free screening testing

Free Screening, Testing and Treatment Drive to Eli…

Pakistan observed World Hepatitis Day on 28 July in Islamabad with a renewed national commitment to eliminating Hepatitis C and strengthening public health interventions through coordinated action, innovation, and community engagement. Under the Prime Minister’s National Programme for the Elimination of Hepatitis C Infection, the Government of Pakistan has launched free screening, free diagnostic testing, and free treatment for Hepatitis C patients across the country. The initiative represents a major public health intervention aimed at reducing the country’s exceptionally high burden of the disease and ensuring that financial constraints do not prevent patients from receiving timely diagnosis and life-saving treatment.

The ceremony was attended by the Federal Minister for Health, Syed Mustafa Kamal; the Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Special Initiatives, Professor Ahsan Iqbal; the WHO Country Representative, Dr. Luo Dapeng; the Federal Secretary for Health, Muhammad Aslam Ghori; Professor Dr. Saeed Akhtar, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Pakistan Kidney and Liver Institute and Research Centre (PKLI&RC); the Chief Executive Officer of Dr. Akbar Niazi Teaching Hospital, Islamabad, Yasir Khan Niazi; Dr. Huma Qureshi; and Dr. Hassan Mahmood, Country Head of Integral Global. International delegates, representatives of national and international organizations, and leading health experts were also present.

The event was organized by the Project Management Unit of the Prime Minister’s National Programme for the Elimination of Hepatitis C Infection under the leadership and supervision of Project Director Dr. Zia Dawar, in collaboration with Dr. Akbar Niazi Teaching Hospital, Islamabad, and Integral Global. The gathering provided an important platform to assess progress, discuss future strategies, and reaffirm Pakistan’s determination to achieve Hepatitis C elimination through evidence-based policies, strong partnerships, and effective implementation mechanisms.

Hepatitis C remains a major public health concern worldwide, but the scale of the challenge is particularly serious in Pakistan. A large number of infected individuals remain unaware of their condition because the disease may progress silently for years without producing obvious symptoms. Limited access to screening, delayed diagnosis, unsafe medical practices, inadequate awareness, and the high cost of treatment have historically prevented many patients from seeking timely care.

The introduction of free screening, testing, and treatment under the Prime Minister’s National Programme therefore marks a significant shift in Pakistan’s response. It recognizes that Hepatitis C cannot be eliminated merely by treating patients who reach hospitals at an advanced stage. Instead, a comprehensive national strategy is required to identify undiagnosed cases, provide confirmatory testing, ensure immediate access to treatment, prevent new infections, and maintain effective monitoring and surveillance systems.

Addressing the gathering, Federal Minister for Health Syed Mustafa Kamal stated that Pakistan carries one of the highest burdens of Hepatitis C patients in the world. He warned that the disease continues to threaten millions of lives and places immense pressure on families, communities, and the national healthcare system. He emphasized that the government could not remain indifferent to a health crisis of such magnitude and had therefore launched a nationwide programme providing free screening, free testing, and free treatment to eligible patients.

Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Special Initiatives Professor Ahsan Iqbal highlighted the need to integrate public health priorities into Pakistan’s broader national development agenda. He emphasized that a healthy population is the foundation of economic growth, social stability, productivity, and sustainable development. Illness not only affects individuals and families but also reduces workforce participation, increases household expenditure, and places additional pressure on national resources. Professor Ahsan Iqbal noted that investment in disease prevention and healthcare accessibility should not be viewed merely as an expenditure. Rather, it is a long-term investment in Pakistan’s human capital and future prosperity. He stressed that the elimination of communicable diseases such as Hepatitis C requires continuity of policy, effective planning, measurable targets, institutional coordination, and transparent implementation.

The presence of international health partners at the event reflected the global importance of Pakistan’s hepatitis elimination agenda. WHO Country Representative Dr. Luo Dapeng appreciated Pakistan’s efforts to advance Hepatitis C elimination and reiterated the importance of sustained political commitment, strong surveillance, effective prevention, reliable data, public awareness, and universal access to treatment. He emphasized that international cooperation, technical expertise, and knowledge-sharing remain essential for strengthening national healthcare responses. Pakistan’s success in controlling Hepatitis C would not only protect millions of its citizens but would also contribute significantly to regional and global disease-elimination targets.

Addressing the gathering online, Professor Dr. Saeed Akhtar emphasized that eliminating Hepatitis C requires more than treating individuals after they become seriously ill. He stressed the importance of prevention, widespread screening, early diagnosis, safe medical practices, public awareness, and timely access to effective treatment. Professor Dr. Saeed Akhtar observed that Pakistan possesses the medical knowledge and therapeutic tools necessary to control the disease. However, success will depend on sustained political commitment, effective implementation, and close cooperation among the federal and provincial governments, healthcare institutions, development partners, and local communities.

Reliable data will enable policymakers to understand where infections are concentrated, which populations remain underserved, and whether screening and treatment programmes are producing the desired results. Without accurate monitoring, even well-funded programmes may struggle to measure their impact or address gaps in implementation.

The participation of international delegates and eminent health professionals demonstrated the growing recognition of Pakistan’s hepatitis elimination efforts on the global health platform. Their engagement provided an opportunity to exchange knowledge, examine successful international models, and identify practical solutions for overcoming the challenges that continue to hinder progress.

World Hepatitis Day serves as a reminder that Hepatitis C is preventable, diagnosable, and treatable. Its elimination is achievable when governments, healthcare professionals, communities, development partners, and international organizations work together with a shared vision and sustained commitment.

Pakistan’s journey towards eliminating Hepatitis C is not merely a medical campaign. It is a national commitment to protecting lives, reducing health inequalities, preventing avoidable suffering, and ensuring that no individual is denied treatment because of poverty or limited access to healthcare.

The Islamabad event conveyed a clear and powerful message; Hepatitis C elimination is possible through leadership, collaboration, public awareness, and sustained action. The government’s decision to bear the cost of screening, testing, and treatment represents an important step towards removing the financial barriers that have prevented many patients from receiving care.

As the country moves forward, the priorities remain clear: expanding access to free screening, ensuring free diagnostic testing, providing free and timely treatment, improving infection-control practices, empowering communities through awareness, and building a resilient healthcare system capable of responding effectively to major public health challenges.

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  • Power Behind the Scenes

    By Tuba Khan Informal networks represent an extremely important yet widely ignored aspect of governance, especially within developing nations whose formal administrative apparatus is either weak or disputed. Informal institutions refer to uncodified norms and traditions that influence decision-making processes in ways beyond the reach of legal processes. As far as the informal networks are concerned, they can include networks of patronage, kinship and alliances based on personal connections. In countries with hybrid governance structures such as Pakistan where formalized democratic mechanisms co-exist with informal structures, a clear distinction between formal institutions from informal institutions must be made for effective governance. In Pakistan, informal networks do not exist in parallel with institutionalized structures of governance; they actually become the central point around which power operates. Despite having formal governmental structures intact, the informal networks become quite important and influential. There exists a high level of interaction between political, military, bureaucratic and commercial elites. The origins of the informal networks in Pakistan’s governance system are rooted in the colonial era when the governance system of the British was based mainly on the principles of indirect governance. Alongside formal institutionalized structures of governance, the colonial rulers gave powers to local intermediaries in the form of local landlords, tribal chieftains and other local power-brokers. This led to the development of patronage systems and kinship power, which were based on caste and biradari relations. Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has experienced a very weak governance system. In the absence of stable and fully consolidated democratic institutions, the informal networks took on greater importance in political activities. These informal networks were strengthened by the repeated involvement of the powerful actors in political matters. The periods of outright military takeover or indirect control through civilian regimes cemented a structure where important decisions were frequently taken without recourse to institutionalized processes. The military, along with bureaucrats and politicians, established networks that could affect the policy agenda, political succession and even national interests. Resultantly, this trend continued to blur the lines between formal and informal authority. Islamization strategies of the 1970s and 1980s further broadened the informal networks by involving religious figures in the politics of Pakistan. Religious leaders can trigger religious sentiments and thus influence public opinion according to the needs of influential networks. So, in many cases, the government depended on the clergy and their organizations to mobilize mass support, which gave rise to interchanges of mutual benefits between religious and political authorities. Since the 1990s, liberalization in the economy and growth of the media industry have introduced new players into informal networks. Informal networks have several mechanisms within Pakistan through which they exercise their authority. Patronage stands out as one such mechanism where rewards and resources, such as employment opportunities within the public sector, campaign financing and even electoral loyalty are offered in exchange for support. On the other hand, back-channel negotiations conducted outside formal channels, such as Parliament and cabinet meetings, are vital in influencing the decision-making process of the state. Furthermore, elites are capable of hijacking policy-making processes and diverting resources in ways beneficial to themselves. Additionally, the media often mobilize people and give political power some form of moral legitimacy through propaganda. There are many implications of the existence of informal networks on the efficiency of the governance process. One of the major impacts is the undermining of formal institutional structures and electoral practices. Checks and balances, as well as the legislative process itself are often ignored or used solely for show purposes, while the real process of decision-making is handled through the use of private contacts and backdoor diplomacy. Another important implication is that the culture of corruption and inefficiency continues to persist. Patronage-driven systems tend to give preference to loyalty as opposed to competence, which leads to the appointment of people and the distribution of resources in a manner that is unrelated to development and the needs of the people at large. Policies tend to be revised according to changes in the interests of those in positions of authority, ultimately hindering the way to stability. To counter the effects of informal networks in Pakistan, the gradual development of formal institutions needs to take place instead of abruptly altering the current political environment. The starting point for designing a reform package is to redefine the role of the state. It is critical to ensure institutional independence, transparency of decision-making processes, meritocracy, citizen participation, press freedom and the accountability for the excessive influence of religious and economic elites to decrease dependence on informal institutions. Prevalence of informal political institutions in Pakistan causes several problems for the country’s political system. Formal institutions are often sidelined or rendered symbolic, leading to policy inconsistency and the undermining of democratic accountability. Nevertheless, the existence of informal groups is entrenched in the system and cannot be completely eliminated, their impact can be progressively restricted. This serves as an indication that reforms should be incremental and continuous

  • The AJK Crisis 

    Azad Jammu and Kashmir has recorded at least 40 deaths since early June in clashes tied to the Joint Awami Action Committee’s campaign against the region’s twelve refugee assembly seats, a toll that predates the events of July 27-28, when JAAC and AJK police gave conflicting counts of 14 to 21 more killed in Rawalakot. The combined total since June likely sits in the high 40s to high 50s, though no independent body has confirmed a single figure; every clash in this sequence has produced a JAAC count and a police count that don’t match, and neither has been verified from outside. The July violence fell during the first phase of a legislative election that AJK’s election commission split into three stages because of the unrest, a break from the territory’s usual practice of voting in a single day. Mirpur division cast ballots on July 27. Rawalakot, in Poonch division, was deliberately held back for the third phase because it has been the epicenter of the agitation. The clashes there on July 27-28 came as JAAC’s long march tried to push through the city toward Muzaffarabad, not on a day its own constituents were voting. That the state felt it necessary to stagger an election by geography to manage a protest movement is itself a measure of how far the crisis had already gone. Law enforcement personnel have been repeatedly targeted through the unrest. Police say an armed JAAC contingent opened fire on officers near Combined Military Hospital Rawalakot in a planned attack, which the region’s police chief called outright terrorism. JAAC disputes this, as it has disputed nearly every account of nearly every clash, saying its own people came under fire after power was cut to the area. Neither version has been independently verified, and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has called for an impartial probe into the Rawalakot deaths for that reason. What is not contested is that a movement now banned under anti-terrorism law has been in near-continuous confrontation with police for eight weeks, and that officers have died in it. The dispute traces back to a structural question the state has already answered through the proper channel. Six of the twelve seats go to refugees from the Jammu division, numbering around 434,000; six more go to refugees from the Kashmir Valley, numbering around 30,000. JAAC calls this disproportionate and argues the seats let people who do not live in AJK shape its politics from outside. The AJK Supreme Court ruled on June 7 that the seats are constitutionally protected and can only be altered through a formal amendment, not by administrative order or by protest. The government’s proscription of JAAC under anti-terrorism law came two days earlier, on June 5, ahead of a planned June 9 protest; the worst of the killing followed the ban rather than preceding it. Both sides of that sequence can be argued. What can’t be argued is that the state waited for a body count before invoking the law , it acted first, and the deaths followed. On the demands themselves, the government reports 24 of JAAC’s 44 total demands fully implemented and 16 more partially complete or in process, with 4 at an impasse. That record is substantial, larger than most governments manage against a protest charter. But it does not settle the argument on its own, because none of the 24 completed demands is the refugee-seat question. That one sits among the 16 still unresolved, and it is the demand driving the current violence. A compliance rate built mostly from other line items ; subsidies, cabinet size, judicial commissions, demonstrates the state’s good faith in general. It does not demonstrate its handling of the one issue JAAC is dying and killing over, and that distinction should not be blurred. Even so, the seat question has been settled by the only body with authority to settle it. Abolishing the seats to appease pressure tactics would be unconstitutional on its face, and it would tell any future movement in Pakistan that enough disruption can override a court and a negotiated settlement alike. A state that has followed its own constitutional process, implemented most of an agreed reform charter, and still faces an intensifying campaign of blockades and attacks on security personnel has grounds to hold its position; grounds that rest on the process it followed, not on an implementation statistic that doesn’t reach the actual grievance. The state’s strongest move now is to negotiate from the position it has already earned, not concede from a position of weakness. Reweighting the seats toward Jammu’s larger population, pursued through the amendment process the Supreme Court has itself outlined, would resolve the proportionality complaint on the state’s own terms and timeline, not JAAC’s. Offered now, immediately after a disputed mass-casualty event, it would read as capitulation. Offered once the group’s remaining leadership either accepts the court’s authority or is dealt with through the law, it becomes a demonstration of a functioning constitutional order rather than a retreat from one. The state does not owe JAAC a seat at the table it has spent eight weeks helping to blow up. It owes AJK’s residents a government that can enforce the law, account honestly for its own role in how this got this bloody, and eventually fix what is fair within the constitution , in that order.

  • Reforming the Security Council Without Entrenching…

    The United Nations was founded in 1945 after the League of Nations had failed to preserve peace. Its Security Council was designed for the world that emerged from the Second World War, with five permanent members holding the veto and a small number of elected seats. That basic architecture has scarcely changed since 1965, when the non-permanent membership rose from six to ten. The veto was meant to keep the great powers inside the system and to prevent open conflict among them. Eight decades later the organisation still carries the imprint of 1945 while the membership of the United Nations has grown to 193 states and the global population exceeds eight billion. The Council’s composition therefore no longer reflects the international community it is supposed to serve. In 2008 the General Assembly launched the Intergovernmental Negotiations to consider reform. The discussions have centred on five linked questions: categories of membership, the veto, regional representation, the size of the Council and its working methods. Africa still has no permanent seat. Latin America, South Asia and large parts of the Muslim world remain under-represented. The present arrangement is widely seen as a remnant of the colonial order that concentrates power among a few states. Many argue that emerging powers and significant regional actors—Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and India among them—ought to enjoy greater weight if the Council is to regain legitimacy and effectiveness. Yet the debate is locked. The Group of Four seeks permanent seats for itself and two for Africa. The African Group demands two permanent seats with full veto rights. France and Mexico urge the permanent members to refrain voluntarily from using the veto in cases of mass atrocity. The Uniting for Consensus group, led by Pakistan and supported by Italy, Mexico, Argentina, Canada and South Korea, rejects any enlargement of the permanent category. It proposes instead an expansion of elected seats that would be longer-term and renewable. The rival camps cancel one another’s majorities, leaving the process stalled. Enlarging permanent membership would not reform the Council so much as entrench new privileges. Additional veto-holders would multiply the occasions on which national interests can block action. The repeated American vetoes that have shielded Israel and allowed the destruction of Gaza to continue illustrate how a single permanent member can nullify the will of the rest. More permanent members would introduce further competing interests and raise the risk of paralysis. Once granted, permanent status is effectively irreversible; the new members would be free to obstruct any future attempt to revise the arrangement. India’s claim to a permanent seat invites particular scrutiny. Permanent membership requires sustained confidence in a state’s fidelity to the Charter. India’s refusal to implement successive Security Council resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, its rejection of a United Nations-supervised plebiscite and its unilateral constitutional changes in the territory sit uneasily with that standard. Concerns about human-rights practices in the disputed region and elsewhere, the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, reports of transnational repression, the Citizenship Amendment Act, the treatment of Rohingya refugees and a foreign policy that has offered strategic comfort to Israel all raise legitimate questions. India’s status outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty adds a further layer of unease. Germany’s candidature faces different objections. Europe already holds two permanent seats. Adding a third would deepen regional imbalance. Recent German positions on Gaza have been criticised as inconsistent with the very humanitarian principles permanent members are expected to uphold. The country’s failure to secure even a non-permanent seat in a recent election suggests that its aspirations do not command the necessary breadth of support. The Uniting for Consensus proposal offers a more measured path. Expanding the elected membership from ten to twenty would open opportunities for Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean without creating new permanent centres of power. Periodic elections would keep members accountable to the wider membership. Rotation would allow more states to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. Broader participation could improve the quality of deliberation on intractable questions such as Palestine, Ukraine and other long-standing disputes, without multiplying vetoes that have so often produced deadlock. Reform should strengthen the Council’s legitimacy without sacrificing its capacity to act. Expanding permanent membership would create additional privileged seats, heighten the risk of institutional paralysis and make subsequent change more difficult still. Wider geographical representation is better achieved by enlarging the elected ranks. The Uniting for Consensus approach preserves the existing institutional framework, enhances inclusivity, promotes accountability through regular elections and reflects the interests of the membership as a whole. Sustainable reform therefore lies in widening participation and reinforcing regional balance rather than in extending permanent privilege and the veto.

  • Beyond Riba: Reconstruction of Just Financial Orde…

    The preceding part of this series examined a question ordinarily left outside discussions on riba: who should create money? It argued that commercial-bank money creation is not, by itself, riba, but that the power to create purchasing power through credit is a matter of public importance requiring transparency, restraint and accountability. One possible reform is to separate transaction money, fully backed by sovereign money, from funds deliberately committed for investment. That proposition leads to an even more fundamental question. What exactly is a bank deposit? The answer appears obvious only because modern banking has merged several economically different relationships into the same institution. A person places salary in a current account because it must be available tomorrow morning. Another person places accumulated savings with a bank hoping to earn a return over five years. A business maintains money for payroll and suppliers. An investor deliberately commits capital to a project knowing that commercial gain is accompanied by the possibility of loss. Calling all these balances “deposits” conceals distinctions that become crucial in a financial order seeking to eliminate riba. There is a basic difference between money and investment. Money held for payment performs the functions of medium of exchange and store of nominal value. Its owner expects Rs.100 deposited today to remain Rs.100 tomorrow and to be transferable on demand. Investment capital performs another function. It is consciously placed in productive activity in expectation of gain and consequently bears the possibility of commercial loss. One cannot logically demand both absolute safety and entrepreneurial return from the same contractual relationship unless somebody else is made to carry the risk. Islamic jurisprudence recognised these distinctions long before modern banking. Funds entrusted purely for safekeeping can constitute amanah. A trustee does not own them and is not ordinarily liable for loss occurring without negligence or misconduct. Where fungible money is transferred to another person with authority to use it and an obligation to return its equivalent, the relationship acquires the character of qard, or loan. State Bank of Pakistan’s own glossary reflects precisely this reasoning. It describes an amanah as property held in trust and states that current accounts may initially be regarded as trust deposits. Once a bank obtains authority to use current-account funds in its business, however, the relationship becomes a loan because the bank must repay the full amount. This point deserves much greater attention. If a bank accepts Rs.100,000 from a customer, is free to use that money for its own financing operations and remains legally bound to repay Rs.100,000 whenever demanded, the customer is not bearing an investment risk. Whatever terminology appears on the account-opening form, economically the bank has received financing from the customer. No difficulty necessarily arises if the customer receives nothing beyond repayment of the amount advanced. The difficulty arises when banking system treats this repayable-at-par money simultaneously as the raw material from which additional financing and monetary claims can be generated. Part II suggested one possible solution: transaction accounts should be treated entirely differently. A current account used for wages, household expenditure, business payments and ordinary transfers should represent protected transaction money. If such balances are fully backed by sovereign money or central-bank reserves, they need not be exposed to the bank’s commercial financing decisions. The account holder would possess money, not an investment claim upon the success of a bank. The bank would provide custody, payments, transfers, cards, digital access and settlement services. It could legitimately charge transparent fees for those services. What it would not receive is free investment capital merely because citizens require access to a payment system. The consequences are significant. Fully backed transaction accounts would remain available on demand and at par. They would not earn an investment return because their owners have assumed no investment risk. Nor would their repayment depend upon the quality of the bank’s commercial portfolio. This is not merely a theological distinction. Modern central banking itself recognises the peculiar character of bank deposits. The Bank of England recently described commercial-bank deposits as liabilities used as money, expected to be redeemable at par on demand and relied upon as a safe store of value. It contrasted them with investment products whose values fluctuate and whose losses are borne by investors. A riba-free financial system should take that distinction seriously. The second category would consist of genuine investment accounts. Here the relationship is entirely different. A customer does not merely park money awaiting payment instructions. He consciously makes capital available for investment and accepts that lawful profit cannot be separated completely from commercial risk. Mudarabah provides one classical framework. One party supplies capital and the other enterprise and expertise. Profit is divided according to an agreed ratio; financial loss, in the absence of negligence or breach by the manager, falls upon the provider of capital. SBP itself explains Islamic investment deposits on this basis: the depositor acts as rabb-ul-maal and the bank as mudarib. Restricted mudarabah allows the investor to specify where the funds may be deployed; unrestricted mudarabah gives the bank wider investment authority. The principle is straightforward. If the depositor wants profit because capital is being employed commercially, the depositor must understand what capital is doing and what risk attaches to it. This is where present banking practice requires closer examination. Islamic banks commonly pool deposits, calculate weighted-average yields and distribute profits under elaborate regulatory rules. SBP presently prescribes profit-distribution arrangements for savings depositors, including minimum distribution requirements linked to the weighted-average gross yield of the institution. It also permits additional hiba in specified circumstances. These measures protect customers against inequitable allocation of profits by banks. Their consumer-protection purpose is understandable. At the same time, an increasingly managed and smoothed return can create in the depositor’s mind an expectation remarkably similar to a conventional savings rate. The crucial question is not whether the return happens to fluctuate by a few basis points. It is whether the depositor actually bears the economic character of an investor. An investment account should identify the pool in

  • The Stories of Pakistan’s Unsung Heros

    Every 14th of August we hear the same national narrative. Speeches recall 1947, flags are hoisted, and anthems are played at midnight. The symbolism matters. It reminds us of the cost of independence and the idea of Pakistan. Yet symbolism without substance risks becoming ritual. If we are to understand what independence means in 2026, we must look beyond the ceremony and toward the quiet, persistent work that sustains the nation through every crisis. That work is rarely televised. It is carried out by teachers in under-resourced schools, by health workers walking door to door, by engineers keeping the grid alive during heatwaves, by farmers adapting to erratic weather, and by young people building livelihoods from laptops in small towns. These are the stories of resilience that deserve a central place in our understanding of Pakistan, 79 years after its founding. Resilience is not an abstract virtue. It is a measurable response to constraint. Pakistan has faced recurring fiscal stress, energy shortfalls, climate shocks, and security challenges. In each case, state capacity alone has been insufficient. What has prevented collapse is a dense network of civic and professional effort that fills gaps, innovates under pressure, and restores basic function. Consider education. Official data continues to show millions of children out of school and low learning outcomes. At the same time, thousands of low-fee private schools, community learning centers, and volunteer tutoring initiatives operate in the same neighborhoods. They do not appear in headlines, but they keep children literate, prepare them for exams, and create a pathway, however narrow, to higher education. The same pattern appears in health. Lady Health Workers and polio teams travel on foot in heat and in risk, maintaining immunization coverage and maternal counseling in areas where clinics are distant or overburdened. Their work is repetitive, underpaid, and essential. Without it, disease surveillance and primary care would deteriorate far more rapidly. Economic resilience is visible in the informal sector and in the emerging digital economy. Pakistan’s labor market has never been able to absorb all new entrants through formal jobs alone. In response, millions have created their own employment: workshops, transport, retail, agriculture processing, and services. In the last decade, a new layer has appeared. Freelancers in Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, Peshawar, Quetta, Multan, and Faisalabad now earn foreign exchange by writing, designing, coding, and providing remote services. They pay no rent for office space, require little imported capital, and learn through online courses. This is not a substitute for industrial policy, but it is a real expansion of opportunity. It represents a form of independence: the ability of an individual to earn without waiting for a large institution to hire them. The state’s role here should be to reduce friction, ensure reliable electricity and internet, and simplify taxation and payment systems, so that this energy is not wasted. Climate resilience is now inseparable from national security. Floods in 2010, 2014, and 2022 displaced millions and damaged infrastructure worth billions. Drought and heatwaves threaten wheat and water. The response has included both engineering and community adaptation. Farmers are experimenting with drought-tolerant varieties and more efficient irrigation. Urban volunteers organize tree planting and waste management in their streets. Provincial and federal programs have attempted large-scale afforestation and watershed management. Progress is uneven and often underfunded, but the impulse is clear: adapt or lose. The most effective adaptations are local, because they are designed around specific soil, rainfall, and social networks. National policy can support them by providing data, credit, and technical extension, but it cannot replace the judgment of people who live on the land. What ties these examples together is a refusal to wait for perfect conditions. Resilience in Pakistan is not optimism. It is a practical calculation that problems will persist, and that action must proceed anyway. This attitude is visible in small businesses that maintain generators and solar panels to cope with load-shedding, in parents who pool money to hire a tutor, and in journalists and lawyers who document cases despite pressure. It is not heroic in the cinematic sense. It is tedious, repetitive, and often thankless. That is precisely why it matters. Nations are built not only in founding moments but in the accumulation of ordinary competence over decades. As we mark 79 years, the task is to recognize this resilience and to institutionalize it. Recognition means collecting data that captures informal work, community schools, and local adaptation, and then designing policy around them. Institutionalization means protecting merit in recruitment, ensuring predictable funding for primary services, and removing regulatory obstacles for small enterprises and freelancers. It also means telling a different story about Pakistan. The dominant story is one of crisis and rescue. The more accurate story is one of persistence and incremental gain. Both are true. But a country that only narrates its crises will train its citizens to expect failure. A country that also narrates its resilience will train its citizens to contribute. Independence, therefore, is not a date. It is a practice. It is the practice of showing up to teach, to heal, to build, to adapt, and to hold institutions accountable when they fall short. The midnight speech reminds us why we began. The morning work determines whether we continue. If we wish to honor 1947, we should honor those who, without fanfare, keep Pakistan functioning every day between 15th August and the next 14th. Their work is not perfect, and it is not sufficient on its own. But it is the foundation on which any serious reform must rest. To see it, to name it, and to support it is the most patriotic act available to us now.

  • Jalalpur Canal: Politics, Procedure and Sindh&#821…

    Just as the BRB Canal is often regarded as Lahore’s lifeline, the Indus River occupies a similar position for Sindh. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the river has remained at the center of the province’s political discourse for decades. Yet, since the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, few issues have continued to unite Sindh’s population across political divides and enable a collective political stance at the federal level. Today, the province’s politics remains broadly divided between urban and rural Sindh. In rural Sindh, apart from disputes over canals and water resources, there appears to be no issue capable of sustaining political mobilization against either Punjab or the federal government. As a result, water politics has become the principal rallying point for several nationalist parties. At times, this has also led to exaggerated claims or misleading narratives. The political logic is evident: abandoning canal politics would require these parties to confront more entrenched issues within Sindh itself, including feudal dominance, decades of corruption and the continued exploitation of ordinary citizens. The recent trial inauguration of the Jalalpur Canal briefly generated political unrest in Sindh. However, the initial wave of anger faded almost as quickly as it emerged. As videos showing water flowing through the canal circulated on social media, several anti-Punjab groups directed their criticism primarily towards Punjab rather than questioning the Sindh government. Arguably, the first questions should have been asked of the province’s own elected representatives. Why was the public not adequately informed about the project’s legal and administrative status? And why was Sindh unable to pursue its case more effectively through political and institutional channels? The concerns expressed by Sindh are neither new nor insignificant. By the time the Indus reaches the province, river flows have already declined substantially, affecting agriculture, fisheries and the livelihoods of communities living in the lower riparian region. At the same time, the Indus Delta continues to deteriorate while groundwater levels have fallen to alarming levels. Against this backdrop, many in Sindh believe that any additional diversion of water through projects such as the Jalalpur Canal could further reduce the province’s already constrained water availability. Punjab, however, has consistently maintained that the Jalalpur Canal is not among the six canal projects over which Sindh has formally raised objections. It further argues that the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) issued the Water Availability Certificate for the project in 2014, when Sindh was represented on the authority by Mazhar Ali Shah. If Sindh considered the project objectionable, Punjab argues, why were those objections not raised at that stage? Likewise, why was the issue not pursued more effectively when the project was placed before the   Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) for approval and when construction subsequently commenced? Sindh, for its part, maintains that the Provincial Assembly adopted a formal resolution against the canal in 2021. Three years later, in 2024, the provincial government formally placed the matter before the Council of Common Interests (CCI). Punjab nevertheless rejected Sindh’s objections there as well, reiterating that the Jalalpur Canal did not fall within the six disputed canal projects that remain under contention between the two provinces. Politically, however, the episode exposed the Sindh government’s difficult position before its own electorate. The documentary record indicates that the provincial government had registered its reservations through official forums. Yet it failed to convert those institutional objections into an effective political narrative because Punjab’s position appeared stronger from both procedural and technical standpoints. This became particularly evident when Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah acknowledged during a press conference that the Jalalpur Canal was not among the six canal projects to which Sindh had consistently objected. That admission effectively defused the anti-Punjab momentum that had briefly gathered pace following the canal’s trial inauguration. For years, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) has sought to accommodate Sindh’s nationalist parties within the framework of mainstream politics by assuring them political representation at both the provincial and federal levels. At the same time, nationalist parties themselves appear conscious of the electoral limitations of their own rhetoric. Many recognise that slogans traditionally associated with nationalist politics, including “Pakistan Na Khappay”, may have limited appeal when competing with mainstream political parties in electoral politics.

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