innovation counts

Where Innovation Counts

A couple of years back I was travelling from Karachi to Lahore after visiting some research institutions. The person sitting next to me was a federal minister. He asked me if I had been to the museum at Mohenjo Daro and seen the bullock cart on display there. To this day, the same cart is being used in the villages of Sindh with hardly any upgradation or improvement. His remarks were startling. Despite our advancements and research, the ground realities remain grim in the land of the pure.

As a child growing up on the Mall very close to the Punjab University Old Campus, I have fond memories of real-time research being carried out by our scientists. Dr Niaz Ahmed, Director, Institute of Chemical Engineering and Technology, worked around the clock to upgrade the Kalabagh Iron deposits. He developed the Tanvir-Niaz process to extract iron from a low-grade deposit. Next door in Government College was Dr Sultan, the biologist, sitting on his charpoy working late hours. Dr Nazir Ahmed, the famous zoologist who rose to be the principal of the esteemed institution, worked in the zoological gardens of the college next to the zoo on the Mall. Dr Rafi Chaudhry established the first High Tension Physics laboratory in Asia. Dr Abdul Salam, the Nobel Laureate, was his student. The University of Agriculture was not too far behind, transferring its research to the farmers through its extension program.

Slowly but surely, the republic was working towards technological self-reliance and food self-sufficiency. There was no external debt. By and large, corruption was contained. Institutions were strong. Order prevailed in the country. The founding fathers understood their responsibilities towards nation building. Despite initial hiccups, the nation remained on track. Through PIDC (Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation), steel was produced from the Kalabagh iron ore using the German Krupp-Renn process. A pilot plant was set up at the site to first upgrade the ore, followed by its conversion to steel. For demonstration purposes, VW cars were produced from this steel. The brilliant engineer C.M. Latif, whom I consider to be the Tata of Pakistan, established BECO (Batala Engineering Company), which was ahead of its time. Comrade Chou-En-Lai visited the plant in Kot Lakhpat during his visit to Pakistan in the early sixties. Both BECO and Ittefaq Foundry were nationalized in the seventies. The government of Zia-ul-Haq decided to denationalize both. While Ittefaq (LEFO then) was handed over to the Sharifs totally free of financial liabilities, BECO (PECO then) was not given this option. C.M. Latif refused to accept the liabilities. The Sharifs sold the land of the foundry, while PECO still stands there as a liability instead of an asset, which at one time it was.

It is widely believed that the people of Pakistan are very innovative. A term “Jugaad” is used, which means to find a desi, out-of-the-box solution with minimal resources. In my personal experience, I have interacted with very able ‘Mistris’ (technicians) and theoretically able engineers and scientists who work well on paper but with limited practical application. The link between the hands and the mind is not there. Nations rise by applying their indigenous know-how. Technology is the strongest resource of our times, and its advancement and commercialization hold the key. For self-sufficiency in food, the manufacturing of agri-equipment at Daska needs technological advancement to mechanize the farms. A few years back, PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission) developed laser land levelers for better utilization of water. The technology could have reached the farmers through Daska, but it did not. Orders have started to pour in for our armaments, which is a good sign, but massive re-organization with commercial discipline will be required for maximum utilization of the huge investments (around $20 billion) in this sector. There is a famous American saying: “The test of rubber is when it hits the road.” Similarly, the test of innovation is when it sells in the marketplace; otherwise, it remains an intellectual curiosity only, which developing nations cannot afford.

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The distinction is crucial. A regionalised conflict can become much more dangerous because the number of actors involved increases. At the same time, regional ownership of security could eventually create a framework in which regional states themselves negotiate a new balance rather than remaining permanently dependent on an external power. The Pakistan-Saudi relationship provides the foundation for this transformation. The two countries signed their Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025, committing themselves to collective security. The new Mecca agreement effectively brings Türkiye into a much broader strategic framework. Each country brings a different strategic asset. Saudi Arabia possesses enormous financial resources, energy influence and geographical importance. Türkiye brings one of the region’s most capable conventional militaries, a rapidly developing indigenous defence industry, drone technology and NATO experience. Pakistan brings a large and experienced military establishment and, uniquely among Muslim-majority states, a nuclear deterrent. The combination therefore has significance beyond its three signatories. It links the Gulf, South Asia and the eastern Mediterranean in a single security conversation. For Saudi Arabia, the agreement represents strategic insurance. Riyadh has increasingly understood that sophisticated American weapons alone cannot eliminate vulnerabilities created by missiles, drones, cyberwarfare and attacks on energy infrastructure. Diversifying its security relationships allows Saudi Arabia to maintain its partnership with Washington while simultaneously developing alternative sources of military capability. For Türkiye, the pact fits into Ankara’s long-standing ambition to exercise greater strategic autonomy. Türkiye remains a NATO member, but it has increasingly demonstrated that it does not want its foreign policy to be dictated by any single great power. A defence relationship stretching from Türkiye through Saudi Arabia to Pakistan expands Ankara’s influence across two strategically vital regions. For Pakistan, however, the equation is much more delicate. Pakistan has the opportunity to emerge as an important security bridge between South Asia and the Gulf, but it also has a geographical reality that cannot be ignored, it shares a border with Iran. Islamabad cannot afford to treat Tehran simply as an enemy without exposing itself to enormous security, economic and diplomatic risks. Pakistan therefore faces the most difficult balancing act of the three. Its relationship with Saudi Arabia is strategically important. Its relationship with Türkiye is deepening. Its partnership with China remains fundamental. Its relationship with the United States is economically and strategically significant. Yet Iran is its immediate western neighbour, with which it shares a long border and important diplomatic and economic interests. This makes Pakistan potentially more valuable as a mediator than as a frontline combatant. If Islamabad can defend Saudi Arabia while simultaneously maintaining communication with Tehran, it could acquire an extraordinary diplomatic role. Pakistan could become one of the few countries capable of speaking to the Gulf, Iran, Türkiye, China and Washington at the same time. That possibility is already visible in Pakistan’s efforts to maintain diplomatic engagement with Iran while navigating its defence commitments to Saudi Arabia. The Iranian response will be critical. Although the three countries have described the agreement as defensive rather than an alliance directed against a particular state, Tehran will inevitably examine its military implications. A coordinated Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani security structure potentially means improved intelligence, air defence, military exercises, drone capabilities and defence-industrial cooperation around Iran’s strategic neighbourhood. 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  • Youth, Extremism, and the Fight for Tomorrow

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  • Pakistan–United States Relations: From Strategic…

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Both countries continued cooperation in defense, education, health, agriculture, energy, and people-to-people exchanges. Millions of Pakistani-Americans have served as an enduring bridge between the two societies, making valuable contributions to American economic, academic, technological, and public life while strengthening bilateral understanding. Recent diplomatic engagement indicates that both Islamabad and Washington recognize the need to move beyond a security-centric relationship. The visit of senior members of the U.S. Congress and American business leaders to Pakistan, alongside growing high-level diplomatic exchanges, demonstrates renewed interest in expanding cooperation across multiple sectors. Pakistan’s leadership has correctly emphasized that mature strategic partnerships are increasingly measured not by military cooperation alone but by the depth of economic, technological, and commercial engagement. Economic cooperation offers perhaps the greatest untapped potential. 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The Pakistan-United States relationship has survived changing global orders because it rests on shared interests that extend beyond any single issue or region. In today’s interconnected world, economic resilience, technological innovation, and regional stability require partnerships built on trust and consistency. By embracing a forward-looking agenda centered on trade, investment, innovation, and people-to-people ties, Islamabad and Washington can transform a relationship shaped by history into one driven by shared opportunity. The future of Pakistan-U.S. relations need not be defined by the ups and downs of the past. It can instead become a model of pragmatic cooperation—one based on sincerity, equality, mutual respect, and a common commitment to peace, stability, and shared prosperity.  Author: Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan,  Sinologist – Diplomat – Advisor – Consultant, Founding Chair, Global Silk Route research Alliance.

  • New Provinces

    Pakistan’s more than 240 million people live across an enormous and geographically diverse territory, yet governance remains concentrated in only four provinces, each responsible for more than 60 million people. This creates an administrative system that is too distant and overburdened to address the specific needs of individual districts and tehsils, especially in Punjab, where more than half the population is governed from Lahore despite the distance from areas such as Dera Ghazi Khan, Bahawalpur, and Sialkot. Remote citizens often have to make long, expensive, and difficult journeys to provincial capitals for basic documentation, land disputes, specialized healthcare, and other services; Chitral residents may face difficult travel to Peshawar, while Balochistan’s coastal communities may travel hundreds of miles to Quetta and encounter additional linguistic and cultural barriers. This distance produces feelings of neglect and unequal development, as peripheral communities may believe their taxes benefit major cities while their own areas lack clean water, schools, healthcare, and other basic facilities, potentially contributing to separatist movements and regional instability. India provides an example of more decentralized administration, operating with 36 states, provinces, and union territories despite being much larger in population and territory, while Pakistan’s One Unit policy of 1955–1970 demonstrates the dangers of excessive centralization and ignoring ethnic, linguistic, and regional identities. These experiences suggest that Pakistan’s existing provincial structure should not be regarded as permanent and should evolve according to changing administrative and social needs. The most practical solution proposed is to transform existing administrative divisions into provinces, using their established headquarters, government offices, police, courts, development authorities, and other infrastructure as the foundation for new provincial governments. Multan, for example, already has a civil secretariat, high court bench, police headquarters, and departmental offices, meaning it could become a provincial capital with comparatively modest investment rather than requiring the construction of entirely new secretariats, universities, hospitals, housing, and other infrastructure costing hundreds of billions of rupees. This would reduce financial pressure and allow existing administrative machinery to continue operating during a relatively smooth transition. New provinces could also stimulate regional economies by creating provincial governments, assemblies, ministries, civil-service positions, courts, judges, police structures, and thousands of jobs, while attracting professionals and reducing migration to overcrowded metropolitan areas. New police forces could improve law and order through familiarity with local languages, geography, and social conditions, while construction and increased spending would benefit contractors, suppliers, hotels, restaurants, transport providers, and other small and medium businesses. However, provincial creation alone cannot solve Pakistan’s governance or financial crisis: it must be combined with a strong crackdown on systemic corruption, including embezzlement, favoritism, bribery, ghost employees, inflated development contracts, fraudulent welfare payments, and theft of electricity and water. The cited audit findings—including alleged embezzlement of more than Rs40 billion from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa government accounts and Rs25 billion siphoned from the Benazir Income Support Programme through fraudulent payments—illustrate the scale of the problem. Weak tax collection and severe electricity-sector theft and line losses further deprive the government of revenue, forcing borrowing and leaving inadequate resources for infrastructure and social development; therefore, administrative decentralization must be accompanied by stronger financial accountability, better revenue collection, and effective control of public-sector leakages so that new provinces can become financially viable and genuinely improve citizens’ welfare. Therefore, the creation of new provinces must be intrinsically linked to a comprehensive governance reform agenda that includes the establishment of independent and powerful anti-corruption bodies, the full digitization of government financial systems to eliminate human discretion and create a verifiable audit trail, the implementation of strict and transparent merit-based recruitment policies for all government jobs, and a radical overhaul of the tax collection system to ensure that every eligible citizen and business pays their fair share. The guiding principles for the creation of these new provinces must be crystal clear and fundamentally rooted in the national interest, and the primary criteria for demarcation should be the population size and the geographical contiguity of the proposed units, with the express purpose of ensuring that no new province is created on the divisive basis of language, ethnicity, or tribal affiliation, as such an approach would sow the seeds of further disintegration and undermine the long-term unity and solidarity of the Pakistani people. The history of Pakistan is unfortunately replete with examples of how identity politics and the mobilization of people along ethnic and linguistic lines have led to intense conflict, sometimes violent, and have distracted the nation from the more pressing issues of economic development and social justice, and it would be the height of folly to repeat these mistakes by creating provinces that are defined by a single ethnic group. The creation of provinces like Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on the basis of language and ethnicity in the past, while a recognition of historical grievances, has also entrenched these identities in the political landscape, creating a sense of ownership and exclusivity that can sometimes manifest in hostility towards other groups. The goal of the new provincial scheme should be to create units that are diverse and pluralistic, where no single ethnic or linguistic group feels that the province belongs exclusively to them and where all citizens feel equally represented and entitled to the benefits of the state. A province should be a unit of administration and development, not a homeland for a particular ethnic group, and by focusing on population and geography, the government can create provinces that are both administratively viable and socially cohesive, fostering a sense of unity and patriotism that transcends narrow sub-national identities. This is not to say that the cultural and linguistic heritage of the various regions should be ignored, but rather that this heritage should be celebrated and preserved within a framework of civic nationalism, where the primary identity of every citizen is that of a Pakistani, and where the new provinces are seen as different branches of the same national tree, not as separate trees in a divided forest. It is absolutely imperative that the political parties of the country, which hold the levers of power and shape

  • Gujrat: The Height of the Akbari Fort and the Trag…

    When rain descends from the folds of clouds, it assumes the form of divine mercy for the earth—reviving parched soil and spreading smiles across the weary faces of farmers. Yet, when this very rain turns unbridled and the administrative apparatus built to welcome it pulls a heavy shroud of negligence over its eyes, this descent of mercy transforms into a harrowing shape of torment and sudden calamity. Gujrat, a historic and industrial city of Punjab that holds a unique global identity through its civilizational expanse, skilled artisans, and proximity to the Chenab River, presents the terrifying spectacle of a pond and a swamp every monsoon season. Here, urban flooding is no longer merely a climatic accident; rather, it has become a chilling confession of administrative apathy, unscientific planning, and a criminal denial of historical geographical realities. When the hydrological management of cities is evaluated on a global scale, the concepts of “Sponge Cities” are put into practice, but our reality stands in stark opposition. When the state of urban drainage in Gujrat is objectively reviewed through the corridors of history, one’s eyes are opened to the bitter truth that the rulers and elements who dominated this city consciously hollowed out its roots at every level for the gratification of greed. The city’s drainage and sewerage system, in particular, fell prey to the plunder of commission agents belonging to the corruption mafia. It is an immensely agonizing chapter of history that two decades ago, when a renowned international Japanese company completed a detailed survey of Gujrat, officially announced its complete reconstruction on modern lines, and promised a world-class drainage system, the hungry brokers sitting in the echelons of power burnt this magnificent project in the fire of personal lust. The people of Gujrat can never forget the actors who sacrificed the Japanese company’s dream at the altar of kickbacks. Later, when times changed and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi assumed the helm of this region as Chief Minister, he released heavy, voluminous funds amounting to billions of rupees to radically improve and modernize Gujrat’s decrepit and worn-out drainage system. Yet the tragedy was that these billions of rupees in Gujrat’s history remained restricted to a few specific and powerful pockets, and to openly divide these funds, the entire system was mortgaged to a fostered contractor mafia. With an exceptionally substandard, superficial, and unprofessional approach, this mafia played a game of window-dressing that instead of fixing Gujrat’s sewerage system, ruined it permanently and turned the entire city into an artificial swamp. Today, the agony of drainage dancing through the city’s streets and roads offers no hope of deliverance from this terrifying urban flood unless a severe accountability of these true, deceitful culprits is carried out. The political leadership that followed also made efforts suited to their respective statures for the betterment of the city; and although their own technical errors consistently hampered this improvement, every resident of Gujrat continues to carry the heavy burden of those primary sinners who devastated Gujrat’s history, civilization, and urbanity. Last year, when urban flooding once again descended upon the city as a mortal torment, uproar echoed everywhere, the wheel of life halted, and the situation reached a point where the Chief Minister of Punjab had to personally make an emergency visit to Gujrat to rescue the district administration from this storm of incompetence. During this visit, a heavy downpour of announcements and promises took place, accompanied by the release of special funds worth billions for complete and sustainable improvement next year. Despite the sincere efforts and financial provisions of Honorable Maryam Nawaz Sharif, the district administration—entrenched in a colonial mindset—spent all its energies throughout the year on personal image-building and photo sessions rather than the timely completion of this vital sewerage project. As ill luck would have it, as soon as the monsoon season arrived once again this year, the colorful balloon of good governance and claims deflated entirely, exposing the bitter reality that this malaise of flawed planning persists and rainwater continues to rain down as a torment upon citizens’ lives. And when this rainwater has already devastated citizens’ lives, wounding their homes and businesses, only then do the traditional efforts of WASA and district institutions begin to bear fruit, with water finally receding from the streets after prolonged suffering. Success drums are then beaten over this very temporary performance, adding salt to the injuries of the citizens. A profound study of Gujrat’s urban geography reveals that its foundations and topography are deeply embedded in its centuries-old historical backdrop. Built during the Mughal era, the Akbari Fort serves as the greatest metaphor for the region’s military, political, and administrative history. Viewed from a geographical and topographical standpoint, the Akbari Fort is situated on a relatively high mound or plateau, and the city’s older structural layout spreads outward from this height in gradual slopes in all directions. Principally and naturally, this elevation of the fort and the surrounding natural slopes should have stood as an exceptional geographical blessing for a drainage system—provided the natural pathways of water flow had been preserved and left unmolested by grotesque tampering. The tragedy, however, is that over time, unbridled urban expansion and a flood of encroachments mutilated this natural sloping system so ruthlessly that today, that very height and slope have turned into a bane for the city. Unchecked commercialization and illegal constructions in and around the Akbari Fort and its adjoining low-lying areas have blocked all traditional water routes in such a manner that water finds no outlet. The consequence is that when rainwater flows down from the elevated parts of the fort, instead of finding an open path or paved drain ahead, it encounters dead alleys, narrow sewage pipelines, and an endless siege of encroachments. Consequently, this water accumulates in lower regions to form a permanent lake, leaving city residents weeping over their helplessness. Gujrat’s tragedy is not merely the accumulation of rainwater; it is a reflection of that collective apathy and corruption which wakes up with the arrival

  • Road to the East

    Kashi with its rich culture is becoming a hub of tourism, industry. Despite being very close to Pakistan border with Kashi, the aerial trade is being very limited. We are not making a full use of our land link with China. That is not passing a positive impact for the regional economy. Our natural reserves for mines and minerals are one of the biggest resource that we can exchange with China; such as an export for the raw material using the land route, what more specifically if our gov is very vigilant, they can invite the Chinese investors from this region specifically, to extract mines and minerals, but thing that can change the economy of this entire region mainly depends if we can convince Chinese investors to invest in this particular region of Gilgit for the purification of metals. Vice President Pakistan-China Joint Chamber The other best way is the tourism and the hospitality. We need to engage the tourism groups who can be helpful to attract the Chinese people who want to cross over Khunjarab pass to Pakistan. I have noticed many people of this region very much interested to cross the Khunjarab pass to get an access to Pakistan side. Further I want to make you sure that the plateau of the Pakistan side is considered to be one of the most beautiful natural plateau in the world. Culturally this area have been preserved very well, including the ancient buildings such as centuries old. Food is one of the best attraction and the delicacies, it is commonly believed that Ice cream originally started from this region. Similarly, there is a long route which is called the inner wall of the city have a long cue of traditional restaurants with hundreds of options. Paya the lamb foot, is named the same in Kashi language same as pulao, naan, kabab, and many other words. I have never seen a variety of naans in all over sub continent. The same i saw only in Kashi. They also produced a qeema naan (meat) which is one of the delicacy of this region. I conceived an idea that the concept of pizza and spaghettis was stolen by Marco Polo in the 13th century from this region and was taken to Italy. That is why till today spaghettis and pizza is one a famous dish in Italy. But nowhere else in Europe. Bar b que globally I have been to many countries but the best natural taste of bar b que is in this region. Mostly they use lamb, sheep, and beef to make this bar b que. Similarly, pulao was originated from Xinjiang in this region. So, it traveled all the way to subcontinent. The pulao I tasted in Kashi, was one of the best delicacy. It added up with dried grapes. They also love to serve it with the yogurt. Kabab, shawarma have many kind of faces, the region have a lot of shapes for kabab mostly by the meat of sheep. These people like to eat the fats more often Ly than our region. The weather of this area is very harsh as it climbs p to 40 degrees in hot season while drop down to minus -25 in the cold season. Because of this harsh weather the living condition of the normal people have totally been changed. This harsh weather physically converted theses people as a very tough nation. But the other impact of this weather is that this area is mostly dry and even the mountains are mostly barren. Tea is one of a natural product of this area with many kind of teas to be offered. Flower tea is one of the famous tea from this area which is commonly believed to keep a face fresh. But there are multiple kind of teas available in this region. Walking through the streets of Kashi there are hundred of shops, as I mentioned dry fruits are one of the basic product of this region, I have never seen the variety of dry fruits that I found in Kashgar, is indescribable. They are genuine dry fruit lovers providing of hundreds of kinds of dry fruit. The way they preserve it and roast it with the honey, this technology we may need to learn from them. The use of metal and handicrafts especially in the form of brass I have observed are the best in the whole world. Where the use of art work by hand was even more inspiring. Alladin was one of the story that we listen from our childhood, actually this story was also originated in this region. Same as Alibaba, which is one of the oldest tale we always listening from centuries. And who can forget the famous stories of Ali baba with forty thieves. These all stories were originated from the same region. The beauty of this area along with the traditional dresses of the girls that are still very popular in subcontinent. There were a lot of tea houses with a history of more than a hundred years traditionally serving their local tea. Most of the tea houses have the people playing their traditional music and that is so fascinating that you can spend hours to listens that music. The rhythm will really mesmerize you. In my next article I will describe about the traditional restaurants and their dances as performance. To be continued..

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