empty classrooms digital

Empty Classrooms, Digital Classrooms: Reimagining …

By Engineer Arshad Hameed Abbasi, International Energy, Climate Change and Water Security Practitioner and Engineer Idrees Abbasi, Former Consultant, World Bank,  and Mr. Amjad Butt, Writer; Secretary General, Murree Literary Council, resident of [address].

 

 There is a particular kind of grief in watching an institution outlive its usefulness while still drawing a salary, still cutting ribbons, still issuing degrees that mean less each year they are printed. That is where Pakistan’s higher education system stands today, and it is time someone said so plainly: the paradigm has already shifted, quietly, without anyone in Islamabad’s marble offices noticing. It shifted on YouTube, on TED, on edX and Udemy and Khan Academy, in a thousand free lecture halls that never asked a single Pakistani student for tuition, a hostel fee, or four years of their life. The only people who have not caught up are the ones still running the old one. There is a particular kind of grief in watching an institution outlive its usefulness while still drawing a salary, still cutting ribbons, still issuing degrees that mean less each year they are printed. That is where Pakistan’s higher education system stands today, and it is time someone said so plainly: the paradigm has already shifted, quietly, without anyone in Islamabad’s marble offices noticing. It shifted on YouTube, on TED, on edX and Udemy and Khan Academy, in a thousand free lecture halls that never asked a single Pakistani student for tuition, a hostel fee, or four years of their life. The only people who have not caught up are the ones still running the old one.

For decades, the deal offered to a Pakistani student was simple: surrender your time, your family’s savings, and your twenties to a physical campus, and in exchange receive knowledge you could not get anywhere else. That deal is dead. A seventeen-year-old with a smartphone and a working internet connection can now watch a Nobel laureate explain quantum mechanics, follow a structural engineer walk through a seismic design calculation line by line, or sit in on a Stanford lecture on macroeconomics — all free, all on demand, all taught by people who are, in most cases, simply better at their subject than the men and women drawing a professor’s salary in the classroom down the road. The tragedy is not that this content exists. The tragedy is that almost no one in a position of authority ever told the students it was there. For decades, the deal offered to a Pakistani student was simple: surrender your time, your family’s savings, and your twenties to a physical campus, and in exchange receive knowledge you could not get anywhere else. That deal is dead. A seventeen-year-old with a smartphone and a working internet connection can now watch a Nobel laureate explain quantum mechanics, follow a structural engineer walk through a seismic design calculation line by line, or sit in on a Stanford lecture on macroeconomics — all free, all on demand, all taught by people who are, in most cases, simply better at their subject than the men and women drawing a professor’s salary in the classroom down the road. The tragedy is not that this content exists. The tragedy is that almost no one in a position of authority ever told the students it was there.

Ask yourself honestly: when was the last time a Vice Chancellor stood in front of a first-year class and said, “Before you trust anything I teach you, go watch the version of this lecture that MIT put online for free, and come back and tell me if I taught it better”? It has not happened, and it will not happen, because the entire architecture of Pakistani higher education depends on students not asking that question. It depends on the fiction that a degree is the same thing as an education, that a seat in a lecture hall for four years is the same thing as understanding, and that an institution’s worth can be measured in acres of campus rather than in what a graduate can actually do when the exam is over and the job begins.Ask yourself honestly: when was the last time a Vice Chancellor stood in front of a first-year class and said, “Before you trust anything I teach you, go watch the version of this lecture that MIT put online for free, and come back and tell me if I taught it better”? It has not happened, and it will not happen, because the entire architecture of Pakistani higher education depends on students not asking that question. It depends on the fiction that a degree is the same thing as an education, that a seat in a lecture hall for four years is the same thing as understanding, and that an institution’s worth can be measured in acres of campus rather than in what a graduate can actually do when the exam is over and the job begins.

We do not need to guess what an alternative looks like, because the world has already built it. Universities that were once measured by the size of their footprint are now measured by the depth of their content and the reach of their delivery. Institutions like the National University of Singapore have shown that a compact, space-efficient campus married to serious digital delivery outperforms sprawling, underused infrastructure every time. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, students still find themselves inside partially built mega-campuses, sitting in half-used lecture halls, being taught by professors whose most recent research contribution was a maintenance grant, while the actual global classroom — free, current, taught by the best minds alive — sits one browser tab away, untouched, unmentioned, unrecommended by the very people whose job it was to point students toward it.We do not need to guess what an alternative looks like, because the world has already built it. Universities that were once measured by the size of their footprint are now measured by the depth of their content and the reach of their delivery. Institutions like the National University of Singapore have shown that a compact, space-efficient campus married to serious digital delivery outperforms sprawling, underused infrastructure every time. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, students still find themselves inside partially built mega-campuses, sitting in half-used lecture halls, being taught by professors whose most recent research contribution was a maintenance grant, while the actual global classroom — free, current, taught by the best minds alive — sits one browser tab away, untouched, unmentioned, unrecommended by the very people whose job it was to point students toward it.

Two cases make this failure impossible to wave away as an abstraction. At Kohsar University, Murree, students told us plainly, in their own words, that the free video lectures on their phones taught them more, more clearly, and more usefully than what they were receiving inside the classroom — a university sitting at over 7,600 feet that has still, decades into Murree’s existence, never grown into the institution its setting deserves. At the University of Chakwal, the pattern inverted but the failure was the same: a campus built out past any enrollment or capacity that could plausibly justify it, laboratories and halls constructed for a student body that was never going to fill them, infrastructure mistaken for education. Neither institution has ever published a key performance indicator for its own leadership. Neither has ever been asked, in public, to show what a graduate can actually do that a free online course could not have taught them just as well, at a fraction of the cost, without the concrete. These are not isolated embarrassments. They are what happens, predictably, when a system rewards the square footage of a campus and asks nothing at all about the square inch of a student’s actual understanding.

So let us say the uncomfortable thing plainly: it is time to shelve the old model of the Higher Education Commission as a degree-issuing, campus-building bureaucracy, and replace its actual function — the thing it was supposed to do, which is help Pakistani students become genuinely educated — with something built for how learning actually happens now. Not a ministry. A server. A single, serious, well-curated national learning platform, free at the point of use, open eighteen hours a day if that is what students need, that does not try to compete with MIT or Stanford by pretending to reinvent their content, but instead does the one thing no foreign platform will ever do for us: organise the best already-existing open lectures, video demonstrations, and practical walkthroughs in science, social science, and engineering into a coherent, Pakistan-relevant curriculum, mapped to the concepts our students actually need to master, in the language and context they actually live in. So let us say the uncomfortable thing plainly: it is time to shelve the old model of the Higher Education Commission as a degree-issuing, campus-building bureaucracy, and replace its actual function — the thing it was supposed to do, which is help Pakistani students become genuinely educated — with something built for how learning actually happens now. Not a ministry. A server. A single, serious, well-curated national learning platform, free at the point of use, open eighteen hours a day if that is what students need, that does not try to compete with MIT or Stanford by pretending to reinvent their content, but instead does the one thing no foreign platform will ever do for us: organise the best already-existing open lectures, video demonstrations, and practical walkthroughs in science, social science, and engineering into a coherent, Pakistan-relevant curriculum, mapped to the concepts our students actually need to master, in the language and context they actually live in.

This is not a call to abandon rigour. It is the opposite. A physics student who has only ever heard a formula recited in a crowded lecture hall, half-copied into a notebook before the professor moved on, has not learned physics. A physics student who has watched the same concept demonstrated three different ways, by three different teachers, with the actual apparatus shown on screen, pausing and rewinding until the idea finally sits still in their mind — that student has built a foundation. Engineering above all cannot survive on recitation. A structural engineer who has never watched a real failure analysis, a real load test, a real demonstration of how a beam actually bends before it breaks, is not being trained; they are being credentialed. Video does not replace the workshop and the laboratory. But it can, for the first time in this country’s history, replace the lecture hall — and free every laboratory hour we do have for the demonstrations and hands-on work that video genuinely cannot substitute.This is not a call to abandon rigour. It is the opposite. A physics student who has only ever heard a formula recited in a crowded lecture hall, half-copied into a notebook before the professor moved on, has not learned physics. A physics student who has watched the same concept demonstrated three different ways, by three different teachers, with the actual apparatus shown on screen, pausing and rewinding until the idea finally sits still in their mind — that student has built a foundation. Engineering above all cannot survive on recitation. A structural engineer who has never watched a real failure analysis, a real load test, a real demonstration of how a beam actually bends before it breaks, is not being trained; they are being credentialed. Video does not replace the workshop and the laboratory. But it can, for the first time in this country’s history, replace the lecture hall — and free every laboratory hour we do have for the demonstrations and hands-on work that video genuinely cannot substitute.

There will be objections, and they deserve an honest answer rather than a dismissal. Not every student has reliable internet or electricity, and any serious version of this proposal has to reckon with that gap before it reckons with anything else — through offline downloadable content, through campus-based access points, through partnerships that get connectivity to the students who need it most, not just the ones already comfortable online. Employers will ask what a credential from a national learning platform is actually worth, and that question deserves a real answer built on assessed competence, not just video views — proctored testing, practical demonstration of skill, verified project work, the things a degree was supposed to certify in the first place but too often no longer does. None of these are reasons to abandon the idea. They are the actual work that a serious version of this reform requires, and work is not the same as impossibility. There will be objections, and they deserve an honest answer rather than a dismissal. Not every student has reliable internet or electricity, and any serious version of this proposal has to reckon with that gap before it reckons with anything else — through offline downloadable content, through campus-based access points, through partnerships that get connectivity to the students who need it most, not just the ones already comfortable online. Employers will ask what a credential from a national learning platform is actually worth, and that question deserves a real answer built on assessed competence, not just video views — proctored testing, practical demonstration of skill, verified project work, the things a degree was supposed to certify in the first place but too often no longer does. None of these are reasons to abandon the idea. They are the actual work that a serious version of this reform requires, and work is not the same as impossibility.

The same platform should not stop at science, social science, and engineering. A generation of Pakistani graduates fluent only in Urdu and English is a generation quietly locked out of most of the world’s job market before they ever apply. The same server that teaches a student how a bridge carries load should teach them French, Arabic, German, and Spanish — not as an elective luxury reserved for the children of the wealthy who can afford a private language centre, but as a core, freely available track alongside every other subject. Arabic opens the Gulf, where millions of Pakistanis already work and where fluency, not just labour, would let the next generation move from construction sites into boardrooms. French and German open Francophone Africa, Europe, and some of the world’s strongest engineering and manufacturing economies. Spanish opens a market of over twenty countries. A doctor, an engineer, or a teacher who can work competently in a second or third language is not just more employable; they are a form of export Pakistan has barely begun to take seriously, at a moment when remittances already keep large parts of this economy standing. Language, taught the same way as physics or engineering — through structured practice, real conversation, and consistent daily exposure rather than a single memorised semester — is not a soft addition to this platform. It is one of its most economically serious purposes. The same platform should not stop at science, social science, and engineering. A generation of Pakistani graduates fluent only in Urdu and English is a generation quietly locked out of most of the world’s job market before they ever apply. The same server that teaches a student how a bridge carries load should teach them French, Arabic, German, and Spanish — not as an elective luxury reserved for the children of the wealthy who can afford a private language centre, but as a core, freely available track alongside every other subject. Arabic opens the Gulf, where millions of Pakistanis already work and where fluency, not just labour, would let the next generation move from construction sites into boardrooms. French and German open Francophone Africa, Europe, and some of the world’s strongest engineering and manufacturing economies. Spanish opens a market of over twenty countries. A doctor, an engineer, or a teacher who can work competently in a second or third language is not just more employable; they are a form of export Pakistan has barely begun to take seriously, at a moment when remittances already keep large parts of this economy standing. Language, taught the same way as physics or engineering — through structured practice, real conversation, and consistent daily exposure rather than a single memorised semester — is not a soft addition to this platform. It is one of its most economically serious purposes.

This is not a proposal offered from the sidelines. Engineer Arshad H. Abbasi and his son, Engineer Musa Arshad Abbasi, are themselves at work building a version of exactly this server — a platform designed to hold a student’s attention on genuine learning for ten to twelve hours a day, not through compulsion, but by making the material good enough, current enough, and practical enough that it earns that time honestly. Alongside its science, social science, and engineering content, it is being built to carry the same four languages — French, Arabic, German, and Spanish — as a core part of what it teaches, not an afterthought. It is offered here not as a hypothetical for someone else to eventually build, but as a project already underway, by a father and son who have spent their own careers watching this country’s institutions fail to do what a determined family, and a server, might yet manage to do instead.This is not a proposal offered from the sidelines. Engineer Arshad H. Abbasi and his son, Engineer Musa Arshad Abbasi, are themselves at work building a version of exactly this server — a platform designed to hold a student’s attention on genuine learning for ten to twelve hours a day, not through compulsion, but by making the material good enough, current enough, and practical enough that it earns that time honestly. Alongside its science, social science, and engineering content, it is being built to carry the same four languages — French, Arabic, German, and Spanish — as a core part of what it teaches, not an afterthought. It is offered here not as a hypothetical for someone else to eventually build, but as a project already underway, by a father and son who have spent their own careers watching this country’s institutions fail to do what a determined family, and a server, might yet manage to do instead.

What should not survive this conversation is the assumption that Pakistan’s talent is the problem. It never was. This country’s young people have proven, again and again, that given the right tools they can compete with anyone on earth — in mathematics olympiads, in engineering, in the quiet, determined way a generation has taught itself to code and design and build using nothing more than a phone and a data plan, often despite their universities rather than because of them. What has failed them is an institutional imagination frozen in the era of the physical lecture hall, defending its own relevance long after the students it was meant to serve had already logged on somewhere else and started learning without it.What should not survive this conversation is the assumption that Pakistan’s talent is the problem. It never was. This country’s young people have proven, again and again, that given the right tools they can compete with anyone on earth — in mathematics olympiads, in engineering, in the quiet, determined way a generation has taught itself to code and design and build using nothing more than a phone and a data plan, often despite their universities rather than because of them. What has failed them is an institutional imagination frozen in the era of the physical lecture hall, defending its own relevance long after the students it was meant to serve had already logged on somewhere else and started learning without it.

The lecture hall is empty now, in every way that matters. The only kindness left is to finally admit it, and build something that meets these students where they already are. The lecture hall is empty now, in every way that matters. The only kindness left is to finally admit it, and build something that meets these students where they already are.

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Constitutional engineering undertaken without social consensus has rarely strengthened federations; more often, it has deepened existing divisions. The debate, therefore, should not be framed as one between those who favour additional provinces and those who oppose them. The real issue is whether territorial reorganisation genuinely addresses the underlying causes of poor governance or merely offers an attractive political slogan. A federation derives its strength not from the number of provinces appearing on its map but from the confidence its citizens repose in the fairness of its institutions. Where constitutional principles are respected, resources distributed equitably and local governments empowered, both large and small provinces can flourish. Where these foundations are absent, no amount of territorial rearrangement can compensate for institutional decay. Pakistan’s future will ultimately be determined less by the cartography of its provinces than by the constitutional maturity of its federation. If new provinces emerge through genuine constitutional consensus and demonstrable administrative necessity, they may well strengthen the federal structure. If, however, they arise merely as instruments of political convenience or regional rivalry, they risk replacing the promise of federalism with the peril of fragmentation.  The challenge before Pakistan, therefore, is not simply to decide how many provinces it should have. It is to determine whether the federation can faithfully uphold the constitutional promise of self-rule and shared rule upon which every enduring federal democracy ultimately depends. _____________________________________________________________________________ The writer, lawyer and author, is former Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), a member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) 

  • Reforming the Security Council Without Entrenching…

    The United Nations was founded in 1945 after the League of Nations had failed to preserve peace. Its Security Council was designed for the world that emerged from the Second World War, with five permanent members holding the veto and a small number of elected seats. That basic architecture has scarcely changed since 1965, when the non-permanent membership rose from six to ten. The veto was meant to keep the great powers inside the system and to prevent open conflict among them. Eight decades later the organisation still carries the imprint of 1945 while the membership of the United Nations has grown to 193 states and the global population exceeds eight billion. The Council’s composition therefore no longer reflects the international community it is supposed to serve. In 2008 the General Assembly launched the Intergovernmental Negotiations to consider reform. The discussions have centred on five linked questions: categories of membership, the veto, regional representation, the size of the Council and its working methods. Africa still has no permanent seat. Latin America, South Asia and large parts of the Muslim world remain under-represented. The present arrangement is widely seen as a remnant of the colonial order that concentrates power among a few states. Many argue that emerging powers and significant regional actors—Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and India among them—ought to enjoy greater weight if the Council is to regain legitimacy and effectiveness. Yet the debate is locked. The Group of Four seeks permanent seats for itself and two for Africa. The African Group demands two permanent seats with full veto rights. France and Mexico urge the permanent members to refrain voluntarily from using the veto in cases of mass atrocity. The Uniting for Consensus group, led by Pakistan and supported by Italy, Mexico, Argentina, Canada and South Korea, rejects any enlargement of the permanent category. It proposes instead an expansion of elected seats that would be longer-term and renewable. The rival camps cancel one another’s majorities, leaving the process stalled. Enlarging permanent membership would not reform the Council so much as entrench new privileges. Additional veto-holders would multiply the occasions on which national interests can block action. The repeated American vetoes that have shielded Israel and allowed the destruction of Gaza to continue illustrate how a single permanent member can nullify the will of the rest. More permanent members would introduce further competing interests and raise the risk of paralysis. Once granted, permanent status is effectively irreversible; the new members would be free to obstruct any future attempt to revise the arrangement. India’s claim to a permanent seat invites particular scrutiny. Permanent membership requires sustained confidence in a state’s fidelity to the Charter. India’s refusal to implement successive Security Council resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, its rejection of a United Nations-supervised plebiscite and its unilateral constitutional changes in the territory sit uneasily with that standard. Concerns about human-rights practices in the disputed region and elsewhere, the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, reports of transnational repression, the Citizenship Amendment Act, the treatment of Rohingya refugees and a foreign policy that has offered strategic comfort to Israel all raise legitimate questions. India’s status outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty adds a further layer of unease. Germany’s candidature faces different objections. Europe already holds two permanent seats. Adding a third would deepen regional imbalance. Recent German positions on Gaza have been criticised as inconsistent with the very humanitarian principles permanent members are expected to uphold. The country’s failure to secure even a non-permanent seat in a recent election suggests that its aspirations do not command the necessary breadth of support. The Uniting for Consensus proposal offers a more measured path. Expanding the elected membership from ten to twenty would open opportunities for Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean without creating new permanent centres of power. Periodic elections would keep members accountable to the wider membership. Rotation would allow more states to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. Broader participation could improve the quality of deliberation on intractable questions such as Palestine, Ukraine and other long-standing disputes, without multiplying vetoes that have so often produced deadlock. Reform should strengthen the Council’s legitimacy without sacrificing its capacity to act. Expanding permanent membership would create additional privileged seats, heighten the risk of institutional paralysis and make subsequent change more difficult still. Wider geographical representation is better achieved by enlarging the elected ranks. The Uniting for Consensus approach preserves the existing institutional framework, enhances inclusivity, promotes accountability through regular elections and reflects the interests of the membership as a whole. Sustainable reform therefore lies in widening participation and reinforcing regional balance rather than in extending permanent privilege and the veto.

  • Pakistan’s Courts Are Running Out of Time

    By Qashf Aizdi Justice delayed is justice denied. This phrase has become almost cliché in Pakistan and it unfortunately remains painfully true for millions of litigants who are waiting for their day in court. Every year hundreds of new cases are filed while thousands remain undecided and as a result courtrooms continue to grow more congested and hearings become more infrequent. The unfortunate consequence is that justice moves further out of reach. Time is perhaps the only thing Pakistan’s justice system can no longer afford to lose. The scale of the crisis is reflected in the numbers. According to the Judicial Statistics of Pakistan 2023, more than 2.25 million cases remain pending before courts of Pakistan. During the same year, 4.48 million new cases were instituted while 4.41 million were disposed of, resulting in a 5 percent increase in the overall backlog. The district judiciary alone accounts for 82 percent of all pending cases. With just over 3,100 working judges and judicial officers, each is responsible for more than 700 pending cases, even before accounting for the thousands of new cases filed every year. These figures do not suggest that Pakistan’s judges are idle; rather, they point to a justice system struggling to keep pace with an ever-growing caseload. Civil disputes in Pakistan can often take 10 to 15 years and in some instances even longer, before reaching its conclusion. Court proceedings are routinely delayed by repeated adjournments, cumbersome procedures, paper-based case management and multiple tiers of appeal. Difficulties in serving notices, delays in recording evidence and frequent adjournment requests often leave litigants waiting months before their cases are heard again. Additionally, the consequences of delayed justice extend beyond the courtroom. By the time a case is finally decided, litigants find themselves in a morass of mounting legal costs, lost opportunities and prolonged uncertainty. Every adjournment adds to the financial and emotional burden borne by litigants. A favorable judgment delivered after years of litigation can never fully restore the time, financial stability or peace of mind that has already been obliterated. Article 37(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan obliges the State to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. Yet, for many litigants, this constitutional promise often rings hollow. As mounting caseloads continue to overwhelm the judiciary, lengthy delays have become an accepted and vexatious feature of the legal system rather than an exception. Justice that arrives years too late often fails to provide meaningful relief. The immediate explanation is ostensibly straightforward; the number of judges is insufficient to handle the growing caseload. Pakistan has one of the lowest judge-to-population ratios in the region, leaving judges responsible for hundreds and often thousands of matters. Yet the shortage of judges tells only part of the story. Addressing this crisis requires more than appointing additional judges; it demands a more comprehensive approach to resolving disputes. One such reform lies in the greater use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Cases can be resolved out of court using processes like mediation and arbitration, whereby judges can focus on cases which require formal adjudication. Consequently, ADR works in conjunction with the courts in solving disputes outside of court. The potential of ADR is perhaps best illustrated by the Morgah Valley dispute. Despite taking over 42 years to be settled via litigation, the same case took only two months to settle after being referred to mediation. Though not all disputes are suitable for mediation, this case is an example of the value that comes with the application of ADR at the right time. More importantly, it shows that timely justice is not an impossible ideal but an achievable one when the right mechanisms are used. However, for countless litigants, delay remains the norm as the judiciary continues to grapple with overwhelming caseloads. Repeated adjournments leave litigants facing prolonged uncertainty and growing frustration. Cases pass from one generation to the next and some litigants never live to see the final outcome of disputes they initiated and fought for. Justice should not become an inheritance passed from parents to children. The longer that reform is postponed, the greater the cost to litigants, businesses and public confidence. Pakistan’s courts are running out of time and so are the people waiting for justice. If Pakistan is serious about fulfilling the constitutional vision embodied in Article 37(d) of the Constitution, reducing judicial delays can no longer remain an aspiration, it must become a national priority. Reforming the justice system will require efficient case management, greater use of appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms and a collective commitment to ensuring that justice is delivered when it is needed most. Until then, Pakistan’s courts will continue to run out of the one resource they cannot recover: time.  

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