Pakistan shapes the emerging order

Pakistan and the United States have maintained one of the most consequential yet complex bilateral relationships in South Asia. Over more than seven decades, the relationship has witnessed periods of close strategic cooperation, moments of mutual disappointment, and repeated efforts at rebuilding trust. Today, amid shifting geopolitical realities, economic transformation, and emerging technological opportunities, both countries have a rare chance to redefine their partnership based on equality, mutual respect, and long-term shared interests rather than short-term strategic expediency. Pakistan recognized the United States soon after its independence in 1947, and diplomatic relations were formally established in 1948. During the Cold War, Pakistan emerged as an important security partner, joining U.S.-backed regional alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. The relationship deepened further during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when both countries cooperated closely in support of the Afghan resistance. Following the end of the Cold War, however, strategic priorities diverged. The imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment, differences over nuclear policy, and declining geopolitical convergence created a period of mistrust. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Pakistan again became a frontline partner in global counterterrorism efforts. While this cooperation produced significant security outcomes, it also imposed enormous economic, human, and social costs on Pakistan. Differences over regional security, Afghanistan, drone operations, and counterterrorism strategies periodically strained bilateral ties. Despite these fluctuations, the relationship never completely lost its strategic relevance. Both countries continued cooperation in defense, education, health, agriculture, energy, and people-to-people exchanges. Millions of Pakistani-Americans have served as an enduring bridge between the two societies, making valuable contributions to American economic, academic, technological, and public life while strengthening bilateral understanding. Recent diplomatic engagement indicates that both Islamabad and Washington recognize the need to move beyond a security-centric relationship. The visit of senior members of the U.S. Congress and American business leaders to Pakistan, alongside growing high-level diplomatic exchanges, demonstrates renewed interest in expanding cooperation across multiple sectors. Pakistan’s leadership has correctly emphasized that mature strategic partnerships are increasingly measured not by military cooperation alone but by the depth of economic, technological, and commercial engagement. Economic cooperation offers perhaps the greatest untapped potential. The United States remains Pakistan’s largest single-country export destination, while bilateral trade has continued to grow steadily. Pakistan imports American cotton, soybeans, advanced technology, and industrial equipment, while exporting textiles, apparel, surgical instruments, sporting goods, agricultural products, and information technology services. However, the current trade volume remains far below its potential. Expanding bilateral trade toward the proposed target of $20 billion over the coming years would benefit businesses, workers, and consumers in both countries. Pakistan’s improving macroeconomic stability, structural reforms, investment facilitation through the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), expanding digital economy, growing technology sector, critical minerals, renewable energy projects, and improved logistics infrastructure provide new opportunities for American investors. The recent financing support for the Reko Diq mining project demonstrates that confidence in Pakistan’s long-term economic prospects is increasing. At the same time, the relationship should not overlook cooperation in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, higher education, climate resilience, healthcare, agricultural modernization, clean energy, semiconductor supply chains, and digital entrepreneurship. These areas represent the future of global competitiveness and can become new pillars of bilateral cooperation. Yet lasting partnerships require addressing historical shortcomings. For decades, Pakistan-U.S. relations have often been shaped by transactional calculations linked to immediate regional crises. This cyclical engagement has produced recurring trust deficits whenever strategic priorities shifted. Both sides should now avoid allowing temporary geopolitical developments to define a relationship with far broader potential. Several steps can help transform bilateral relations into a more durable partnership. First, both governments should institutionalize regular strategic dialogue covering trade, investment, technology, education, climate, and regional security. Second, expanding private-sector investment should become a central objective alongside government-to-government cooperation. Third, greater parliamentary exchanges, academic collaboration, and cultural diplomacy can reduce misconceptions and strengthen public understanding. Fourth, both countries should respect each other’s sovereignty, security concerns, and national priorities while managing differences through sustained dialogue. Finally, cooperation should increasingly be guided by equality, transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit rather than dependency or short-term geopolitical calculations. The Pakistan-United States relationship has survived changing global orders because it rests on shared interests that extend beyond any single issue or region. In today’s interconnected world, economic resilience, technological innovation, and regional stability require partnerships built on trust and consistency. By embracing a forward-looking agenda centered on trade, investment, innovation, and people-to-people ties, Islamabad and Washington can transform a relationship shaped by history into one driven by shared opportunity. The future of Pakistan-U.S. relations need not be defined by the ups and downs of the past. It can instead become a model of pragmatic cooperation—one based on sincerity, equality, mutual respect, and a common commitment to peace, stability, and shared prosperity.  Author: Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan,  Sinologist – Diplomat – Advisor – Consultant, Founding Chair, Global Silk Route research Alliance.

In the winter of 1979, a neighbour’s house caught fire. The Soviet Union had marched into Afghanistan, and the flames of war were licking at the walls of Kabul. From across the ocean, a distant power arrived at Pakistan’s door. It did not come with soldiers. It came with money, guns, and a promise: *”Let us fight this fire together. Use your roof. Use your roads. We will stand with you. We will not let the fire reach your house.”* Pakistan opened its door. What else could it do? The Soviet army sat on its western border. The world was divided into two camps, and neutrality was a luxury no frontline state could afford. For ten years, Pakistan became the staging ground for a war that was not its own. It hosted three million refugees. Its cities swelled. Its tribal areas became training grounds for fighters armed and funded by outside money. Weapons arrived by the shipload through Karachi. Pakistani officers coordinated strategy. Every bullet fired at a Soviet convoy in the Hindu Kush passed through Pakistani hands. The distant power paid the bills. It sent the Stinger missiles. It called the resistance fighters “freedom fighters” and Pakistan a “frontline state.” But the war was never truly about Pakistan’s safety. It was about bleeding the Soviet Union in a distant mountainside, using Pakistani soil as the operating theatre and Afghan bodies as the currency. Then, in 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew. The fire in the neighbour’s house went out. And the distant power that had promised eternal friendship turned its attention elsewhere. The billions dried up. The diplomatic interest evaporated. Afghanistan, the battlefield, was left to warlords who turned the weapons on each other. Pakistan was left with three million refugees who would not go home, a Kalashnikov culture that would not disappear, and a border that would never again be quiet. The weapons that had been given to fight the Soviets did not rust. They remained. They moved into streets, into disputes, into corners of the country where the state had never fully reached. The guest who had brought the fire extinguisher had started a blaze that spread to the host’s own house — and then moved to a new neighbourhood. The distant power won its strategic objective at the cost of Afghan and Pakistani soil, then walked away. Its own cities were never bombed. Its own children never became refugees. Its economy never staggered under the weight of someone else’s war. Pakistan, which had signed no formal treaty of alliance but had acted as an ally in every meaningful sense, was left holding the pieces. This is what happens when alliances are forged in the middle of a fire. The stronger partner does not need your victory. He needs your usefulness. He needs you to hold the front, to absorb the blow, to stand in a place where he does not wish to stand. And when the war ends, he will shake your hand and go home — while you remain amid the embers, wondering why the fire you helped extinguish has reignited in your own courtyard. History records a curious pattern. The alliances that have endured — the ones that outlasted their founders and shaped the world for generations — were almost never built while the house was burning. NATO was forged in 1949, not because the bombs were falling on Paris, but because the memory of war was still fresh and the desire to prevent it was shared. The parties had time to read the text, to negotiate the terms, to build institutions that could survive a change of government on either side. An alliance born in the middle of a fire is a different creature entirely. It is an emergency measure. And emergency measures have a way of becoming permanent arrangements that no one planned and no one fully controls. When you sign while the heat is at your back and the smoke is in your eyes, you do not have time to ask who owns the hose, who pays for the water, and who walks away when the flames are out. The Afghan episode is not ancient history. It is in our own lifetime. It is written in the smoke that still rises from our western border. And it is written in the simple fact that the weapons once aimed at a northern invader eventually turned inward, because no one had written a clause for what happens after the guest leaves. Pakistan has every right to defend itself. Pakistan has every right to seek friends in a dangerous world. But history offers a quiet observation for those who are listening: **the strongest alliances are built in peacetime, not borrowed in panic.** The fire is real. The neighbour’s house is burning. Yet the hand that offers protection in the middle of a war is holding a different ledger than the hand that offers partnership in the middle of calm. That is not a warning against friendship. It is simply what the record shows.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye’s landmark defence agreement draws international attention; Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir play pivotal roles in historic strategic breakthrough The landmark Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has triggered intense international interest, with analysts viewing the accord as a potentially significant development in the evolving security architecture of the Middle East and wider Muslim world. Signed in Makkah by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the agreement establishes a collective-defence principle under which an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three. The pact brings together three strategically important states with highly complementary capabilities: Saudi Arabia’s economic and energy weight, Türkiye’s powerful conventional military and expanding defence industry, and Pakistan’s extensive military experience and strategic deterrent. The combination has prompted international analysts to examine whether the Makkah agreement could become the foundation of a more autonomous, regionally driven security framework. Ishaq Dar: agreement is defensive, not directed against any country Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Senator Ishaq Dar has sought to clarify the scope and purpose of the agreement amid growing international interest. Dar described the Makkah Accord as “purely defensive in nature” and “not targeted against any country”, stressing that its purpose is to strengthen collective security and promote peace and stability. He said the agreement does not replace or undermine existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements maintained by the three countries with each other, other states or international organisations. Under the accord, Dar explained, an external armed attack against any one of the three countries would be considered an attack against all, consistent with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Dar also said the framework remains open to other countries that share its principles and are prepared to resolve differences through mutual respect, cooperation and peaceful means. His clarification is strategically important because it positions the Makkah framework as a mechanism of deterrence rather than confrontation, without identifying Iran, Israel or any other state as a permanent adversary. Hakan Fidan compares mutual-defence provision with NATO Article 5 The most significant international description of the agreement’s collective-defence provision has come from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Fidan said the provision is technically comparable to NATO’s Article 5, under which an attack against one member is treated as an attack against all. The comparison does not mean that the Makkah framework has NATO’s integrated command structure or institutional architecture. The practical response to any attack would be determined according to the circumstances. Fidan said a ministerial committee would be established and a general secretariat based in Saudi Arabia would oversee the framework, with further operational details to be developed. He also indicated that Türkiye wants the framework to expand, identifying Egypt as a potential future member. The prospect of expansion is potentially significant because it could transform a trilateral arrangement into a wider regional security mechanism. OIC welcomes agreement as an ‘important strategic step’ The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has welcomed the agreement, with Secretary General Hissein Brahim Taha expressing strong support and describing the pact as an “important strategic step” reflecting the commitment of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to strengthening cooperation. The OIC response gives the agreement significance beyond the three signatories and places it within the wider context of cooperation among Muslim-majority countries. The development comes at a time when several regional states are reassessing existing security arrangements and seeking greater strategic autonomy. Saudi Arabia: strengthening security without abandoning existing partnerships Riyadh has emphasised that the new defence framework does not replace its existing security arrangements. Saudi Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy Rayed Krimly said the agreement does not supersede or replace existing bilateral or multilateral agreements involving the three countries. The position reflects Saudi Arabia’s broader foreign-policy strategy of strategic diversification. The Kingdom continues to maintain a major relationship with the United States while simultaneously deepening strategic, economic and defence ties with Türkiye, Pakistan, China and other powers. The Makkah pact therefore appears less a replacement for existing alliances than an additional layer of regional deterrence. Chatham House: Türkiye pursuing strategic ‘hedging’ The Makkah agreement has also given renewed significance to earlier analysis by Chatham House. Tim Chattell of the International Security Programme at Chatham House examined the prospect of a Turkish strategic arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan before the trilateral agreement was signed. He argued that such cooperation formed part of Ankara’s wider strategy of “hedging” — developing alternative strategic partnerships while retaining its NATO commitments. Chattell also identified potential synergy between the three countries, particularly because Türkiye and Pakistan possess complementary defence capabilities while Saudi Arabia has significant financial resources that could support defence cooperation and industrial development. What had previously been examined as an emerging strategic alignment has now become a formal defence commitment. Atlantic Council: a ‘double deterrence tool’ The Atlantic Council has also examined the evolving Saudi-Pakistan security relationship. Analyst Eleonora Ardemagni described the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact as a “double deterrence tool”, arguing that the relationship reflected both immediate security concerns and Saudi Arabia’s longer-term drive towards greater defence autonomy. Her analysis highlighted military training, capacity building, defence-industry cooperation, technology transfer and potential co-production as important elements of the emerging partnership. The inclusion of Türkiye adds another major military and defence-industrial dimension to that relationship. A strategic triangle of complementary power The significance of the Makkah pact lies partly in the capabilities each country brings to the partnership. Saudi Arabia contributes enormous economic and energy influence, strategic geography and financial resources. Türkiye contributes a major conventional military, NATO experience and an increasingly sophisticated indigenous defence industry. Pakistan contributes one of the region’s largest and most experienced armed forces, longstanding military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, and a nuclear deterrent. The three-way combination therefore creates a strategic partnership in which each member contributes capabilities that complement

When France first levied a 3% tax on the domestic revenues of large technology companies in 2019, the move was presented as a modest, temporary fix. Five years later, the temporary fix has become a global patchwork. More than 20 countries now operate some form of digital services tax, the United States has threatened retaliatory tariffs, and the multilateral replacement intended to tidy it all up remains unsigned.   The question at the heart of the scramble is disarmingly simple and technically complex: where should a company that sells everywhere but is physically located almost nowhere pay its taxes?   For most of the last century, international tax rules rested on physical presence. A company was taxed where it had offices, factories, or personnel. That principle struggled as companies like Google, Amazon, and Meta built business models in which value is derived from users, data, and online advertising in one country, while profits are booked in another, often lower-tax, jurisdiction.   The scale of the mismatch sharpened after the 2008 financial crisis. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013, estimating that profit-shifting cost governments $100 billion to $240 billion annually in lost revenue. By 2018, public pressure to act on highly visible technology firms accelerated political timelines faster than the OECD process could move.   The result was the rise of the unilateral digital services tax, or DST.   Unlike corporate income taxes, DSTs are typically levied on gross revenues, not profits, generated from specific digital activities online marketplaces, search engines, social media platforms, and targeted advertising within a country’s borders. Rates are low, generally 2% to 5%, but they apply broadly. The United Kingdom’s 2% DST raised over £800 million in 2024-25. France, Italy, Spain, Austria, India, Turkey and others adopted similar measures, each with slightly different thresholds, definitions, and scopes.   Proponents argue DSTs restore a basic link between economic activity and taxation. “If a platform earns substantial revenue from French users watching French ads, the French tax base should reflect that,” a senior official at the French Ministry of Finance said in 2023. For many developing economies, where consumption of digital services is large but physical presence of providers is minimal, DSTs are also a matter of fiscal sovereignty.   Critics, including the technology companies themselves and the U.S. government, point to three problems. First, taxing revenue rather than profit can penalize low-margin businesses and be passed on to small businesses and consumers who use the platforms. Second, the proliferation of different rules creates compliance complexity and the risk of double taxation, where the same income is taxed in multiple jurisdictions. Third, Washington has long argued DSTs are discriminatory by design, targeting predominantly American firms.   That third argument carried trade consequences. Under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) investigated DSTs adopted by France, India, Italy, and others, concluding that several did discriminate against U.S. companies. Tariffs of up to 25% on selected imports were prepared, then suspended pending a global deal.   That deal was meant to be Pillar One.   In October 2021, 136 countries and jurisdictions representing more than 90% of global GDP agreed to a two-pillar framework brokered by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework. Pillar Two, a 15% global minimum corporate tax, has largely moved forward and is now in force in dozens of countries. Pillar One is the more ambitious and more fragile.   Under Pillar One’s Amount A, a portion of the residual profits of the world’s largest and most profitable multinationals  those with global turnover above €20 billion and profitability above 10% would be reallocated to market jurisdictions where their customers and users are located, regardless of physical presence. The scope was deliberately expanded beyond tech; excluding extractive industries and regulated financial services, it would cover roughly 100 multinationals across sectors.   In exchange, countries would be required to withdraw DSTs and similar measures and commit not to introduce new ones. A Multilateral Convention (MLC) would implement the rules, replacing a web of unilateral taxes with a single, coordinated mechanism. The OECD estimated in 2023 that Pillar One would reallocate $200 billion in profits and generate $13 billion to $36 billion in additional global tax revenue annually, a figure comparable in aggregate to existing DST receipts, though distribution would differ markedly by country.   Negotiations have since slowed. The original goal of signing the MLC in 2023 was missed. A target for 2024 was also missed. In 2025 and early 2026, several governments, including the UK, revised their internal planning assumptions to 2027, while confirming that their DSTs “remain in operation” until a convention enters into force.   Several factors explain the delay. The convention requires ratification, including in the United States, where any tax treaty must secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Bipartisan skepticism about ceding taxing rights and concerns about revenue impacts have made ratification uncertain. Some emerging economies have argued that the thresholds for Pillar One are too high and the reallocation too small to benefit them meaningfully, preferring instead to retain DSTs or pursue a parallel negotiation at the United Nations on international tax cooperation that could run until 2027. In Washington, meanwhile, successive administrations have maintained that any acceptable deal must include robust DST withdrawal provisions.   The result is a holding pattern with real costs. In October 2021, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, the UK and the United States announced a transitional agreement: as long as Pillar One progressed, the U.S. would not impose retaliatory tariffs, and European DST liabilities would be creditable against future Pillar One obligations. That truce has largely held, but it depends on continued progress.   For businesses, the uncertainty complicates planning. A multinational may face a DST in India, a diverted profits tax in the UK, a Pillar Two top-up in the EU, and the prospect of Pillar One reallocation all with different calculation bases and documentation requirements.

Calling Babarloi Bypass the “Strait of Hormuz of Sindh” would not be an exaggeration. In Sindh’s nationalist political discourse, the name Babarloi Bypass has repeatedly resurfaced in connection with the “Babarloi Dharna” (sit-in). Babarloi is an ancient settlement in Khairpur district. According to historical accounts, including Tareekh-e-Masoomi and Tarkhan Nama, this was the place where Mughal Emperor Humayun, after being defeated by Sher Shah Suri and forced into exile, stayed for nearly six months before heading towards Iran. Today, Babarloi Bypass has emerged as a crucial junction on the National Highway N-5. This strategic corridor connects Sindh with Punjab, Balochistan and upper Sindh, making it a vital artery for trade and transportation. Economically, Punjab and Sindh are deeply interdependent. On one hand, Punjab relies on Sindh for imported goods arriving through Karachi’s ports, including machinery, industrial raw material, chemicals and electronics. It also depends on Sindh for the transportation of oil and petroleum products, as some of Pakistan’s major oil refineries and import terminals are located in Sindh. On the other hand, Sindh depends heavily on Punjab for wheat, flour, sugar, textiles, engineering goods, agricultural products, poultry, dairy and other food supplies. However, in comparative terms, blocking Babarloi Bypass on the N-5 route would cause a far greater economic disruption to Punjab than to Sindh because of Punjab’s larger dependence on this transit corridor for trade flows. Whether the issue is the controversial six-canal project or the debate over the creation of new provinces, some political stakeholders in Sindh view Babarloi Bypass as a pressure point against Punjab and the federal government. Their strategy has been to send a message that before raising questions about the division of Sindh, Punjab and the federation must recognise the consequences of alienating the province. For these groups, Babarloi Bypass has become Sindh’s equivalent of a strategic pressure point — a place through which pressure can be exerted on the federal centre. Last year, a major protest was staged at Babarloi Bypass (Khairpur, Sindh) against the federal government’s proposed project to construct six new canals from the Indus River. The eleven-day sit-in, organised by lawyers, nationalist parties, farmers’ organisations and civil society groups, continued from April 18 to April 29, 2025. As a result, the National Highway N-5 remained blocked at Babarloi Bypass, disrupting movement between Sindh and Punjab. The transportation of goods was almost suspended, affecting supplies of vegetables, fruits, cotton, rice and other agricultural commodities to Punjab. Several industries faced delays in receiving raw materials, while hundreds of trucks remained stranded for days, causing losses worth millions of rupees to transporters and traders. The protest eventually ended after negotiations between a delegation of the Sindh government and the lawyers’ action committee. The agreement included the following assurances: The Council of Common Interests (CCI) would decide the future of the controversial canal project, and no progress would be made without consensus among all provinces. The government assured the issuance of an official notification addressing the lawyers’ demands and promised to provide relevant legal documents. The Babarloi Dharna was considered one of the significant political protests of 2025 because it increased pressure on the federal government, disrupted the land link between Sindh and Punjab for several days, and played a role in bringing the canal issue back to the platform of the Council of Common Interests.   The following year, Babarloi Bypass once again became the centre of a major protest. On July 23, 2026, a second sit-in was staged, this time not against the canal project but to demand the recovery of 27 missing children from Sindh, including the high-profile case of Priya Kumari. The protest was attended by lawyers, civil society activists, nationalist political workers, families of missing children and ordinary citizens. During the protest, the debate over the creation of new provinces, particularly from Karachi and federal circles, once again gained momentum. As a result, Sindh’s nationalist politics was once again seen aligning itself with anti-centre and anti-Punjab sentiments during the demonstration. Moreover, some separatist elements reportedly raised slogans such as “Pakistan Na Khappe” (We do not want Pakistan) and “Pakistan Murdabad” (Down with Pakistan) during the sit-in. However, unlike the previous year, the protest was brought to an end by the Sindh government with the assistance of police authorities. The Babarlo police, in their own account of the incident, accused the protesters of obstructing police vehicles, resorting to stone-pelting, and raising anti-Pakistan slogans during the standoff. According to reports, police took action to disperse the protesters, several individuals were arrested, and later cases were registered against 13 named persons and around 150 unidentified individuals under various provisions, including anti-terrorism laws. The manner in which the Sindh government dealt with this year’s sit-in suggests a different political approach compared to nationalist leaders. It indicates that the provincial government was reluctant to escalate tensions with either the Punjab government or the Pakistan Peoples Party’s political partners at the federal level. The Sindh government also appeared unwilling to allow the closure of Babarloi Bypass to turn the issue into a larger confrontation. The PPP leadership is aware that preventing child abductions and ensuring the recovery of missing children is primarily the responsibility of the Sindh government; neither Punjab nor the federal government can be held directly accountable for such matters. Therefore, before nationalist groups could create a situation that might politically embarrass the PPP at the federal level, the Sindh government moved to end the sit-in and restrict the influence of protest organisers. Whether the two major political parties have reached an understanding behind closed doors under the spirit of the Charter of Democracy remains a matter of speculation. However, the way both parties continue to engage in verbal confrontations during the Azad Jammu and Kashmir elections appears, to some observers, to be part of a broader political strategy.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA) to strengthen their defense cooperation. The agreement was signed at a critical juncture in history, both globally and regionally. On the global front, the old order is in disarray, and conflicts are breaking out one after another. The West’s dominance and hegemony are fading. Economic power, which the West once used to rule the world, is in decline. Western control over weapons of destruction has weakened. Simultaneously, Western diplomatic influence has softened, and their grip on the UN and decision-making has weakened.    This has destabilized global peace, and in 2025 alone, 50 countries were engaged in conflicts or wars. As a result, new powerhouses, in economic, diplomatic, and defense production, have emerged. On a regional level, the Middle East and South Asia have emerged as flashpoints, where conflict or war can break out at any time due to the reckless behavior of Israel and India in their respective regions.    In this context, the signing of the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement has raised many questions, and people are exploring possible answers. First, what does the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement include? According to available information at this time, the three Muslim countries have joined hands to strengthen their defense cooperation. It sends a strong message to opponents and enemies that any attack on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Turkey will be treated as an attack on all. The aggressor will have to face the wrath of three powers.    Second, why is it important? It is important for two reasons. First, three countries are in hostile regions and face numerous security challenges. Let’s start with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is in a region where Israel is committing the worst genocide in modern history. The genocide in Gaza has destabilized the whole region. Unconditional support from the USA and the West allows Israel to continue the genocide in Gaza with complete immunity. They are providing all types of weapons of mass destruction and financial support to Israel. Even the USA and some Western countries are threatening the International Court of Justice or other UN agencies for asking for accountability of Israel. The USA and Israel’s attack on Iran has further complicated the situation. Iranian attacks on regional countries in the context of US bases are threatening a wide-scale war in the region. Saudi Arabia is also facing direct attacks by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia, especially on oil installations, which pose serious threats to the whole region.     For Pakistan, it has two hostile neighbors, India and Afghanistan. In 2025, India attacked Pakistan based on self-assumed allegations. However, a strong, full-scale retaliation from Pakistan compelled India to come to its knees. Pakistan destroyed many Indian fighter jets and missile systems. India rushed to the USA to beg for a ceasefire. On the other border, Pakistan is facing terrorism originating from Afghanistan. Afghanistan, with the support of India and Israel, has launched a full-scale proxy and terrorism war. It is also harboring terrorist groups such as BLA, TTP, etc. India, acting as a proxy of Israel, is providing full support to terrorists and fueling terrorism in Pakistan.   In the case of Turkey, it is facing multiple threats, including direct threats from Israel, Greece, and some regional proxies. Over the past few months, Israel has begun to portray Turkey as a new threat to Israel. Greece has also been encouraged by Israel and other Western powers to create problems for Turkey. Some Western countries also have historical grievances with Turkey and are seeking opportunities to harm it.    Therefore, this agreement is extremely important for the three countries and for both regions, the Middle East and South Asia.    Third, how will regional countries react, and what impact will the MJDA have on the region? First, Israel will not like it at all. Why? Because it will view it as a hurdle to creating a Greater Israel. Therefore, Israel will do everything to sabotage the agreement. It can use this agreement to create a sectarian divide in the region by portraying Iran as the enemy. It can conspire to instigate sectarian violence in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. The USA and Western countries can also join hands to facilitate Israel. President Trump’s recent statement on the potential role of Syria in tackling the issue of Hezbollah is a strong indication of this strategy. He is urging Israel to stop attacking Lebanon and let the Syrian government fight Hezbollah. Lastly, Israel can also exploit the civilizational context and emotions of the custodians of the Arab, Iranian, and Turkish civilizations. It can trigger feelings of self-greatness and urge each civilization to pursue past glory.     Simultaneously, some elements in Iran, especially those pro-Israel or influenced by Israel, can propagate the MJDA against Iranian interests. They can argue that it will undermine Iran’s status and create hurdles for Iran to become the region’s major power. Proponents of this view can argue that, in the presence of this alliance, it will be difficult for Iran to dominate the region. It would be an ideal situation for Israel and other elements to create a divide along sectarian lines and fan sectarian violence in the region and in respective countries. Therefore, all countries (Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) need to be extremely vigilant and coordinate closely.     Fourth, what would be the reaction of the global community, especially from the USA and China? China and the USA are important because they are major powers at this point in time. First, I do not believe the USA will have an independent view or reaction. It is strongly suspected, rather sure, that Israel will dictate the American response. It is an open secret that Israel does not want peace and stability in the region. Thus, the USA will follow this policy.    It is also in the USA’s interest. How and why? The USA considers the Middle East and South Asia vital to