Pakistan’s Rise Leaves India Isolated: A Set…

For three decades, the prevailing narrative of the global economy was one of seamless integration. From the design studios of California to the high-tech assembly lines of Shenzhen, the world operated on the assumption that technology was a bridge, not a barrier. However, that era of “borderless innovation” is rapidly giving way to a more fragmented reality. As the United States and China engage in an intensifying rivalry over the foundational technologies of the 21st century artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and 5G a “Silicon Curtain” is descending, reshaping global supply chains and forcing a difficult reckoning for developing nations. The shift marks a transition from a world defined by economic efficiency to one governed by national security. In Washington, the consensus has hardened around the idea that “de-risking” from China is essential to protect intellectual property and maintain a military edge. In Beijing, the drive for “technological self-reliance” has become a central pillar of national survival. What began as a series of trade disputes in 2018 has evolved into a comprehensive decoupling that threatens to bifurcate the global digital ecosystem. The Semiconductor Siege and the AI Arms Race At the heart of this decoupling is the semiconductor the “oil” of the digital age. Advanced microchips are the brains behind everything from smartphones to hypersonic missiles. In 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce introduced sweeping export controls designed to prevent China from acquiring the high end chips necessary for training generative AI models. The “CHIPS and Science Act” further signaled Washington’s intent to reshore manufacturing, offering billions in subsidies to bring fabrication back to American soil. China has responded with its own set of defensive and offensive measures. Beijing has invested hundreds of billions of dollars into its domestic chip industry via the “Big Fund” and has imposed export restrictions on critical minerals like gallium and germanium materials essential for high-tech manufacturing. This tit-for-tat dynamic has profound implications for AI development. While the U.S. currently leads in algorithmic innovation and hardware design, China possesses a vast reservoir of data and a highly integrated industrial base. As the two powers diverge, the world faces the prospect of two distinct AI “stacks” each with its own standards, ethical frameworks, and hardware requirements. For global corporations, the cost of maintaining two separate supply chains is staggering, with some estimates suggesting a permanent 1 to 5 percent drag on global GDP. The 5G Dilemma: Infrastructure as an Ideology The rivalry is equally visible in the rollout of 5G telecommunications. As the backbone of the “Internet of Things,” 5G infrastructure is more than just a faster cellular network; it is the nervous system of modern cities. The U.S. campaign to exclude Chinese providers like Huawei and ZTE from Western networks, citing security vulnerabilities, has effectively split the world into two camps. Many European and “Five Eyes” nations have aligned with Washington, citing the risks of state-sponsored espionage. Conversely, many nations across Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have continued to embrace Chinese infrastructure, which is often more affordable and comes with flexible financing. This infrastructure divide creates a “path dependency”: once a country adopts a specific 5G standard, the subsequent software, security protocols, and hardware upgrades are likely to follow the same technical lineage. The “Digital Non-Aligned Movement” Perhaps the most complex fallout of this decoupling is felt in the Global South. Developing nations, many of which are in the midst of their own digital transformations, now find themselves in an uncomfortable position. They are being pressured to choose between the two technological poles, a choice that carries significant economic and diplomatic risks. For a developing economy in Africa or Latin America, U.S. technology offers high security and integration with Western financial markets. However, Chinese technology often provides a lower barrier to entry and a focus on state-led development goals. The danger, according to many economists, is that this “tech-polarization” will lead to a lack of interoperability. If a startup in Nairobi develops an app on a Chinese cloud platform, will it function seamlessly for a user in a market dominated by American standards? Furthermore, the “friend-shoring” of supply chains where production is moved to politically allied nations is creating new winners and losers. Countries like Vietnam, India, and Mexico have seen an influx of investment as manufacturers seek to diversify away from China. However, other developing nations that lack the infrastructure or political alignment to join these new “trusted” supply chains risk being further marginalized. A World of Redundancy and Risk Critics of decoupling argue that the process is not only expensive but potentially futile. The global tech industry is so deeply intertwined that total separation may be impossible without catastrophic economic damage. Apple, for instance, still relies heavily on Chinese assembly, while Chinese tech firms still utilize American software architectures. Moreover, the environmental cost of decoupling is often overlooked. As both superpowers race to build redundant factories and secure mineral supplies, the efficiency gains of globalized production are lost, leading to increased carbon footprints and resource competition. The “Green Transition” itself is at risk, as solar panels and electric vehicle batteries are caught in the crosshairs of trade restrictions. The US-China tech rivalry is no longer a peripheral trade dispute; it is the defining feature of modern geopolitics. The shift from a globalized market to a fractured one represents a fundamental change in how the world innovates and communicates. While “strategic autonomy” may offer a sense of security for the superpowers, it introduces a new layer of volatility for the rest of the world. As we move forward, the challenge for the international community will be to establish a “digital floor” a set of minimum standards and protocols that allow the world to remain connected even as political systems diverge. Without such a framework, the “Fractured Circuit” may not only slow the pace of global innovation but also deepen the divide between the connected and the disconnected, leaving the most vulnerable nations to navigate a world of incompatible systems and dwindling choices.

Pakistan’s growing diplomatic influence has entered a new phase as Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir lead the country’s strategic engagement with the world, strengthening alliances and projecting Pakistan as an important voice in regional peace and security. The signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye represents a major milestone in Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. The agreement brings together three influential nations through a framework of collective defence, enhanced military cooperation and a shared commitment to regional stability. In recent months, Pakistan’s defence capabilities and strategic importance have received increased international attention. The role of the Pakistan Army in national security and regional stability has been a central factor in shaping Pakistan’s strategic partnerships, while Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s engagement with international counterparts has highlighted the importance of defence diplomacy in promoting peace and cooperation. The global perception of Pakistan’s strategic role has evolved as Islamabad has continued to demonstrate its capacity to engage with major powers and regional stakeholders. Under Field Marshal Asim Munir’s leadership, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has focused on strengthening partnerships, supporting stability and advancing dialogue as a pathway to resolving regional challenges. Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif has complemented these efforts through active diplomatic outreach, engaging world leaders and strengthening Pakistan’s relationships with key allies. Whenever Pakistan’s leadership has engaged internationally, these visits have increasingly focused on expanding cooperation, improving economic ties and promoting peace initiatives. Pakistan’s diplomatic role in encouraging dialogue during tensions involving the United States and Iran also attracted international attention. US President Donald Trump acknowledged Pakistan’s leadership efforts in supporting peace and dialogue, reflecting the country’s potential role as a constructive bridge between nations. Pakistan continues to maintain strong strategic relations with major international partners, including China, while also enjoying deep historical and security ties with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and other Middle Eastern countries. Iran has repeatedly highlighted the importance of its relationship with Pakistan and recognised the value of regional cooperation. The Makkah Declaration further strengthens this strategic momentum. The agreement reflects the shared commitment of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan to collective security and regional stability. It establishes that any armed attack against one of the three states will be regarded as an attack against all, while enhancing defence cooperation, military coordination and strategic collaboration. Built on historic relations, Islamic solidarity and common interests, the declaration aims to strengthen collective deterrence and contribute towards peace, security and prosperity. The emerging partnership between Pakistan’s political and defence leadership is being viewed by supporters as a coordinated national effort to protect Pakistan’s interests and expand its international role. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s diplomatic engagement and Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s strategic approach have together shaped a more proactive foreign policy outlook. The Makkah summit could become a defining moment in Pakistan’s international journey—strengthening its alliances, enhancing its strategic relevance and reinforcing its message that Pakistan seeks peace through cooperation, dialogue and responsible global engagement.

Inflation is at its peak all around the world, while some in one part of the world cannot afford clean fresh water, others are buying a cup of coffee worth more than 10 dollars just to meet their aesthetics for an instagram story. It has become a necessity to upgrade their phones each year as apples launch new versions, or to eat at fancy cafes just to take pictures of the food even if their rent is not due. These are the outcomes and aftermaths of the rise of social media trends.   A new occupation of being an online influencer has emerged. Where a decade ago A-list celebrities were paid to promote products, now the same can be done through influencers (which from a marketing point of view is a lot cheaper and faster for companies). An influencer makes a 30 second video of persuasively advertisementing customers which allows them to make sufficient amounts of income. Paradoxically  they may even be neglectful of the product they are branding being safe or useful. Thus, common people with normal 9-5 jobs are falling for these traps online.   Millennials and Genz, both have been found to indulge in these unnecessary shopping habits arising from the online advertisements of influencers. The lives of influencers may seem perfect. Contradictorily someone promoting a skin care treatment may have genetically clear skin, others promoting health and fitness programmes may in reality live an unhealthy lifestyle. Little by little, bit by bit people who scroll on social media platforms like instagram and facebook are convinced to purchase needless items with no useful impact in their lives.   Gluttony is regarded as one of the seven deadly sins. The newly emerged habit of online shopping is feeding into it. Young adults nowadays are often in debt, however not the usual student debt they owe to their colleges- but the ones they owe to the credit card companies whom they have failed to pay back for the haphazard jumble of products they have purchased while not being cautioned enough. Most of these purchases are done to fit in a trend and are often to please the society they are around rather than personal desires.   One after another, the oligarchs set up traps for the world and yet again and again we have been seemingly fallen for it. May it be big fast food chains labeling every ultraprocessed junk as “high in protein” whilst hiding the fact that the same products are also high in processed fats and preservatives or having addictive ingredients which release dopamine and makes the buyer destined to repurchase.   People often call this impulse buying “convenient” for it is delivered on doorsteps. In some cases it may be accuarte, but in truth it is another method of making people becoming indolent and shiftless. A 10 minute walk to the supermarket is avoided when apps like doordash are introduced to deliver groceries to doorsteps- the same 10 minute walk which is without a debate must for all ages. Not only is this extremely harmful for the human body physically but it has its dangerous impacts on psychological health leading to high profile cases of depression and isolation.   These habits start slow and seem innocent, until they become addictions and empty bank accounts while also destroying an individual’s ability to live a life in which pleasing others is not a priority. This trend does not seem to stop anytime soon- nevertheless it is expanding endlessly in all countries, cultures and environments. Even in this cycle the rich gain tremendously while the poor pay unconsciously thinking that their lives are improving. This is modern slavery where chains are replaced by computers given to people in their hands and control their lives through it.

By Eng Saqlain Abid Last weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump declared on Truth Social that the United States and Israel were fully prepared to strike Iran’s critical power infrastructure, warning that military pressure would continue until Tehran surrendered completely. Around the same time, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly conveyed messages through Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, emphasizing that any major attack on Iran would be met with a determined response against GCC partners and strategic regional assets if no diplomatic option remained. Yet within hours, the rhetoric shifted dramatically. Trump announced that although American and Israeli forces were fully prepared, he had decided to postpone military action following appeals from Gulf states and international mediators, citing “humanity” and the possibility of reaching an agreement. Reports suggested that negotiations revolved around two major conditions: keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to global shipping and ensuring that Iran would not pursue nuclear weapons. At first glance, the story appears simple—a crisis narrowly avoided through diplomacy. In reality, however, it represents a sophisticated narrative war in which every actor seeks to project strength while avoiding the devastating costs of a prolonged regional conflict. For Washington, the challenge is not merely military capability but strategic credibility. The United States undoubtedly possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority over Iran. However, superiority does not automatically translate into political success. Internal assessments by CENTCOM and the Pentagon have reportedly warned that any large-scale conflict could extend well beyond expectations, potentially lasting until 2027. Such a scenario would coincide with America’s domestic political calendar, including congressional elections, while risking declining public support for another costly Middle Eastern war. The lessons of Afghanistan continue to shape American strategic thinking. Airpower alone may inflict significant damage, but permanently degrading Iran’s military capabilities without ground operations remains an uncertain objective. Any decision requiring “boots on the ground” would carry enormous political and economic consequences. Consequently, Washington’s repeated threats increasingly resemble a strategy of coercive diplomacy rather than an immediate roadmap to invasion. A superpower is expected to demonstrate resolve, but maintaining global leadership also requires restraint when the costs outweigh the benefits. Iran, on the other hand, continues to rely on its long-established doctrine of strategic resistance. Despite mounting military pressure and repeated warnings, Tehran has sought to demonstrate that it retains the ability to impose costs across multiple theatres. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most strategically significant maritime chokepoints, and any disruption immediately reverberates through global energy markets. Meanwhile, continued instability around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, largely influenced by Iran-aligned Houthi forces, further complicates regional trade and shipping.   These maritime flashpoints have created understandable concerns among Gulf states. Countries investing billions of dollars in economic diversification projects—including Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and NEOM—depend heavily upon uninterrupted trade routes and stable energy markets. For Gulf capitals, preventing a regional escalation has become not merely a security priority but an economic necessity. Israel’s strategic calculations are equally complex. Since the beginning of the confrontation, Israeli policymakers have consistently sought firm American backing while remaining conscious of the domestic burden imposed by prolonged conflict. Extended military campaigns strain national resources, disrupt civilian life, and test public resilience. Consequently, Israel also has incentives to support diplomatic arrangements if they preserve security objectives without expanding into an open-ended regional war. Ultimately, today’s confrontation extends beyond missiles and military deployments. It is a contest of narratives, deterrence, and political signalling. Every side seeks to appear uncompromising while simultaneously avoiding a conflict whose consequences none can fully control. The prospect of a prolonged regional war is becoming increasingly difficult for any major stakeholder to sustain. Iran continues to deepen its strategic relationships with China and Russia, while the United States prefers negotiated constraints over another indefinite military campaign. Pakistan and Turkey have emerged as important channels of communication, but expecting either country to shoulder the diplomatic burden of resolving one of the world’s most dangerous geopolitical crises would be unrealistic. History repeatedly demonstrates that wars are easier to begin than to conclude. In the current Middle Eastern crisis, the loudest battlefield may not be defined by bombs or missiles but by competing narratives, diplomatic manoeuvres, and carefully calculated restraint. Whether this fragile pause evolves into a lasting settlement or merely delays another round of confrontation will determine not only the future of Iran but also the stability of the wider region and the global order.

For much of the past half-century, the Middle East was described in binaries: Arab and Israeli, Sunni and Shia, American ally and adversary. That framework is no longer sufficient. In the span of 18 months, two events have forced a fundamental reassessment of regional order: a Chinese-brokered handshake between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, and the eruption of war in Gaza in October 2023. Together, they have set in motion a realignment that is testing old alliances, elevating new mediators, and leaving the future of American-backed normalization efforts deeply uncertain.   The significance extends well beyond the region. How power is distributed between Riyadh, Tehran, Ankara, Cairo and Tel Aviv shapes global energy markets, maritime security in the Red Sea, nuclear non-proliferation, and great-power competition between the United States and China. What emerges is not a new stable order, but a fluid period of transactional diplomacy in which ideology is increasingly subordinated to regime survival and economic interest.   A Rapprochement Brokered in Beijing   The agreement announced on March 10, 2023, that Saudi Arabia and Iran would restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year rupture was remarkable less for its content than for its venue. The deal was negotiated over four days in Beijing, with China acting as guarantor.   The context was pragmatic. For Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, foreign policy has become inseparable from Vision 2030, an ambitious plan to diversify the economy away from oil. That vision requires regional calm. The years preceding the deal saw drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure at Abqaiq and Khurais, a costly and inconclusive war in Yemen where Tehran backed the Houthi movement, and rising oil price volatility. De-escalation with Iran offered a path to contain those risks.   For Iran, the calculus was equally material. Facing stringent international sanctions, inflation above 40 percent at the time, and domestic unrest following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, Tehran sought diplomatic breathing room and economic openings, particularly with Gulf states that could provide investment and trade channels.   China’s role was both opportunistic and strategic. As the largest buyer of both Saudi and Iranian crude, Beijing had unique leverage and a direct interest in the stability of Gulf shipping lanes. The mediation allowed China to present itself as a responsible alternative to the United States, a power broker capable of delivering outcomes Washington could not, given its lack of diplomatic ties with Iran. Analysts in Washington and Brussels were quick to note the limits of this shift: China did not replace the U.S. security umbrella that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states continue to rely on, nor did it offer a framework for resolving deeper sectarian and strategic rivalries. The agreement did not settle disputes over Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, or Iran’s nuclear program. It did, however, establish that regional rivals were willing to manage competition through dialogue rather than direct confrontation, and that Beijing was willing to facilitate it.   The Abraham Accords on Hold   If the Saudi-Iran détente represented one vector of realignment, the Abraham Accords represented another. Signed in 2020, the U.S.-brokered agreements that normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco marked a paradigm shift. They rested on the premise that shared concerns over Iran and shared economic interests could advance Arab-Israeli normalization even without resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   By mid-2023, attention had turned to the potential prize of Saudi-Israeli normalization. U.S. officials pursued an ambitious package that would have linked a Saudi-Israel deal with U.S. security guarantees for Riyadh and support for a civilian nuclear program, alongside concessions toward the Palestinians.   The war in Gaza, triggered by Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed approximately 1,200 people and led to the abduction of more than 250 hostages, and followed by Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, which Gaza health authorities report has killed tens of thousands, has fundamentally altered that trajectory.   Saudi Arabia has not abandoned the idea of normalization, but it has recalibrated its public conditions. Riyadh has stated repeatedly that any deal now requires a credible, irreversible path toward a Palestinian state. This position reflects both genuine concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza and a reading of domestic and wider Arab public opinion, where images from the war have generated widespread anger.   For the UAE and Bahrain, which maintained their embassies in Israel throughout the war, the Accords have endured but become more subdued. Economic and security cooperation, particularly on technology, trade, and air defense against Iranian drones, has continued behind closed doors. Public-facing celebration of the accords, however, has largely been suspended. The experience has highlighted a duality: the Accords have proven resilient as state-to-state security arrangements, but fragile as instruments of broader regional integration without progress on the Palestinian question.   Gaza and the Redistribution of Influence   The prolonged conflict in Gaza has accelerated several regional trends. First, it has restored the centrality of the Palestinian issue to Arab diplomacy, after a period when many policymakers assumed it could be sidelined.   Second, it has empowered non-state actors and redefined deterrence. The near-daily exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah until a late-2024 ceasefire, attacks on international shipping by the Houthis in the Red Sea that disrupted an estimated 12 percent of global trade at its peak, and direct Iranian-Israeli missile exchanges in April 2024 demonstrated that escalation management has become the defining security challenge of the region.   Third, it has created space for middle powers to mediate. Qatar, alongside Egypt and the United States, emerged as a central mediator in hostage and ceasefire negotiations due to its channels to Hamas. Turkey has sought to leverage its political support for the Palestinian cause while maintaining economic ties with Israel. Oman has continued its quiet role as a back-channel facilitator.   For the United States, the war has illustrated both its indispensability and its constraints. Washington remains the only power capable

Dr Pervez Butt died on the 26th of July, 2026, at the age of 84, and with him Pakistan lost one of the last living architects of its nuclear age. The obituaries will rightly recount the long arc of his public service: joining the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1963, cutting his teeth on the design of KANUPP-I, Pakistan’s first commercial nuclear power plant, spending years at GE Canada absorbing the discipline of reactor engineering, and eventually rising to chair the PAEC from 2001 to 2006 — a tenure during which he oversaw the expansion of Chashma and laid groundwork that would carry Pakistan’s nuclear power programme well into this century. He would go on to serve as Federal Secretary for Science and Technology, as an adviser at the Planning Commission, and, until his final days, as a quiet counsel to the National Command Authority. Nishan-i-Imtiaz, Hilal-i-Imtiaz, Sitara-i-Imtiaz — the honours are a matter of record.     But I did not know him first as a chairman or a decorated public servant. I knew him as a teacher who happened to hold the keys to some of the country’s most consequential engineering decisions, and who chose, for reasons I am still grateful for, to hand a few of those keys to me. I want to remember him the way I actually experienced him — not through the official biography, but through three long afternoons at his house in F-11 Sector, Islamabad, where he taught me something the textbooks never quite manage: how the price of nuclear electricity in Pakistan is actually determined. Anyone who has sat through a lecture on tariff determination knows how dry the subject can be made to sound — EPC cost, fuel cost, capacity purchase price, energy purchase price, indexation, decommissioning liability. Dr. Butt made none of it dry. He made it a ritual. Each session began the same way, and the way it began told you everything about the man. There was no walking straight into the numbers. First came tea — always a full spread of dry fruits, delicate sandwiches, fresh fruit, chana chaat, and cappuccino. It was in his drawing room that I had my first Cortado, and my first Mocha, both poured by a man who clearly took as much pride in introducing a good cup of coffee as he did in explaining a heat-rate calculation. Only once the plates were cleared did the real class begin. He held nothing back. The sessions ran from ten in the morning until nearly four in the afternoon — six hours at a stretch, with no formal lunch break at all. Instead, somewhere past midday, a trolley would appear, loaded with Lahori chanay and naan, and he would keep teaching straight through it, tariff formulas in one breath and the economics of fuel fabrication cost in the next, a piece of naan in hand the whole time. I have sat in university seminars with more structure and far less learned. What I remember most, though, is the break. Every two hours, without fail, he would stop — not because he was tired, but because he knew I smoked, and he had built an orchard directly across the road from his house for exactly this purpose. We would walk over together, and his waiter would already be there ahead of us, a fresh cappuccino on the table, an ashtray set out with wet tissue paper folded neatly beside it — a small, deliberate touch that told you this man planned for his guests down to the last detail. And it was in that orchard, not at his desk, that the real teaching happened. He would ask me, plainly, to repeat back what I had just understood. Not to test me — to correct me, gently, if I had drifted, and to make sure the idea had actually landed before we walked back inside for the next round. I was, I suspect, an unlikely student for him to invest that kind of care in. I have never been a person drawn to nuclear energy for its own sake — the physics of it, the fission and the neutrons and the reactor cores, left me largely unmoved. What pulled me toward him was the economics: how a country decides what a unit of nuclear electricity should cost, how the capital recovery on a plant like K-2 or C-3 gets built into a tariff, how fuel cost and EPC cost and decommissioning liability all get stitched together into a number that regulators can defend and the public can pay. That was the language I wanted to learn, and he taught it to me the way he taught everything — thoroughly, patiently, and without ever once looking at the clock. Looking back, I think that was the most VIP treatment anyone taught by him could have asked for — not a title, not a certificate, but three full days of a man who had chaired the PAEC choosing to spend his mornings, his working lunches, and his smoking breaks making sure a subject I hadn’t cared about a week earlier had become one I could speak on with confidence. Pakistan will remember Dr. Pervez Butt for KANUPP and Chashma, for the plants he helped design and the institutions he helped build — the Pakistan Welding Institute, the nondestructive testing facility at Taxila, decades spent quietly ensuring that a technically demanding and politically sensitive programme kept working. Those achievements belong to the history books, and they are considerable. I will remember the orchard. I will remember a Cortado poured by a man who insisted the tea come before the tariff, and a lecture that never stopped even for lunch. That was his real gift — not just what he knew, but how completely he was willing to give his time to make sure someone else knew it too. Rest well, sir. The lesson stayed.