great tragedy partitionviii

The Great Tragedy of Partition—VIII Mountbatten,…

The legality of a constitutional settlement cannot compensate for the absence of time, preparation and protection required to implement it

The collapse of the Cabinet Mission Plan did more than extinguish the last comprehensive attempt to preserve a united India. It transformed a constitutional dispute into an administrative and humanitarian emergency.

Indian National Congress proceeded with the Constituent Assembly, the Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of the Plan, and political distrust increasingly gave way to confrontation. Communal violence spread across different parts of India, demonstrating that the approaching transfer of power could no longer be treated simply as an exercise in constitutional drafting.

By the beginning of 1947, Britain had reached a decisive conclusion. Its rule in India could not continue indefinitely, while no constitution acceptable to all the principal political parties had emerged. On February 20, 1947, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced that British authority would be transferred to Indian hands no later than June 1948.

The statement also acknowledged that, in the absence of an agreed constitution, Britain would have to determine whether power should pass to a central authority, provincial governments or some other arrangement. The possibility of more than one successor authority had now entered official policy.

Lord Louis Mountbatten arrived as the last Viceroy in March 1947 with a mandate to supervise this transfer. He inherited a political order already close to collapse. The Cabinet Mission framework had ceased to command common confidence, the interim government was paralysed by rivalry between Congress and the Muslim League, and communal violence had exposed the fragility of provincial administration.

Mountbatten’s task was not to negotiate within a stable constitutional environment. It was to construct a settlement while the institutions through which it had to be implemented were rapidly disintegrating.

The central question was whether the deadline of June 1948 provided sufficient time to undertake an orderly transfer or whether delay would deepen violence and political uncertainty. Mountbatten chose acceleration.

On June 3, 1947, the British Government announced a plan under which British India could be divided and power transferred to two successor governments. Punjab and Bengal would decide whether they should themselves be partitioned; separate constituent assemblies could emerge; and referendums would determine the future of the North-West Frontier Province and the Sylhet district of Assam. The date for transfer was brought forward from June 1948 to August 1947.

The acceleration was defended as a response to deteriorating conditions. British authority was weakening, communal violence was spreading and the principal political parties had accepted that Partition had become unavoidable. Mountbatten and his supporters believed that a definite and immediate date would end uncertainty and compel the parties to assume responsibility.

The opposing view deserves equal attention. A constitutional transformation of such magnitude required the division of provinces, armed forces, civil services, financial assets, railways, irrigation systems, records and administrative institutions. It required the establishment of two governments and the settlement of territorial boundaries affecting millions of people. Compressing this process into a few weeks inevitably reduced the time available for administrative preparation, security arrangements and the protection of vulnerable communities.

The question is therefore not simply whether British withdrawal had become inevitable. It plainly had. The more difficult question is whether the decision to advance the transfer by approximately ten months converted political urgency into administrative recklessness.

The Indian Independence Act received Royal Assent on July 18, 1947. It provided that two independent Dominions—India and Pakistan—would be established from August 15, 1947. It partitioned Punjab and Bengal, empowered the respective constituent assemblies to legislate for the new Dominions and terminated British responsibility for governing India. Parliamentary sovereignty, exercised from London for generations, legislated itself out of the subcontinent in an extraordinarily compressed period.

The legal instrument was concise. Partition was not. An Act of Parliament could establish two Dominions, confer legislative authority and terminate imperial jurisdiction. It could not divide villages, canals, railway lines, police forces, military units, families and centuries of shared social existence with comparable simplicity. Constitutional law could provide a date for independence, but it could not by itself produce the administrative capacity necessary to manage the consequences of territorial division.

The most visible illustration of this haste was the work of the Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commissions. Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed to chair both bodies and was required to determine the boundaries separating Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority areas. The task involved densely populated territories in which religious communities, agricultural systems, transport networks and commercial centres were deeply interwoven. He was given only a matter of weeks to complete it.

Punjab and Bengal could not be divided by applying census figures mechanically. District-level majorities concealed substantial minorities, while economic and geographic considerations frequently pointed in directions different from religious demography.

Rivers, irrigation headworks, railways and markets crossed the proposed boundaries. Sikhs were particularly vulnerable in Punjab because their population, landholdings and sacred places were distributed across areas claimed by both successor states.

The commissions were expected to resolve these questions while political authority was itself being divided. Their members were nominated from opposing political sides and were unable to agree on many decisive matters. The ultimate responsibility therefore rested with Radcliffe, who was required to draw boundaries under extraordinary pressure and with limited opportunity for local investigation.

More troubling was the timing of publication. The boundary awards were made public on August 17, 1947, after independence ceremonies had already taken place. Large populations in Punjab and Bengal consequently entered independence without knowing with certainty on which side of the new international frontier they would fall.

The delay may have been intended to prevent the boundary controversy from overshadowing the independence celebrations or provoking immediate disorder. Its effect was to deepen uncertainty at the precise moment when administrative clarity was most urgently required. Officials responsible for security, local government and transportation had little time to prepare for the territorial consequences. Ordinary people were left to respond to rumour, fear and rapidly changing political realities.

No law expressly ordered a complete exchange of populations between India and Pakistan. The migration that followed arose from violence, insecurity and the collapse of confidence that minorities could remain safely on the “wrong” side of the new border. Trains, roads and refugee columns became scenes of unimaginable suffering.

Families abandoned land, homes and livelihoods accumulated over generations. Women were subjected to abduction and sexual violence, while entire communities disappeared from places where they had lived for centuries.

The precise numbers remain disputed, but the scale is beyond controversy. Around fourteen million people were uprooted during Partition, making it one of the largest forced movements of population in modern history. Estimates of those killed vary greatly, reflecting both the chaos of the period and the inadequacy of official records.

Responsibility for this tragedy cannot be placed upon one actor alone. Congress and the Muslim League accepted Partition when other constitutional alternatives had collapsed. Communal organisations and armed groups converted political division into organised violence. Provincial administrations failed to protect minorities. Local grievances, rumours and retaliatory killings intensified the catastrophe.

Recognition of this shared responsibility does not absolve the departing imperial power. Britain controlled the timetable, supervised the division of the state and retained formal authority until the transfer occurred. The decision to accelerate independence, complete the boundary process within weeks and disclose the awards only after the transfer materially affected the conditions under which Partition was implemented.

The archival record does not establish that Britain intended the humanitarian catastrophe. It reveals something different and equally disturbing: a withdrawal carried out with insufficient appreciation of the administrative and human consequences of speed. Haste was treated as the solution to political instability when it also magnified institutional weakness.

Mountbatten succeeded in transferring power earlier than originally contemplated. The British Parliament enacted the required constitutional legislation, and two independent states came into existence. Judged solely by the formal completion of imperial withdrawal, the process was remarkably rapid. Judged by the suffering of the people required to live through it, the same process appears tragically unprepared. This is the central distinction upon which historical assessment must rest.

Partition as a political decision and Partition as an administrative operation were not identical questions. Even after the decision to create two states had been accepted, different choices remained possible regarding the timetable, security arrangements, boundary publication, refugee protection and institutional transition. The failure to make adequate provision in these areas converted constitutional separation into human catastrophe.

The tragedy of 1947 did not arise from constitutional disagreement alone. It arose when political division was implemented faster than administrative institutions could protect the people caught within it.

The concluding article will consider whether Partition itself, the haste of its execution and the scale of the resulting violence were inevitable. It will also examine the unresolved constitutional inheritance that passed to India and Pakistan when British rule ended.

References: Principal Documents and Sources

His Majesty’s Government, Statement on the Transfer of Power in India, February 20, 1947.

His Majesty’s Government, Plan for the Transfer of Power, June 3, 1947.

Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 30.

Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commission Awards, August 1947.

Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), The Transfer of Power 1942–47, relevant volumes.

Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India.

Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan.

The National Archives, collections on Indian independence and the Partition of British India.

[To be continued]

____________________________________________________________________

Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.

Similar Posts

  • Beyond Public Finance: Towards  Constitutional Po…

    Pakistan has never lacked economic advice. Since independence, successive governments have experimented with socialist planning, import substitution, nationalisation, structural adjustment, privatization, fiscal decentralisation, value added taxation, documentation drives, digital governance and, most recently, artificial intelligence in tax administration.  Almost every reform has been presented as the missing ingredient that would place the country on the path of sustained prosperity. However, Pakistan continues to oscillate between balance-of-payments crises, external dependence, fiscal instability and repeated recourse to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This persistent failure raises a more fundamental question. Is Pakistan’s crisis primarily economic, or are economists asking the wrong questions? For decades, the dominant explanation has remained remarkably consistent. Pakistan is said to suffer from a narrow tax base, inadequate domestic resource mobilisation, weak public institutions, poor governance and inconsistent implementation of otherwise sound policies. According to this view, if taxes were broadened, exemptions withdrawn, administration digitalised and markets allowed to function efficiently, sustainable growth would eventually follow. There is much truth in these observations. They identify many of the symptoms. But they do not fully explain why technically sound reforms repeatedly fail in Pakistan while producing very different outcomes elsewhere. The reason, as suggested in earlier writings, is that Pakistan cannot be understood through the conventional assumptions of public finance alone. Economic policy does not operate in a constitutional vacuum; it reflects the incentives created by the political and legal institutions within which governments function. Orthodox economics generally assumes a constitutional order within which governments seek, however imperfectly, to maximise public welfare. Fiscal policy, taxation and expenditure are analysed as instruments for correcting market failures, financing public goods and promoting economic growth. Political constraints are acknowledged but usually treated as external distortions rather than integral components of economic analysis. Pakistan presents a different reality. Here, constitutional arrangements, political incentives, strategic considerations and informal institutions have shaped fiscal outcomes as much as, and often more than, economic policy itself. Taxation has frequently reflected the distribution of political power rather than principles of efficiency or equity.  Public expenditure has often been determined by strategic imperatives rather than developmental priorities. External assistance has repeatedly substituted for difficult domestic reforms. Elite bargains have preserved privilege while transferring the burden of adjustment to documented businesses, salaried individuals and ordinary consumers. These outcomes cannot be adequately explained by models that assume an impartial state pursuing coherent economic objectives. The analytical framework itself, therefore, requires reconsideration. This series proceeds from a simple but powerful proposition: before analysing taxes, budgets or debt, one must first understand the constitutional rules that shape political incentives. This is the central insight of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE).  Unlike conventional public finance, CPE begins not with taxes or budgets but with the constitutional rules, institutional incentives and political structures that determine how economic decisions are actually made. It asks a prior question: Who designs the rules under which economic policy operates, whose interests do those rules serve, and how do they shape incentives for both governments and citizens? Once that question is asked, many of Pakistan’s recurring puzzles begin to appear less mysterious. Why do technically sound tax reforms repeatedly fail? Why do successive governments rely on indirect taxation while avoiding politically influential sectors? Why has documentation remained elusive despite extraordinary advances in digital technology? Why does every external crisis quickly become a fiscal crisis? Why has debt expanded despite repeated stabilisation programmes? The answers lie not merely in economics but in the constitutional and political environment within which economics operates. This series proposes a different approach. Rather than examining taxation, debt or fiscal federalism as isolated subjects, it will analyse them as interconnected manifestations of Pakistan’s constitutional political economy. Future parts will explore how colonial legacies, post-independence constitutional choices, geopolitical dependency, elite capture, federal arrangements, judicial interpretation and administrative incentives have combined to shape Pakistan’s economic trajectory. The purpose is not to reject orthodox economics. Public finance remains indispensable. Sound taxation, efficient expenditure and macroeconomic stability are essential for any modern state. However, these instruments cannot achieve their intended objectives when the institutional environment within which they operate generates incentives that systematically frustrate reform. Pakistan’s crisis is not simply a fiscal crisis. Nor is it merely a crisis of governance. It is, more fundamentally, a crisis of constitutional political economy. Unless that deeper reality is understood, technical reforms, however well designed, will continue to produce disappointing results because they address the symptoms rather than the constitutional incentives that generate them. In the next part, we shall examine why the assumptions of orthodox public finance differ fundamentally from those of constitutional political economy, and why that distinction matters profoundly for understanding Pakistan. [To be continued]  ____________________________________________________________________ Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996. 

  • Gujrat: The Height of the Akbari Fort and the Trag…

    When rain descends from the folds of clouds, it assumes the form of divine mercy for the earth—reviving parched soil and spreading smiles across the weary faces of farmers. Yet, when this very rain turns unbridled and the administrative apparatus built to welcome it pulls a heavy shroud of negligence over its eyes, this descent of mercy transforms into a harrowing shape of torment and sudden calamity. Gujrat, a historic and industrial city of Punjab that holds a unique global identity through its civilizational expanse, skilled artisans, and proximity to the Chenab River, presents the terrifying spectacle of a pond and a swamp every monsoon season. Here, urban flooding is no longer merely a climatic accident; rather, it has become a chilling confession of administrative apathy, unscientific planning, and a criminal denial of historical geographical realities. When the hydrological management of cities is evaluated on a global scale, the concepts of “Sponge Cities” are put into practice, but our reality stands in stark opposition. When the state of urban drainage in Gujrat is objectively reviewed through the corridors of history, one’s eyes are opened to the bitter truth that the rulers and elements who dominated this city consciously hollowed out its roots at every level for the gratification of greed. The city’s drainage and sewerage system, in particular, fell prey to the plunder of commission agents belonging to the corruption mafia. It is an immensely agonizing chapter of history that two decades ago, when a renowned international Japanese company completed a detailed survey of Gujrat, officially announced its complete reconstruction on modern lines, and promised a world-class drainage system, the hungry brokers sitting in the echelons of power burnt this magnificent project in the fire of personal lust. The people of Gujrat can never forget the actors who sacrificed the Japanese company’s dream at the altar of kickbacks. Later, when times changed and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi assumed the helm of this region as Chief Minister, he released heavy, voluminous funds amounting to billions of rupees to radically improve and modernize Gujrat’s decrepit and worn-out drainage system. Yet the tragedy was that these billions of rupees in Gujrat’s history remained restricted to a few specific and powerful pockets, and to openly divide these funds, the entire system was mortgaged to a fostered contractor mafia. With an exceptionally substandard, superficial, and unprofessional approach, this mafia played a game of window-dressing that instead of fixing Gujrat’s sewerage system, ruined it permanently and turned the entire city into an artificial swamp. Today, the agony of drainage dancing through the city’s streets and roads offers no hope of deliverance from this terrifying urban flood unless a severe accountability of these true, deceitful culprits is carried out. The political leadership that followed also made efforts suited to their respective statures for the betterment of the city; and although their own technical errors consistently hampered this improvement, every resident of Gujrat continues to carry the heavy burden of those primary sinners who devastated Gujrat’s history, civilization, and urbanity. Last year, when urban flooding once again descended upon the city as a mortal torment, uproar echoed everywhere, the wheel of life halted, and the situation reached a point where the Chief Minister of Punjab had to personally make an emergency visit to Gujrat to rescue the district administration from this storm of incompetence. During this visit, a heavy downpour of announcements and promises took place, accompanied by the release of special funds worth billions for complete and sustainable improvement next year. Despite the sincere efforts and financial provisions of Honorable Maryam Nawaz Sharif, the district administration—entrenched in a colonial mindset—spent all its energies throughout the year on personal image-building and photo sessions rather than the timely completion of this vital sewerage project. As ill luck would have it, as soon as the monsoon season arrived once again this year, the colorful balloon of good governance and claims deflated entirely, exposing the bitter reality that this malaise of flawed planning persists and rainwater continues to rain down as a torment upon citizens’ lives. And when this rainwater has already devastated citizens’ lives, wounding their homes and businesses, only then do the traditional efforts of WASA and district institutions begin to bear fruit, with water finally receding from the streets after prolonged suffering. Success drums are then beaten over this very temporary performance, adding salt to the injuries of the citizens. A profound study of Gujrat’s urban geography reveals that its foundations and topography are deeply embedded in its centuries-old historical backdrop. Built during the Mughal era, the Akbari Fort serves as the greatest metaphor for the region’s military, political, and administrative history. Viewed from a geographical and topographical standpoint, the Akbari Fort is situated on a relatively high mound or plateau, and the city’s older structural layout spreads outward from this height in gradual slopes in all directions. Principally and naturally, this elevation of the fort and the surrounding natural slopes should have stood as an exceptional geographical blessing for a drainage system—provided the natural pathways of water flow had been preserved and left unmolested by grotesque tampering. The tragedy, however, is that over time, unbridled urban expansion and a flood of encroachments mutilated this natural sloping system so ruthlessly that today, that very height and slope have turned into a bane for the city. Unchecked commercialization and illegal constructions in and around the Akbari Fort and its adjoining low-lying areas have blocked all traditional water routes in such a manner that water finds no outlet. The consequence is that when rainwater flows down from the elevated parts of the fort, instead of finding an open path or paved drain ahead, it encounters dead alleys, narrow sewage pipelines, and an endless siege of encroachments. Consequently, this water accumulates in lower regions to form a permanent lake, leaving city residents weeping over their helplessness. Gujrat’s tragedy is not merely the accumulation of rainwater; it is a reflection of that collective apathy and corruption which wakes up with the arrival

  • Administrative Provinces: Winning Public Trust Bef…

    Dr. Abdul Jabbar Sahito Karachi, Pakistan The debate over creating new provinces in Pakistan has existed for decades, yet one crucial question remains unanswered: how can the public be convinced that administrative provinces are intended to improve governance rather than increase the burden on the country? Today, public trust in the state is already fragile. People are frustrated by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and excessive government expenditure. Whenever the idea of creating new provinces is raised, many immediately assume that it will only produce more chief ministers, more governors, more provincial assemblies, more secretaries, chief secretaries, inspectors general (IGs), deputy inspectors general (DIGs), assistant commissioners, deputy commissioners, and an even larger bureaucracy. The public perception is straightforward: if corruption and inefficiency already exist with four provinces, what will happen if Pakistan has thirty-two or even thirty-six provinces? This concern must be addressed before any constitutional or administrative reform is proposed. The government should first present a clear governance model explaining exactly how these new provinces would function. People deserve to know whether these provinces will have provincial assemblies or whether they will operate through a compact administrative structure. Will each province be headed by a governor directly elected by the people? Will representation be limited according to population? These questions must be answered before asking the public for support. The objective of creating administrative provinces should never be to expand the bureaucracy. On the contrary, the government should explain that the existing administrative system can simply be reorganized. Unnecessary bureaucratic positions can be reduced, provincial cabinets can remain small, and major ministries can continue to operate under the federal government to avoid duplication. There should be only one chief executive for each province—either a governor or a chief minister, not both. Representation should remain limited and population-based instead of creating large provincial assemblies. The government must reassure the public that administrative reform will not increase financial burdens. Existing administrative and police structures can be reorganized instead of creating entirely new departments. A lean administrative structure is far more likely to gain public confidence than one that appears expensive and oversized. The purpose of administrative provinces is to bring governance closer to the people. Smaller administrative units can improve healthcare through new hospitals, strengthen education by establishing more schools and universities, expand road networks, and accelerate local infrastructure development. They can also encourage the emergence of new leadership, empower citizens to demand their rights, and make governments more responsive because they will be closer and more accountable to the people. Greater accountability should also become a central feature of this model. Institutions responsible for oversight, including NAB and other accountability bodies, would be able to monitor governance more effectively within smaller administrative units. Better administration can also attract greater investment, encourage industries and factories to expand, bring more businesses and brands into different regions, and create employment opportunities for local communities. The government should particularly engage the younger generation and begin this conversation in Sindh. It must make it absolutely clear that this proposal is not about creating provinces on ethnic or linguistic lines. It is not about separating Muhajirs from Sindhis or dividing communities. The proposal is purely administrative and aims to improve governance for every citizen. Instead of creating a province only for Karachi, every administrative division could become a province. Hyderabad, Nawabshah, Larkana, Mirpurkhas, Sukkur, Bahawalpur, and other divisions can each function as separate administrative provinces. If necessary, even the names of these provinces can be changed to prevent unnecessary political controversy. The purpose is not division—it is better administration. Such administrative provinces would encourage the establishment of more schools, universities, hospitals, IT parks, industries, factories, and businesses. They would provide young people with better educational opportunities, create employment, stimulate local economies, improve tax collection, strengthen infrastructure, support clean drinking water projects, facilitate the construction of dams, and promote environmental development through better local planning. However, none of these reforms can succeed unless the public fully understands the proposed governance structure. The government must organize seminars in universities, engage students and young professionals, and use the media to educate citizens about the objectives and practical benefits of administrative provinces. Public awareness must come before implementation. Ultimately, people will support administrative provinces only when they are convinced that the reforms are designed to create a government that is smaller, more efficient, more accountable, and closer to the people—not a larger bureaucracy with greater costs. Winning public trust is therefore the first and most essential step toward any successful administrative reform.  

  • When Ambition Meets Reality

    On July 04 every year the United States of America (USA) celebrates its Independence Day with great fanfare. This year grand fireworks were carried out by a local educational institution that has been established in collaboration with a US university. Perhaps Americans were the only colonial subjects who were able to break the colonial molds to gain real freedom from the Brits. Ellis Island was the entry point where an inscription caught my attention; “What good rain or shine if freedom fails.” Patrick Henry went even further by asserting; “Give me liberty or give me death.” Freedom is at the core of the American dream that continues even after 250 years. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan emerged on the world map after the division of the Indian Subcontinent. After the riots that followed, millions left their homes to pursue their dream of freedom. There was bloodshed on the way. My late father Nazir Ahmed Malik, Tehreek-e-Pakistan Gold medalist and a soldier of the Quaid, had to fight a pitched battle in Ludhiana (East Punjab) to save his neighborhood from the Hindu mob. He was convicted in absentia. The family left a flourishing watch business to start all over again in the new land. My late father-in-law Shehzad Ahmed Khan travelled all the way from Brailey to keep the trains running as refugees poured in from all over India. According to him, there was a scarcity of engine drivers and mechanics. The officers stood with appeals for expert help on the platforms. Those who could help did not rest; they kept the wheels turning. Ghulam Haider Wyne, as Chief Minister (CM), started a very ambitious project called ‘Bab-e-Pakistan’ (Door to Pakistan) to preserve history. He had arrived in Pakistan from Amritsar via Ferozepur. Unfortunately, after his term ended, the project was shelved. In the words of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) is a grand laboratory where the workability of Islam was to be tested. True to our ambition, we started off well. The founding fathers burnt the midnight oil to establish functional institutions. The first born free generation was being prepared to take over. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s vision, Allama Iqbal’s dream and Jinnah’s struggle had paid off. The republic was poised to emerge as the first Asian Tiger when tragedy set in. Our Bengali brothers, the majority population, decided to go their way. Jinnah’s Pakistan was dismembered. My father suffered a heart attack and remained depressed for days. ZAB raised hopes of the nation that was left behind. In his words, “I have come to pick up the pieces.” To make our defence impregnable, he started the Nuclear Program in early 1972. Finally, in May 1998 Pakistan entered the ranks of the Nuclear Powers. Unnecessary misadventures have derailed the country which was poised for glory. Afghan War I proved to be deadly. The very fabric of the nation was stressed. Then Afghan War II was even more lethal. Suddenly a U-turn turned friends into enemies. Hope was rekindled when the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021 after 20 years of war. On August 14, 2026, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan will be 79 years old. Instead of dangerous one-wheeling by the youth, it is time to review and refwords,n the reality, putting ambition on the side for the time being. Today only the border with China is secure. Iran is fighting a survival battle. Diplomacy is non-functional both with India and Afghanistan. The economy continues to struggle. Challenges of debt are becoming insurmountable. There is some good news about energy. Finally, the government has decided on the use of Thar Coal to meet our energy needs. An agreement has been signed by Karachi Electric for the expansion of the mine in Block I. Mined Black Gold will replace the imported commodity to produce inexpensive electricity. Fauji Fertiliser has signed on the expansion of the mine in Block II to gasify coal, which will then be used to produce the much-needed urea fertiliser.

  • Gen Z, Jantar Mantar & PM Modi

    If a protest is peaceful, does not create problems for the public, and remains free of violence, it is a basic human right. In fact, protest is a sign of a living society. Dead people cannot protest or resist. Unfortunately, in our society, the protests of ordinary and poor people are often looked down upon, even though every protest should be judged on its own merits. People often complain that today’s generation is not as good as the previous one. But history shows that every older generation has made the same complaint about its youth. Even centuries ago, elders believed that young people had lost their values. Times have changed, but this mindset has remained the same. I believe that every new generation brings something better than the one before it. Today’s young people have access to knowledge in ways that no previous generation could have imagined. The internet and artificial intelligence have placed the world’s knowledge within everyone’s reach. As a result, today’s youth are more informed, more curious, and more aware. This is exactly what can be seen in the recent **Generation Z protests in India**. These young people are presenting their demands in a calm and respectful manner. Their speeches are based on logic rather than emotion. Whether boys or girls, they explain their concerns with confidence and reason. According to the protesters, **152 examination papers have leaked over the past ten years**, affecting nearly **70 million students**. They believe that Education Minister **Dharmendra Pradhan** should take responsibility and resign. They are demanding reforms in the education system, action against police officers who used force on students, medical treatment for the injured, the release of arrested protesters, and the withdrawal of cases filed against them. One female student said that their movement should not be turned into a Hindu-Muslim issue. She explained that her closest friend is Muslim and that religion has never come between them. According to her, the real issues are education, employment, and a better future—not religious divisions. She also argued that public money should be spent on schools and hospitals instead of fueling religious politics. Another young protester remarked that India’s two prominent leaders, Prime Minister Modi and Yogi Adityanath, do not have children of their own, so they may not fully understand the struggles faced by students and young people. Some protesters also mocked allegations that they were receiving funding from Pakistan or China. Holding packets of chips and spices, they jokingly referred to them as their “Pakistani funding,” using humor to challenge what they described as baseless accusations. The movement has not relied only on slogans. Students have also used songs, poetry, and creative performances to express their message. In some places, however, clashes with the police have occurred. The movement traces its origins to remarks made by **Justice Surya Kant** of the Supreme Court of India, who reportedly compared some unemployed young people to “cockroaches” during a court hearing. Many students felt insulted by the comment, which eventually led to the formation of the **Cockroach Janata Party** protest movement. The movement focuses on issues such as examination paper leaks, unemployment, and reforms in the education system. Among its well-known figures are **Abhijit Deepke** and **Sonam Wangchuk**. Wangchuk carried out a 26-day hunger strike before being taken into custody and moved to a hospital. What began in Delhi has gradually spread to other cities across India. Reports indicate that police have used baton charges, tear gas, and water cannons against demonstrators. Several international human rights organizations have expressed concern over the use of force against peaceful protesters. The students argue that India is the world’s largest democracy and that the right to peaceful protest must be protected rather than suppressed. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced that cases involving examination paper leaks will be referred to fast-track courts and that those responsible will face strict action. However, many protesters believe that promises alone are not enough and that concrete reforms are needed. History has shown that governments often underestimate public movements in their early stages. If legitimate concerns are ignored, such movements can grow into much larger crises, as has happened in several countries in the past. If the demands of these young people are genuine and reasonable, the government should engage with them directly, listen to their concerns, and reform the education system where necessary. If officials have failed in their responsibilities, they should be held accountable. A strong democracy is one that listens to peaceful voices instead of trying to silence them.

  • Iran’s Nuclear Program: From American Partne…

    By Ali Haider Iran’s nuclear program has been frequently described as defiance of the West. But the history reveals a different picture. It appears paradoxical that the very infrastructure of the nuclear facilities in Iran was built under the patronage of the Americans during the Cold War period. The project, which initially symbolized cooperation between Washington and Tehran, became one of the most dangerous confrontations in international relations. This transformation demonstrates how alliances shift in geopolitics.   The roots of the Iranian nuclear program can be traced back to the Cold War period in which the United States and the USSR were locked in idealogical and geopolitical rivalry. In 1950s, when the two superpowers were trying to increase their sphere of influence on the planet by establishing new alliances, US President Dwight Eisenhower introduced the initiative “Atoms for Peace” in 1953. On surface level, the program was devoted to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, however, it fulfilled the geopolitical interests of Washington as well. Several countries, including Pakistan, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran get benefited from the program. Yet the degree of aid was dependent on the strategic significance of each country. Iran, under the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, became one of Washington’s closest regional allies. When Mohammad Mossadegh came to power in 1953, he nationalized the Iranian oil industry that ultimately affected British economic interests and aroused American fear that Iran would align with the Soviet Union. In order to save Iran from becoming a Soviet ally, the CIA, along with Britain’s MI6, undertook Operation Ajax, resulting in the ouster of Mossadegh and the restoration of power to the Shah. Such close relations between the United States and Shah Reza Pahlavi facilitated the signing of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. The United States helped establish the Tehran Research Reactor, aided Iran with highly-enriched uranium to be used as reactor fuel and provided training to Iranian scientists in American universities. At that time, the nuclear aspirations of Iran did not provoke any concerns in the global community due to the fact that the country was considered a loyal ally of the United States. The technology that is now considered a threat by USA, used to be advertised by Washington itself as a tool of development. The situation changed drastically after the 1979 Islamic Revolution when Shah was overthrown and the Islamic Republic of Iran was created under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who pursued the agenda of anti-Americanism. Seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and the resulting hostage crisis broke off diplomatic relations and transformed allies into bitter enemies. Initially, Iranian leadership suspended its nuclear program, and Khomeini showed religious concerns about it. However, soon the Iran-Iraq War changed the perspective of Iranian leaders.In the ensuing years, Iran started rebuilding its nuclear program with the help of Russia and China, while at the same time pursuing the development of uranium enrichment facilities independently. This dramatic reversal transformed Iran’s nuclear program from a symbol of strategic partnership into a source of deep geopolitical mistrust that continues to shape Western policy toward Tehran. Matters came to a head in 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed the existence of two undeclared facilities, Natanz and Arak. Subsequent inspections of the sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency found no evidence of an active nuclear weapons program, but criticized Iran for not reporting certain nuclear activities before. This became the core of the conflict: the West demanded transparency from Iran, while Iran claimed that its rights were enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gradually, the situation developed into an international crisis. In 2006, the IAEA referred the case of Iran to the UN Security Council, after which the UN imposed a series of sanctions on Iran for refusing to stop the enrichment program. The US and EU imposed sanctions on Iran and restricted its banking system and oil exports, these sanctions brought Iran’s economy to its knees, causing severe damage to its currency. However, unprecedented economic pressure did not cause Iran to abandon its enrichment program.The Iranian case demonstrates that technological capability alone is rarely the real source of international conflict; rather, it is the absence of trust and transparency that transforms civilian nuclear technology into a geopolitical crisis. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed which was considered the most important non-proliferation deal in the modern world. Iran was willing to place strict limits on the enrichment of uranium, reduce its enriched uranium stocks, and make changes to its nuclear sites in return for the lifting of the sanctions. This deal proved that effective diplomacy can be used to manage the risk of nuclear proliferation instead of coercion. Nonetheless, this was short-lived. The success of the JCPOA, despite its eventual collapse, illustrated that diplomatic engagement can achieve outcomes that years of sanctions and pressure often fail to deliver. In 2018, President Donald Trump left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action saying that the deal overlooked the ballistic missile program, activities in the region, and the sunset clauses. America re-imposed tough sanctions and put maximum pressure on Iran. This move did not make Iran sign another deal but led Iran to abandon all of its commitments step-by-step and expanded uranium enrichment to levels of up to 60%. Indeed, the nuclear question is still relevant today. The program that was developed with the assistance of the US nearly seven decades ago has now become America’s major concern. Iran claims that its nuclear program is purely peaceful, whereas the US and its Western allies believe that increasing enrichment capacity of the country may pave the way for developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions could not prevent Iran from developing its nuclear capacities, whereas the JCPOA demonstrated that negotiation and transparency measures can be far more efficient in preventing proliferation than coercion. The history of Iran’s nuclear program illustrates two important lessons. First, it is not the technology that causes conflict between states, but mistrust. Second,

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *