jalalpur canal politics

Jalalpur Canal: Politics, Procedure and Sindh&#821…

Just as the BRB Canal is often regarded as Lahore’s lifeline, the Indus River occupies a similar position for Sindh. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the river has remained at the center of the province’s political discourse for decades. Yet, since the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, few issues have continued to unite Sindh’s population across political divides and enable a collective political stance at the federal level. Today, the province’s politics remains broadly divided between urban and rural Sindh.

In rural Sindh, apart from disputes over canals and water resources, there appears to be no issue capable of sustaining political mobilization against either Punjab or the federal government. As a result, water politics has become the principal rallying point for several nationalist parties. At times, this has also led to exaggerated claims or misleading narratives. The political logic is evident: abandoning canal politics would require these parties to confront more entrenched issues within Sindh itself, including feudal dominance, decades of corruption and the continued exploitation of ordinary citizens.

The recent trial inauguration of the Jalalpur Canal briefly generated political unrest in Sindh. However, the initial wave of anger faded almost as quickly as it emerged. As videos showing water flowing through the canal circulated on social media, several anti-Punjab groups directed their criticism primarily towards Punjab rather than questioning the Sindh government. Arguably, the first questions should have been asked of the province’s own elected representatives. Why was the public not adequately informed about the project’s legal and administrative status? And why was Sindh unable to pursue its case more effectively through political and institutional channels?

The concerns expressed by Sindh are neither new nor insignificant. By the time the Indus reaches the province, river flows have already declined substantially, affecting agriculture, fisheries and the livelihoods of communities living in the lower riparian region. At the same time, the Indus Delta continues to deteriorate while groundwater levels have fallen to alarming levels. Against this backdrop, many in Sindh believe that any additional diversion of water through projects such as the Jalalpur Canal could further reduce the province’s already constrained water availability.

Punjab, however, has consistently maintained that the Jalalpur Canal is not among the six canal projects over which Sindh has formally raised objections. It further argues that the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) issued the Water Availability Certificate for the project in 2014, when Sindh was represented on the authority by Mazhar Ali Shah. If Sindh considered the project objectionable, Punjab argues, why were those objections not raised at that stage? Likewise, why was the issue not pursued more effectively when the project was placed before the

 

Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) for approval and when construction subsequently commenced?

Sindh, for its part, maintains that the Provincial Assembly adopted a formal resolution against the canal in 2021. Three years later, in 2024, the provincial government formally placed the matter before the Council of Common Interests (CCI). Punjab nevertheless rejected Sindh’s objections there as well, reiterating that the Jalalpur Canal did not fall within the six disputed canal projects that remain under contention between the two provinces.

Politically, however, the episode exposed the Sindh government’s difficult position before its own electorate. The documentary record indicates that the provincial government had registered its reservations through official forums. Yet it failed to convert those institutional objections into an effective political narrative because Punjab’s position appeared stronger from both procedural and technical standpoints. This became particularly evident when Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah acknowledged during a press conference that the Jalalpur Canal was not among the six canal projects to which Sindh had consistently objected. That admission effectively defused the anti-Punjab momentum that had briefly gathered pace following the canal’s trial inauguration.

For years, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) has sought to accommodate Sindh’s nationalist parties within the framework of mainstream politics by assuring them political representation at both the provincial and federal levels. At the same time, nationalist parties themselves appear conscious of the electoral limitations of their own rhetoric. Many recognise that slogans traditionally associated with nationalist politics, including “Pakistan Na Khappay”, may have limited appeal when competing with mainstream political parties in electoral politics.

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