hormuz hiroshima iran

From Hormuz to Hiroshima: Is the Iran War Approach…

By Saqlain Abid Tarrar

The 60-day U.S.-Iran understanding expired on August 17 without the breakthrough Washington and Tehran had hoped—or claimed—to seek. The agreement has effectively stalled, the Strait of Hormuz remains at the centre of the confrontation, and both sides continue to blame the other for the diplomatic failure. Iran has now warned that it could shift towards a more offensive posture if diplomacy does not progress.

This leaves a disturbing question on the table: is the nuclear option becoming the next neutralisation node in the Iran war?

The question gained momentum after former Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene claimed that the use of nuclear weapons had been discussed in Trump administration strategy meetings. Such a claim should be treated cautiously because there is no independent evidence that President Donald Trump has ordered or formally approved a nuclear strike. Nevertheless, the allegation itself demonstrates how far the strategic debate has moved. The White House has maintained that nuclear use is not a proposal on the table.

Yet Trump’s own rhetoric has made the situation increasingly difficult to ignore. He has declared that the United States has “total control” of Hormuz and described the idea of making the strategically vital waterway U.S. territory as attractive.

The Strait of Hormuz is not merely another battlefield. Around one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas supplies normally pass through this narrow maritime chokepoint. Any prolonged closure therefore creates consequences far beyond Iran and the United States: higher energy prices, disrupted shipping, inflationary pressure and another shock to an already fragile global economy.

So, what are the chances of the United States actually using nuclear weapons?

At present, they remain extremely low—but low is not the same as impossible.

History demonstrates how quickly supposedly unthinkable options can become military realities. The United States became the first country to use nuclear weapons in warfare when it dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. However, it would be historically inaccurate to argue that those attacks were simply conducted to test plutonium and uranium against the Soviet Union. The motives remain debated, including compelling Japanese surrender and influencing the emerging post-war balance with Moscow.

The lesson, nevertheless, is unmistakable: once a state believes that an extraordinary weapon can achieve an extraordinary political objective, the threshold can become dangerously negotiable.

That is why today’s situation deserves scrutiny.

The Trump administration needs an exit from a war that has become increasingly difficult to convert into a decisive political settlement. The USS Abraham Lincoln has also endured an exceptionally long deployment, reportedly more than 240 days at sea, adding another layer of military and political pressure.

But nuclear weapons would not provide a rational solution to that problem.

Iran’s nuclear capability is certainly a serious concern. The IAEA reported that Iran had accumulated about 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent before the 2025 attacks disrupted international verification. That material could theoretically produce significant quantities of weapons-grade material if further enriched, but possession of 60-percent enriched uranium does not mean Iran already possesses nuclear weapons.

Iran, meanwhile, has suffered severe economic and infrastructural damage, yet its resistance has not disappeared. Tehran continues to signal that it will not simply surrender under pressure. The danger is therefore that military escalation creates the very nuclear insecurity Washington says it wants to prevent.

Russia and China could condemn any nuclear use and mobilise diplomatic opposition. The United Nations could debate emergency resolutions. European governments could strongly object. But none of these actors could physically intercept an American warhead once Washington had made the decision.

That makes the most important restraint internal: the political and strategic judgment of the American leadership itself.

And there is an even larger regional consequence.

If Iran were struck with nuclear weapons, Gulf states could reach a frightening conclusion: conventional alliances may no longer provide sufficient security. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye and others could reconsider their long-term strategic options. Nuclear hedging and proliferation could become increasingly attractive.

That would transform the Middle East permanently.

The irony would be profound. An American nuclear strike intended to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power could encourage an entire region to seek nuclear deterrence.

Hormuz may eventually be reopened through negotiations, military pressure or a new regional security arrangement. But once the nuclear taboo is broken, restoring it would be far more difficult.

The nuclear option should therefore remain the last option—not because it is weak, but because its consequences are stronger than any victory it could deliver.

Power can neutralise an opponent. But when power is unleashed without restraint, it can ultimately neutralise the international order itself.

Similar Posts

  • The Middle Ground Shifts: How Gaza, Riyadh, and Te…

    For much of the past half-century, the Middle East was described in binaries: Arab and Israeli, Sunni and Shia, American ally and adversary. That framework is no longer sufficient. In the span of 18 months, two events have forced a fundamental reassessment of regional order: a Chinese-brokered handshake between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, and the eruption of war in Gaza in October 2023. Together, they have set in motion a realignment that is testing old alliances, elevating new mediators, and leaving the future of American-backed normalization efforts deeply uncertain.   The significance extends well beyond the region. How power is distributed between Riyadh, Tehran, Ankara, Cairo and Tel Aviv shapes global energy markets, maritime security in the Red Sea, nuclear non-proliferation, and great-power competition between the United States and China. What emerges is not a new stable order, but a fluid period of transactional diplomacy in which ideology is increasingly subordinated to regime survival and economic interest.   A Rapprochement Brokered in Beijing   The agreement announced on March 10, 2023, that Saudi Arabia and Iran would restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year rupture was remarkable less for its content than for its venue. The deal was negotiated over four days in Beijing, with China acting as guarantor.   The context was pragmatic. For Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, foreign policy has become inseparable from Vision 2030, an ambitious plan to diversify the economy away from oil. That vision requires regional calm. The years preceding the deal saw drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure at Abqaiq and Khurais, a costly and inconclusive war in Yemen where Tehran backed the Houthi movement, and rising oil price volatility. De-escalation with Iran offered a path to contain those risks.   For Iran, the calculus was equally material. Facing stringent international sanctions, inflation above 40 percent at the time, and domestic unrest following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, Tehran sought diplomatic breathing room and economic openings, particularly with Gulf states that could provide investment and trade channels.   China’s role was both opportunistic and strategic. As the largest buyer of both Saudi and Iranian crude, Beijing had unique leverage and a direct interest in the stability of Gulf shipping lanes. The mediation allowed China to present itself as a responsible alternative to the United States, a power broker capable of delivering outcomes Washington could not, given its lack of diplomatic ties with Iran. Analysts in Washington and Brussels were quick to note the limits of this shift: China did not replace the U.S. security umbrella that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states continue to rely on, nor did it offer a framework for resolving deeper sectarian and strategic rivalries. The agreement did not settle disputes over Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, or Iran’s nuclear program. It did, however, establish that regional rivals were willing to manage competition through dialogue rather than direct confrontation, and that Beijing was willing to facilitate it.   The Abraham Accords on Hold   If the Saudi-Iran détente represented one vector of realignment, the Abraham Accords represented another. Signed in 2020, the U.S.-brokered agreements that normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco marked a paradigm shift. They rested on the premise that shared concerns over Iran and shared economic interests could advance Arab-Israeli normalization even without resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   By mid-2023, attention had turned to the potential prize of Saudi-Israeli normalization. U.S. officials pursued an ambitious package that would have linked a Saudi-Israel deal with U.S. security guarantees for Riyadh and support for a civilian nuclear program, alongside concessions toward the Palestinians.   The war in Gaza, triggered by Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed approximately 1,200 people and led to the abduction of more than 250 hostages, and followed by Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, which Gaza health authorities report has killed tens of thousands, has fundamentally altered that trajectory.   Saudi Arabia has not abandoned the idea of normalization, but it has recalibrated its public conditions. Riyadh has stated repeatedly that any deal now requires a credible, irreversible path toward a Palestinian state. This position reflects both genuine concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza and a reading of domestic and wider Arab public opinion, where images from the war have generated widespread anger.   For the UAE and Bahrain, which maintained their embassies in Israel throughout the war, the Accords have endured but become more subdued. Economic and security cooperation, particularly on technology, trade, and air defense against Iranian drones, has continued behind closed doors. Public-facing celebration of the accords, however, has largely been suspended. The experience has highlighted a duality: the Accords have proven resilient as state-to-state security arrangements, but fragile as instruments of broader regional integration without progress on the Palestinian question.   Gaza and the Redistribution of Influence   The prolonged conflict in Gaza has accelerated several regional trends. First, it has restored the centrality of the Palestinian issue to Arab diplomacy, after a period when many policymakers assumed it could be sidelined.   Second, it has empowered non-state actors and redefined deterrence. The near-daily exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah until a late-2024 ceasefire, attacks on international shipping by the Houthis in the Red Sea that disrupted an estimated 12 percent of global trade at its peak, and direct Iranian-Israeli missile exchanges in April 2024 demonstrated that escalation management has become the defining security challenge of the region.   Third, it has created space for middle powers to mediate. Qatar, alongside Egypt and the United States, emerged as a central mediator in hostage and ceasefire negotiations due to its channels to Hamas. Turkey has sought to leverage its political support for the Palestinian cause while maintaining economic ties with Israel. Oman has continued its quiet role as a back-channel facilitator.   For the United States, the war has illustrated both its indispensability and its constraints. Washington remains the only power capable

  • Sindh’s Education Revolution: Transforming C…

    Education  is no longer measured merely by the number of schools or students enrolled. In the modern era, success depends on transparency, accountability, quality learning, financial empowerment, and the effective use of technology. Over the past few years, the School Education & Literacy Department (SELD), Government of Sindh, has introduced a series of reforms that are gradually transforming the province’s education landscape. These initiatives reflect a shift from conventional administration to a modern, technology-driven education system focused on improving learning outcomes and governance. One of the most significant reforms is the Student Attendance Monitoring & Redress System (SAMRS). This digital platform records students’ attendance in real time, allowing school heads and education authorities to identify absenteeism, monitor enrollment trends, and intervene promptly to reduce dropout rates. By replacing manual reporting with digital monitoring, SAMRS enables data-driven decision-making and strengthens accountability throughout the education system. Complementing this initiative is FRAMES (Facial Recognition Attendance Monitoring System), a facial recognition-based attendance mechanism for teachers and non-teaching staff. By replacing traditional attendance registers with biometric verification, the system minimizes proxy attendance, enhances punctuality, and ensures greater transparency and discipline across government schools. Another landmark initiative is the e-Transfer System, which has digitized the transfer process for government school teachers. Instead of relying on lengthy manual procedures, teachers can now apply online, making the process more transparent, merit-based, efficient, and accessible while reducing unnecessary administrative delays. Financial decentralization has also emerged as a defining feature of Sindh’s education reforms through the School Specific Budget (SSB). During FY 2025–26, the Government of Sindh allocated Rs. 18.67 billion directly to government schools, empowering Head Teachers to manage repairs, maintenance, sanitation, furniture, learning materials, and other operational requirements according to local needs. Recognizing the positive impact of this initiative, the allocation was increased to Rs. 22.64 billion in the FY 2026–27 budget, representing an increase of approximately 21 percent. This reform has significantly strengthened school-level autonomy and improved service delivery. Equally important are the Curriculum Reforms, which aim to prepare students for the demands of the 21st century. The revised curriculum emphasizes competency-based learning, critical thinking, creativity, problem-solving, inquiry-based education, and student-centered teaching methodologies. Modernized textbooks and improved publishing standards are helping create a more relevant and engaging learning experience while promoting tolerance, inclusion, and responsible citizenship. A landmark achievement in inclusive education is the introduction of religious textbooks for Hindu students in government schools. For the first time, Hindu students are being provided with textbooks based on their own faith, ensuring that minority students can study their religion within the formal education system. This historic initiative reflects Sindh’s commitment to religious harmony, equal educational opportunities, and respect for diversity. These reforms are further reinforced through merit-based teacher recruitment, digital education management systems, improved monitoring mechanisms, free textbook distribution, and technology-enabled governance. Collectively, these initiatives demonstrate that education reform is no longer confined to infrastructure alone; it now encompasses transparency, accountability, innovation, curriculum modernization, and school empowerment. The transformation of Sindh’s education sector is an ongoing journey rather than a single achievement. Yet, the direction is unmistakable. Through digital innovation, decentralized governance, curriculum modernization, financial empowerment, and inclusive policies, the leadership of Syed Sardar Ali Shah has helped lay the foundation for a more transparent, efficient, and student-centered education system. If these reforms continue with the same commitment and consistency, Sindh has the potential to become a leading model of public education reform in Pakistan. Author: Dr Muhammad Rafique Wahi Pandhi, District Dadu

  • The Door That Once Slammed in Europe is Now Echoin…

    When Henrik Ibsen wrote A Doll’s House in 1879, Europe was not prepared for Nora Helmer’s final act, where she left her husband. The sound of a woman shutting the door on her husband and children became one of the most controversial moments in literary history. To nineteenth-century society, the idea that a wife could leave an unhappy marriage was not merely immoral; it was considered an attack on the very foundation of civilization itself: the marriage. The reaction was so intense that German theatre managers forced Ibsen to change the ending. In the revised version, Nora looks at her sleeping children, collapses emotionally, and stays in the marriage. Society wanted the family preserved at all costs. Marriage was sacred. Separation was shameful. A woman’s identity was expected to remain tied to sacrifice, endurance, and silence. More than a century later, something similar is unfolding in Pakistan, particularly in Islamabad. According to recent reports, family courts in Islamabad are facing an unprecedented rise in khula and maintenance cases. More than 45,000 khula-related cases have reportedly already been filed this year, with over 300 new cases emerging daily. The number of family disputes continues to rise, reaching 100,000 cases in 2025. Alongside this trend, court marriages have also increased significantly, many ending in disputes soon after marriage. This phenomenon is often discussed only through statistics or social criticism. Yet beneath these numbers lies a deeper sociological transformation, one that history has witnessed before: a doll’s house. The most striking aspect is not the increase in divorce. It is the change in social attitudes toward marriage itself. Pakistan today appears to be experiencing debates that Europe confronted more than one hundred years ago. In traditional Pakistani society, much like Victorian Europe, marriage has long been treated as sacred, permanent, and socially untouchable. Previous generations often viewed separation as failure, dishonour, or rebellion against family values. Women were expected to tolerate emotional hardship, neglect, incompatibility, and sometimes even abuse for the sake of preserving the household structure. This is precisely the social environment that Nora challenged in A Doll’s House. At the time, audiences were horrified not because Nora committed a crime, but because she chose herself over an unhappy domestic life. Society could forgive a flawed husband more easily than it could accept a woman leaving the marriage altogether. Her departure symbolized individual dignity over social expectation. Today, in Islamabad’s family courts, one can observe echoes of the same historical transformation. Increasingly, people, particularly women, are refusing to remain in marriages they perceive as emotionally unbearable, unequal, or destructive. Whether one agrees with this shift or not, it represents a visible social reality. This does not necessarily mean that society has abandoned the institution of marriage. Rather, it may indicate that expectations from marriage are changing. Earlier generations often prioritized endurance and collective family reputation. Modern generations increasingly prioritize emotional compatibility, respect, mental peace, and personal autonomy. The pace of this transition, however, varies across societies. Europe underwent these debates gradually through industrialization, feminism, legal reform, and changing gender roles over decades. Pakistan, by contrast, is witnessing social change at a much faster pace due to urbanization, education, digital connectivity, economic pressures, and shifting cultural narratives. Ideas that once took generations to spread now travel instantly through social media, television, and global interaction. This is why the comparison with Ibsen’s drama becomes deeply relevant. History does not repeat itself in identical forms, but human societies often move through similar psychological and cultural stages. The same fears once expressed in nineteenth-century Europe, that family systems would collapse, morality would disappear, and social order would weaken, are now frequently heard in discussions within Pakistan. Yet it is important to approach this issue carefully and honestly. Recognizing this social transformation does not automatically mean celebrating divorce, nor does it mean condemning marriage. It simply means acknowledging that societies evolve, and that concepts once considered absolute eventually become contested. The sanctity of marriage remains deeply important for millions of families in Pakistan. At the same time, increasing numbers of individuals no longer believe that preserving a marriage at any cost is always the highest social virtue. Perhaps the real lesson from A Doll’s House is not about encouraging separation, but about understanding how societies react when individuals begin demanding dignity, identity and personal autonomy within family life. More than a century ago, Europe feared Nora’s door slam. Today, Pakistan is hearing similar sounds, not from theatre stages, but from courtrooms and homes. Whether this transformation strengthens or weakens society remains a question for future generations. But one thing is undeniable: social change, once it begins, rarely moves backward.

  • When Ambition Meets Reality

    On July 04 every year the United States of America (USA) celebrates its Independence Day with great fanfare. This year grand fireworks were carried out by a local educational institution that has been established in collaboration with a US university. Perhaps Americans were the only colonial subjects who were able to break the colonial molds to gain real freedom from the Brits. Ellis Island was the entry point where an inscription caught my attention; “What good rain or shine if freedom fails.” Patrick Henry went even further by asserting; “Give me liberty or give me death.” Freedom is at the core of the American dream that continues even after 250 years. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan emerged on the world map after the division of the Indian Subcontinent. After the riots that followed, millions left their homes to pursue their dream of freedom. There was bloodshed on the way. My late father Nazir Ahmed Malik, Tehreek-e-Pakistan Gold medalist and a soldier of the Quaid, had to fight a pitched battle in Ludhiana (East Punjab) to save his neighborhood from the Hindu mob. He was convicted in absentia. The family left a flourishing watch business to start all over again in the new land. My late father-in-law Shehzad Ahmed Khan travelled all the way from Brailey to keep the trains running as refugees poured in from all over India. According to him, there was a scarcity of engine drivers and mechanics. The officers stood with appeals for expert help on the platforms. Those who could help did not rest; they kept the wheels turning. Ghulam Haider Wyne, as Chief Minister (CM), started a very ambitious project called ‘Bab-e-Pakistan’ (Door to Pakistan) to preserve history. He had arrived in Pakistan from Amritsar via Ferozepur. Unfortunately, after his term ended, the project was shelved. In the words of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) is a grand laboratory where the workability of Islam was to be tested. True to our ambition, we started off well. The founding fathers burnt the midnight oil to establish functional institutions. The first born free generation was being prepared to take over. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s vision, Allama Iqbal’s dream and Jinnah’s struggle had paid off. The republic was poised to emerge as the first Asian Tiger when tragedy set in. Our Bengali brothers, the majority population, decided to go their way. Jinnah’s Pakistan was dismembered. My father suffered a heart attack and remained depressed for days. ZAB raised hopes of the nation that was left behind. In his words, “I have come to pick up the pieces.” To make our defence impregnable, he started the Nuclear Program in early 1972. Finally, in May 1998 Pakistan entered the ranks of the Nuclear Powers. Unnecessary misadventures have derailed the country which was poised for glory. Afghan War I proved to be deadly. The very fabric of the nation was stressed. Then Afghan War II was even more lethal. Suddenly a U-turn turned friends into enemies. Hope was rekindled when the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021 after 20 years of war. On August 14, 2026, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan will be 79 years old. Instead of dangerous one-wheeling by the youth, it is time to review and refwords,n the reality, putting ambition on the side for the time being. Today only the border with China is secure. Iran is fighting a survival battle. Diplomacy is non-functional both with India and Afghanistan. The economy continues to struggle. Challenges of debt are becoming insurmountable. There is some good news about energy. Finally, the government has decided on the use of Thar Coal to meet our energy needs. An agreement has been signed by Karachi Electric for the expansion of the mine in Block I. Mined Black Gold will replace the imported commodity to produce inexpensive electricity. Fauji Fertiliser has signed on the expansion of the mine in Block II to gasify coal, which will then be used to produce the much-needed urea fertiliser.

  • Saudi Arabia Is Our Red Line?

    If someone were to say today that neither Iran nor the United States actually wants war, the immediate question would be: “Then why is this conflict happening?” The answer depends on whom you ask. Each side presents its own narrative, blaming the other for provoking the crisis and insisting that it is merely responding to aggression. From the Iranian perspective, the United States is portrayed as a global bully with a long history of military interventions. Iranian supporters argue that Washington has once again resorted to force, launching a sudden attack on February 28 that allegedly eliminated Iran’s top political and military leadership. They contend that the reported killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with members of his family, is an act that cannot simply be forgotten or forgiven. In their view, they now possess the moral right to seek revenge. If their highest leader was targeted, they argue, then retaliatory action against U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and those associated with them is justified. For many in this camp, revenge has become a national rallying cry. The American position is fundamentally different. Washington argues that Iran’s religious establishment under the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih has destabilized the Middle East for more than four decades. According to this view, Tehran has built, funded, and armed militant proxy groups not only around Israel but also across neighboring Gulf and Arab states. U.S. officials point to Syria, where former President Bashar al-Assad—despite belonging to a minority sect—was accused of carrying out decades of repression and mass violence against the Sunni majority, allegedly with Iran’s political and military backing. Similar accusations are made regarding Iraq, where Iranian influence is said to have fueled years of instability. In Lebanon, critics argue that Hezbollah, widely regarded as Iran’s most powerful proxy, has effectively established a state within a state, operating beyond the authority of the Lebanese government. They claim the group has not only maintained continuous hostility toward Israel but has also contributed to Lebanon’s internal political and economic paralysis. According to this narrative, tensions have escalated to the point where Lebanon’s elected government has explored understandings with Israel aimed at confronting these armed groups. American officials further argue that Iran’s regional influence has created deep anxiety among Israel as well as neighboring Gulf Arab governments, who fear that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its affiliated groups could threaten their security at any time. They also maintain that the military action taken on February 28 was rooted in the events of October 7, when Hamas—described by Washington as an Iranian-backed organization—launched an unprecedented attack inside Israel that killed approximately 1,200 civilians and resulted in around 250 hostages, including women and children. Despite these deep divisions, the United States and Iran, with the mediation of Pakistan and Qatar, reportedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at reducing tensions. One of its key provisions allegedly guaranteed that the Strait of Hormuz would remain open, allowing international shipping to pass freely without Iran imposing fees, restrictions, or obstacles. However, according to the American account, tensions flared again when missiles were reportedly fired at Saudi and Qatari vessels passing through waters near Oman. Critics questioned the justification for such an action, arguing that instead of acknowledging responsibility or seeking de-escalation, elements within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps insisted that the Strait of Hormuz should remain closed to commercial shipping. They further allege that the IRGC instructed Yemen’s Houthi movement to block the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in order to disrupt Saudi oil exports to Europe. If the Strait of Hormuz has already strained Asian energy markets, they argue, closing Bab el-Mandeb could create similar disruptions for Europe. Such developments would pose serious economic and strategic challenges for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Adding to these concerns, Yemen’s Houthis—who are widely viewed by Western governments as being aligned with Iran—have reportedly threatened to strike Saudi oil infrastructure. It is within this context that Pakistan has chosen to clarify its position. Beyond the longstanding religious, diplomatic, and strategic relationship between Islamabad and Riyadh, Pakistan has repeatedly maintained that any attack on Saudi Arabia would be regarded as a direct threat to Pakistan itself. Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s leadership reportedly conveyed a clear message to Tehran: “An attack on Saudi Arabia will be treated as an attack on Pakistan. That is our red line.” In line with this policy, Pakistan has reportedly deployed fighter aircraft and thousands of military personnel to Saudi Arabia, with forces positioned near the Yemeni border. Alongside air and ground deployments, Pakistani naval units are also said to be prepared to cooperate with Saudi and U.S. forces in securing maritime routes and responding to Houthi activities if required. Given these escalating tensions, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is urged by its critics to recognize the gravity of the situation and avoid actions that could bring Pakistan and Iran into direct confrontation. They argue that disrupting both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb would not only inflict severe damage on the global economy but would also deepen international opposition toward Iran—an outcome they believe Tehran can ill afford. According to this perspective, divisions are already becoming visible within Iran itself. Some observers argue that the country’s elected political leadership is increasingly uneasy with policies that risk further isolation and conflict. They see growing differences between Iran’s political and military establishments, even though these tensions remain largely behind the scenes. The funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader reportedly drew millions of mourners, reflecting widespread public sympathy. Yet critics argue that this did not necessarily indicate universal support for perpetual confrontation or calls for vengeance. Reports also suggested that hardline supporters directed slogans accusing President Masoud Pezeshkian of betrayal, while Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi allegedly faced verbal hostility and even physical attacks during the proceedings. Those who criticize Iran’s hardline factions argue that such behavior deserves condemnation rather than praise. In their view, the greatest burden of continued escalation will ultimately

  • Reforming the Security Council Without Entrenching…

    The United Nations was founded in 1945 after the League of Nations had failed to preserve peace. Its Security Council was designed for the world that emerged from the Second World War, with five permanent members holding the veto and a small number of elected seats. That basic architecture has scarcely changed since 1965, when the non-permanent membership rose from six to ten. The veto was meant to keep the great powers inside the system and to prevent open conflict among them. Eight decades later the organisation still carries the imprint of 1945 while the membership of the United Nations has grown to 193 states and the global population exceeds eight billion. The Council’s composition therefore no longer reflects the international community it is supposed to serve. In 2008 the General Assembly launched the Intergovernmental Negotiations to consider reform. The discussions have centred on five linked questions: categories of membership, the veto, regional representation, the size of the Council and its working methods. Africa still has no permanent seat. Latin America, South Asia and large parts of the Muslim world remain under-represented. The present arrangement is widely seen as a remnant of the colonial order that concentrates power among a few states. Many argue that emerging powers and significant regional actors—Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and India among them—ought to enjoy greater weight if the Council is to regain legitimacy and effectiveness. Yet the debate is locked. The Group of Four seeks permanent seats for itself and two for Africa. The African Group demands two permanent seats with full veto rights. France and Mexico urge the permanent members to refrain voluntarily from using the veto in cases of mass atrocity. The Uniting for Consensus group, led by Pakistan and supported by Italy, Mexico, Argentina, Canada and South Korea, rejects any enlargement of the permanent category. It proposes instead an expansion of elected seats that would be longer-term and renewable. The rival camps cancel one another’s majorities, leaving the process stalled. Enlarging permanent membership would not reform the Council so much as entrench new privileges. Additional veto-holders would multiply the occasions on which national interests can block action. The repeated American vetoes that have shielded Israel and allowed the destruction of Gaza to continue illustrate how a single permanent member can nullify the will of the rest. More permanent members would introduce further competing interests and raise the risk of paralysis. Once granted, permanent status is effectively irreversible; the new members would be free to obstruct any future attempt to revise the arrangement. India’s claim to a permanent seat invites particular scrutiny. Permanent membership requires sustained confidence in a state’s fidelity to the Charter. India’s refusal to implement successive Security Council resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, its rejection of a United Nations-supervised plebiscite and its unilateral constitutional changes in the territory sit uneasily with that standard. Concerns about human-rights practices in the disputed region and elsewhere, the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, reports of transnational repression, the Citizenship Amendment Act, the treatment of Rohingya refugees and a foreign policy that has offered strategic comfort to Israel all raise legitimate questions. India’s status outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty adds a further layer of unease. Germany’s candidature faces different objections. Europe already holds two permanent seats. Adding a third would deepen regional imbalance. Recent German positions on Gaza have been criticised as inconsistent with the very humanitarian principles permanent members are expected to uphold. The country’s failure to secure even a non-permanent seat in a recent election suggests that its aspirations do not command the necessary breadth of support. The Uniting for Consensus proposal offers a more measured path. Expanding the elected membership from ten to twenty would open opportunities for Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean without creating new permanent centres of power. Periodic elections would keep members accountable to the wider membership. Rotation would allow more states to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. Broader participation could improve the quality of deliberation on intractable questions such as Palestine, Ukraine and other long-standing disputes, without multiplying vetoes that have so often produced deadlock. Reform should strengthen the Council’s legitimacy without sacrificing its capacity to act. Expanding permanent membership would create additional privileged seats, heighten the risk of institutional paralysis and make subsequent change more difficult still. Wider geographical representation is better achieved by enlarging the elected ranks. The Uniting for Consensus approach preserves the existing institutional framework, enhances inclusivity, promotes accountability through regular elections and reflects the interests of the membership as a whole. Sustainable reform therefore lies in widening participation and reinforcing regional balance rather than in extending permanent privilege and the veto.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *