beyond public finance

Beyond Public Finance: Towards  Constitutional Po…

The third part of this series demonstrated that tax policy is never politically neutral. Every exemption, rate differential, withholding provision and collection mechanism determines who will bear the burden, who will receive protection and who will remain outside effective enforcement.

The next question is unavoidable. Why do reforms that appear technically sound on paper repeatedly fail in Pakistan? The usual explanation is weak implementation. Successive governments announce that the policy was correct, while administrative capacity, political resistance or taxpayer behaviour prevented its success. This distinction between sound design and deficient execution is comforting because it preserves confidence in the original prescription. It also conceals an important reality: implementation is not external to policy. It is part of policy.

A reform designed without considering the incentives of legislators, administrators, affected sectors and enforcement institutions is not technically sound. It is technically incomplete. Pakistan’s fiscal history is filled with such incompleteness. Broad-based taxation is announced, followed by exemptions.

Documentation is promised, followed by presumptive and final taxation. Value added taxation is introduced, followed by reduced rates, fixed taxes, special procedures and restrictions on input adjustment. Taxpayer facilitation is proclaimed, followed by additional withholding obligations, automated demands, coercive recovery and delayed refunds.

Each deviation is described as temporary. Temporary arrangements acquire permanent beneficiaries and eventually become defining features of the system. The problem cannot be explained simply by lack of expertise. Pakistan has received technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other institutions for decades.

Numerous committees, commissions and task forces have recommended broadening the base, reducing exemptions, simplifying rates, improving audits, integrating data and strengthening administration. The present IMF programme again calls for base broadening, rationalisation of tax expenditures, digital invoicing, risk-based audits and improved revenue administration.

The prescriptions remain familiar because the institutional incentives producing the original distortions remain largely unchanged. Consider value added taxation. A genuine VAT is collected at successive stages of production and distribution, with tax paid on inputs allowed against tax charged on outputs. The mechanism creates a documentary chain because each registered purchaser has an interest in obtaining an invoice. Exemptions, fixed regimes and blocked input credits break that chain.

Pakistan has retained the name of sales tax while repeatedly undermining its value added character. Multiple schedules, special rates, exemptions, extra taxes, further taxes, minimum value addition requirements and restrictions on input adjustment have converted a potentially coherent instrument into an intricate system of revenue extraction.

The resulting complexity is then blamed upon taxpayers. Pakistan’s “innovation” has been to combine high statutory rates with a fragmented base, extensive concessions and aggressive collection from those already documented. The system punishes formalisation while expecting formalisation to expand voluntarily.

The Tax Expenditure Report 2026 estimates revenue forgone during fiscal year 2024–25 through income tax, sales tax and customs concessions at approximately Rs. 2.353 trillion. This figure excludes the larger constitutional controversy created by keeping petroleum products outside the sales tax chain and collecting petroleum levy instead since March 2024. Sales tax concessions accounted for about Rs. 1.274 trillion, income tax concessions for Rs. 579.70 billion and customs concessions for Rs. 499.14 billion.

The treatment of petroleum products reveals how implementation can defeat both tax design and constitutional distribution. Sales tax forms part of the divisible pool under Article 160 of the Constitution. Petroleum levy is a non-tax federal receipt outside that pool. Replacing sales tax on petroleum products with an ever-increasing levy therefore does more than alter the method of collection. It changes the distribution of fiscal resources between the Federation and provinces.

A measure presented as revenue policy consequently modifies the federal bargain without formally amending the Constitution. Income taxation displays the same institutional pattern. A normal income tax determines taxable income after allowing legitimate expenses and then applies the appropriate rate. Pakistan increasingly taxes transactions, turnover and gross receipts without establishing real income.

Withholding taxes, advance taxes, minimum taxes, final taxes and presumptive liabilities were initially justified as responses to weak enforcement. They gradually became substitutes for enforcement. The Revenue Division Year Book 2024–25 confirms the continuing centrality of withholding and advance collection within direct taxes.

This model is administratively attractive. Revenue is collected through banks, employers, utility companies, registrars, import authorities and businesses without requiring the tax administration to investigate actual income. It also creates impressive collection figures before returns are filed and liabilities determined.

The constitutional cost is rarely measured. Taxpayers become liable because they undertake transactions rather than because they earn taxable income. Private persons become unpaid collection agents. Refunds and adjustments remain blocked or delayed. Documented businesses carry the state’s administrative burden, while powerful informal sectors continue bargaining for concessions.

Pakistan has even institutionalised the category of the “non-filer”. Instead of identifying income, making assessments and enforcing payment, the law imposes higher transaction-based rates upon persons whose names do not appear on the Active Taxpayers’ List. Non-compliance is monetised rather than eliminated.

This is presented as behavioural taxation: higher deductions will supposedly encourage return filing. The state simultaneously acquires a fiscal interest in retaining non-filers because they yield higher collections. The instrument designed to eliminate a category becomes dependent upon its continued existence. No conventional textbook could have anticipated such an innovation.

Retailer taxation provides another illustration. Every government announces that traders will be brought into the tax net. Every scheme begins with declarations of equality and documentation. Political resistance follows, negotiations commence, liability is diluted, and the final arrangement bears little relationship to actual income or turnover. The administration then turns to those who cannot collectively bargain: salaried persons, incorporated businesses, importers, banks, telecom users and consumers of electricity, fuel and essential goods.

Agricultural income taxation has travelled a similar path. The Constitution assigns this field to the provinces. Provincial laws exist, returns may be filed and declarations may be recorded. Effective collection, verification and enforcement remain modest in comparison with the sector’s economic and political significance. The failure is not the absence of legal authority. It reflects the distribution of political power within provincial legislatures and administrations. A reform cannot succeed where those expected to legislate and enforce it are drawn from, dependent upon or accountable to its principal beneficiaries.

Digitalisation is now offered as the universal solution. Pakistan possesses identity records, banking information, property data, travel records, utility consumption, vehicle registrations and corporate databases. Digital invoicing, production monitoring and risk-based audit systems are being expanded under the current reform programme.

Technology can identify discrepancies. It cannot decide whether discrepancies involving powerful persons will be pursued. It cannot prevent selective notices, arbitrary assessments or misuse of data. It cannot create constitutional accountability where institutional incentives reward revenue targets rather than fair determination of liability. Digitising an unequal system may merely automate inequality.

The obsession with annual revenue targets reinforces this behaviour. Tax officers are evaluated primarily by collection. Governments require immediate resources to service debt and meet programme conditions. The resulting incentives favour advance collection, withholding, blocked refunds and easily accessible taxpayers over patient audits, dispute reduction and long-term base development.

A rupee collected through excessive deduction counts immediately. A new taxpayer cultivated through credible administration may produce revenue only later. Institutions under short-term pressure predictably choose the former.

Constitutional Political Economy rejects the convenient separation between formulation and implementation. The true design of a reform includes the political process through which it will be altered, the bureaucracy through which it will be administered, the courts and tribunals through which it will be contested, and the interest groups that will seek exceptions.

A technically serious proposal must answer more than economic questions. Who has an incentive to implement it? Who can obstruct it? Who will monitor enforcement? What remedies are available against abuse? Will the rules apply equally to those who make them? Can the beneficiaries of the existing system capture the reform process?

Abu Yusuf recognised this problem more than twelve centuries ago. His discussion of public revenue did not stop at rates and classifications. It addressed the conduct of collectors, the danger of oppression, preservation of productive capacity and responsibility of the ruler for the manner in which taxes were administered.

Ibn Khaldun later explained that excessive fiscal burdens could weaken incentives, contract economic activity and eventually reduce revenue. Arthur Laffer acknowledged that the proposition later associated with the Laffer Curve was not his original discovery and expressly referred to Ibn Khaldun among its intellectual antecedents.

The enduring lesson is broader than the relationship between rates and receipts. A state cannot continuously extract from productive activity while protecting privilege and expect prosperity to follow. Revenue depends upon legitimacy, incentives and confidence in institutions.

Pakistan does not lack tax reforms. It lacks a constitutional and institutional structure capable of preventing reforms from being captured, diluted or redirected. The central challenge is not how to design another technically impressive measure. It is how to create rules under which sound measures survive the political process, apply equally and remain subject to public accountability. Without that transformation, every reform will begin with promises of broadening the base and end by increasing the burden upon those already trapped within it.

In the next part, we shall examine Pakistan’s rent-based political economy and how geopolitical assistance, privileges, exemptions and access to state power have discouraged productive transformation.

[To be continued]

____________________________________________________________________

Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.

Similar Posts

  • A New Strategic Divide: The India-Iran Axis Meets …

    The signing of the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Türkiye defence agreement in Makkah on August 7 marks a significant moment in the changing security architecture of the Middle East and South Asia. Its declaration that an armed attack against one member would be treated as an attack against all three has immediately raised questions about the future balance of power. Is the region moving towards two competing strategic formations — an emerging India-Iran axis on one side and the Pakistan-Saudi-Türkiye triangle on the other? The answer is not yet definitive, but the direction of regional politics is becoming increasingly visible. The most surprising element of this equation is Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Relations between Riyadh and Ankara have not always been comfortable. The rivalry and mistrust of the past, particularly during the period when Saudi and Turkish regional interests sharply diverged, made the two capitals appear more like competitors than strategic partners. Yet geopolitics has a way of bringing former rivals together when their security calculations begin to converge. For Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, security has become inseparable from economic transformation. Saudi Arabia’s ambitious Vision 2030 projects require uninterrupted energy exports, stable maritime routes and a predictable regional environment. The continuing threat to Red Sea shipping and the vulnerability of energy infrastructure have demonstrated that geographical distance is no longer sufficient protection. Türkiye offers Riyadh a valuable strategic instrument. Ankara possesses NATO experience, an expanding defence industry and significant diplomatic access across the region. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can communicate with actors that may remain difficult for Riyadh or Washington to approach directly. Türkiye can therefore serve not merely as a military partner but potentially as a diplomatic bridge. This is where the role of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan becomes particularly important. His experience in intelligence and diplomacy could provide Ankara with the capacity to pursue difficult negotiations involving regional conflicts, including the unresolved Saudi-Houthi security dilemma. For Riyadh, reducing the threat to the Red Sea and ensuring uninterrupted oil and trade routes is not simply a military objective; it is an economic necessity. Türkiye, meanwhile, also has its own economic calculations. Ankara needs investment, economic stability and stronger international partnerships. A closer relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United States and Western financial institutions could provide economic and strategic dividends. Thus, the partnership is not based on sentiment but on converging interests. Pakistan’s position is even more complicated. Islamabad has historically enjoyed close defence and political relations with Saudi Arabia while maintaining strong ties with Türkiye. Its military credibility and longstanding relationship with Riyadh make it a natural participant in such an arrangement. Pakistan can potentially emerge as the facilitator connecting the Gulf with South Asian security calculations. But there is a price. Pakistan’s traditional diplomatic strength has partly rested on its ability to maintain communication with opposing camps. Formal participation in a collective-defence arrangement may make Islamabad appear less like a neutral mediator and more like a contestant in an emerging regional confrontation. The question therefore arises: can Pakistan protect its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye without damaging its relations with Iran? The Iranian response will be crucial. Tehran is unlikely to accept a new security architecture surrounding it without attempting to construct diplomatic counterweights. Here, India could become an important part of the equation. Iran and India possess longstanding economic and strategic interests, particularly around connectivity, energy and the Chabahar corridor. Their cooperation does not automatically constitute a military alliance, but strategic circumstances could push their interests closer. Iran also possesses diplomatic instruments of its own. Oman and Qatar remain particularly important because of their ability to communicate with multiple competing powers. Rather than immediately creating a formal counter-alliance, Tehran could seek to use diplomacy, maritime negotiations and regional mediation to prevent isolation. This is why the emerging equation should not be reduced to a simple military confrontation. It is a contest of diplomacy, technology, economics, energy security and strategic geography. The United States also remains an unavoidable factor. Washington’s relationships with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and India mean that any emerging regional architecture will inevitably intersect with American interests. Yet it would be premature to describe the Makkah agreement as an anti-American bloc. Saudi Arabia remains deeply connected to the United States, Türkiye remains a NATO member, and Pakistan continues to maintain important relations with Washington. The real transformation may therefore be something more subtle: regional powers are increasingly seeking strategic autonomy instead of relying exclusively on one external guarantor. For Pakistan, this is a moment of both opportunity and danger. Islamabad can gain diplomatic weight from its position within the Pakistan-Saudi-Türkiye triangle, but it must avoid becoming trapped in a zero-sum regional rivalry. Its relationship with Iran cannot simply be sacrificed, nor can its longstanding partnership with Saudi Arabia be ignored. The emerging India-Iran axis and Pakistan-Saudi-Türkiye triangle may never become formal opposing blocs. But if regional tensions continue to deepen, the strategic calculations of these countries could increasingly move in opposite directions. The region is entering a new chess game — one in which missiles and drones matter, but diplomacy, energy routes, economic leverage and political alliances may matter even more. The challenge for Pakistan is therefore not merely to choose a side. It is to ensure that, while standing with its strategic partners, it retains enough diplomatic space to speak to everyone. Because in the new regional order, the strongest player may not be the one with the largest alliance — but the one capable of preventing the chessboard from becoming a battlefield.

  • Why System Collapsed in Pakistan?

    These days, one phrase echoes throughout our country: “Pakistan’s system has collapsed.” If we translate the word collapse into plain, colloquial language, it means that our so-called system has completely broken down, gone to ruin, or become utterly dysfunctional. Therefore, the argument goes, the country now needs a new system. This, they claim, can only happen if, instead of the existing four provinces, Pakistan is reorganized into thirty or thirty-two new provinces. Such a restructuring, they believe, would push aside the traditional politicians and allow a new generation of political leaders to emerge. Otherwise, they warn, just as in India, there will be an uprising of the “cockroaches”—that is, the youth—which will force this collapsed, rotten system to surrender. At first glance, these words appear attractive and appealing. They express not only frustration and disgust with our current political situation but also offer hope to the younger generation, particularly Generation Z. It is as if they are saying: “Dear frustrated young people! We are opening the doors to your future. You will rise, dominate the scene, and sweep away all the debris of the past—that is, the traditional politicians—with the force of your determination and enthusiasm.” However, this humble writer sees, behind these beautiful words, not a bright future but the same worn-out and ugly mirage of the past. In reality, those who are truly responsible—the real culprits—cleverly distance themselves from blame, divert the attention of the youth toward others, and then present themselves as the young people’s sympathizers and supporters. In our poetry, it is through such tricks that the beloved murderer becomes an innocent beloved, and the criminal appears as the trusted confidant. But this humble writer calls it what it really is: “the thief making the loudest outcry.” Our national poet, Iqbal, once wrote: There is an outcry that Muslims have vanished from the world; We ask: Were true Muslims ever really present? In appearance you resemble Christians, in civilization the Hindus; These are the Muslims before whom even the Jews would feel ashamed. If, in today’s circumstances, you replace the word “Muslims” with “system,” the verses take on a striking new meaning: There is an outcry that the system has vanished from the country; We ask: Was there ever really a system to begin with? If we were to parody the remaining verses, they might be difficult for some to digest. Suffice it to say that those in power never truly allowed a genuine system to develop here. And whenever, after much struggle, some semblance of a system did emerge, there were always certain “respectable gentlemen” who seemed to have taken an invisible oath—or perhaps a vow of deliberate silence—that it must never be allowed to function. In the eyes of this humble writer, our system truly collapsed on 16 August 1946, when, under the guidance of the British establishment, the Direct Action Day was observed, reducing the foundations of any future system to rubble. From that point onward, the struggle was no longer for a functioning system but for personal rule. That struggle strangled democracy, human rights, liberty, and freedom, and instead built a grand highway of coercion and dictatorship. Anyone who dared to step off that path or disagree with it was labeled a traitor, an enemy of the nation, an Indian agent, or part of the so-called “Fitna-e-Hind” (the Indian conspiracy). These labels were then applied to whomever those in power wished. The first victim was Dr. Khan Sahib’s democratically elected provincial government in the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), which was dismissed within the very first week. Soon afterward, the same authoritarian mentality struck the government of Ayub Khuhro in Sindh. It was also decided that any cabinet member who failed to say “Yes, Sir” to the Governor-General would be considered dispensable. Once the founding generation established such principles of governance, why would later generations lag behind in following them? Thereafter, the race for personal power was inevitable. In the end, victory was bound to go to whoever possessed the greater force—whether the power of the stick or the gun. How could it be otherwise? If, instead of making the Constitution and the rule of law your source of authority, you rely on personal superiority, intimidation, prestige, and the power of office, then someone carrying a gun will inevitably dominate the throne of personal power. And once that happens, the cycle simply continues. It is a law of nature that the bigger fish eats the smaller fish. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Muhammad, and Iskander Mirza all played their respective roles. Later, when greater power confronted lesser power, the result was the rise of powerful military rulers such as Ayub Khan, Agha Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Qamar Javed Bajwa. (To be continued)

  • Fundamental Right No. 11: Prohibition of Slavery, …

    By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Sadia Hammad, Advocate & Internship Coordinator at AGHS, Lahore and Muhammad Abdullah, Law Student, SAHSOL-LUMS Introduction: Article 11 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, enshrines one of the most fundamental guarantees of human dignity by unequivocally prohibiting slavery, forced labour, human trafficking, and the exploitation of children. It declares that slavery is non-existent and forever prohibited within Pakistan while simultaneously outlawing all forms of forced labour and trafficking in human beings. The constitutional prohibition reflects not merely a legal norm but a profound moral and civilizational commitment to safeguarding human freedom, dignity, and equality. It embodies the universal principle that no individual may be treated as the property of another or compelled to labour against his or her free will. In contemporary constitutional democracies and under international human rights law, slavery has been universally condemned as one of the gravest violations of human rights. Accordingly, the Constitution places Article 11 within the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, thereby elevating freedom from slavery and forced labour to the status of an inviolable constitutional guarantee. Islamic Foundations of Article 11: The constitutional prohibition is deeply rooted in Islamic jurisprudence. Islam fundamentally transformed the institution of slavery by encouraging emancipation, prohibiting oppression and exploitation, and affirming the equality of all human beings before Allah. The Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) consistently emphasize justice, compassion, and the liberation of human beings from servitude. Since Article 227 of the Constitution mandates that no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, Article 11 represents not merely a constitutional guarantee but also the constitutional manifestation of Islamic principles concerning liberty, equality, and human dignity. Scope and Constitutional Character of Article 11: Article 11 prohibits slavery, forced labour, and trafficking in human beings. Although the Constitution does not expressly define “forced labour,” it generally includes work extracted against a person’s free will through coercion, intimidation, abuse of authority, economic compulsion, or without adequate remuneration. Judicial developments have also recognized that persistent non-payment or unreasonable delay in wages may, in appropriate circumstances, amount to forced labour because it creates conditions of economic dependency. Clause (1) employs categorical constitutional language by declaring slavery to be non-existent and prohibiting all forms of forced labour and trafficking. The emphatic wording demonstrates the framers’ intention to leave no room for legislative or executive action that legitimizes involuntary servitude. Consequently, Article 11 possesses a near-absolute constitutional character. Constitutional Obligations of the State: Article 11 imposes both negative and positive obligations upon the State. Negatively, the State itself is prohibited from authorizing, encouraging, or tolerating slavery and forced labour. Positively, it must protect individuals from exploitation by private employers, industrial enterprises, landlords, traffickers, and other non-state actors. This dual obligation requires the enactment of effective legislation, robust enforcement mechanisms, and meaningful judicial remedies to eradicate all forms of involuntary labour and human exploitation. Judicial Interpretation: The Supreme Court of Pakistan significantly expanded the scope of Article 11 in Darshan Masih v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 513). Acting upon a telegram received from bonded labourers employed at brick kilns, the Court exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to investigate widespread bonded labour practices. Recognizing bonded labour as a direct violation of Articles 9, 11, and 14 of the Constitution, the Court adopted a purposive approach by issuing comprehensive directions for the eradication of bonded labour and the protection of vulnerable workers. The judgment remains a landmark example of public interest litigation and constitutional activism in Pakistan. Comparative Constitutional Perspective: Comparative constitutional jurisprudence reveals a similar constitutional commitment in the United States. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude following the American Civil War. Section 1 prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment following lawful conviction, while Section 2 empowers Congress to enforce the Amendment through appropriate legislation. This constitutional framework enabled the enactment of extensive federal laws against slavery, peonage, human trafficking, and forced labour. Honorable Justice Fazal Karim (late), in his Access to Justice in Pakistan: A Sine Qua Non for district judiciary practice,  and Opus Magnum Judicial Review of Public Action, has quoted legal scholar Moyle, who aptly describes slavery as “a condition of absolute rightlessness,” emphasizing that slavery deprives an individual of legal personality and fundamental rights. This understanding stands in sharp contrast to the notorious decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), where the United States Supreme Court denied citizenship to persons of African descent. The ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 decisively repudiated that reasoning and firmly established the constitutional principle of human liberty. Provincial Legislation after the Eighteenth Amendment: Following the Eighteenth Amendment, labour became a provincial subject predominantly, enabling the provinces to enact legislation implementing Article 11. Punjab enacted the Punjab Restriction on Employment of Children Act, 2016, together with other labour welfare statutes. Sindh enacted the Sindh Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act and comprehensive child labour legislation. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa introduced the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prohibition of Employment of Children Act, 2015, while Balochistan enacted legislation regulating and prohibiting child employment in hazardous occupations alongside other labour laws. Notwithstanding provincial legislative competence, bonded labour continues to be principally governed by the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1992, a federal statute enacted before the Eighteenth Amendment. Following constitutional devolution, responsibility for its implementation largely rests with the provincial governments, which are obligated to establish Vigilance Committees, enforce labour laws, prosecute offenders, rescue bonded labourers, and ensure their rehabilitation. Protection of Children: Article 11 also provides special constitutional protection for children by prohibiting the employment of children below fourteen years of age in factories, mines, and other hazardous occupations. When read together with Article 25A, which guarantees free and compulsory education for children between the ages of five and sixteen years, the Constitution clearly envisages education rather than labour as the primary occupation of every child. Effective implementation of Article 25A would substantially reduce child labour and promote children’s physical, intellectual, and social development. Constitutional Exception:

  • Mining vs Refining: Real secret behind China&#8217…

    For more than a decade, the global debate over critical minerals has focused almost entirely on mining and extraction. Western policymakers, multinational mining companies and international financial institutions have invested billions of dollars in securing mineral reserves across Africa and Latin America. From cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Lithium Triangle of South America, the prevailing belief has been simple: control the mines and secure the future of the green energy transition. However, this overwhelming focus on extraction overlooks a fundamental reality of modern industrial power. In today’s world, strategic independence is not achieved simply by digging raw minerals out of the ground. True industrial strength lies in refining those raw materials into high-purity, battery-grade and industrial-grade minerals through advanced chemical processing. It is at this critical processing stage, often referred to as the “processing bottleneck,” that China has established an extraordinary and nearly unmatched global dominance. The Mining Illusion and China’s Refining Monopoly Understanding why Western efforts to reduce dependence on China continue to struggle requires recognising the crucial difference between mining and refining. Raw lithium extracted from Australian hard-rock mines or South American brine deposits cannot be used directly in electric vehicle batteries. It must first undergo complex chemical processing to produce lithium hydroxide or lithium carbonate with a purity of 99.9 percent. The same applies to rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel and graphite. Without refining, raw minerals have little value for advanced technology or defence industries. This is where China’s true strength becomes evident. While the country’s share of global mining production is relatively limited, it dominates global refining capacity. China currently refines about 35 percent of the world’s nickel, between 50 and 70 percent of global lithium and cobalt, and nearly 90 percent of all rare earth elements. It also controls virtually 100 percent of the global market for spherical graphite, a key material used in battery anodes. This creates a major strategic challenge for Western economies. Even if companies in the United States, Europe or Australia develop new mines, much of the extracted material still has to be shipped to China for chemical processing. As a result, many attempts to bypass China ultimately continue to strengthen its refining ecosystem. The Structural Foundation of China’s Success China’s refining dominance is neither accidental nor simply the result of low labour costs. It reflects more than three decades of consistent industrial planning and state-backed investment. During the 1990s and early 2000s, many Western economies shifted heavy industries overseas to reduce costs and meet stricter environmental regulations. At the same time, China recognised that chemical refining would become the foundation of future technological leadership. Through successive five-year development plans, Beijing invested heavily in large-scale refining facilities, specialised metallurgical universities and low-cost energy infrastructure. Decades of research enabled Chinese engineers to master technologies capable of refining even low-grade ores efficiently and at relatively low cost. China also accepted the significant environmental costs associated with refining. Processing rare earth minerals produces toxic waste, radioactive by-products and hazardous chemicals. While strict environmental regulations and public opposition have made large-scale refining projects difficult in North America and Europe, China accepted these environmental challenges as part of its long-term national strategy. Why the West Cannot Easily Replicate China’s Model Concern over potential Chinese export restrictions has encouraged the United States and its allies to invest in domestic refining infrastructure. However, matching China’s industrial ecosystem remains an enormous challenge. Several major obstacles stand in the way First, time. Building a modern refining facility in Europe or North America typically takes seven to twelve years because of environmental approvals and legal procedures. In China, similar projects can often be completed in less than two years. Second, cost. Chinese refineries benefit from economies of scale, low electricity prices and extensive government support. Western facilities face much higher labour, environmental and operational expenses. Without strong financial guarantees, private investors remain reluctant to finance projects that could later become uncompetitive if China lowers prices. Third, skilled manpower. Decades of industrial outsourcing have reduced the number of mining metallurgists and chemical engineers in many Western countries. Meanwhile, China continues to produce thousands of specialised engineers every year, maintaining a steady pipeline of technical expertise. Strategic and Geopolitical Consequences China’s refining advantage extends far beyond electric vehicles and consumer electronics. It has become a critical factor in global defence and national security. Modern military equipment—including guided missiles, radar systems, nuclear submarines and fifth-generation fighter aircraft such as the F-35—depends heavily on refined rare earth magnets and processed critical metals. In the event of a military crisis involving Taiwan or the South China Sea, China would not necessarily need to block access to global mines. Instead, it could simply restrict exports of refined minerals. Such a move could disrupt Western defence manufacturing within months, even if friendly nations continued producing raw mineral resources. The global competition over critical minerals, therefore, is no longer centred solely on who owns the mines. It increasingly depends on who controls the refining process—the stage where China has built its strongest and most strategically important advantage.

  • The Future of Provinces in Pakistan

    The debate over the creation of new administrative units and provinces in Pakistan has once again occupied the national discourse after Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi declared that the country’s existing governance system had “collapsed” and argued that governance must be brought closer to the people through new administrative units. His remarks have revived an issue that has periodically surfaced since independence but has rarely moved beyond political rhetoric. While some interpreted his statement as a call for creating additional provinces, others argued that he was advocating broader administrative restructuring. Regardless of terminology, the debate has exposed the structural weaknesses of Pakistan’s governance architecture and compelled policymakers, constitutional experts and political parties to revisit an important question: can Pakistan continue to be governed effectively under its existing administrative framework, or has demographic growth, urban expansion and governance complexity made institutional restructuring unavoidable?  Pakistan today is home to more than 250 million people, yet it continues to function primarily through four provinces established under historical rather than administrative considerations. At independence in 1947, the population and governance challenges were dramatically different. Since then, urbanisation, economic diversification, internal migration and increasing demands for public services have transformed governance requirements. Provincial capitals often remain geographically and administratively distant from citizens living in peripheral districts. Residents of South Punjab, Hazara, southern Balochistan, merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and interior Sindh frequently complain that decision-making remains concentrated in provincial capitals, resulting in unequal development, delayed service delivery and inadequate representation. Mohsin Naqvi’s argument rests on the proposition that governance has become excessively centralised and that citizens are compelled to travel long distances merely to access basic government services, courts and administrative offices. He further argued that countries with expanding populations have responded by creating additional administrative units rather than maintaining outdated structures. Whether one agrees with his assessment or not, his central observation deserves serious consideration because governance effectiveness is measured not by the size of government but by the accessibility, responsiveness and accountability of institutions.  The debate itself is not new. Successive governments have proposed South Punjab Province, Bahawalpur Province, Hazara Province and even administrative restructuring in Karachi and Balochistan. Parliamentary resolutions regarding South Punjab have previously been adopted, yet constitutional consensus has remained elusive. Political parties have often supported new provinces while in opposition but have shown considerably less enthusiasm after assuming power. Consequently, proposals have become election slogans rather than governance reforms.  Critics of creating new provinces argue that administrative fragmentation alone cannot solve governance failures. They point out that Pakistan’s primary problem is not necessarily the number of provinces but weak institutions, bureaucratic inefficiency, political interference, corruption and inconsistent implementation of laws. According to this perspective, multiplying provinces without institutional reform merely replicates existing inefficiencies across additional administrative boundaries. New provincial governments would require assemblies, governors, chief ministers, secretariats, police structures, judicial infrastructure and enormous recurring financial expenditures. Unless accompanied by governance reforms, decentralisation may simply increase administrative costs without improving public service delivery. Supporters, however, contend that administrative proximity improves governance outcomes. Comparative international experience demonstrates that countries such as India have periodically reorganised states to improve administrative efficiency and political representation. Smaller administrative jurisdictions often enable faster decision-making, improved monitoring, stronger accountability and more equitable distribution of development resources. Citizens generally experience better governance when government institutions are physically and administratively closer to them. These arguments have gained renewed attention following Naqvi’s intervention.  However, the current debate suffers from one significant omission. It largely ignores Pakistan’s weakest democratic institution: local government. Before creating additional provinces, policymakers must honestly evaluate why local governments have repeatedly failed. Pakistan has experimented with local government systems under different constitutional and political arrangements, yet these institutions have rarely been allowed to function independently and consistently. Elected local governments are frequently dissolved, elections are delayed and financial autonomy remains severely restricted. Provincial governments often resist devolving meaningful authority because local governments are perceived as political competitors rather than governance partners. This brings the issue of local body elections to the centre of the discussion. The Constitution envisions democratic decentralisation, yet local government elections have remained irregular across several provinces. In many cases, elected councils complete only partial terms or remain financially dependent upon provincial governments. Consequently, citizens seeking municipal services, sanitation, water supply, local roads, building regulation or community development frequently confront administrative paralysis. A country that struggles to sustain functioning local governments cannot realistically expect that merely creating additional provinces will automatically improve governance. The experience of Pakistan’s devolution reforms provides valuable lessons. The Local Government reforms introduced in the early 2000s attempted to decentralise authority by empowering districts and local councils. Although those reforms had weaknesses and generated political controversy, they demonstrated that bringing government closer to citizens can improve responsiveness when accompanied by fiscal authority, administrative autonomy and institutional accountability. Unfortunately, subsequent governments reversed or weakened many of these arrangements, resulting in repeated cycles of centralisation and decentralisation. Political reactions to Mohsin Naqvi’s proposal reflect Pakistan’s broader constitutional divisions. Some leaders have welcomed discussion on governance reform while supporting greater administrative decentralisation. Others have questioned both the timing and constitutional implications of the proposal, expressing concerns that restructuring provinces without broad political consensus could intensify ethnic, linguistic and regional sensitivities. There are also concerns that debates over provincial boundaries could distract attention from more immediate governance priorities, including economic recovery, inflation, institutional reforms and electoral credibility. The political diversity of these reactions demonstrates that constitutional restructuring cannot succeed through executive statements alone; it requires sustained parliamentary dialogue, provincial participation and national consensus.  The constitutional dimension cannot be overlooked. Creating new provinces requires constitutional amendments and political agreement among federal and provincial stakeholders. Such reforms inevitably involve questions relating to resource distribution, National Finance Commission allocations, Senate representation, civil service restructuring, judicial jurisdictions and provincial assets. Therefore, any attempt to redraw administrative boundaries without extensive consultation risks generating political instability rather than administrative efficiency. The opportunities nevertheless remain significant. Properly designed administrative restructuring could reduce regional disparities, improve public service delivery, enhance

  • Pakistan’s Economy: Challenges and Opportuni…

    A country’s economy is the foundation of its development, sovereignty and national security. A strong economy not only improves the quality of life of its citizens but also strengthens a nation’s standing in the international community. Pakistan’s economy today stands at a critical juncture. While there are encouraging signs of stability, many structural challenges continue to hold back sustainable growth. As a result, the economy has become a central concern for citizens, businesses, investors and policymakers alike. Over the past few years, Pakistan has endured one of its most difficult economic periods. High inflation significantly reduced people’s purchasing power, while repeated increases in electricity and gas tariffs drove up production costs for industries. At the same time, the depreciation of the Pakistani rupee made imports more expensive, placing additional pressure on businesses and households. The burden fell most heavily on middle and low-income families, many of whom struggled to meet even their basic daily needs. Despite these hardships, recent economic indicators offer cautious optimism. Inflation has eased compared to previous highs, foreign exchange reserves have shown improvement, remittances have remained resilient, and efforts to increase exports are beginning to produce positive results. However, stronger macroeconomic indicators alone do not automatically translate into better living standards. Sustainable progress can only be achieved when economic growth creates employment opportunities, revitalises industries and leads to meaningful increases in household incomes. One of Pakistan’s most persistent economic challenges is the lack of policy continuity. Successive governments often replace or abandon the initiatives of their predecessors in favour of new priorities. This inconsistency weakens investor confidence and undermines long-term economic planning. Many successful economies have demonstrated that sustained growth depends on stable national policies that remain consistent regardless of political transitions. Tax reform is another area that demands urgent attention. The country’s tax base remains disproportionately small compared to its population, placing an unfair burden on compliant taxpayers while a significant portion of the economy continues to operate outside the formal tax system. Broadening the tax net, simplifying tax procedures, enhancing transparency and effectively addressing tax evasion would provide the government with greater fiscal space to invest in infrastructure, education and public services. Agriculture continues to be the backbone of Pakistan’s economy, yet the sector faces numerous challenges. Water scarcity, limited adoption of modern farming techniques, rising input costs and the growing impact of climate change have reduced agricultural productivity and increased the hardships faced by farmers. Investing in modern agricultural technologies, improving water management and providing farmers with better financial and technical support could substantially enhance production and boost agricultural exports. Pakistan’s information technology sector also presents remarkable opportunities. With a large and increasingly skilled young population, expanding freelance services and growing participation in the digital economy, the country has significant potential to earn valuable foreign exchange. Realising this potential requires greater investment in digital education, reliable internet infrastructure, research, innovation and an environment that supports entrepreneurship. The energy sector remains equally important to economic growth. High electricity and gas prices continue to increase industrial production costs, reducing the competitiveness of Pakistani products in international markets. Greater investment in renewable energy, reducing transmission losses and improving energy management could help lower costs and strengthen industrial productivity. Foreign direct investment is another key driver of sustainable economic development. Investors are naturally attracted to countries that offer political stability, transparent regulations, an efficient judicial system and a business-friendly environment. Pakistan can significantly improve its investment climate by reducing bureaucratic hurdles, strengthening institutions and implementing investor-friendly policies that encourage long-term confidence. Economic progress, however, is not solely the responsibility of governments. Citizens also have an essential role to play by paying taxes honestly, using energy responsibly, supporting local industries and respecting the rule of law. A resilient economy is built through shared responsibility between the state, businesses and the public. Pakistan is not short of resources or potential. What it needs is better governance, prudent management of available resources, policy consistency and broad national consensus on economic priorities. Continued investment in education, industry, agriculture, exports and human capital can enable the country not only to overcome its economic challenges but also to emerge as a stronger and more competitive economy in the region. The need of the hour is to place long-term economic interests above short-term political considerations. A strong economy is the cornerstone of a strong state. By making informed and consistent policy choices today, Pakistan can lay the foundations for lasting prosperity, economic resilience and a better future for generations to come.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *