spsc cockroaches approach

SPSC: When Cockroaches Approach the Granary

A society does not collapse the day corruption is discovered; it begins to decay the day corruption becomes ordinary. The Sindh Public Service Commission (SPSC), established to uphold merit and provide equal opportunities to the youth of Sindh, has repeatedly found itself at the center of controversy. Allegations of paper leaks, irregularities, and lack of transparency have steadily eroded public confidence, leading thousands of young aspirants to raise their voices in protest. Reports of demonstrations against SPSC over recruitment and examination concerns, as well as past official action following examination irregularities, reflect the depth of this mistrust.

The title, “Cockroaches Approaching the Granary,” is symbolic. A granary stores the food that sustains a nation, while cockroaches represent decay, contamination, and silent destruction. Public institutions responsible for selecting the brightest minds are the granaries of governance. If corruption, negligence, or manipulation infiltrates these institutions, they contaminate not merely examinations but the very future of society.

The protests by the youth of Sindh are not simply demonstrations against one institution. They are a cry for justice, transparency, and dignity. Behind every candidate stands a family that has invested years of sacrifice, countless hours of preparation, and unwavering hope. When the credibility of competitive examinations is questioned, it is not only individual dreams that are shattered; public trust in the state’s promise of equal opportunity is weakened.

This struggle echoes a wider regional concern. Across South Asia, young people have repeatedly taken to the streets whenever examination systems were perceived to have failed them. In India, nationwide protests over alleged examination paper leaks became a powerful reminder that education and public recruitment derive their legitimacy from public trust. Whether in India or Pakistan, the message from the youth remains remarkably similar: merit cannot survive where examination integrity is compromised.

The issue transcends politics. It is fundamentally about governance. Every leaked paper, every allegation of favoritism, and every unexplained irregularity diminishes the value of honest effort. When deserving candidates begin to believe that influence outweighs competence, a dangerous message spreads across society: hard work is no longer enough.

The consequences extend far beyond recruitment. Civil servants, lecturers, engineers, doctors, and administrators selected through questionable processes ultimately shape the institutions that govern millions. Weak recruitment today becomes weak governance tomorrow. A nation that compromises on merit ultimately compromises on its future.

Yet this moment also presents an opportunity. The protests of Sindh’s youth should not be viewed merely as expressions of anger but as demands for institutional reform. Transparent examination procedures, secure digital systems, independent oversight, prompt investigations into alleged irregularities, and public accountability can restore confidence. Institutions earn respect not by claiming perfection but by responding credibly to legitimate concerns.

History reminds us that nations progress when their institutions are stronger than individual interests. The youth of Sindh are asking for nothing extraordinary. They seek only a level playing field where success is determined by knowledge, ability, and perseverance rather than by connections or corruption.

The metaphor of cockroaches approaching the granary serves as a warning. If the guardians of merit fail to protect the granary, decay will eventually consume the harvest. But if institutions choose transparency over secrecy and accountability over complacency, the granary can once again nourish hope instead of despair.

The future of Sindh depends not merely on educating its youth but on convincing them that their honesty, talent, and hard work will always be rewarded. Merit is the foundation of every successful society. Once that foundation cracks, the entire structure stands in peril.

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Extremist recruitment has migrated substantially online, where algorithms on social media platforms can inadvertently funnel vulnerable young users toward increasingly radical content. Countries that have invested in digital counter-narrative campaigns, training young social media influencers and content creators to actively challenge extremist messaging with authentic, relatable content, have seen measurable success in disrupting online radicalization pipelines. Pakistan’s own vibrant youth culture, increasingly connected through smartphones even in remote areas, could be harnessed similarly if government and civil society organizations invest in training a new generation of digital counter-extremism voices. Ultimately, the fight against terrorism cannot be sustained through security operations alone, however necessary those remain against active threats. 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Yet they demonstrate one important principle, institutions, continuity, human capital and economic strategy can transform countries even when starting conditions are difficult. Bangladesh is perhaps the most striking comparison because it began as the poorer and more politically disadvantaged wing of Pakistan. In 1971, its future looked extremely uncertain. Today, Bangladesh’s nominal GDP per capita is substantially higher than Pakistan’s, the World Bank reports about $2,593 for Bangladesh compared with about $1,479 for Pakistan in 2024. Bangladesh’s total GDP has also grown larger than Pakistan’s despite having a much smaller land area according to world bank open data. Singapore represents an entirely different model. A small island with few natural resources, it concentrated on competent administration, education, trade, infrastructure, investment and institutional discipline. Its 2024 GDP per capita was approximately $90,674, compared with Pakistan’s approximately $1,479. World bank open data says. Taiwan and South Korea followed another path, export-oriented industrialisation, investment in education and technology, strong state capacity and, eventually, increasingly democratic institutions. These countries did not become successful because their people were inherently more capable than Pakistanis. They created systems that allowed capability to produce results. So what happened to Pakistan? The first failure was institutional continuity. Pakistan spent much of its history moving between civilian governments, military rule, political confrontation and constitutional crises. Instead of allowing institutions to mature, every political transition often became a struggle over who controlled the state. The second failure was the weak rule of law. A country cannot become prosperous when laws are applied selectively, institutions are politicised and citizens do not have equal confidence in justice. Democracy is not merely the holding of elections, it requires constitutional supremacy, independent institutions, accountable government and protection of fundamental rights. The third failure was education and human capital. Pakistan has a huge young population, yet education has too often remained underfunded, unequal and disconnected from the needs of a modern economy. Countries that transformed themselves invested heavily in the quality of their people. Pakistan has frequently treated education as expenditure rather than as the country’s most important investment. The fourth failure was economic inconsistency. Pakistan repeatedly moved between economic models without developing a stable, long-term national strategy. Political governments changed priorities, economic crises produced short-term fixes, dependence on external financing repeatedly returned. Meanwhile, countries such as Bangladesh built globally competitive export sectors, particularly garments, while East Asian economies moved aggressively into manufacturing, technology and high-value exports. The fifth failure was population planning and social development. Pakistan’s population has grown enormously, while economic growth has not consistently kept pace with the needs of its people. The World Bank’s latest figures show Pakistan with a life expectancy of around 68 years, compared with 75 years in Bangladesh and 83 years in Singapore. The sixth failure has been our inability to build a culture of accountability without political revenge. Accountability is essential, but when it becomes a weapon used selectively against political opponents, it destroys trust rather than strengthening the state. The seventh and perhaps deepest failure is that Pakistan repeatedly confused national security with national development. Security is essential, but a nation’s ultimate security comes from educated citizens, a productive economy, social cohesion, constitutional government and opportunities for its young people. Pakistan’s people, however, did not fail Pakistan. Pakistanis have demonstrated remarkable resilience. They built businesses, universities, industries, hospitals, technology companies and a vast overseas community. Millions of Pakistanis work abroad and send billions of dollars home. In 2024, remittances were equivalent to about 9.4% of Pakistan’s GDP, according to the World Bank. The real tragedy is that the capacity of the Pakistani people has repeatedly been greater than the capacity of the systems governing them. Independence was supposed to mean more than freedom from colonial rule. It was supposed to mean dignity, justice, representation and opportunity. After 79 years, Pakistan therefore needs a different question. Not who is responsible for our problems? but what kind of state do we want to become? The answer cannot be another political slogan or another temporary economic package or presidential system of government . Pakistan needs constitutional supremacy, civilian and institutional stability, independent justice, free media, serious investment in education and health, economic continuity, women’s participation in the workforce, export-led growth, technological development and genuine local governance. The comparison with Bangladesh, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea should not produce humiliation. It should produce reflection. We began with a dream. The unfinished task of Pakistan’s next generation is to turn that dream into functioning institutions, human development and dignity for every citizen. Seventy-nine years after independence, perhaps the most patriotic thing Pakistanis can do is not merely celebrate the birth of the country, but honestly ask why the promise of 1947 has still not reached every Pakistani.

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