new provinces stronger

New provinces or stronger local governments?

The debate over Pakistan’s administrative structure has returned to the national stage after Interior Minister Syed Mohsin Raza Naqvi suggested that the country should seriously examine the question of creating new provinces or administrative units. Predictably, the discussion immediately descended into familiar political slogans. Some portrayed the proposal as a threat to federalism, others embraced it as the long-awaited solution to governance failures. Between these two extremes lies a far more important question: what does the Constitution of Pakistan actually permit, and what course best serves national unity at a time of unprecedented regional instability?

The timing of the debate is significant. Pakistan today faces persistent security challenges in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, constitutional sensitivities relating to Azad Jammu and Kashmir, continuing political polarisation, and a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment as conflict in the Middle East threatens to reshape regional geopolitics. In such circumstances, constitutional reform should not be driven by political expediency. It must be guided by constitutional principles, empirical evidence and the long-term interests of the federation.

The Constitution of islamic Republic of Pakistan is neither silent nor rigid on the question of creating new provinces. Article 1 recognises Pakistan as a federation consisting of provinces and territories whose limits may be altered in accordance with the Constitution. However, Article 239(4) places an important constitutional safeguard on any proposal affecting provincial boundaries. No constitutional amendment that alters the limits of a province can become law unless, in addition to obtaining the prescribed parliamentary majority, it is approved by not less than two-thirds of the members of the provincial assembly concerned.

This requirement reflects the federal compact. Provinces are not merely administrative divisions; they are constitutional partners in the federation. Consequently, no province can be divided, merged or otherwise altered through a simple parliamentary majority in Islamabad. Provincial consent is itself a constitutional requirement.

This constitutional position explains why proposals for South Punjab, Bahawalpur, Hazara or other new provinces have repeatedly surfaced over the past two decades but have never matured into constitutional reality.

Various drafts, often described collectively as proposals for a Twenty-Eighth Constitutional Amendment, have circulated in political and academic circles. They have contemplated the creation of additional provinces together with corresponding adjustments in Senate representation, National Finance Commission allocations, provincial institutions and administrative structures. Yet none has commanded the political consensus demanded by Article 239. Constitutional design has proved stronger than political rhetoric.

The debate, however, should not begin with Article 239. It should begin with Article 140A. Inserted through the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act of 2010, Article 140A obliges every province to establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to elected representatives. This is not merely a recommendation. It is a constitutional command. Unfortunately, after even lapse of 16 years, this remains a constitutional provision that has been implemented (sic) with greater reluctance.

Successive provincial governments, irrespective of political affiliation, have preferred centralised provincial bureaucracies over constitutionally empowered local governments. Elections have been delayed, powers diluted, finances retained by provincial capitals and administrative authority reclaimed through executive control. The result is that Pakistan continues to speak the language of devolution while practising administrative centralisation.

Before demanding new provinces, one must ask a more fundamental question: has Pakistan sincerely implemented the Constitution it already possesses?

The empirical evidence nevertheless deserves serious attention. Pakistan has experienced extraordinary demographic transformation since independence. The country’s population has increased from approximately 34 million in the early years of independence to over 255 million today, yet the number of provinces has remained unchanged.

The presentation recently unveiled on constitutional and administrative reforms demonstrates this remarkable contrast and argues that governance structures have failed to evolve alongside population growth. It further notes that each of Pakistan’s four provinces administers populations exceeding those of many sovereign countries and that, among major federations, Pakistan places an unusually large administrative burden upon each provincial government.

Whether one accepts every conclusion of that presentation/study or not, the underlying constitutional question cannot be ignored. Effective governance depends not merely upon constitutional powers but upon administrative reach.

A provincial capital hundreds of kilometres from remote districts inevitably encounters greater challenges in delivering education, healthcare, policing and justice than a more decentralised system. The presentation also links many development indicators with administrative distance from provincial capitals, suggesting that constitutional debate should be informed by measurable governance outcomes rather than political sentiment alone.

However,  administrative efficiency is only one dimension of federalism. The second is national integration. Pakistan’s history demonstrates that provincial identities become dangerous only when constitutional grievances remain unresolved. Conversely, attempts to suppress legitimate constitutional debate merely strengthen centrifugal tendencies. The Constitution therefore wisely provides a peaceful and democratic mechanism through which territorial adjustments may be considered while ensuring that no province loses its constitutional status without its own consent. This balanced approach deserves preservation.

Current security realities also counsel prudence. Parts of Balochistan continue to face organised violence supported by hostile external actors. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa confronts renewed terrorist activity along its western frontier. Azad Jammu and Kashmir occupies a unique constitutional and strategic position within Pakistan’s national policy on Jammu and Kashmir.

Simultaneously, the widening conflict across the Middle East has introduced new uncertainties affecting regional security, energy supplies and geopolitical alignments. These circumstances require a stronger federation rather than a weaker one. That objective, however, should not be confused with excessive centralisation.

Strong federations are built upon responsive institutions, constitutional legitimacy and public confidence. Citizens judge the State not by constitutional theory but by whether schools function, hospitals remain open, justice is delivered promptly and basic civic services reach every district.

Equally important is the responsibility of political leadership. Statements by political actors—including repeated interventions by Maulana Fazlur Rehman on constitutional and provincial questions—must be evaluated through the prism of constitutionalism rather than political confrontation.

Democratic disagreement is legitimate, but constitutional discourse should unite rather than inflame an already polarised polity. The Constitution provides lawful mechanisms for reform. Political mobilisation should reinforce those mechanisms, not substitute for them. The real constitutional debate, therefore, is not whether Pakistan should have four provinces, six provinces or ten provinces.

The real question is far more fundamental. At what level should public power be exercised so that constitutional accountability, fiscal responsibility and administrative effectiveness reinforce one another?

A federation that merely creates additional provinces without devolving financial authority and administrative responsibility to local governments will simply multiply bureaucracies without improving governance. Equally, a federation that refuses to reconsider administrative boundaries despite profound demographic transformation risks overburdening provincial governments beyond their effective capacity.

Pakistan’s constitutional future t lies neither in emotional demands for new provinces nor in rigid defence of inherited administrative boundaries. It lies in a principled constitutional conversation that integrates Article 239 with Article 140A, territorial reorganisation with genuine local self-government, and political consensus with fiscal federalism.

The Constitution already provides both pathways. One permits the creation of new provinces through constitutional amendment founded upon federal and provincial consensus. The other requires the immediate and faithful implementation of elected local governments with genuine political, administrative and financial autonomy.

Pakistan should first honour the constitutional obligation it has consistently neglected. If, after genuine implementation of Article 140A, experience still demonstrates that additional provinces are necessary to improve governance, the Constitution already provides the lawful mechanism for achieving that objective. Constitutional evolution should proceed through evidence rather than emotion, through consensus rather than confrontation, and above all through an unwavering commitment to strengthening the federation in an increasingly uncertain world.

_____________________________________________________________

Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, specializes in constitutional, corporate, environment, media, ML/CFT related laws, IT, intellectual property, arbitration and international tax laws.  He holds an LLD in tax laws with specialization in transfer pricing. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.

He established Huzaima & Ikram in 1996 and is presently its chief partner. He studied journalism, English literature and law. He is Chief Editor of Taxation.  He is country editor and correspondent of International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and member of International Fiscal Association (IFA).  He is Visiting Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE).

He has coauthored with Huzaima Bukhari many books that include, Tax Reforms in Pakistan: Historic & Critical Review, Towards Broad, Flat, Low-rate, and Predictable Taxes (third edition, 2024),  Pakistan: Enigma of Taxation, Towards Flat, Low-rate, Broad and Predictable Taxes (revised/enlarged edition of December 2020), Law & Practice of Income Tax, Law , Practice of Sales Tax, Law and Practice of Corporate Law, Law & Practice of Federal Excise, Law & Practice of Sales Tax on Services, Federal Tax Laws of Pakistan, Provincial Tax Laws, Practical Handbook of Income Tax, Tax Laws of Pakistan, Principles of Income Tax with Glossary and Master Tax Guide, Income Tax Digest 1886-2011 (with judicial analysis).

He is author of Commentary on Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements, Pakistan: From Hash to Heroin, its sequel Pakistan: Drug-trap to Debt-trap and Practical Handbook of Income Tax. Two books of poetry are Phull Kikkaran De (Punjabi 2023) and Nai Ufaq (Urdu 1979 with Siraj Munir and Shahid Jamal).

He regularly writes columns/article/papers for many Pakistani newspapers and international journals and has contributed over 3000 articles on a variety of issues of public interest, printed in various journals, magazines and newspapers at home and abroad.

_______________________________________________________________

Abdul Rauf Shakoori, Advocate High Court, is a subject-matter expert on AML-CFT, Compliance, Cyber Crime and Risk Management. He has been providing AML-CFT advisory and training services to financial institutions (banks, DNFBPs, Investment companies, Money Service Businesses, insurance companies and securities), government institutions including law enforcement agencies located in North America (USA & CANADA), Middle East and Pakistan.  His areas of expertise include legal, strategic planning, cross-border transactions including but not limited to joint ventures (JVs), mergers & acquisitions (M&A), takeovers, privatizations, overseas expansions, USA Patriot Act, Banking Secrecy Act, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Over his career he has demonstrated excellent leadership, communication, analytical, and problem-solving skills and have also developed and delivered training courses in the areas of AML/CFT, Compliance, Fraud & Financial Crime Risk Management, Bank Secrecy, Cyber Crimes & Internet Threats against Banks, E–Channels Fraud Prevention, Security and Investigation of Financial Crimes. The courses have been delivered as practical workshops with case study driven scenarios and exams to ensure knowledge transfer.

His notable publications are Rauf’s Compilation of Corporate Laws of Pakistan, Rauf’s Company Law and Practice of Pakistan and Rauf’s Research on Labour Laws and Income Tax and others.

His articles include: Revenue collection: Contemporary targets vs. orthodox approach, It is time to say goodbye to our past, US double standards, Was Due Process Flouted While Convicting Nawaz Sharif?, FATF and unjustly grey listed Pakistan, Corruption is no excuse for Incompetence, Next step for Pakistan, Pakistan’s compliance with FATF mandates, a work in progress, Pakistan’s strategy to address FATF Mandates was Inadequate, Pakistan’s Evolving FATF Compliance, Transparency Curtails Corruption, Pakistan’s Long Road towards FATF Compliance, Pakistan’s Archaic Approach to Addressing FATF Mandates, FATF: Challenges for June deadline, Pakistan: Combating the illicit flow of money, Regulating Crypto: An uphill task for Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy – Chicanery of numbers. Pakistan: Reclaiming its space on FATF whitelist. Sacred Games: Kulbhushan Jadhav Case. National FATF secretariat and Financial Monitoring Unit. The FATF challenge. Pakistan: Crucial FATF hearing. Pakistan: Dissecting FATF Failure, Environmental crimes: An emerging challenge, Countering corrupt practices .

The recent publication, coauthored by these writes with Huzaima Bukhari is:                       

Pakistan Tackling FATF: Challenges & Solutions, available at:

https://aacp.com.pk/book-detail/pakistan-tackling-fatf-challenges-and-solutions-35

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08RXH8W46

Similar Posts

  • Beyond Public Finance: Towards  Constitutional Po…

    Pakistan has never lacked economic advice. Since independence, successive governments have experimented with socialist planning, import substitution, nationalisation, structural adjustment, privatization, fiscal decentralisation, value added taxation, documentation drives, digital governance and, most recently, artificial intelligence in tax administration.  Almost every reform has been presented as the missing ingredient that would place the country on the path of sustained prosperity. However, Pakistan continues to oscillate between balance-of-payments crises, external dependence, fiscal instability and repeated recourse to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This persistent failure raises a more fundamental question. Is Pakistan’s crisis primarily economic, or are economists asking the wrong questions? For decades, the dominant explanation has remained remarkably consistent. Pakistan is said to suffer from a narrow tax base, inadequate domestic resource mobilisation, weak public institutions, poor governance and inconsistent implementation of otherwise sound policies. According to this view, if taxes were broadened, exemptions withdrawn, administration digitalised and markets allowed to function efficiently, sustainable growth would eventually follow. There is much truth in these observations. They identify many of the symptoms. But they do not fully explain why technically sound reforms repeatedly fail in Pakistan while producing very different outcomes elsewhere. The reason, as suggested in earlier writings, is that Pakistan cannot be understood through the conventional assumptions of public finance alone. Economic policy does not operate in a constitutional vacuum; it reflects the incentives created by the political and legal institutions within which governments function. Orthodox economics generally assumes a constitutional order within which governments seek, however imperfectly, to maximise public welfare. Fiscal policy, taxation and expenditure are analysed as instruments for correcting market failures, financing public goods and promoting economic growth. Political constraints are acknowledged but usually treated as external distortions rather than integral components of economic analysis. Pakistan presents a different reality. Here, constitutional arrangements, political incentives, strategic considerations and informal institutions have shaped fiscal outcomes as much as, and often more than, economic policy itself. Taxation has frequently reflected the distribution of political power rather than principles of efficiency or equity.  Public expenditure has often been determined by strategic imperatives rather than developmental priorities. External assistance has repeatedly substituted for difficult domestic reforms. Elite bargains have preserved privilege while transferring the burden of adjustment to documented businesses, salaried individuals and ordinary consumers. These outcomes cannot be adequately explained by models that assume an impartial state pursuing coherent economic objectives. The analytical framework itself, therefore, requires reconsideration. This series proceeds from a simple but powerful proposition: before analysing taxes, budgets or debt, one must first understand the constitutional rules that shape political incentives. This is the central insight of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE).  Unlike conventional public finance, CPE begins not with taxes or budgets but with the constitutional rules, institutional incentives and political structures that determine how economic decisions are actually made. It asks a prior question: Who designs the rules under which economic policy operates, whose interests do those rules serve, and how do they shape incentives for both governments and citizens? Once that question is asked, many of Pakistan’s recurring puzzles begin to appear less mysterious. Why do technically sound tax reforms repeatedly fail? Why do successive governments rely on indirect taxation while avoiding politically influential sectors? Why has documentation remained elusive despite extraordinary advances in digital technology? Why does every external crisis quickly become a fiscal crisis? Why has debt expanded despite repeated stabilisation programmes? The answers lie not merely in economics but in the constitutional and political environment within which economics operates. This series proposes a different approach. Rather than examining taxation, debt or fiscal federalism as isolated subjects, it will analyse them as interconnected manifestations of Pakistan’s constitutional political economy. Future parts will explore how colonial legacies, post-independence constitutional choices, geopolitical dependency, elite capture, federal arrangements, judicial interpretation and administrative incentives have combined to shape Pakistan’s economic trajectory. The purpose is not to reject orthodox economics. Public finance remains indispensable. Sound taxation, efficient expenditure and macroeconomic stability are essential for any modern state. However, these instruments cannot achieve their intended objectives when the institutional environment within which they operate generates incentives that systematically frustrate reform. Pakistan’s crisis is not simply a fiscal crisis. Nor is it merely a crisis of governance. It is, more fundamentally, a crisis of constitutional political economy. Unless that deeper reality is understood, technical reforms, however well designed, will continue to produce disappointing results because they address the symptoms rather than the constitutional incentives that generate them. In the next part, we shall examine why the assumptions of orthodox public finance differ fundamentally from those of constitutional political economy, and why that distinction matters profoundly for understanding Pakistan. [To be continued]  ____________________________________________________________________ Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996. 

  • Regulating DeFi Risk

    The development of decentralized finance represents a material reconfiguration of financial intermediation rather than a peripheral experiment in virtual assets. DeFi enables trading, lending, borrowing, liquidity provision and asset management through blockchain based smart contracts, with continuous availability, programmable execution, global accessibility and reduced dependence on conventional intermediaries. The FATF records total value locked at USD 86.644 billion in 2026, approximately 85 percent above the 2023 level, while institutional investors, virtual asset service providers and regulated entities are increasingly committing capital to DeFi arrangements. This track suggests that DeFi will not simply compete with traditional finance, but will progressively intersect with it through tokenized assets, settlement, payments, liquidity and market infrastructure. The policy significance of that convergence lies in the need to preserve innovation without permitting functional substitutes for regulated finance to escape equivalent safeguards. Traditional finance provides legal accountability, prudential discipline, customer identification and institutional channels for enforcement, while DeFi contributes automation, composability, transparency of public ledger transactions, broader access and rapid settlement. The future architecture is therefore likely to be hybrid: regulated institutions will use decentralized infrastructure where it produces efficiency, whereas supervisors will require comparable financial integrity outcomes whenever equivalent financial functions are performed. FATF, the Financial Stability Board, IOSCO and the IMF converge on a technology neutral and function oriented conception under which substance, activity, control and risk prevail over labels or technological form. The July 2026 FATF Targeted Report is consequently best understood as an implementation instrument that updates the 2021 Guidance in light of DeFi’s expansion. Its scope is to identify emerging money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing risks, clarify when the FATF Standards apply. It also provide practical tools for identification, regulation, supervision and investigation, develop criteria for identifying controllers or persons exercising sufficient influence, and recommend measures for public and private actors. The report is expressly non-binding, but its analytical significance is substantial because it translates Recommendation 15 into a functional supervisory methodology for a market whose legal form, governance and territorial nexus are frequently indeterminate. The defining characteristics of DeFi create both utility and vulnerability. Similarly, smart contract automation removes many conventional execution functions, open source and composable architecture permit rapid replication and interaction among protocols, algorithmic market mechanisms automate liquidity, pricing and liquidation, pseudonymous liquidity provision permits participation without conventional identification, permissionless access may eliminate customer due diligence, and reliance on oracles imports external data into automated decisions. These characteristics permit rapid and complex movement of value but also allow illicit proceeds to be layered through liquidity pools, decentralized exchanges, bridges, swaps and multiple chains before supervisory or enforcement systems can react. The regulatory fragmentation, weak compliance, cyber vulnerabilities and diminishing dependence upon regulated entry and exit points further aggravate supervisory difficulty. The applicable legal framework begins with technological neutrality. The recommendation 15 applies where a natural or legal person, as a business, conducts or actively facilitates activities falling within the VASP definition. The software itself is not regulated merely because it executes a financial function, but persons exercising control or sufficient influence over a DeFi arrangement may fall within the regulatory perimeter. FATF differentiates centralized arrangements with identifiable controllers, centralized arrangements in which control exists but controllers are difficult to identify, and truly decentralized arrangements in which no person maintains control or sufficient influence. The first two categories fall within the Standards, the third falls outside direct application, although it remains subject to alternative risk mitigation through adjacent regulated actors. The principal implementation deficit is therefore institutional rather than conceptual. FATF’s 2026 survey found that only 26 of 142 responding jurisdictions had assessed DeFi risks, 132 had not identified qualifying DeFi arrangements operating in their territory, only four had implemented licensing or registration requirements, and only two had licensed or registered such arrangements. The resulting supervisory gap facilitates regulatory arbitrage and demonstrates why national authorities must integrate DeFi into national, sectoral or virtual asset risk assessments, calibrated to materiality, domestic exposure, cross border activity, governance structures and actual financial crime threats. The financial crime typologies identified by FATF demonstrate that DeFi risk is not confined to speculative misconduct. The fraudsters have used purported DeFi structures to misrepresent liquidity and divert investor assets, professional money laundering networks fragment funds across wallets and then use decentralized exchanges, bridges, mixers, swaps and chain hopping to obscure provenance, ransomware groups and hackers use DeFi immediately after compromise to convert and disperse proceeds, and proliferation financing actors have exploited governance weaknesses, oracles, bridges and limited compliance environments. The policy concern is intensified by speed: automated movement can complete layering before authorities, intermediaries or analytics providers can identify the event, establish attribution and initiate restraint. The decisive supervisory question is the identification of control or sufficient influence. FATF treats control as the practical ability to determine or materially influence key operations, service delivery or economic benefits. The relevant indicators include authority to modify or pause smart contracts, alter protocol parameters, control oracles, administer treasury assets, determine participation, appoint key actors, receive material fee flows, control governance votes, operate public interfaces, manage corporate entities, determine development priorities, control essential infrastructure, or direct branding and communications. No single indicator is conclusive. Additionally, authorities should combine public blockchain evidence, governance records, audits, service provider information, financial intelligence and investigative material, and should assess economic reality rather than formal claims of decentralization. The assessment of control must remain continuous because governance can migrate from a company or foundation to a decentralized autonomous organization without relinquishing substantive authority. The concentrated governance tokens, delegated voting blocs, special proposal rights, veto powers, administrative keys, clustered wallets and continuing receipt of protocol revenues may disclose retained control. On the contrary, a genuinely decentralized arrangement, after independent assessment, falls outside direct FATF obligations because no accountable person can be identified. That conclusion does not equate to absence of risk. The authorities should instead influence stablecoin issuers, regulated VASPs, financial institutions and controlled application interfaces, whereas encouraging digital identity, embedded customer due diligence and blockchain analytics within genuinely decentralized environments. The licensing and

  • From Mediator to Ally: Pakistan’s Balancing …

    In the space of a single year, Pakistan has moved from the periphery of Middle Eastern diplomacy to its center. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir have positioned the country as both a mediator between Washington and Tehran and, more recently, a formal treaty partner of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The result  the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed on August 7 in Islam’s holiest city  marks one of the most consequential shifts in South Asian foreign policy in decades. Yet it also raises hard questions about who is really steering Pakistan’s course, and at what long-term cost.   A war that reshaped the region   The backdrop is a war between the United States and Iran that erupted on February 28, drawing in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Iraqi militias and Yemen’s Houthi movement, and disrupting roughly a fifth of the world’s seaborne energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. Missile and drone exchanges reached Saudi cities, unsettling a region that had spent years trying to de-escalate after the 2015 nuclear deal’s collapse.   Pakistan, one of the few states with working channels to both Washington and Tehran, stepped into the gap. Sharif’s government hosted preliminary contacts that produced the so-called Islamabad Memorandum, under which Iran signalled it would not pursue nuclear weapons  a pledge it had already made under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 2015 accord  in exchange for a mechanism allowing it to dilute stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian later thanked Islamabad for its “constructive engagement” in securing a ceasefire and agreed to send negotiators to further talks in the Pakistani capital. Analysts at the Washington-based Stimson Center have noted that Munir personally staked considerable political capital on the diplomacy, given how easily it could have collapsed.       The Makkah pact   That mediating role fed directly into last week’s agreement. Saudi Arabia, repeatedly struck during the war by Iranian missiles and by Tehran-aligned forces in Yemen and Iraq, had already signed a bilateral defence pact with Pakistan in September 2025  struck, notably, just over a week after an Israeli strike on Hamas negotiators in Doha rattled Gulf capitals’ confidence in American security guarantees. The Makkah agreement extends that arrangement into a trilateral pact with Turkey, declaring that an armed attack on any one of the three signatories will be treated as an attack on all.   Pakistani officials describe the pact as purely defensive. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said this week it was “not directed against any country” and remained open to other regional states. President Asif Ali Zardari called it a reflection of “shared resolve for peace and security,” while Sharif credited Munir’s “tireless efforts” in securing an arrangement he said had been years in the making. For Riyadh and Ankara, the pact offers a hedge against dependence on any single outside power at a moment when American commitments to the region look less certain than they once did. For Pakistan, it offers closer ties with two wealthy allies, a symbolic role as guardian of Islam’s holiest sites, and outsized influence for a country whose economy remains fragile.   Praise, and pointed scepticism   The agreement has been celebrated in much of Pakistan’s domestic media as evidence that the country’s leadership  civilian and military alike  is finally translating decades of geopolitical positioning into tangible strategic weight. Supporters point to a similar dynamic in May, when a brief but intense military confrontation with India ended within days, after which the government promoted Munir to the rare, largely ceremonial rank of Field Marshal, only the second officer in Pakistan’s history to hold it.   But that same promotion has drawn sharp criticism from analysts who see it as part of a broader consolidation of power by the military at the expense of elected institutions. Munir, appointed army chief in November 2022, has presided over a period in which  according to critics including jailed former prime minister Imran Khan’s supporters  courts, the media and Sharif’s own coalition have operated increasingly under military direction, a system some commentators have dubbed a “hybrid regime.” The Middle East Institute has described Munir’s elevation as “a thunderous declaration of the military’s unassailable supremacy,” while other analysts note that his growing role in foreign and economic policy  well beyond the traditional remit of an army chief  blurs the line between civilian governance and military command in a country with a long history of that line collapsing altogether.   What comes next   None of this diminishes the immediate diplomatic achievement: a ceasefire process that, however fragile, has held; a new pact that binds three influential Muslim-majority states more closely together; and a Pakistan that finds itself, for now, indispensable to great-power diplomacy in a region convulsed by war. Whether that translates into durable stability  for the Gulf, for the broader Middle East, or for Pakistan’s own democratic institutions  remains an open question. The coming months, as the Islamabad talks resume and the Makkah pact’s practical implications become clearer, will test whether this new era represents a genuine diplomatic breakthrough or a further tightening of military control dressed in the language of strategic necessity.

  • Fundamental Right No. 12: Protection Against Retro…

    By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Asma Rahmat, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University and Muhammad Ameer Hamza, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, enshrines one of the oldest and most celebrated principles of criminal jurisprudence, namely nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which means there can be neither a crime nor a punishment without prior law. This constitutional guarantee embodies the rule of law by prohibiting retrospective criminal legislation and protecting every individual from arbitrary prosecution or punishment. It ensures that a person may be held criminally liable only for conduct that constituted an offence under the law at the time it was committed, and that no punishment more severe than that then prescribed may subsequently be imposed. The first part of Article 12 prohibits the retrospective creation of criminal offences. A person cannot be convicted for an act or omission which was lawful when committed merely because the legislature subsequently criminalises that conduct. The second part prohibits the retrospective enhancement of punishment. Accordingly, where the law prescribes a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment or two years’ imprisonment at the time of the offence, neither the judiciary nor the legislature may subsequently impose or authorise a more severe penalty for that completed act. The constitutional guarantee thus preserves legal certainty, protects legitimate expectations, and prevents arbitrary exercises of legislative and executive power. Article 12 is founded upon the universally accepted doctrine of legal certainty, which requires that criminal laws be clear, prospective, and predictable. Individuals must be capable of regulating their conduct according to existing law without fear that future legislation will retrospectively criminalise their past actions or increase their punishment. The principle therefore operates as an indispensable safeguard against governmental arbitrariness and political persecution and constitutes a cornerstone of every constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. The constitutional philosophy embodied in Article 12 is consistent with internationally recognised human rights norms. Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, provides that no person shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission that did not constitute a penal offence under national or international law at the time it was committed, nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that applicable at the time of the commission of the offence. Likewise, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Pakistan is a State Party, reiterates the same prohibition against retrospective criminal liability while recognising only the limited exception relating to offences recognised under the general principles of international law. Comparable constitutional protection is also found in the United States Constitution, where Article I, Sections 9 and 10 expressly prohibit Congress and the States from enacting ex post facto laws. This prohibition has long been regarded as a fundamental limitation upon legislative authority and reflects a universal constitutional commitment to fairness in criminal justice. The superior courts of Pakistan have consistently treated Article 12 as an indispensable constitutional safeguard. In Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article 12 embodies the constitutional prohibition against retrospective penal legislation and protects individuals from being subjected to criminal liability or enhanced punishment under laws enacted after the commission of the alleged offence. The Court emphasised that retrospective penal laws offend the rule of law because criminal consequences must always be determined according to the law in force at the relevant time. Similarly, in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, the Supreme Court underscored that fundamental rights must receive a liberal and purposive interpretation so as to prevent arbitrary governmental action and preserve constitutional liberties. Although that case did not directly concern Article 12, its interpretative philosophy has significantly influenced the constitutional protection afforded to penal safeguards. A significant constitutional question concerns the offence of high treason under Article 6 of the Constitution. High treason, comprising the abrogation, subversion, suspension, or holding in abeyance of the Constitution, represents the gravest constitutional offence. Through the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, Parliament expanded Article 6 to include persons who aid, abet, collaborate with, or validate such unconstitutional acts. Nevertheless, Article 12 continues to apply with full constitutional force. Even in prosecutions for high treason, criminal liability and punishment cannot be imposed retrospectively. Any legislative amendment increasing punishment or enlarging criminal liability can operate only prospectively and cannot constitutionally affect acts committed before its enactment. The historical experience of constitutional development further demonstrates the importance of this principle. Following the restoration of the English monarchy, the remains of Oliver Cromwell were exhumed in 1661 upon the orders of Charles II, symbolically hanged, beheaded, and publicly displayed. Although this episode belonged to a different constitutional era, it illustrates the dangers of political vengeance unconstrained by constitutional guarantees. Modern constitutional democracies reject such practices and instead insist that criminal justice must always be governed by legality, due process, and prospective application of penal laws. Article 12, therefore, is not merely a procedural safeguard but a substantive manifestation of constitutionalism itself. It preserves the supremacy of law over arbitrary power, protects individual liberty against retrospective criminal legislation, and strengthens public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system. Together with Articles 4, 9, and 10A of the Constitution, it forms an integral part of Pakistan’s constitutional architecture for the protection of human dignity, legal certainty, and the rule of law. Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is a cornerstone of constitutionalism and the rule of law. By prohibiting retrospective criminal legislation and the retrospective enhancement of punishment, it embodies the fundamental principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, ensuring that no person is punished except in accordance with the law in force at the time of the alleged offence. In conjunction with Articles 4, 9, and 10A, Article 12 protects legal certainty, due process, and individual liberty while preventing arbitrary or politically

  • After Makkah: towards an Islamic NATO—or a new r…

    “Nato is a giant military alliance where there are 32 countries. We have started here as three countries and we have to take very humble but concrete steps”—Makkah defence pact technically same as Nato’s Article 5: Turkish minister, The News, August 9, 2026 The above words of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan deserve careful attention. Speaking after the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, he went considerably further than the diplomatic language normally accompanying defence cooperation. He described the arrangement as technically the same as NATO’s Article 5 principle of collective defence. More importantly, Fidan disclosed something about its intended institutional evolution. A ministerial committee resembling NATO’s structure is to be created, a permanent secretariat will be established in Saudi Arabia, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not envisage an organisation permanently confined to its three founding members. Egypt is already being mentioned as a possible entrant. The question we raised immediately after Makkah has therefore acquired greater urgency: are we witnessing the embryonic formation of an Islamic NATO? The answer requires more caution than either celebration or alarm. The Makkah agreement is unquestionably important. Saudi Arabia combines enormous financial and energy resources with a pivotal position in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military, an increasingly sophisticated defence-industrial base and strategic access linking Europe, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state located at the intersection of South Asia, China, Central Asia, Iran and the Arabian Sea. Taken together, the three constitute an unusual coalition of middle powers. Their convergence is also occurring at a moment when the regional order constructed around American predominance is under extraordinary strain. The latest Middle Eastern war has again demonstrated that overwhelming military capability can destroy infrastructure and degrade adversaries without necessarily producing political order. Michael Fuchs recently argued in Foreign Affairs that the United States should finally relinquish its attempt to dominate the Middle East militarily. The proposition is important, but it raises a larger question. If American primacy recedes, what replaces it? International relations offers no reason to assume that withdrawal by a dominant external power automatically produces regional peace. It can produce strategic autonomy. It can equally produce competitive balancing, arms races and struggles among regional powers seeking to fill the resulting space. Makkah Defence Agreement represents both an opportunity and a danger. The opportunity is the emergence of indigenous collective security. For much of the modern history of the Middle East, regional states have depended upon external powers for protection while simultaneously fearing abandonment by those same protectors. Britain once performed this role in the Gulf. The United States subsequently constructed a much larger military architecture based upon bases, arms supplies, bilateral guarantees and partnerships. Dependence created security, but never complete strategic autonomy. Saudi Arabia’s search for alternatives must be understood against this background. Türkiye has followed another path: remaining inside NATO while steadily expanding its capacity for independent action. Pakistan maintains a strategic partnership with China without severing its relationships with Washington, Riyadh or Ankara. These are not states simply changing camps. They are practising what contemporary scholarship increasingly describes as hybrid or non-exclusive alignment: cultivating overlapping relationships rather than accepting the rigid binaries of Cold War alliance politics. This makes Fidan’s second assertion as important as his comparison with Article 5. He insists that Makkah is not directed against Iran or any other country. That principle must survive implementation. An alliance requires deterrence; it does not necessarily require a permanent enemy. If the emerging arrangement becomes an anti-Iran coalition, it will institutionalise one of the Muslim world’s most dangerous fault lines. Iran is not a temporary presence in the Gulf. It is a major civilisation and regional power whose geography cannot be altered by sanctions, regime change strategies or military pressure. Pakistan has particular reason to understand this. Iran is its neighbour. Internal sectarian peace, Balochistan, border security, Afghanistan and regional connectivity all make a permanently hostile Pakistan-Iran relationship strategically irrational. Nor should Makkah become simply the Muslim military response to Israel. The Palestinian question cannot be removed from regional security, as proponents of the Abraham Accords sometimes appeared to assume. Normalisation and economic integration cannot indefinitely substitute for a political settlement guaranteeing Palestinian rights and viable statehood. At the same time, transforming the region into two permanent military camps would hardly produce the peace Palestinians themselves require. The better possibility is, thus, not an Islamic NATO in the literal sense. NATO emerged from the particular conditions of post-war Europe and bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Muslim world is geographically dispersed, politically heterogeneous and internally divided. Its states have very different relations with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and Tel Aviv. Türkiye itself demonstrates the difficulty of imposing a binary model: it would simultaneously belong to NATO and to the emerging Makkah Accord. That apparent contradiction may actually tell us something important about the international order now taking shape. The twenty-first century may be characterised less by fixed blocs than by overlapping arrangements through which middle powers seek room for manoeuvre between larger powers. This is also where geoeconomics becomes indispensable. Saudi finance and energy, Türkiye’s manufacturing and defence technology and Pakistan’s geography, human resources and access towards China, Central Asia and the Arabian Sea could create something considerably more important than another military organisation. Egypt’s eventual participation would add the Suez Canal, the Arab world’s largest population and another major military power. A security structure built around such capabilities could eventually support trade, energy corridors, defence production, technological cooperation, food security and infrastructure connectivity. Without this economic foundation, an Islamic NATO would remain largely an exercise in military coordination. China will watch these developments closely. Beijing requires Gulf energy, values Iran, has deep interests in Pakistan and maintains substantial economic relations across the Middle East. It is unlikely to wish to inherit America’s expensive role as regional military hegemon. A regional arrangement capable of providing stability without forcing states into an

  • Institutional Entropy

    By Syed Tahir Rashidi Democracies do not usually die in a dramatic moment. Their decline is usually quiet. Elections are still held constitutions are still there on paper and institutions that represent the people are still around.. Beneath these democratic rituals the things that make constitutional government work gradually get weaker. What people think starts to matter more than what people know institutions start to lose their authority and politics starts to reward show more than leadership. These problems were already being talked about in Athens, the city that first came up with the idea of democracy long before they became issues in modern democracies. The people of Athens had to deal with a paradox that still affects societies today: how can a system that is based on freedom protect itself from the bad effects of too much freedom? How can the power of the people avoid being controlled by emotions, populism and demagoguery? Plato, one of the thinkers in history was very concerned about these questions. His criticism of democracy is often seen as the complaints of an aristocrat who did not like the idea of the people having power.. That is not a complete understanding of his thoughts. Plato was worried because he saw what happened in Athens especially when his teacher Socrates was put to death by a jury. This event made Plato realize that a democracy could allow great injustices to happen through its institutions. In his book The Republic Plato talks about democracy not as a system of government but as a way of life. It is a society where what people think matters more than what they know, where emotions control reason and where freedom, if not limited loses its value. Plato said that if people are too free they will eventually become disorderly. When people want much freedom they become impatient with authority, expertise and discipline.. This impatience can lead to the rise of a leader who promises to restore order by taking control. History has shown us that this paradox is real. When there are many factions in a country people often want a strong leader to take charge. Democracies can inadvertently create the conditions for authoritarianism if they do not have institutions to limit power. This transition from democracy to authoritarianism rarely happens suddenly. It happens gradually as the norms of democracy get weaker. People start to value certainty over discussion. Physicists use the term entropy to describe the natural tendency of complex systems to drift from order towards disorder unless sustained by continual effort. Democracies are no exception. When constitutional norms weaken, institutions lose their independence, and public trust steadily erodes, political systems begin to experience what may be called institutional entropy: a slow but relentless decay in the structures that preserve constitutional order. Democracies seldom collapse because elections cease. They falter because the institutions that give elections meaning gradually lose their authority. Plato was not the one who saw these dangers. Thucydides, who wrote about the Peloponnesian War said that democratic Athens was surrendering to the power of leaders. Aristotle, who was more sympathetic to democracy than Plato also warned that democracy could fail if the law did not control life and emotions took over. For both thinkers democracy needed institutions that could control power, including the power of the majority. These old ideas are still relevant today because they point out a weakness in politics. Elections alone do not guarantee government. Having a majority is important for democracy. It is not enough. There also need to be institutions, a system of laws and informed citizens. Without these things democracy can become just a numbers game than responsible government. This is especially important in countries where politicss about personalities rather than institutions. When election wins are seen as mandates rather than responsibilities governments start to confuse popularity with legitimacy. Politics becomes more divided public debate becomes more about parties than issues and the quality of government is measured by rhetoric than competence. The experience of Athens is not just a historical curiosity; it is a warning for today. The questions that Plato and Aristotle asked are still relevant for every experiment that tries to balance the power of the people with the need for a constitutional order. Pakistans democratic journey, with its recurring crises and contested political authority must be understood in this broader historical context. The challenge for Pakistan is not just to keep procedures but to build democratic institutions. Voting can give legitimacy. Legitimacy alone cannot produce effective government. Constitutions can proclaim rights. Rights are only meaningful if institutions are independent and credible enough to protect them. Democracy survives not just because people vote,. Because both rulers and the ruled accept that power must be limited by law, restraint and accountability. The relevance of this dilemma is clear in Pakistan. Since it was founded Pakistan has said it is committed to government. Constitutions have been written and suspended elections have been held and disputed assemblies have been. Dissolved.. The fact that democratic rituals have continued has not necessarily meant that democracy has become stronger. The recurring crisis has been less about the lack of elections than about the weakness of institutions that can turn legitimacy into constitutional governance. This distinction is crucial. Democracy is often mistaken for the act of voting but its survival depends on a much broader system of limits. Independent courts, impartial bureaucracy, professional legislatures, autonomous regulatory institutions and political parties based on ideas than personalities are not just nice to have; they are essential for democracy. Without them elections can become contests for power rather than ways to hold government accountable. Plato illustrated this problem with his allegory of the ship of state. A ship with a crew may have a great structure but without knowledge of navigation it will not reach its destination. The story was not meant to argue against participation but to show how important competence, wisdom and responsibility are in government. This allegory is still relevant today in

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *