biodegradation plastic way

Biodegradation of plastic- the way forward

By Saman Aftab

Since the world has deliberated a lot to find a workable solution of plastic pollution, it is imperative to underscore the significance of most promising eco- friendly solutions to curb the plastic menace. The non-degradable nature of synthetic plastics is contaminating terrestrial and aquatic eco systems. Moreover, the disastrous effects of microplastics (extremely tiny plastic pieces) on human nervous system development, hormonal balance and reproductive system are becoming evident with scientific research. Hence, plastic pollution has become a grave concern not only for the environment but also for human health. It is a well-documented fact that the current strategies to deal with disposing of synthetic plastic are not sufficient to get rid of this man made pollution. Landfilling is littering the water bodies as the leachate escaping from the landfills causes the contamination of water. Similarly, incineration (burning of plastic waste) leads to air pollution in turn causing several health hazard in the surroundings. Even, recycling of plastic seems to be highly expensive when dealing with enormous amounts of mix plastic wastes in developing countries like Pakistan.

However, as a bioremediative strategy, biodegradation holds promising prospects. Biodegradation of plastic simply means the use of microorganisms (including bacteria and fungi etc.) that have the capability of degrading petroleum based plastic in such a manner that would render the synthetic plastic degraded in the environment. Such microbial strains are present ubiquitously in those environments where plastics are dumped such as landfills. The researchers have not only isolated such strains but also managed to produce genetically modified bacteria/fungi capable of easily degrading synthetic plastics. Even the microbial enzymes of such microorganisms have been employed for such purposes as to study the intricacies of the biodegradation process only to make it more effective in the future.

Pakistan is one of the countries where the use and misuse of plastic allows the environment to host such microbial strains capable of decomposing plastic in abundance. Having keen interest in this topic, I myself have isolated and identified several bacterial and fungal strains in my research work of MPhil titled “Biodegradation of plastics by locally isolated microorganisms”. Moreover, I have contributed a chapter on “Role of microbes in microplastic removal and its health effect on human health” in a book titled “Advanced treatment technologies for the removal of microplastics in wastewater”. Similarly, I have authored another chapter on “The role of microbial enzymes in the degradation of plastics- a sustainable tool for waste management” in an Elsevier book titled “Plastic waste valorization”. Hence, in my humble opinion, the optimization of biodegradation process can be exploited in an industrial setup where synthetic plastics would be degraded in the same manner as biological/microbiological systems are used to treat industrial wastewater.

The scientists around the world are working day and night to come up with innovative strategies of plastic waste removal without deteriorating our environment. China, for example is working to convert mix plastic waste into hydrogen fuel but that is too expensive for the time being. In our country we hear about the banning of single use plastic specifically polyethylene shopping bags from our policy makers on and off. However, its enforcement never takes into effect. In fact, since hundreds and thousands of people are associated with the industry of plastic production, it is not wise to disrupt this supply chain abruptly without providing people with other feasible options. The introduction of biodegradable plastic as an alternative is overrated. The biodegradable plastic has shown to last much longer in the environment than what it promises and its production cost makes it too expensive to replace conventional plastic in the market.

Whereas, Biodegradation of plastic still offers much hope to tackle plastic pollution. The dearth of resources and governmental assistance is the only hindrance, otherwise Pakistan has the potential to streamline an effective plastic waste management plan pivoted around biodegradation and become a global leader in this regard. I request the authorities to pay attention and incentivize researchers to explore this area of research for national good in particular and international benefit in general. Even if the unlikely consensus on plastic production cap is reached, still the world will need to streamline the process of plastic waste management. And, out of all plastic waste management techniques including incineration, landfilling and recycling, biodegradation is the most ecofriendly process of getting rid of hazardous plastics. The governments all across the globe must encourage their researchers to explore plastic degrading microorganism and optimize the process of biodegradation to get effective outcomes.

The writer has done MPhil in Microbiology from GCU Lahore

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In 2016, Chinese Smart Grid firms — brought to the table personally (Engineer Arshad H Abbasi) in that effort — offered to bring smart grid technology into Pakistan’s distribution network, the same technology that helped State Grid Corporation of China push national transmission and distribution losses down to roughly the mid-single digits in recent years. The proposal on the table was a shared-risk model: China would modernise the DISCOs into smart grids over a decade, splitting recovered losses fifty-fifty with the state. It would have cost Pakistan almost nothing upfront and aligned China’s incentives directly with reducing theft and technical loss — the two diseases actually killing Pakistan’s grid. The Ministry of Power and the Planning Commission rejected it. A parallel 2015 pitch to interconnect Pakistan’s grid with China’s has sat on the drawing board for over a decade. Meanwhile Pakistan built its way into the LNG and imported-coal trap that now drives the very capacity payments crushing consumers and taxpayers alike — a trap Chinese engineers, who have spent thirty years wiring one of the largest and most loss-efficient grids on earth, would likely have steered Pakistan away from. Compare the region. India already exports power to Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and is deepening links with Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Bhutan alone hosts roughly 3,156 MW of Indian-financed hydropower capacity across five major projects — a model of a regional power partner investing in generation rather than merely trading finished electricity. Pakistan, by contrast, cannot even get its own national grid properly connected into Gilgit-Baltistan or Gwadar, a port city that still runs short of reliable power despite sitting at the centre of a multi-billion-dollar Chinese economic corridor. China already has more than 5,000 MW of committed CPEC power capacity inside Pakistan, selected and negotiated by the Planning Commission, and a demonstrated willingness to build hydropower in difficult terrain. It is time to stop pretending Pakistan can manage this alone. Invite China to finance and build the hydropower across GB, AJK and KPK the way India financed Bhutan, and let Pakistan’s surplus eventually be wheeled toward Afghanistan, toward India, even toward China itself — which still needs to retire coal capacity and would gladly take clean power off a friend’s grid. Because that is what China has been, in a relationship most Pakistanis do not need convincing about: a friend when the ledger was empty, a builder when nobody else would build, a partner sweeter than honey and, on the balance sheet of sixty years of cooperation, standing taller than Everest over every other option on the table. NEPRA and CPPA-G have failed

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