Change we must

Climate change is no longer solely an environmental concern, it has become one of the defining economic and trade challenges of the twenty-first century. Around the world, governments are increasingly using market-based mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while maintaining industrial competitiveness and economic growth. Among these mechanisms, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) has emerged as one of the most effective policy instruments. According to the World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026, there are now 87 carbon pricing instruments operating globally, including emissions trading systems and carbon taxes, covering nearly 30 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. These instruments generated over US$107 billion in public revenues in 2025, demonstrating that carbon pricing has evolved from an environmental policy into an important pillar of economic and fiscal governance. In the case of Pakistan, one that is most vulnerable to climate change, the discourse & discussion on emissions trading has become increasingly pertinent. While Pakistan contributes less than one percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, it remains among the nation’s most severely affected by climate-induced disasters. The catastrophic floods of 2022 alone caused economic losses estimated at more than US$30 billion, highlighting the enormous economic costs of climate vulnerability. As Pakistan seeks to achieve sustainable economic growth while fulfilling its commitments under the Paris Agreement, an Emissions Trading System offers an opportunity to integrate climate action with industrial competitiveness, investment promotion, and long-term economic resilience. An Emissions Trading System, commonly referred to as a cap-and-trade mechanism, establishes a limit on the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions that regulated industries are permitted to emit. Within this overall cap, companies receive or purchase emission allowances that authorize them to emit a specified quantity of carbon dioxide or its equivalent. Firms that reduce their emissions below their allocated limits can sell their unused allowances to companies that exceed their emission caps. This market-based approach creates a financial incentive for industries to invest in cleaner technologies, improve energy efficiency, and reduce emissions while allowing businesses the flexibility to determine the most cost-effective compliance strategy. The success of emissions trading systems across the world demonstrates the growing importance of carbon markets in modern economic management. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), launched in 2005, remains the world’s largest multinational carbon market and has significantly reduced emissions from power generation, manufacturing, and aviation. China now operates the world’s largest ETS by emissions covered, initially focusing on the power sector and gradually expanding to additional industries. South Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, and several states in the United States and Canada have also established operational emissions trading systems tailored to their economic structures. Collectively, jurisdictions accounting for almost two-thirds of global GDP have either implemented or are actively developing direct carbon pricing mechanisms, signalling that carbon markets are rapidly becoming mainstream economic policy rather than experimental environmental initiatives. Across South Asia, governments are increasingly recognising carbon markets as instruments of economic competitiveness rather than solely environmental regulation. India has initiated the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) while expanding its long-standing Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) programme to improve industrial energy efficiency. Bangladesh is developing the institutional and regulatory foundations needed to participate in voluntary carbon markets and future compliance mechanisms. Together, these developments indicate a gradual regional shift towards integrating climate policy with industrial development, trade competitiveness, and sustainable economic growth. Pakistan has also begun laying the foundations for a future carbon market, although the country remains at an early stage of development. The National Climate Change Policy, Pakistan’s updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and the National Adaptation Plan recognise the importance of market-based mechanisms for reducing emissions. The Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination, together with development partners including the World Bank, GIZ, UNDP, and the Asian Development Bank, has initiated policy dialogue and capacity-building initiatives aimed at strengthening Pakistan’s carbon market readiness. At the provincial level, Punjab has emerged as the frontrunner in preparing for emissions trading. With technical support from GIZ, the Environment Protection and Climate Change Department and the Planning and Development Board have initiated collaborative efforts to develop the institutional architecture necessary for an Emissions Trading System. These initiatives include the development of emissions inventories, digital Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems, the Green Credit Initiative, and the strengthening of Punjab’s Climate Watch platform to improve emissions monitoring and support evidence-based climate decision-making. Although these initiatives do not yet constitute a formal ETS, they represent important building blocks for a future provincial pilot that could eventually inform the development of a national emissions trading framework. Despite these encouraging developments, Pakistan faces several institutional and technical challenges before an operational ETS can be introduced. Reliable emissions inventories remain incomplete across many industrial sectors, while comprehensive Monitoring, Reporting and Verification systems are still evolving. Institutional responsibilities for climate policy, industrial regulation, energy management, and environmental protection remain fragmented across multiple federal and provincial agencies, requiring stronger coordination. Furthermore, many industries and institutions have limited experience with greenhouse gas accounting, carbon pricing & reporting, emissions verification that highlight the need for substantial technical capacity building. Nevertheless the opportunities created by ETS are significant, not only due to environmental benefits but formulates holistic markets that contribute to the world economy. Carbon market revenues have already crossed the threshold of almost US$30 billion in 2016 to over US$107 billion in 2025, representing the rapid and robust growth of climate finance and green investments worldwide. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) signals a new era where carbon compliance is becoming integral to international trade. Although Pakistan’s textile exports are not yet covered, global buyers increasingly demand transparent emissions reporting and low-carbon production. Developing an Emissions Trading System (ETS) and robust Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems will help Pakistani industries strengthen compliance and safeguard export competitiveness. Pakistan stands at a crossroads in its climate and economic development. With an estimated greenhouse gas emissions of around 500 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) per year, of which

A truly democratic-technocratic model for Pakistan should also address the country’s administrative structure. Pakistan is too large and administratively complex to depend on highly centralized decision-making from Islamabad and provincial capitals. A modern governance system should therefore consider the creation of new provinces or constitutionally recognized administrative units, based on population, geography, economic viability, administrative accessibility, historical and cultural considerations, and the ability to provide effective public services. This distribution must not be based on the ground of nationality. In my personal opinion, in Pakistan, there is a very emotional and stimulation mind sets found everywhere, they create prejudice mentality among the whole nation. All provinces names should be on the basis of their respective specialty of that particular area. Sindh, Punjab, Khaiber pakhtoon kha, Balochistan, these names also must be changed to other names. This will remove the nation base mentality. The objective should not be to divide Pakistan on the basis of ethnicity, language or political rivalry. Rather, administrative boundaries should be designed around governance and public welfare. Where existing provinces have become too large to administer effectively, new administrative units could bring government closer to citizens, improve resource allocation, strengthen accountability and allow regional development plans to be tailored to local needs. Here is a very common example, as if there is a school, when strength of the students increases, school starts to produce more campus, this is just because of good administration, to deliver good services, to provide better education to all students equally. So same case is in Pakistan, now the population has been reached out more than 250 million. While, at the time of 1947, the population was 70-75 million, that was combined, west and East Pakistan both, and West Pakistan comprised of only 32-33 million. Now imagine, now the population is more than 250 million and provinces are same. The population has been increases up to 681%. Imagine….! Punjab population was 20 million in 1947, now in 2026 is 127 million. Sindh population was 6 million in 1947 and now in 2026 is 56 million. Similarly KPK was 11 million in 1947 and now is 41 million, Baluchistan was 4.3 million in 1947 and now is 15 million. By these figures, more provinces or administrative units must have been developed many years ago. When we look for cities of Sindh, as the largest opposition found in Sindh against this proposal, we see, Karachi population was 1 million and in 2026 is more than 20 million, Hyderabad was 5-6 lacs, means 500 to 600 thousands, and now in 2026 is 2.4 million. Similarly Tharparker population was almost 300 thousand only, now near to 2 million, Nawabshah, currently is SBA was 500 thousand in 1947 now in 2026 is almost 2 million, Larkana was 420 thousands and now is 1.7 million, Sukkur was 340 thousand in 1947 and now is 1.6 million. If I write the whole country data then we need many pages, so these main examples are presented to elaborate that new provinces or administrative units are compulsory in the country for the betterment of Pakistan and the people of Pakistan. Now, keeping in view the concept of new provinces or new administrative units, under a Democratic Technocracy model, each administrative unit could have an elected political government supported by professional technocratic administration. Citizens would elect their representatives, while key departments would be managed by qualified professionals and career administrators. Health systems could be led by experienced health administrators and public-health professionals; education by education-policy specialists; municipal development by professional urban planners and engineers; finance by qualified public-finance specialists; and agriculture, water, energy and industry by relevant technical experts. In current system, our all ministries have, very unfortunately, absolute irrelevant Persons to run that particular area, except a very few. Now see this model, would create a three-level governance architecture: Federal Government → Provincial/Regional Governments → Empowered Local Governments At the federal level, matters such as defense, foreign affairs, currency, national economic policy and other genuinely national responsibilities would remain centralized. At the regional level, governments would concentrate on sectors such as health, education, agriculture, provincial infrastructure and regional economic development. At the local level, elected governments would become directly responsible for municipal services, sanitation, water supply, local roads, primary healthcare, local education, waste management and other services that directly affect citizens. A New Map for Better Governance Pakistan should therefore be willing to have a serious national debate about whether the present administrative map remains optimal for the country’s future. The creation of additional provinces or administrative regions should be based on objective criteria rather than political convenience. A proposed new unit should undergo an independent feasibility assessment covering: – Population and geographic size – Administrative accessibility – Economic and revenue potential – Existing infrastructure – Healthcare and education requirements – Natural resources – Urban and rural population distribution – Connectivity and transportation – Fiscal sustainability – Public opinion and consultation – Protection of minority and regional rights No new unit should be created merely because a political group demands it, nor should a legitimate administrative reform be rejected simply because existing political interests oppose it. The principle should be simple: “Administrative boundaries should serve citizens-not political elites”. A smaller and more manageable administrative structure, combined with empowered local governments and professional administration, could make it easier to identify responsibility, measure performance and deliver public services. However, creating new provinces alone will not solve Pakistan’s governance problems. A smaller province with the same inefficient institutions would simply reproduce the same problems on a smaller scale. Administrative restructuring must therefore occur simultaneously with civil-service reform, fiscal decentralization, digital governance, merit-based appointments, independent oversight and strong local governments. The ultimate objective should be to create a Pakistan in which every citizen can reach an effective government institution without travelling hundreds of kilometers to a distant provincial capital, while every level of government remains constitutionally accountable to the people. This is where administrative reform and Democratic Technocracy meet: democracy determines representation, technocracy ensures competence,

The debate over Pakistan’s administrative structure has returned to the national stage after Interior Minister Syed Mohsin Raza Naqvi suggested that the country should seriously examine the question of creating new provinces or administrative units. Predictably, the discussion immediately descended into familiar political slogans. Some portrayed the proposal as a threat to federalism, others embraced it as the long-awaited solution to governance failures. Between these two extremes lies a far more important question: what does the Constitution of Pakistan actually permit, and what course best serves national unity at a time of unprecedented regional instability? The timing of the debate is significant. Pakistan today faces persistent security challenges in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, constitutional sensitivities relating to Azad Jammu and Kashmir, continuing political polarisation, and a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment as conflict in the Middle East threatens to reshape regional geopolitics. In such circumstances, constitutional reform should not be driven by political expediency. It must be guided by constitutional principles, empirical evidence and the long-term interests of the federation. The Constitution of islamic Republic of Pakistan is neither silent nor rigid on the question of creating new provinces. Article 1 recognises Pakistan as a federation consisting of provinces and territories whose limits may be altered in accordance with the Constitution. However, Article 239(4) places an important constitutional safeguard on any proposal affecting provincial boundaries. No constitutional amendment that alters the limits of a province can become law unless, in addition to obtaining the prescribed parliamentary majority, it is approved by not less than two-thirds of the members of the provincial assembly concerned. This requirement reflects the federal compact. Provinces are not merely administrative divisions; they are constitutional partners in the federation. Consequently, no province can be divided, merged or otherwise altered through a simple parliamentary majority in Islamabad. Provincial consent is itself a constitutional requirement. This constitutional position explains why proposals for South Punjab, Bahawalpur, Hazara or other new provinces have repeatedly surfaced over the past two decades but have never matured into constitutional reality. Various drafts, often described collectively as proposals for a Twenty-Eighth Constitutional Amendment, have circulated in political and academic circles. They have contemplated the creation of additional provinces together with corresponding adjustments in Senate representation, National Finance Commission allocations, provincial institutions and administrative structures. Yet none has commanded the political consensus demanded by Article 239. Constitutional design has proved stronger than political rhetoric. The debate, however, should not begin with Article 239. It should begin with Article 140A. Inserted through the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act of 2010, Article 140A obliges every province to establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to elected representatives. This is not merely a recommendation. It is a constitutional command. Unfortunately, after even lapse of 16 years, this remains a constitutional provision that has been implemented (sic) with greater reluctance. Successive provincial governments, irrespective of political affiliation, have preferred centralised provincial bureaucracies over constitutionally empowered local governments. Elections have been delayed, powers diluted, finances retained by provincial capitals and administrative authority reclaimed through executive control. The result is that Pakistan continues to speak the language of devolution while practising administrative centralisation. Before demanding new provinces, one must ask a more fundamental question: has Pakistan sincerely implemented the Constitution it already possesses? The empirical evidence nevertheless deserves serious attention. Pakistan has experienced extraordinary demographic transformation since independence. The country’s population has increased from approximately 34 million in the early years of independence to over 255 million today, yet the number of provinces has remained unchanged. The presentation recently unveiled on constitutional and administrative reforms demonstrates this remarkable contrast and argues that governance structures have failed to evolve alongside population growth. It further notes that each of Pakistan’s four provinces administers populations exceeding those of many sovereign countries and that, among major federations, Pakistan places an unusually large administrative burden upon each provincial government. Whether one accepts every conclusion of that presentation/study or not, the underlying constitutional question cannot be ignored. Effective governance depends not merely upon constitutional powers but upon administrative reach. A provincial capital hundreds of kilometres from remote districts inevitably encounters greater challenges in delivering education, healthcare, policing and justice than a more decentralised system. The presentation also links many development indicators with administrative distance from provincial capitals, suggesting that constitutional debate should be informed by measurable governance outcomes rather than political sentiment alone. However,  administrative efficiency is only one dimension of federalism. The second is national integration. Pakistan’s history demonstrates that provincial identities become dangerous only when constitutional grievances remain unresolved. Conversely, attempts to suppress legitimate constitutional debate merely strengthen centrifugal tendencies. The Constitution therefore wisely provides a peaceful and democratic mechanism through which territorial adjustments may be considered while ensuring that no province loses its constitutional status without its own consent. This balanced approach deserves preservation. Current security realities also counsel prudence. Parts of Balochistan continue to face organised violence supported by hostile external actors. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa confronts renewed terrorist activity along its western frontier. Azad Jammu and Kashmir occupies a unique constitutional and strategic position within Pakistan’s national policy on Jammu and Kashmir. Simultaneously, the widening conflict across the Middle East has introduced new uncertainties affecting regional security, energy supplies and geopolitical alignments. These circumstances require a stronger federation rather than a weaker one. That objective, however, should not be confused with excessive centralisation. Strong federations are built upon responsive institutions, constitutional legitimacy and public confidence. Citizens judge the State not by constitutional theory but by whether schools function, hospitals remain open, justice is delivered promptly and basic civic services reach every district. Equally important is the responsibility of political leadership. Statements by political actors—including repeated interventions by Maulana Fazlur Rehman on constitutional and provincial questions—must be evaluated through the prism of constitutionalism rather than political confrontation. Democratic disagreement is legitimate, but constitutional discourse should unite rather than inflame an already polarised polity. The Constitution provides lawful mechanisms for reform. Political mobilisation should reinforce those mechanisms, not substitute for them.

The passing of Professor Amin Mughal in London on August 12, 2026, at the age of 91, has left me with an overwhelming sense of personal bereavement. I have lost a mentor, friend and former colleague; Pakistan has lost one of the last representatives of a generation for whom progressive politics was inseparable from humanism, scholarship, intellectual integrity and personal courage. Harris Khalique called his departure “یہ ماتمِ وقت کی گھڑی ہے”—an hour for mourning the times—and described him as “the last of the Mohicans who touched so many lives.” These words capture the magnitude of the loss. Professor Mughal belonged to a generation that imagined Pakistan as a democratic, pluralistic and egalitarian state—not as a security-dominated order governed by fear, dogma and privilege. Born in Punjab in 1935, he taught English at Islamia College, Civil Lines, Lahore. His teaching career there ended because of his trade union activities. For Professor Mughal, principles were never dispensable instruments of convenience. Losing employment did not silence him. Along with Professor Manzoor Ahmed, he helped establish Shah Hussain College, transforming an act of official victimisation into another avenue for education and intellectual resistance. As a leader of the National Awami Party, he was imprisoned more than once. His politics sprang from compassion for workers, peasants, minorities and all those denied dignity by structures of power. It was not the doctrinaire radicalism of slogans. It was a deeply humane commitment to freedom from exploitation, arbitrary authority and cultural suffocation. He was associated with Lail-o-Nahar and later with the weekly Viewpoint, edited by the legendary Mazhar Ali Khan. I had the privilege of working with Professor Mughal at Viewpoint from 1979 to 1984. Its modest office at 4-Lawrence Road, Lahore, became my real university. Mazhar Ali Khan, I.A. Rehman, Zafar Iqbal Mirza—affectionately known as ZIM—Alys Faiz and Amin Mughal represented journalism as a public trust rather than a commercial enterprise. Reflecting on those formative years in my tribute to ZIM, I wrote: “Amin Mughal and Alys Faiz were so proficient in writing that few could match their stature. They also taught me the art of journalism with great affection and dedication.” That remains one of the greatest blessings of my life. Professor Mughal taught by example. His scholarship was vast, his editing precise and his intellectual standards uncompromising. He corrected younger colleagues without belittling them and encouraged inquiry without demanding conformity. The Viewpoint collective stood firm during General Ziaul Haq’s brutal dictatorship, when truth invited censorship, dismissal, imprisonment or exile. Literature and journalism became important sites of resistance during those years. Professor Mughal understood that control over language, culture and historical memory was central to authoritarian rule. His engagement with Urdu and Punjabi literature was therefore never merely aesthetic; it was part of a larger struggle to recover suppressed voices and alternative visions of Pakistan. Forced into political exile in 1984, he settled in London and never returned to Pakistan. Exile, however, could not sever his intellectual or emotional relationship with his homeland. He worked for Daily Jang and, in the early 1990s, edited the Urdu daily Awaaz. Although the newspaper survived for only a little over a year, it represented another attempt to provide Britain’s Pakistani community with a serious and progressive public forum. Writing in The News on Sunday in 2008, Arif Azad recalled Professor Mughal as looking “his usual sharp and buoyant self, dressed in impeccable attire as is his wont.” He described him as belonging to “the vanishing breed of left-wing Pakistan intellectuals” in whom one could still discern the lofty and humane aspirations associated with Pakistan’s early journey. The description was exact. Professor Mughal’s impeccable dress reflected something deeper: an inner discipline, dignity and refusal to be diminished by adversity. Political persecution could deprive him of employment and homeland, but it could not deprive him of intellectual independence or personal grace. His Finchley home gradually became, in Arif Azad’s memorable formulation, “a port of call” for visiting writers, politicians and political and cultural activists from both sides of the border. For decades it served as an informal salon, archive and classroom. Generations of visitors encountered there a formidable memory, an incisive mind and a host of unfailing generosity. Even when he withdrew from active engagement in South Asian politics, he remained an enduring reference point for politically conscious Pakistanis in Britain. His interests ranged across philosophy, literature, history, political economy and contemporary affairs. He wrote perceptively on Bhagat Singh and, following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, produced After Benazir Bhutto: Some reflections. Although he had opposed her politics, he recognised her courage and wrote that in the imagination of the masses she had acquired a mystical significance destined to inspire future struggles. That ability to rise above personal political preference and acknowledge truth distinguished him as a genuine intellectual. Professor Mughal’s life reminds us that exile is not merely physical displacement. It is also the condition imposed upon ideas that a state refuses to accommodate. Pakistan expelled or marginalised many of its finest minds and then wondered why intolerance, intellectual poverty and historical amnesia prevailed. Professor Mughal remained physically in London, but intellectually he never ceased to inhabit the Pakistan for which he had struggled. One by one, the great teachers of my Viewpoint years have departed. Their passing makes the country feel lonelier and its moral landscape immeasurably poorer. Professor Amin Mughal leaves no office, fortune or monument carrying his name. His true legacy survives in the minds he liberated, the writers he encouraged, the causes he defended and the generations he taught to question received wisdom. Farewell, dear mentor and friend. You lived in exile, but your ideas never left us. They will remain at home wherever people struggle for a democratic, pluralistic, just and humane Pakistan.

“The ‘I’ of Bulleh Shah represents man in his very essential capacity as a unit of creation”. —Najm Hosain Syed, Recurrent Patterns in Punjabi Poetry  Najm Hosain Syed’s reading of Bulleh Shah rescues one of Punjab’s most familiar poems from the ease of popular applause. Bullah ki jaana main kaun is commonly heard as a graceful confession that ultimate truth cannot be known. Najm sees something more demanding. Bulleh’s “I” is the elemental human being confronting the question “who?” Every answer offered by history—religion, institution, inherited status, nationality, relationship or dogma—tempts the seeker with a final identity. The poet accepts none as sufficient. His negatives are not an escape from commitment; they refuse to let any socially manufactured label exhaust the meaning of being human. This makes Bulleh Shah indispensable to our inquiry into poetry, power and humanity. Shah Hussain crossed the narrow passage between possession and freedom [Poetry, Power & Humanity—III:  Shah Hussain: Crossing the Narrow Passage of Love & Rebellion, Minute Mirror, July 21, 2026]. Bulleh Shah interrogated the walls on either side. Who constructed them? Who benefits when human beings are separated into pure and impure, believer and unbeliever, ruler and subject, high-born and low-born? His poetry exposes how identity, initially a source of belonging, can be converted into an instrument of hierarchy. اُٹھ گئے گوانڈھوں یار رَبّا ہُن کیہ کریے Uth gaye gawandhon yaar Rabba hun ki kariye The Beloved has left the neighbourhood; Lord, what am I to do now? اُٹھ چلّے ہُن رہندے ناہیں ہویا ساتھ تیار رَبّا ہُن کیہ کریے Uth chale hun rehnde nahin Hoya saath tayyar Rabba hun ki kariye He has risen and departed; the caravan stands ready, and he will remain no more. Lord, what am I to do now? ڈاڈھ کلیجے بل بل اُٹھے بھڑکے بِرہوں نار رَبّا ہُن کیہ کریے Daadh kaleje bal bal uthe Bharke birhon naar Rabba hun ki kariye The depths of my heart are aflame, kindled by the fire of separation. Lord, what am I to do now? بُلھا شاہ پیارے باجھوں رہے اُرار نہ پار رَبّا ہُن کیہ کریے Bulla Shah piyare bajhon Rahe uraar na paar Rabba hun ki kariye Without the Beloved, says Bulleh Shah, I remain stranded midstream, reaching neither shore. Lord, what am I to do now? The kafi begins with departure, though it does not end in private sorrow. The familiar neighbourhood has lost its centre; the traveller is left between shores. This is the existential moment preceding Bulleh’s interrogation of identity. Once the familiar world departs, inherited answers can no longer shelter us. “What am I to do now?” becomes the cry of every human being whose social certainties have collapsed. Bulleh Shah lived in a Punjab experiencing political dislocation, declining Mughal authority and sharpening religious and social conflict. His spiritual choice itself challenged inherited hierarchy. Born into a Syed family, he accepted Shah Inayat, traditionally identified with the Arain community, as his murshid. Knowledge and spiritual worth were thus placed above genealogy. Their relationship was not merely devotional; it denied the proposition that dignity could be inherited by one group and withheld from another. His choice of Punjabi carried similar democratic force. Persian was associated with administration and cultivated elites; Arabic commanded religious authority. Punjabi was the living speech of cultivators, artisans, women, faqirs and labouring communities. Through the kafi, philosophy ceased to be the exclusive property of courts and seminaries. It could be remembered, sung and transmitted without permission from those controlling formal knowledge. The kafi was central to Bulleh Shah’s poetic expression and to the wider Sufi traditions of Punjab and Sindh. Bulleh’s resistance becomes sharper in the following kafi, where he compares the ostentatiously pious with dogs. راتیں جاگیں کریں عبادت راتیں جاگن کُتے تیتھوں اُتے Raatin jaagein karein ibaadat Raatin jaagan kutte Taithon utte You remain awake at night in worship; dogs keep vigil too— and surpass you. بھونکنوں بند مول نہ ہندے جا روڑیں تے سُتے تیتھوں اُتے Bhonkanon band mool na honde Ja roorin te sutte Taithon utte They never cease their watchful barking, then sleep upon a refuse heap— and surpass you. خَسم اپنے دا در نہ چھڈدے بھاویں وجن جُتے تیتھوں اُتے Khasam apne da dar na chhadde Bhaven vajjan jutte Taithon utte They never abandon their Master’s door, though struck repeatedly— and surpass you. بلھے شاہ کوئی رَخت وِہاج لے نہیں تے بازی لے گئے کُتے تیتھوں اُتے Bulleh Shah koi rakht vihaaj lai Nahin te baazi lai gaye kutte Taithon utte Bulleh Shah, acquire provisions for the journey, or the dogs will carry away the prize— and surpass you. The poem reverses an established hierarchy with deliberate audacity. The dog, conventionally treated as impure, becomes the moral teacher; the visibly devout human being becomes the object of satire. Bulleh does not ridicule worship. He asks what worship is worth when it produces neither loyalty nor humility. The dog remains at its master’s threshold despite hunger, rejection and blows. The worshipper may remain awake, although ritual performed for reputation can coexist with pride, cruelty and the pursuit of power. This distinction is critical. Bulleh Shah’s target is not religion but its conversion into social capital. Piety becomes another possession—something to display, trade and employ against others. In Erich Fromm’s terms, the mode of “having” invades faith: one “has” learning, sanctity, lineage and followers. Bulleh insists upon the mode of “being”, where truth appears through conduct rather than claim. The dog’s fidelity defeats the worshipper’s performance. The same assault on borrowed identity culminates in three immortal lines: بلھیا! کی جاناں میں کون Bulleya, ki jaana main kaun? Bulleh, how can I know who I am? نہ میں مومن وچ مسیتاں نہ میں وچ کفر دیاں ریتاں Na main momin vich maseetan Na main vich kufar diyan reetan I am not confined to the believer in the mosque, nor to the rituals called unbelief. نہ میں موسیٰ، نہ فرعون Na main Moosa, na Firaun I am neither Moses nor Pharaoh. Bulleh removes the available answers one after

Pakistan’s banking sector is experiencing a fast pace digital transformation, which includes inception of new digital banks as well as digitalization of the banking services, like Raast, Roshan Digital Accounts etc. Nevertheless, this digitalization sometimes causes technology mistakes / errors in the banking systems as well. One such issue, though to a little extent, is the matter of mistakenly credited amounts to the customers’ accounts, due to system glitches. And unluckily, it is rare that the customers, who are beneficiaries of such mistaken credits, ever bother to intimate the banks about it or return the mistakenly credited amounts. The recovery of such amounts is though legally possible, however, since it is civil cause action, falling within the jurisdiction of civil courts, therefore, it becomes cumbersome for the banks to recover such amounts, easily and speedily. Needless to mention that the subject recovery does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Banking Courts and hence, speedy trial / summary procedure trial is not available for this kind of recovery. In addition, it is also difficult in these cases to have the support of the law enforcement agencies, due to some legal framework’s problems. Luckily, a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court Lahore has recently passed a remarkable judgement on the subject matter, which will support the banks, in such matters. The judgement is regarding a case, where a bank’s system mistakenly credited a significant amount to one of its customers, who utilized a major portion of the amount . The bank pursued the customer and he gave a cheque for the amount involved. The cheque was later bounced, due to insufficient funds in the account and the bank then lodged FIR against him under Section 489-F. He was arrested and his bail was refused by the lower Court, against which he approached the High Court. The High Court observed that the amount received by customer was not meant to be utilized by him, but it was to be retained and preserved by him for return back to the bank. The Honourable Court further observed that the customer was supposed and required to inform the sender/bank regarding the error and make arrangements for its return to the owner/bank. Furthermore, the Honourable Court observed that as soon as the customer became in a position to exercise his control over the property, the property stood entrusted to him impliedly, but he instead of returning the same to its owner/bank, withdrew significant amount and embezzled the same, as such offence punishable under Section 406 of PPC was fully attracted against him. This case will become a precedent that if a bank customer receives mistakenly credited amount in his account and utilizes it, then it will be an offence of Breach of Trust, under Section 406 of Pakistan Penal Code. The Judgement is reported as PLJ 2025 Cr. C 797 LHC.