have returned

What Have We Returned? 

Pakistan was achieved on the fourteenth of August in the year nineteen hundred and forty-seven, after sacrifices of a magnitude that still stir the soul and a struggle whose tirelessness remains an enduring lesson. Millions crossed borders in those turbulent months, leaving behind ancestral homes, familial graves, and the familiar soil of generations, so that a new homeland might rise where Muslims could live according to their faith and their free will. We stand now upon the threshold of the eighth decade of that hard-won independence. I, a Pakistani by birth and by conviction, have myself lived nearly fifty-eight years within the borders of this free land.

This country conferred upon me an identity that no foreign power could erase, furnished me with the means of an independent existence—schools in which to learn, roads upon which to travel, markets in which to earn my bread—bestowed a measure of respect in the eyes of the world, and, in some degree, granted me a name among my fellows. Yet the question returns, quietly and persistently, like a debt long deferred; what have I given in return? Have I ever paused long enough, in the press of daily concerns, to weigh that debt with honesty?

The same inquiry must be put, with equal seriousness and without partiality, to the institutions that were meant to serve as the pillars of the state, and to the rulers and authorities who have held power through these eighty years. What account can they render of their stewardship? Parliament was intended as the voice of the people; the courts as the guardians of justice; the civil service as the steady hand of administration; the universities as the nurseries of thought and character. Have these bodies discharged their duties with fidelity, or have they at times become arenas of personal ambition, partisan calculation, and the slow corrosion of public trust?

The rulers who succeeded one another, whether civilian or military, received the same inheritance of soil, of people, and of hope. What have they added to the national store of justice, of prosperity, of self-respect, and of unity? The record is mixed, and the gaps are painful to contemplate. Have we, as a people, ever undertaken a true reckoning of our collective performance—not the ritual of speeches on national days, but a sober examination of conscience? And if such an accounting was made, did it lead to any genuine reformation of our ways, or did we merely resume the old habits once the anniversary had passed?

Where, in truth, does Pakistan stand as a state at this present hour? We possess a land rich in rivers and fertile plains, a people endowed with resilience and talent, a strategic position that nature itself seems to have marked for consequence. Yet we continue to wrestle with the burdens of poverty that still touch too many homes, with the lingering shadows of disorder in parts of the country, with the uneasy balance between institutions that ought to complement one another, and with the persistent temptation to place private gain above the common good. Have we preserved, or have we frittered away, the sacred trust that our ancestors placed in our hands when they bequeathed us this country? That trust was not lightly given. It demanded vigilance against tyranny, honesty in public dealing, a willingness to educate the young in both knowledge and character, and a readiness to place the welfare of the whole above the advantage of the few. Looking back across the decades, one is compelled to ask whether that demand has been met in full measure.

I do not exempt myself from this examination. For nearly six decades I have drawn from the well of national life—the protection of law, the opportunity to work and to speak, the simple privilege of calling myself a citizen of a free land. Have my contributions matched the gifts received? Have I laboured, in whatever sphere was allotted me, to strengthen rather than weaken the fabric of the republic? Have I spoken truth when silence was easier, practised fairness when partiality promised profit, and taught the rising generation that freedom is not a birthright to be consumed but a responsibility to be renewed? Honesty requires that each of us answer such questions in the solitude of his own heart, without the convenient shield of collective excuses or the comfortable habit of blaming those who came before.

Enough, then, of evasion. The hour has come for every citizen, high or low, including the writer of these lines, to conduct a personal audit. Let each examine what he has taken and what he has returned. Let the institutions examine their fidelity to the purposes for which they were created. Let those who hold authority examine whether their decisions have served the enduring interests of the state or the fleeting interests of the moment. Only through such unsparing self-examination, followed by the hard work of reform, can the trust of the founders be renewed and the promise of Pakistan still be fulfilled for those who will inherit what we leave behind.

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  • From Mediator to Ally: Pakistan’s Balancing …

    In the space of a single year, Pakistan has moved from the periphery of Middle Eastern diplomacy to its center. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir have positioned the country as both a mediator between Washington and Tehran and, more recently, a formal treaty partner of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The result  the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed on August 7 in Islam’s holiest city  marks one of the most consequential shifts in South Asian foreign policy in decades. Yet it also raises hard questions about who is really steering Pakistan’s course, and at what long-term cost.   A war that reshaped the region   The backdrop is a war between the United States and Iran that erupted on February 28, drawing in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Iraqi militias and Yemen’s Houthi movement, and disrupting roughly a fifth of the world’s seaborne energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. Missile and drone exchanges reached Saudi cities, unsettling a region that had spent years trying to de-escalate after the 2015 nuclear deal’s collapse.   Pakistan, one of the few states with working channels to both Washington and Tehran, stepped into the gap. Sharif’s government hosted preliminary contacts that produced the so-called Islamabad Memorandum, under which Iran signalled it would not pursue nuclear weapons  a pledge it had already made under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 2015 accord  in exchange for a mechanism allowing it to dilute stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian later thanked Islamabad for its “constructive engagement” in securing a ceasefire and agreed to send negotiators to further talks in the Pakistani capital. Analysts at the Washington-based Stimson Center have noted that Munir personally staked considerable political capital on the diplomacy, given how easily it could have collapsed.       The Makkah pact   That mediating role fed directly into last week’s agreement. Saudi Arabia, repeatedly struck during the war by Iranian missiles and by Tehran-aligned forces in Yemen and Iraq, had already signed a bilateral defence pact with Pakistan in September 2025  struck, notably, just over a week after an Israeli strike on Hamas negotiators in Doha rattled Gulf capitals’ confidence in American security guarantees. The Makkah agreement extends that arrangement into a trilateral pact with Turkey, declaring that an armed attack on any one of the three signatories will be treated as an attack on all.   Pakistani officials describe the pact as purely defensive. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said this week it was “not directed against any country” and remained open to other regional states. President Asif Ali Zardari called it a reflection of “shared resolve for peace and security,” while Sharif credited Munir’s “tireless efforts” in securing an arrangement he said had been years in the making. For Riyadh and Ankara, the pact offers a hedge against dependence on any single outside power at a moment when American commitments to the region look less certain than they once did. For Pakistan, it offers closer ties with two wealthy allies, a symbolic role as guardian of Islam’s holiest sites, and outsized influence for a country whose economy remains fragile.   Praise, and pointed scepticism   The agreement has been celebrated in much of Pakistan’s domestic media as evidence that the country’s leadership  civilian and military alike  is finally translating decades of geopolitical positioning into tangible strategic weight. Supporters point to a similar dynamic in May, when a brief but intense military confrontation with India ended within days, after which the government promoted Munir to the rare, largely ceremonial rank of Field Marshal, only the second officer in Pakistan’s history to hold it.   But that same promotion has drawn sharp criticism from analysts who see it as part of a broader consolidation of power by the military at the expense of elected institutions. Munir, appointed army chief in November 2022, has presided over a period in which  according to critics including jailed former prime minister Imran Khan’s supporters  courts, the media and Sharif’s own coalition have operated increasingly under military direction, a system some commentators have dubbed a “hybrid regime.” The Middle East Institute has described Munir’s elevation as “a thunderous declaration of the military’s unassailable supremacy,” while other analysts note that his growing role in foreign and economic policy  well beyond the traditional remit of an army chief  blurs the line between civilian governance and military command in a country with a long history of that line collapsing altogether.   What comes next   None of this diminishes the immediate diplomatic achievement: a ceasefire process that, however fragile, has held; a new pact that binds three influential Muslim-majority states more closely together; and a Pakistan that finds itself, for now, indispensable to great-power diplomacy in a region convulsed by war. Whether that translates into durable stability  for the Gulf, for the broader Middle East, or for Pakistan’s own democratic institutions  remains an open question. The coming months, as the Islamabad talks resume and the Makkah pact’s practical implications become clearer, will test whether this new era represents a genuine diplomatic breakthrough or a further tightening of military control dressed in the language of strategic necessity.

  • We Grew the Wheat. We Chose to Import It.

    In early April the grain stood stacked by the roadside in Sahiwal, DG Khan and Bahawalnagar, harvested and bagged, waiting for a buyer the system had promised but never delivered. Three months later the buyer arrived. Not the state purchasing from Pakistani farmers, but the state purchasing from foreign suppliers, paying in scarce dollars. Pakistan’s 2025-26 wheat production is estimated at 29.31 million tonnes against consumption of roughly 31.9 million. The gap is real. This import, however, is not the product of a harvest failure. It is the product of a procurement failure. The wheat existed. What did not exist was the institutional will to buy it at a price that reflected its value while it was still in the farmer’s hands. Private intermediaries bought at Rs 2,900-3,200 per 40 kilograms from farmers who had loans falling due and no storage. Those intermediaries held the grain and watched the open-market price climb to Rs 4,600 by July. The middleman’s profit was the farmer’s loss. The state, having refused to spend rupees in April, must now spend dollars in August. The invoice, compiled from months of evasion, comes due all at once. The cycle was predictable. After the 2022 floods the administrative reflex became “import.” In 2023-24 the country allowed large duty-free private imports into a market already carrying record stocks. That was 3.44 million tonnes at a cost of $1.005 billion. In 2024 and 2025 the Minimum Support Price was first ignored and then abolished under IMF conditionality linked to a $7.1 billion Extended Fund Facility. This happened years ahead of the phased timeline the Fund had allowed until FY2026. In October 2025 the government reversed course and restored the price, but the supporting machinery never materialised. In January 2026 the aggregator model collapsed. Punjab set a procurement target of three million tonnes, but by late May, with partial procurement continuing into June, total procurement fell far short of the target. Three seasons, three frameworks, one recurring failure: the system arrives after the price has already been set. The old procurement system was deeply flawed. It captured only about a quarter of production and skewed toward large landholders and politically influential actors. According to a Competition Commission of Pakistan analysis, the top 40 per cent of farmers in Punjab sold 84 per cent of their wheat to official buyers, while the bottom 40 per cent sold only 6.4 per cent, forced to accept below-benchmark prices from private traders. Abolishing it overnight without private storage, warehouse-receipt financing or functioning commodity exchanges did not liberate the small farmer. It exposed him to cartels he could not match. The state was weak when farmers needed a floor. It is assertive now that consumers need a ceiling. That is not food security. It is political timing. The cost will be paid in November. Punjab’s wheat acreage has already fallen sharply. It fell by roughly 5.5 per cent between 2023-24 and 2024-25, a reduction of close to a million acres, according to official crop reporting data corroborated by independent assessments. The decline has continued into 2025-26. Farmers are not abandoning wheat out of ideology. They are doing arithmetic after three years of suppressed returns, delayed buyers and policy uncertainty. Many are moving into canola and mustard. These are thinner markets with less infrastructure, no public benchmarks and highly concentrated private buyers. Unlike wheat, which benefits from a massive state-backed consumption floor and established procurement infrastructure, edible oils face different demand elasticities and lack the same strategic reserve backing. If oilseed acreage expands faster than processing capacity, the same distress-sale pattern will simply be exported to a new crop. Climate stress amplifies the risk. The 2025 floods were the worst in Punjab in four decades, and the 2026 harvest lost further volume to heat and storms. Rising temperatures and erratic rainfall are no longer background noise; they are actively cutting yields. Yet the deeper threat remains institutional. A farmer who repeatedly experiences losses without protection responds rationally. He reduces acreage. He shifts crops. He exits. And once he exits, he does not return. Sovereignty does not lie only in borders or foreign reserves. It also lies in the ability to buy, store and release grain when the market fails. By that measure the import announcement is not a solution. It is the price of a failure we chose. The 2027 harvest window opens in November. Not in April when the crop arrives. Not in July when the state panics, but in November when the farmer stands in his field and decides what to plant. On that morning he will not be thinking about policy frameworks or export targets or buffer stocks. He will be thinking about what the last three seasons cost him and whether the state that failed him in April, imported in July and abandoned him after harvest has given him any reason to trust it again. That is the only question that matters now. That is the question that must be answered before he plants.

  • The Teachings of Hazrat Ali Hajveri (R.A)

    Hazrat Syed Ali bin Usman Al-Hajveri (R.A), popularly venerated as Data Ganj Bakhsh or Data Sahib, occupies a seminal position among the classical Sufi scholars of the Islamic tradition. Born in 1009 CE in Ghazni, present-day Afghanistan, he migrated to Lahore during the Ghaznavid period, where he spent the remainder of his life engaged in instruction, spiritual guidance, and moral reform. He died in 1072 CE and was interred in Lahore, where his shrine remains a major center of religious and cultural activity in South Asia.   The honorifics “Data” and “Ganj Bakhsh” denoting “the Giver” and “Distributor of Treasures” were conferred upon him in recognition of his intellectual munificence and his commitment to philanthropy. Historical and hagiographic sources attest that his hospice was accessible to individuals irrespective of social, linguistic, or religious affiliation. This principle of inclusivity continues to inform the ethos of his shrine, which attracts millions of pilgrims annually from Pakistan and abroad.   Hazrat Data Sahib’s principal scholarly contribution is the Persian treatise Kashf-ul-Mahjoob: The Revelation of the Veiled. Composed in the 11th century, it is regarded as the earliest systematic exposition of Sufism in the Persian language and retains canonical status in seminaries and universities worldwide. In this work, he delineates the interior dimensions of Islam, emphasizing that proximity to the Divine is attained through sincerity of intention, service to humanity, and sustained remembrance of Allah.   At present, his shrine in Lahore, known as Data Darbar, constitutes one of the largest Sufi complexes in South Asia. Daily visitation peaks on Thursdays, and the institution of perpetual langar  the provision of free meals  operationalizes his teaching on social welfare and continues to serve thousands of people each day.   The epistemological and ethical framework of Hazrat Data Sahib’s thought may be summarized under four interrelated principles.   First, he posited love of Allah and His Messenger ﷺ as the teleological basis of human existence. In Kashf-ul-Mahjoob, he argues that worship should proceed not from instrumental motives of fear or expectation of reward, but from authentic love and sincerity. He further contends that the spiritually realized individual maintains constant consciousness of Allah in all states of being.   Second, he advanced service to humanity as a form of worship. Rejecting ascetic withdrawal, he advocated an engaged ethic in which the pursuit of knowledge is coupled with service to the marginalized. His designation as “Ganj Bakhsh” reflects this commitment to the distribution of both material and spiritual resources. Third, he emphasized Tazkiya-e-Nafs, or the purification of the self, as a prerequisite for moral agency. He enjoined his disciples to abstain from vices such as greed, envy, wrath, slander, and pride, and to cultivate virtues including patience (sabr), gratitude (shukr), veracity (sidq), and contentment (qana‘at). For him, authentic knowledge was manifest not merely in textual erudition but in ethical conduct (akhlaq). Fourth, he articulated Sufism as the inward dimension of Shariah. He maintained that observance of ritual obligations  prayer, fasting, and lawful livelihood  must be complemented by dhikr, the remembrance of Allah, to ensure spiritual vitality. He further stressed the necessity of authoritative pedagogy and virtuous companionship as conduits for moral and spiritual development. The teachings of Data Ganj Bakhsh retain considerable relevance in the 21st century. In an era characterized by consumerism, occupational precarity, and digital hyper-connectivity, his advocacy of qana‘at and dhikr offers a corrective to stress, anxiety, and existential vacuity. His framework suggests that psychological equilibrium is derived less from material accumulation than from interior discipline and divine orientation.   Furthermore, his principle of social service addresses contemporary challenges of poverty, isolation, and inequality. The institutionalized langar at Data Darbar exemplifies this ethic and provides a model for civic engagement, volunteerism, and communal solidarity.   In the context of digital communication, his insistence on akhlaq assumes particular salience. His exhortations to truthfulness, humility, and restraint provide a normative basis for addressing online hostility, misinformation, and the erosion of civility. For students and professionals alike, his model affirms that technical competence must be accompanied by moral integrity.   Finally, his doctrine of equilibrium between spiritual and worldly responsibilities offers a viable paradigm for modern Muslim subjects. He did not advocate monasticism, but rather the integration of professional, academic, and technological life with enduring spiritual commitments. This synthesis enables individuals to pursue vocational excellence without compromising ethical values.   In conclusion, the legacy of Hazrat Ali Hajveri (R.A) transcends its historical milieu. Centered on love of Allah, service to humanity, and self-purification, his teachings provide a coherent response to contemporary social and psychological challenges. The adoption of these principles at the individual and communal level holds the potential to foster more just, compassionate, and purpose-driven societies.

  • Correcting the Asymmetry: Why Bangladesh Needs UN-…

    I first learned to think of rivers as questions of survival, not just geography, from the late Dr. Mohammad Moniruzzaman Miah, the visionary Dhaka University vice-chancellor and geographer whose work shaped a generation of Bangladeshi thinking on transboundary water. In the years when Khaleda Zia’s government stood firm in defending Bangladesh’s water rights, I was part of the technical effort that helped galvanize opposition to India’s proposed 1,500 MW Tipaimukh Dam on the Barak River in Manipur — a fight documented in the broader scholarly record of that transnational resistance movement. That episode taught a lesson Bangladesh cannot afford to forget as it approaches the next deadline in its water diplomacy: December 2026, when the landmark 1996 Ganges Water Treaty expires. The Ganges Treaty, signed in December 1996, was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough — the first long-term water-sharing arrangement between India and Bangladesh. But thirty years on, its formula looks less like fairness and more like a structural handicap for the downstream nation. Under the treaty, dry-season flow at the Farakka Barrage (January 1 to May 31) is divided in alternating ten-day blocks. When total flow is 70,000 cusecs or less, the two countries split it 50-50. But when flow reaches 75,000 cusecs or more — precisely the scenario Bangladesh needs most, during peak dry-season stress — India takes a fixed 40,000 cusecs off the top, and Bangladesh gets only the remainder. In practice, the treaty guarantees India a floor while leaving Bangladesh’s share to fluctuate with whatever is left. For a delta nation of 175 million people, dependent on the Ganges-Padma system for irrigation, drinking water, fisheries, and salinity control, that asymmetry has never been sustainable. It is even less so now, as climate change intensifies dry-season scarcity and accelerates saline intrusion along the coast. Bangladesh is not asking for charity. It is asking for a renewed, predictable framework that reflects present-day hydrological and demographic realities — not the assumptions of three decades ago. That renewal must also confront a public health emergency that the original treaty never anticipated: the mobilization of naturally occurring arsenic into the very groundwater tens of millions of Bangladeshis depend on for drinking water. The mechanism is worth explaining plainly. Reduced dry-season flow in the Ganges limits natural flushing and recharge of shallow aquifers. Farmers and municipalities, deprived of adequate surface water, turn increasingly to groundwater pumping for irrigation and drinking supply. That heavy extraction alters subsurface flow and oxygen conditions, encouraging microbial processes that break down buried organic carbon and release arsenic bound in iron-rich sediments — arsenic that occurs naturally in the geology of the Bengal delta. It’s important to be precise here: most researchers attribute the origin of this arsenic primarily to natural, geogenic sources within the delta’s Holocene sediments, not to the Farakka Barrage itself. But many Bangladeshi hydrologists and public health researchers argue, credibly, that reduced Ganges flow and the resulting over-reliance on groundwater pumping act as an accelerant — turning a latent geological hazard into an active public health catastrophe. Whatever the precise weighting of causes, the outcome is not in dispute: Bangladesh is living through what the World Health Organization has called the largest mass poisoning of a population in history. The economic toll is staggering and measurable. Studies estimate that arsenic contamination has reduced Bangladesh’s effective rural labor supply by roughly 8 percent — a contraction larger than the labor-market shock the United States experienced during the Great Recession. Projections suggest arsenic-related mortality and morbidity could cost the economy up to $13 billion over twenty years in lost productivity alone. Millions of person-days are lost annually to arsenicosis, and the neurotoxic effects on children threaten the cognitive development of the next generation — a bottleneck on Bangladesh’s long-term growth prospects. Contaminated irrigation water enters the food chain, straining agricultural yields and export credibility. At the household level, families spend hundreds of millions of taka annually on treatment, exhausting savings and pushing the rural poor deeper into poverty. Visible skin lesions bring social stigma, job loss, and marginalization, particularly for women. This is not an abstract environmental dispute; it is a slow-moving national emergency with a very real balance sheet. This debate does not exist in isolation. It sits alongside Bangladesh’s long-stalled push for a Teesta River sharing agreement, another dispute where upstream control and India’s domestic politics — particularly in West Bengal — have repeatedly delayed progress. Dhaka has made clear that a fair, long-term renewal of the Ganges pact is now central to the broader trajectory of India-Bangladesh relations. The two issues are linked in substance as much as in diplomacy: both test whether the region can move from a “mercantile” approach to shared rivers, in which every cusec is treated as a zero-sum resource to be captured upstream, toward an approach that treats water as a shared trust with obligations that flow downstream as well as up. Given this, the renewal of the Ganges Treaty must do more than reallocate cusecs. It must treat adequate, dependable freshwater flow as a public health intervention, not merely an irrigation input. Diluting arsenic concentrations in shallow aquifers, sustaining natural flushing, and reducing pressure to over-pump groundwater all depend on Bangladesh receiving a demonstrably larger and more reliable share of dry-season Ganges flow than the 1996 formula allows. Given the scale of what’s at stake — public health, food security, and the credibility of a 175-million-person delta nation’s future — this renewal should not be negotiated behind closed doors on India’s terms alone. Bangladesh should press for the process to include independent, internationally recognized water and public health experts, convened under UN auspices, to assess minimum flow requirements against verifiable arsenic, salinity, and agricultural data. This is not a call to internationalize a bilateral treaty in perpetuity; it is a call for technical objectivity in setting the numbers that will govern Bangladesh’s water security for the next generation. 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  • Road to the East

    Vice President Pakistan-China Joint Chamber In the early 1990, when Chinese Government planned to develop the most modern city of the world at the south eat coast of China, named Shenzhen, the Government named it as the window of the world. In the modern history it is the most advanced, beautiful and well-planned city in the world with its population reaching almost 18 million. Along, Shenzhen GDP is bigger than the GDPs of many countries. Similarly, after the Chairman Xhi announced his initiative to develop for a global trade in the name of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is considered to be the biggest financial project globally. In respect to active this project the initiative of CPEC as a flagship project of BRI was taken. Pakistan with its most sage borders with its neighboring countries China is also the key part of this initiative. Considering my experience to travel to China using a road link was started from the small city of Pakistan name coast. Which is even more than like 200 km from the border of the Khunjarab which leads you to enter to the new window of the world which is starting from the south west of China. Directly you pass the immigration process at Tashgorqan, you will feel the things have been entirely changed. My first inspiration was this city for its cultural background buildings, music, food, that totally fascinated me. I was just in the middle ages where there was a very beautiful city to welcome me with all its cultural strength. The city is even smaller like a country of Kashgar but still you can see the international food chains along with a lot of local delicacies. The ethnic people are mainly Chinese and Tajik origin. This city is similarly famous for the yolk beef. And that was my first feast tried at this city. The visitors of the city were even more than the locals who came from all over China to observe the rich culture of this city. Even I spent there few hours but the fascination, beauty and culture of this city will definitely attract me to visit it again. The roads were wide, clean, infrastructure was excellent, like a combination of an old civilization with modern infrastructure. If a got a chance in the future I would love to stay in this city significantly marking the importance of this city even in the ancient time till today. This was the first settlement as a city I found on my way to the Khunjarab border to tashgorqan. The people were very friendly, beautiful and they showed a lot of love not only fore me but for the all visitors. Such a small city with a rich culture for their dressing, music and traditional dance can fascinate anyone. Kashgar is about 5 hours drive from Tashgorqan. Being the second largest city of Xinjian, this city is I may call a new window of the world. Kashgar city which is normally a called as Kashi by Chinese is an inspiration. This city which was formally very undeveloped like a couple of decades before now have become a center of financial activities under the BRI. With its specific location along with the silk route the locals of Kashi claims that this city have a history to 2000 to 5000 years old. I have never observed a city like Xinjiang with such a remote area and having the ethnic communities for more than 13 including Yugur, dominating Han, Tatar, Tajik, Karghaiz, Mangol and many other are among the most prominent ethnic nationalities living in this city. This diversified this city as a multicultural hub.   China Government is very concerned and they are really developing this area with all the available resources they can inject. Within a decade of time Kashi is now one of the modern cities developing with the gigantic speed and its bordering with the countries like Kirghizstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. With its population increasing ofr more than 6 million people is one of the biggest city in all this region. Yecheng as a county of Xinjiang, is considered to be a window to Tibet all that, who want to start their expedition to Tibet, they have to start from this city name , Yecheng. I got an opportunity to visit his small city which is similarly fascinating, I should appreciate this all areas are culturally being so rich that every building and every road is telling a new story about this city. What attracted me the most that was the food and the dancing culture of this city with some fascinating music. This area is rich for its dry fruits where you can see the most variety of dry fruits in the world. Yecheng is considered to be a capital city of walnuts. Coming back of Kashi which is my topic of the day, everybody can spend hours and hours to have a look at the rich culture. The Government have preserved the buildings and most of them have been converted into historical places mostly are called in the name of Mehman Khana (Hotel). The walled city of Kashgar is one of the top most attraction for any foreigners and mainland Chinese. Now the Kashi economy is mainly based on tourism as the Chairman Xhi announced in his last speech as tourism and health sector would be the main focus of Chinese Government. The streets of Kashi were swarming with the Chinese from all provinces who were eager to learn more about the history and culture of this region.   To be continued..

  • The Perfect Human: Prophetic Biography and the Sci…

    The boundless and dynamic history of Seerah—the prophetic biography—bears witness to how every era’s intellectual currents, scholarly demands, and civilizational pressures have played a pivotal role in shaping the style of this sacred literary genre. In the earliest biographical periods, the primary objective was the preservation of prophetic traces and historical continuity, which later evolved during the medieval age into polemical, defensive, and theological debates. Up until the mid-twentieth century, the major goal of Seerah writing remained a reasoned defense against Western Orientalist objections alongside historical verification. However, in this fast-paced, technology-driven, and metaphysics-averse scientific age of the twenty-first century—where the prevailing trend is to test every narrative against data, logic, and objective criteria—there has been an intense, growing need to present the Seerah of the Prophet (PBUH) with an intellectual cadence that steps outside traditional rhetoric to directly appeal to the modern scientific mind and international academic paradigms. To bridge this intellectual gap, Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed—a distinguished professor of computer science and engineering at the University of Texas at Arlington and director of the Center for Advanced Computing Systems—authored a valuable English work titled The Perfect Human, Muhammad (PBUH). To bring this book into the broader Urdu sphere and facilitate access for intellectual and academic circles, Saqlain Shaukat translated it into Urdu under the title Bashar-e-Kamil: Muhammad ﷺ, an endeavor that undeniably holds a prominent and esteemed place in our intellectual world. The most distinctive quality of this book is that its author is not a traditional graduate of a religious seminary or a conventional orator, but rather a scientist accustomed to weighing every phenomenon through algorithmic precision, systematic models, and multi-level bibliographies. The undertaking of Seerah by a computer science professor with such meticulousness—weaving historical events into a fact-based narrative—bestows upon the account a rare academic and objective validity. Abandoning traditional emotional hyperbole, the author adopts a methodology of historical and documentary evidence that convinces the reader the life of the Prophet (PBUH) is not merely a scattered collection of emotional episodes, but rather the most authentic and actionable code for human evolution and global civilizational formation. The first part of the book comprises fifty-three detailed chapters, presenting a continuous historical narrative of the Prophet’s (PBUH) life. The true uniqueness of this section lies in how the author intertwines nearly fifteen hundred Quranic verses and authentic references from other heavenly scriptures into the text with such skill that the Quran itself becomes the speaker of the Seerah. In particular, the critical analysis applied to the Constitution of Medina (Mithaq-e-Madinah), the documentary treaties of the Medinan state, and other political and social conditions offers rich intellectual nourishment for students of international law, modern political science, and sociology. The second part of this scholarly masterpiece represents an entirely novel and unique chapter in the history of Seerah writing. This section encompasses comprehensive research statements based on one hundred distinct human attributes extracted from the individual, collective, and moral life of the Prophet (PBUH). Each attribute is connected to the historical and Quranic evidence of the first part in such a way that it ceases to be mere verbal advice and instead becomes a living, dynamic model of action. For today’s globalized world—which suffers from materialism, moral decline, and severe intellectual chaos—these one hundred attributes serve as a Magna Carta fully capable of restoring the fractured equilibrium of modern man. The most significant aspect distinguishing this work from traditional Seerah books is its systematic model and algorithmic framework. As an engineering professor, Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed has transitioned the study of Islamic history and the Seerah away from traditional narrative and into a structured system and source code. The one hundred attributes listed at the end of the book are essentially a reverse engineering of the Seerah, providing modern humanity, the corporate world, and academic institutions with a moral source code that any organization in the world can implement to achieve professional success—provided it is applied independently of its colonial and unjust frameworks. Furthermore, the balanced academic perspective that Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed establishes to foster interfaith harmony and intellectual tolerance acts as a robust intellectual bridge for the new generation living in the West and for non-Muslim academies. However, when this book is examined critically through the lens of objective, deep Islamic thought and history, certain fundamental contradictions become apparent in its methodology and narrative, limiting its universal utility to a degree. It is most important to clarify here that Islam is by no means opposed to science or objective research. Throughout Islamic history, illustrious Muslim scientists such as Ibn al-Haytham, al-Khwarizmi, and al-Biruni enlightened humanity precisely by integrating faith with scientific reasoning. Therefore, Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed’s methodology is not an inherent intellectual deviation; rather, its true tragedy lies in the fact that, in its scramble to satisfy the modern scientific mind, it sidelines Islam’s divine and metaphysical essence. The understanding of the prophetic Seerah in Islam is not merely a dry collection of historical events, political treaties, or social algorithms. It is built upon a spiritual equilibrium of divine revelation from heavenly sources, miracles that transcend intellect, and a profound love for the Divine—elements that cannot be entirely imprisoned within the mold of computer science source codes. When an author begins to present the Seerah as a corporate model, they inadvertently weaken the metaphysical beauty of the religion, which offers humanity deep spiritual fulfillment alongside intellectual satisfaction. The second critical observation regarding this assessment is that, in attempting to satisfy the modern scientific mind, the author occasionally reduces historical events to material causes, effectively rendering the original element of miraculous and divine succor either entirely absent or marginalized. An authentic Muslim intellectual perspective maintains that while the material causes of Islamic history hold their proper place, the operational force behind them is divine will and unseen support—the fundamental catalyst without which the entire narrative of the Seerah feels incomplete and lifeless. The book’s assertion that the Magna Carta of the Prophet’s (PBUH) attributes serves as a source code for the

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