watches workplace watchdogs

Who Watches the Workplace Watchdogs?

Pakistan has a peculiar relationship with workplace merit.

We talk about it constantly.

Government departments are criticised for delaying promotions. Corporations are questioned over favouritism. Universities are urged to reward academic performance. Employers are told to retain talent. Media organisations routinely expose nepotism, extensions, political appointments and institutional injustice.

But there is a question that is rarely asked:

Do the organisations making these arguments follow the same standards inside their own walls?

The question is particularly relevant to Pakistan’s media industry.

Newspapers and television channels have considerable influence over how society understands fairness at work. They report on workers denied promotions, bureaucrats given extensions, senior officials superseded and institutions accused of favouritism.

But journalism cannot demand accountability from everyone else while exempting itself from scrutiny.

That is where the conversation around employee retention, promotions and extensions becomes uncomfortable.

The Extension That Blocks an Entire Career Ladder

In any hierarchical organisation, one senior position can determine the careers of dozens of people below it.

When a person occupying a senior position retires, the organisation has several choices.

It can promote someone from within.

It can recruit externally.

It can restructure the position.

Or, where there is a genuine institutional requirement, it can retain the individual for a defined period.

The problem begins when an exception becomes a culture.

A six-month extension becomes another year.

A temporary arrangement becomes a permanent arrangement.

A retired employee is brought back.

Another extension follows.

Meanwhile, people below continue waiting.

For them, the issue is not merely that someone has been allowed to continue working.

It is that their own careers may have been placed on hold to accommodate someone else’s continued career.

That distinction is often ignored in Pakistan.

Even Dawn Has Written About This Problem

Dawn itself has been among the publications highlighting the damage caused by prolonged temporary arrangements.

In a May 2026 editorial titled “Ad hoc culture,” Dawn criticised the practice of keeping people in higher positions through prolonged temporary arrangements, noting that such practices can leave employees without formal promotion, financial benefits or recognition of seniority. It specifically highlighted the frustration of employees whose seniority is bypassed.

That position is difficult to disagree with.

In fact, it is precisely the position that responsible journalism should take.

But it also raises a more uncomfortable question:

What happens when the same principles are applied to the media organisations themselves?

The Dawn Question

Dawn has long presented itself as an institution committed to professional journalism, institutional accountability and workers’ rights.

Its pages have repeatedly carried arguments in favour of merit-based promotions and against prolonged ad-hoc arrangements.

A January 2026 Dawn editorial page contribution on academic promotions, for example, argued that delayed promotions erode meritocracy, demotivate employees and can drive talented professionals towards private institutions or overseas opportunities.

In another recent editorial, Dawn argued that prolonged temporary arrangements can stagnate careers and deprive employees of financial progression and recognition.

These are sound principles.

But principles become meaningful only when they are applied consistently.

And this is where, based on my own knowledge of the organisation, an uncomfortable contradiction deserves examination.

Dawn’s senior management structure has itself seen prolonged extensions, while retired managers have, according to my knowledge, been brought back into employment in Lahore and elsewhere.

That raises a straightforward question:

If retaining retired or extended senior personnel is justified by institutional necessity, why should the same practice be criticised when governments or other organisations do it?

And if prolonged extensions are capable of blocking the careers of younger employees in government departments, why would the principle suddenly cease to apply inside a media organisation?

This is not an argument against experience.

Nor is it an argument that every retired employee should automatically be removed.

Experience has value.

Institutional memory has value.

A highly experienced editor or manager can be extremely difficult to replace.

But institutional value cannot become a permanent justification for blocking succession.

Fifteen Years Is a Long Time in Any Profession

The question becomes even more significant when a senior position remains occupied for an exceptionally long period.

From my own knowledge of Dawn, its editor has remained in the position for nearly 15 years through extensions.

Again, the question is not whether an individual is competent.

The question is whether an institution that advocates professional advancement should also have a mechanism for developing and promoting the next generation of leadership.

Fifteen years is enough time for an entire generation of journalists to enter an organisation, build careers, become senior reporters, become editors and eventually expect to take on greater responsibility.

If the top positions remain occupied indefinitely, where does that generation go?

There is a very real distinction between retaining talent and preventing succession.

A healthy institution must know the difference.

The Supreme Court Has Now Entered This Conversation

This is no longer merely an HR theory.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue in remarkably strong terms.

In January 2026, the court ruled that government departments could not use administrative inefficiency and procedural delays as an excuse for denying employees timely consideration for promotion. It held that promotion is connected to merit, performance and operational requirements, and said employees should not suffer because a department failed to convene promotion committees or relied excessively on acting arrangements.

Four months later, in May 2026, the Supreme Court went further.

It held that prolonged ad-hoc, look-after, current-charge, acting-charge and additional-charge arrangements can amount to exploitation. The case involved a Pakistan Railways employee who had performed duties of a higher post for nearly eight years before receiving regular promotion.

The court’s reasoning is important because it moves the debate beyond bureaucratic procedure.

It is about human beings and their careers.

A person who spends years doing higher-level work without receiving corresponding recognition, seniority or financial benefits is not merely dealing with an administrative inconvenience.

Their career is being affected.

What Happens to the Person Waiting Below?

This is the part of the Pakistani workplace debate we often ignore.

We discuss the person receiving the extension.

We discuss their experience.

We discuss their importance.

We discuss how difficult they would be to replace.

But we rarely discuss the person sitting below them.

The deputy who cannot become director.

The assistant manager who cannot become manager.

The reporter who cannot move into editorial management.

The professor waiting for promotion.

The civil servant waiting for the next grade.

The employee who has spent ten years preparing for a position that never becomes available.

That person also has a career.

That person also has a family.

That person also has ambitions.

And that person eventually has a choice.

Wait—or leave.

When “Retention” Becomes an Excuse

Pakistani organisations frequently say they want to retain experienced employees.

There is nothing wrong with that.

But retention should not become a magic word that ends every discussion.

If an organisation genuinely needs a retired employee’s expertise, it can retain them as a consultant.

It can appoint them for a defined project.

It can create an advisory role.

It can establish a fixed-term arrangement with transparent terms.

But if the same person continues occupying the position that should logically become part of a succession plan, the organisation needs to explain why.

Otherwise, “we need his experience” becomes indistinguishable from:

“We don’t want anyone else to have the position.”

The Media Industry Cannot Be Exempt

This is particularly important for media organisations.

Journalists routinely question government departments about:

– extensions;

– delayed promotions;

– acting appointments;

– supersession;

– nepotism;

– favouritism;

– lack of transparency;

– and the treatment of retired officials.

They should.

But journalism also has an internal obligation.

The same standard of scrutiny must apply inside the newsroom.

A newspaper cannot argue that a government department should promote deserving employees while maintaining opaque career structures of its own.

A television channel cannot criticise corporate nepotism while refusing to explain how senior appointments are made internally.

A media house cannot demand transparency from public institutions while treating questions about its own management practices as inappropriate.

The press should not be above accountability.

Its credibility depends on it.

The Irony of Dawn

There is therefore an unavoidable irony in the case of Dawn.

Its journalism has frequently exposed precisely the institutional behaviours that employees across Pakistan complain about.

Dawn has reported cases where prolonged extensions affected promotion prospects.

It has highlighted the consequences of ad-hocism.

It has carried arguments that merit and performance should determine advancement.

And its reporting on the Supreme Court’s recent rulings has brought renewed attention to the injustice that can arise when temporary arrangements continue indefinitely.

All of that is legitimate and important journalism.

But if these principles are to have credibility, they must also survive an examination of the institution that publishes them.

That does not mean every allegation against a media organisation is true.

It does mean that media organisations should be willing to answer questions about themselves with the same seriousness with which they ask questions of others.

If Dawn believes that prolonged extensions can frustrate promotion and create institutional stagnation, it should be able to explain how its own senior management and succession practices reconcile with that principle.

If retired managers are retained or rehired, there should be a clear explanation of why, for how long and under what criteria.

If senior positions are extended repeatedly, there should be a transparent explanation of the institutional reasoning.

And if there is a genuine succession plan, employees should know what it is.

That is not hostility towards Dawn.

That is exactly the kind of accountability that a newspaper should welcome.

Retired Does Not Mean Useless

There is another point worth making.

The argument should never be reduced to “retired people should leave.”

That would be unfair and simplistic.

Pakistan has an enormous pool of experienced professionals whose expertise remains valuable after retirement.

The issue is not age.

The issue is opportunity and structure.

An organisation can benefit from an experienced retired employee while simultaneously creating opportunities for younger employees.

A consultancy role can transfer institutional knowledge.

A mentoring role can develop younger staff.

A fixed-term project can utilise specialist expertise.

A board or advisory position can preserve institutional memory.

The problem arises when experience is used as a reason to permanently occupy the career ladder.

The Real Cost Is Paid by the Next Generation

When senior positions remain blocked, the damage is not always immediately visible.

The employee does not necessarily resign tomorrow.

Instead, motivation gradually disappears.

They stop volunteering for additional responsibilities.

They stop believing promises about promotion.

They begin looking outside.

Some move to competitors.

Some join international organisations.

Some move abroad.

Others simply become disengaged.

The organisation then complains about a lack of loyalty.

But loyalty cannot survive indefinitely without opportunity.

Pakistan’s Best Employees Have Options

This is especially true in today’s economy.

A talented Pakistani professional no longer has to depend exclusively on the organisation where they started.

LinkedIn has changed professional networking.

Remote work has changed geography.

International companies can recruit Pakistani professionals.

Freelancing has created alternative income streams.

Startups provide new career paths.

The best employees therefore have more choices than previous generations.

If an organisation repeatedly tells them to wait while senior positions remain occupied indefinitely, eventually they will stop waiting.

And when they leave, another company benefits from the investment that the original employer made in developing them.

The Question Every Organisation Should Ask

Every organisation—government, corporate, media, academic or otherwise—should ask itself five questions:

How long should a temporary appointment last?

When does an extension become institutional stagnation?

What happens to the people waiting below?

What is our succession plan?

And perhaps the most important question:

Are we retaining experienced people—or preventing the next generation from advancing?

These are not anti-seniority questions.

They are pro-institution questions.

An institution that depends permanently on one person is not necessarily strong.

It may actually be fragile.

A strong institution creates successors.

A strong institution transfers knowledge.

A strong institution rewards performance.

A strong institution makes room for younger leadership.

And a strong institution can survive when one person eventually leaves.

Who Watches the Watchdogs?

Pakistan needs better workplace cultures.

Government departments need transparent promotion systems.

Private companies need meaningful career paths.

Media organisations need internal accountability.

Universities need timely promotions.

And managers need to understand that employees are not simply resources to be retained.

They are professionals building careers.

The irony is that some of the strongest voices demanding these reforms are themselves part of institutions that must answer the same questions.

That is not a reason to silence criticism.

It is a reason to make the criticism more honest.

Dawn has every right to scrutinise Pakistan’s bureaucrats, corporations and governments.

But Dawn, like every other institution, must also accept scrutiny.

The standard should be simple:

If it is wrong when someone else does it, it should at least require an explanation when we do it ourselves.

Pakistan does not need workplaces where people remain in positions forever because they are experienced.

It needs workplaces where experience is transferred, merit is rewarded and succession is planned.

Because retaining one person indefinitely may protect an individual’s position.

But creating opportunities for the next generation is what protects an institution.

And ultimately, the credibility of any organisation—including a newspaper—is measured not only by what it says about fairness, but by how fairly it treats the people who work inside it.

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  • Circular debt: claims collapse, liabilities return

    The government’s claims of containing power-sector circular debt have not survived the test of its own year-end figures. During the fiscal year (FY) 2025–26, another Rs. 364 billion was added to the flow of circular debt. This happened despite the provision of Rs. 302 billion in subsidies and repeated assurances that operational improvements, tariff adjustments, negotiations with independent power producers and financial restructuring had brought the problem under control. According to the latest report, the gross addition of Rs. 364 billion was Rs. 319 billion, or 709 percent, higher than in the preceding year. After using Rs. 302 billion of public money to reduce the accumulated liability, the reported stock still increased by about Rs. 61 billion from its June 2025 level of Rs.1.614 trillion. These numbers expose the difference between managing the recorded stock and stopping the recurring flow. A subsidy can reduce the amount appearing in the circular-debt account on a particular date. It cannot remove the inefficiencies, payment defaults, regulatory delays and governance failures that create new liabilities every month. The Power Division had taken a very different position earlier. Responding to reports that circular debt had risen during July–November 2025, it described the increase as seasonal and maintained that such variations normally reversed during the second half of the financial year. Its official rebuttal predicted that the circular-debt position would be fully contained by June 2026, with no net addition to the overall stock. The financial year has ended with a gross flow of Rs. 364 billion and a net increase even after a large fiscal injection. The promised reversal did not take place. The language of containment concealed continued deterioration in the financial operations of the power sector. The reported composition of the increase is equally disturbing. Inefficiencies of power distribution companies caused losses of Rs. 262 billion, only Rs. 3 billion less than in the preceding year. Lower recovery of electricity bills added Rs. 64 billion. Interest charges contributed another Rs. 14 billion, while delays in tariff adjustments added Rs. 75 billion. A further Rs. 194 billion arose from non-payment by K-Electric, reportedly connected with the delay in determining its multi-year tariff. This cannot be classified as an unavoidable commercial loss. It represents a failure of regulation, contract administration and timely governmental decision-making. When tariff determinations, subsidy decisions or payment settlements are delayed, the resulting liability does not disappear. It moves through the electricity chain until it is recorded as circular debt and passed to taxpayers or consumers. The reported components and adjustments must be examined carefully when the complete official statement is released. The latest report available on ministry’s website is of April 2026. The Power Division has not placed even its one-page circular-debt reports from May to July 2026 on its website. Public discussion is consequently being conducted based on figures reported in the press. The government cannot demand acceptance of its success narrative while withholding the underlying data required testing it. The Rs. 302 billion subsidy used to contain the closing stock was nearly half of the approximately Rs. 630 billion collected in income tax from salaried persons during the same year. This comparison shows the real social cost of power-sector failure. Citizens who have no role in managing distribution companies, finalising tariffs or settling inter-company disputes are required to finance the consequences through taxation. They also pay through electricity tariffs, surcharges, fuel-price adjustments and declining service quality. Honest consumers are charged for theft, poor recoveries, technical losses and delayed official decisions. As tariffs rise, more households and businesses with adequate resources shift to rooftop solar systems. The grid is left with a shrinking base of paying consumers and a large stock of fixed capacity costs. Tariffs must then be raised further to recover those costs from fewer units sold. The policy response itself deepens the financial problem. For more than a decade, governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have relied heavily on tariff increases, periodic adjustments, withdrawal of subsidies and additional surcharges. These measures may narrow the accounting gap temporarily, but they do not establish commercial discipline within distribution companies or personal accountability for persistent losses. The IMF reportedly allowed up to Rs. 400 billion to be added to the circular-debt flow during FY 2025–26, while requiring the government to neutralise the addition through budgetary subsidies. This approach turns circular debt into an exercise in fiscal presentation. A liability generated inside the electricity system is paid from the federal budget and then described as contained. The loss has not been eliminated. Its location has changed. The same problem arises with the Rs. 1.225 trillion circular-debt settlement plan. Refinancing expensive liabilities at more favourable rates can reduce financing costs and provide immediate liquidity. It does not constitute retirement of debt in any economic sense when the replacement financing has to be repaid over six years through charges imposed on electricity consumers. Pakistan will be servicing yesterday’s circular debt while the unreformed system continues creating fresh liabilities. Financial engineering is being presented as reform because it postpones recognition of the full fiscal burden. Liquidity becomes a substitute for correcting the institutions responsible for the crisis. The proposed privatisation of the distribution companies also requires closer scrutiny. The government has started with Faisalabad, Gujranwala and Islamabad electricity supply companies, which are among the relatively better-performing entities. Selling profitable or manageable companies while retaining those responsible for the largest losses will not remove the structural deficit. It may deprive the public sector of its stronger revenue-generating assets while leaving taxpayers responsible for the weakest companies. Privatisation can improve performance where there is transparent valuation, effective regulation and genuine transfer of commercial risk. It cannot succeed if private investors acquire the sound operations while the state remains responsible for accumulated liabilities, political interference, theft-prone areas and unrecoverable receivables. That would amount to privatisation of gains and socialisation of losses. A credible reform programme must begin with full disclosure. Monthly circular-debt reports should identify, company by company, transmission and distribution losses, recovery ratios, unpaid

  • Debtocracy & bankruptcy of ideas   

    Pakistan’s debt problem has entered a new phase. The headline figure is alarming: total debt and liabilities reached Rs. 99.59 trillion by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2025-26. The deeper concern, however, lies in the composition of this debt, the burden of servicing it and the channels through which public borrowing now affects every productive sector of the economy. According to the latest State Bank of Pakistan data, total debt stood at Rs. 97.88 trillion. Gross government domestic debt reached Rs. 59.44 trillion, while external debt amounted to Rs. 36.20 trillion. Central government debt increased by 7.39% over the preceding year to Rs. 83.64 trillion. External debt and liabilities stood at US$138.85 billion. These numbers confirm the central argument developed in the a ten-part series published in these columns [‘Bankruptcy of ideas—X: Debt, Taxes & Democracy’, Minute Mirror, June 21, 2026]. Pakistan has not merely borrowed against its future. It has increasingly borrowed to service earlier borrowing, while failing to create sufficient productive capacity from the accumulated debt.   ‏The external debt-servicing profile for FY2026 makes this particularly clear. Pakistan serviced US$21.59 billion of external debt during the year. An extraordinary US$10.14 billion—nearly half of the annual amount—fell in the final quarter alone. Quarterly servicing was 2.63 times the amount paid in the preceding quarter, mainly because principal repayments jumped from US$2.70 billion in the third quarter to US$8.81 billion in the fourth. This concentration of repayments is as important as the overall debt stock. A country may carry a large debt if its economy generates sufficient revenue, exports and foreign exchange to service it. Pakistan’s difficulty is that debt obligations have expanded much faster than the productive and export capacities needed to meet them. The debt accumulated over decades cannot be attributed to one government or one fiscal year. Persistent fiscal deficits, a narrow and inequitable tax base, losses of state-owned enterprises, the energy-sector circular debt, excessive recurrent expenditure, exchange-rate depreciation and repeated balance-of-payments crises have all contributed to it. Borrowing became the preferred substitute for reform.  Governments borrowed because they could not tax influential sectors, restructure loss-making enterprises, reduce wasteful expenditure or build a competitive export economy. External lenders financed temporary stability, while domestic banks financed the fiscal deficit. Each arrangement postponed difficult decisions without removing the causes of the crisis. The Ministry of Finance reported public debt at 70.7% of GDP by June 2025. The ratio may improve when nominal GDP grows faster than debt, especially during periods of inflation, fiscal consolidation and lower interest rates. A declining debt-to-GDP ratio, however, does not necessarily mean that the debt burden has become harmless. Pakistan’s debt stock is still increasing. What has improved is the immediate cost of servicing parts of it. Total debt and liabilities servicing declined from Rs. 13.16 trillion in FY2025 to Rs. 11.97 trillion in FY2026. Interest payments on debt fell by more than 23%, from Rs. 9.47 trillion to Rs. 7.27 trillion, largely because lower policy rates reduced the cost of servicing domestic government debt. Interest payments on gross government domestic debt consequently fell from Rs. 8.08 trillion to Rs5.99 trillion. This is welcome relief. It should not be presented as the end of the debt crisis. Lower interest rates reduce the flow cost of debt; they do not extinguish the stock. Principal repayments on external debt and liabilities increased from Rs. 3.47 trillion to Rs. 4.47 trillion during FY2026. Pakistan therefore obtained relief on domestic interest payments while facing a substantially heavier external repayment burden. The distinction is between debt management and economic transformation. Pakistan may be moving from an acute debt-accumulation crisis towards a more manageable financing position. It has not escaped debtocracy—the system in which fiscal policy, taxation, banking, foreign relations and development priorities become subordinate to the requirements of borrowing and repayment. Debtocracy does not remain confined to the accounts of the Ministry of Finance. It is transmitted throughout the economy. The first channel is the banking system. Government securities offer banks sovereign backing, liquidity and attractive risk-adjusted returns. Lending to the government is easier than evaluating businesses, financing innovation or supporting small and medium enterprises. A large domestic borrowing requirement therefore creates continuous competition for available liquidity. The result is crowding out. The State obtains the funds it requires, banks earn relatively secure returns and the private sector bears the adjustment. Productive businesses face limited access to credit, higher risk premiums and shorter financing horizons. Smaller enterprises suffer the most because they cannot compete with the sovereign for bank liquidity. This creates a financial system that can remain profitable while the productive economy remains weak. Deposits are mobilised from citizens and businesses, channelled into government securities, and then used substantially to meet recurrent expenditure and service earlier debt. Banking expands without an equivalent expansion in productive capacity. The second channel operates through foreign exchange. External debt repayment creates demand for dollars. That demand places pressure on reserves and the current account. Any resulting exchange-rate depreciation increases the rupee value of external liabilities and raises the domestic price of imported fuel, machinery, raw materials and intermediate goods.  The chain is direct: External repayment creates foreign-exchange demand; reserve pressure increases exchange-rate sensitivity; depreciation generates imported inflation; and inflation raises working-capital requirements and production costs. Debt consequently becomes a corporate balance-sheet issue. An industrial enterprise may have no external loan, yet still bear the effects of sovereign external debt through a weaker rupee, costlier imports, higher energy prices and restricted access to domestic credit. Consumers ultimately pay through inflation, reduced employment and lower real incomes. The third channel is fiscal. Every rupee allocated to debt servicing is a rupee unavailable for education, health, water, climate resilience and productive infrastructure—unless the State raises additional revenue or borrows again. Pakistan then enters a circular arrangement: borrowing creates servicing obligations, servicing compresses development expenditure, weak development limits growth and revenue, and insufficient revenue necessitates further borrowing. This is why a primary surplus, though necessary, is not sufficient. It can stabilise debt dynamics, but

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