from countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Denmark and Morocco demonstrates that sustainable peace emerges through education reforms, community engagement, youth empowerment, digital literacy, responsible religious discourse and economic inclusion. Pakistan itself has gradually begun recognising this shift. The recently approved National Prevention of Violent Extremism (NPVE) Policy reflects an important transition from exclusively kinetic responses towards prevention, rehabilitation and resilience-building. The policy introduces a comprehensive prevention framework emphasising community participation, education, strategic communication, rehabilitation and institutional coordination.

At the federal level, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) remains Pakistan’s principal coordinating institution for counterterrorism and counter-extremism policies. Established under the NACTA Act 2013, its mandate extends beyond intelligence coordination to include research, policy development, monitoring the National Action Plan, public awareness, strategic communication and prevention of violent extremism. During the past two years, NACTA has expanded partnerships with universities, international organisations and civil society. It has launched the National Prevention of Violent Extremism Policy, strengthened monitoring mechanisms, promoted research through the Pakistan Journal of Terrorism Research, signed academic partnerships and introduced public engagement initiatives such as peace festivals and youth outreach programmes.

Despite these encouraging developments, NACTA continues to face structural limitations that reduce its overall effectiveness. Institutional coordination between federal and provincial stakeholders remains inconsistent. Budgetary constraints, staffing shortages and overlapping mandates with provincial Counter Terrorism Departments often weaken implementation. Many of its policy recommendations remain stronger on paper than in practice because execution depends upon provincial governments. Furthermore, public visibility of NACTA remains limited. Most Pakistani citizens know little about its preventive work, despite the fact that ideological resilience requires continuous public engagement rather than bureaucratic coordination alone. Independent researchers have similarly concluded that Pakistan’s transition towards non-kinetic counter-extremism is promising but still constrained by implementation deficits and institutional fragmentation.

Punjab has taken a significant institutional step by establishing the Punjab Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism (CoE-CVE), which recently received autonomous legal status through provincial legislation. The decision reflects an important understanding that violent extremism cannot be addressed solely through policing. The Centre has been designed to function as a policy, research, training and coordination platform supporting prevention, community resilience and strategic communication. Its transformation into an autonomous institution is expected to strengthen institutional continuity, inter-agency coordination and evidence-based policymaking.

The Centre represents one of Pakistan’s most important experiments in moving from control towards cultivation. Instead of focusing exclusively on arrests and surveillance, it aims to understand why individuals become vulnerable to extremist narratives in the first place. Universities, educational institutions, media organisations, religious scholars, psychologists and community leaders are increasingly recognised as partners in prevention rather than passive observers. This multidisciplinary philosophy aligns with global best practices, where prevention begins in classrooms, families, workplaces and digital platforms long before security agencies become involved.

Nevertheless, the Punjab Centre of Excellence also faces considerable challenges. Being a relatively new institution, measurable outcomes remain limited. Much of its work has concentrated on institutional development, stakeholder engagement and policy formulation rather than long-term behavioural impact. Evaluating prevention programmes presents an inherent methodological challenge because successful prevention often means that negative events never occur. Unlike policing statistics, cultivation outcomes such as increased social cohesion, reduced intolerance or strengthened democratic resilience require longitudinal research and sophisticated impact measurement.

Pakistan’s educational system presents another critical weakness. Schools continue to prioritise examination performance while giving limited attention to civic education, media literacy, conflict resolution, emotional intelligence and critical thinking. Extremist organisations thrive where young people lack analytical skills and become vulnerable to simplified narratives dividing society into absolute categories of believers and enemies. A cultivation approach therefore requires curriculum reforms encouraging dialogue, diversity, constitutional values and peaceful disagreement.

The digital environment further complicates Pakistan’s counter-extremism landscape. Radicalisation increasingly occurs through encrypted messaging applications, algorithm-driven social media platforms and transnational online networks. Traditional security institutions cannot effectively monitor every digital interaction. Instead, digital resilience must be cultivated among citizens themselves. Media literacy programmes teaching young people to identify misinformation, hate speech, manipulation and extremist propaganda should become integral components of educational policy.

Economic marginalisation also deserves attention. Poverty alone does not create terrorists, but unemployment, social exclusion and limited upward mobility increase vulnerability to recruitment by extremist organisations offering identity, purpose and financial incentives. Pakistan’s youth bulge therefore represents both an opportunity and a risk. If properly educated, employed and politically included, young Pakistanis can become the country’s greatest peacebuilders. If neglected, the same demographic may remain susceptible to polarisation and radical narratives.

Political polarisation constitutes another growing concern. Public discourse increasingly rewards confrontation over consensus. Television debates, social media campaigns and partisan rhetoric often normalise hostility rather than dialogue. When democratic disagreement becomes framed as existential conflict, extremist thinking finds fertile ground. Political leaders, journalists and opinion makers therefore share responsibility for cultivating democratic culture through responsible communication.

The media itself occupies a pivotal position in this transformation. For years, coverage of terrorism largely focused on violence, casualties and military operations. While such reporting remains necessary, journalism should increasingly examine prevention, rehabilitation, resilience and successful community interventions. Constructive journalism highlighting interfaith harmony, youth leadership, educational innovation and community policing can strengthen public confidence while reducing the visibility sought by extremist organisations.

Pakistan also possesses significant opportunities. Its expanding higher education sector provides research capacity capable of generating evidence-based prevention strategies. Religious scholars across different schools of thought increasingly reject extremist interpretations. Civil society organisations continue promoting peace education, women’s empowerment and youth engagement. Provincial governments have shown greater willingness to establish specialised prevention institutions. International partners remain prepared to support capacity-building initiatives aligned with locally owned strategies.

However, the threats remain equally serious. Regional instability, cross-border terrorism, sectarian divisions, online radicalisation, political instability and economic uncertainty continue creating environments in which extremist narratives can flourish. Institutional discontinuity caused by administrative changes frequently interrupts long-term prevention programmes. Without sustained political commitment, cultivation initiatives risk becoming temporary projects rather than permanent national priorities.

The most important lesson for Pakistan is straightforward. Security operations can eliminate terrorists, but they cannot alone eliminate terrorism as an ideology. Laws can punish violent behaviour, but they cannot cultivate empathy. Intelligence agencies can monitor threats, but they cannot manufacture social trust. Police can maintain order, but they cannot build democratic citizenship. Those responsibilities belong collectively to families, schools, universities, religious institutions, media organisations, policymakers and civil society.

Pakistan’s experience demonstrates that control remains necessary, but cultivation is indispensable. The country now possesses institutional foundations through NACTA at the federal level and the Punjab Centre of Excellence at the provincial level to advance this transition. Their long-term success, however, will depend not merely on budgets or legislation but on whether they evolve into genuinely research-driven, community-centred and evidence-based institutions capable of shaping attitudes before violence emerges. Peace cannot simply be enforced; it must be cultivated patiently, systematically and continuously. Only then can Pakistan move from managing extremism to preventing it altogether.

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Almost 40 million people lost their jobs, but China continued the reform.  However, China’s privatization was led by a wise and smart policy. First, China identified the requirements for the private sector and SOEs to ensure a balance between tax and non-tax revenue. Second, China did not privatize critical industrial sectors or enterprises. Third, China established mechanisms to mitigate the impact on people and keep them engaged, thereby ensuring stability.   Second, President Jiang Zemin led China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was another landmark decision, which revolutionized China’s economic growth and development. After joining the WTO, China grew and developed by leaps and bounds. It also ushered in a new era of global economic linkages, which helped China develop rapidly and curb poverty. China is now the world’s largest trading partner, with over US$6 trillion in 2025, and the second-largest economy. Third, he prohibited the army from taking part in economic ventures.  Third, he introduced a strategy to revitalize the economy through science and education. He launched two landmark initiatives, Project 211 and Project 985, under this strategy. Project 211 was designed to build institutions for the 21st century. It was decided that 100 universities would be prepared for the 21st century.  For that purpose, 115 universities were identified. Project 985 was designed to create world-class universities, and 39 universities were under the project.   On the diplomatic front, he also achieved many successes. First, Hong Kong and Macau were reunited with the mainland. Second, he signed a friendship treaty with Russia and launched the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in collaboration with Russia. Now, the SCO is one of the world’s major organizations in a multipolar world. Fourth, he also completed China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  However, President Jiang Zemin’s most significant work was his theory of the Three Represents: the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The Three Represents theory is a major work of the Party, following Deng Xiaoping’s theory, in building the modern Party. It reflects the CPC’s philosophy and Chinese political culture, which emphasize evolution and reform in line with ground realities. However, the interests of the people must be the paramount guiding principle. President Jiang Zemin started work just after assuming the position of Secretary General, following Tiananmen Square.  The analysis of Three Represents highlights three important things. First, it urges the Party to better serve the people and embrace new classes. Thus, Three Represents opened the Party’s doors to new classes including entrepreneurs, businessmen, and professionals. It was necessary to diversify and give development new impetus by making the Party more inclusive. However, it sparked debate among Party members and other circles. The conservative elements of the Party were not ready to accept the business community and entrepreneurs. However, there was wider support for the inclusion within and outside the Party.  Second, Three Represents encouraged the enhanced role of science, education, and technology in leading the new phase of development. Although the revitalization of the economy through science and education was already underway, there was a need to accelerate the process further.  Third, the Party envisioned that it must strive to modernize culture in accordance with socialist values and norms.  Simultaneously, President Jiang Zemin also encountered some serious problems. First of all, relations with the USA were a constant irritant. The USA continued to interfere in Taiwan and internal affairs. The situation was further complicated by the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the Hainan incident by USA forces. The Hainan incident was a complicated issue that threatened peace. Second, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis appeared during his tenure. On the domestic front, he had to face an intensive debate over the inclusion of business groups and entrepreneurs in the Party. Moreover, privatization, especially after accession to the WTO, generated debate in the country. However, he solved these issues with wisdom and smart policy.   In conclusion, the above discussion indicates that President Jiang Zemin assumed leadership at a critical rather than a difficult time. However, he steered the country with dedication, wisdom, and smart policies. The ultimate objective of his policies was to serve the people and build an inclusive Party in line with new realities. That’s why he is considered one of

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