mistaken credit bank

Mistaken Credit to a Bank Account: Legal Position

Pakistan’s banking sector is experiencing a fast pace digital transformation, which includes inception of new digital banks as well as digitalization of the banking services, like Raast, Roshan Digital Accounts etc. Nevertheless, this digitalization sometimes causes technology mistakes / errors in the banking systems as well. One such issue, though to a little extent, is the matter of mistakenly credited amounts to the customers’ accounts, due to system glitches. And unluckily, it is rare that the customers, who are beneficiaries of such mistaken credits, ever bother to intimate the banks about it or return the mistakenly credited amounts. The recovery of such amounts is though legally possible, however, since it is civil cause action, falling within the jurisdiction of civil courts, therefore, it becomes cumbersome for the banks to recover such amounts, easily and speedily. Needless to mention that the subject recovery does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Banking Courts and hence, speedy trial / summary procedure trial is not available for this kind of recovery. In addition, it is also difficult in these cases to have the support of the law enforcement agencies, due to some legal framework’s problems.

Luckily, a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court Lahore has recently passed a remarkable judgement on the subject matter, which will support the banks, in such matters. The judgement is regarding a case, where a bank’s system mistakenly credited a significant amount to one of its customers, who utilized a major portion of the amount . The bank pursued the customer and he gave a cheque for the amount involved. The cheque was later bounced, due to insufficient funds in the account and the bank then lodged FIR against him under Section 489-F. He was arrested and his bail was refused by the lower Court, against which he approached the High Court.

The High Court observed that the amount received by customer was not meant to be utilized by him, but it was to be retained and preserved by him for return back to the bank. The Honourable Court further observed that the customer was supposed and required to inform the sender/bank regarding the error and make arrangements for its return to the owner/bank. Furthermore, the Honourable Court observed that as soon as the customer became in a position to exercise his control over the property, the property stood entrusted to him impliedly, but he instead of returning the same to its owner/bank, withdrew significant amount and embezzled the same, as such offence punishable under Section 406 of PPC was fully attracted against him.

This case will become a precedent that if a bank customer receives mistakenly credited amount in his account and utilizes it, then it will be an offence of Breach of Trust, under Section 406 of Pakistan Penal Code. The Judgement is reported as PLJ 2025 Cr. C 797 LHC.

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