Rice water for hair facts vs myths

By Rai Saad Ali Three folders, two green and one crimson, changed hands beneath a portrait of Saudi King Salman at Al-Safa Palace in Mecca, the ink still fresh on the pages inside. Erdoğan, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and Shehbaz Sharif held them up for the cameras at the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence on August 7th, 2026. It was a carefully staged image, and the message was unmistakable: three of the Muslim world’s most consequential states, standing together in Islam’s holiest city, making clear that the region’s old security order is no longer one whose terms they are content merely to accept. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed that day by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, commits each signatory to treat an armed attack against any one of them as an attack against all three. It builds on the bilateral Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed by Islamabad and Riyadh in 2025, but Türkiye’s accession changes the strategic arithmetic considerably. What was previously a two-country understanding, rooted in a decades-old relationship, is now a trilateral framework spanning the eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf and South Asia — and it was signed without so much as a courtesy call to New Delhi. That mutual-defence clause is exactly what has prompted comparisons to NATO’s Article 5, which treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. But the parallel does not hold up well under scrutiny. It would be misleading to oversell this agreement as a “Muslim NATO.” It is not one. The pact names no adversary, creates no joint military command, and does not specify what response would be required if a signatory were attacked. It establishes a framework for defence cooperation and coordination rather than a NATO-style alliance with clearly defined operational commitments, and Saudi officials have stressed that the agreement is defensive in character and not directed against any particular country. That distinction matters. NATO is more than seventy years old and has evolved into a mature institutional and military alliance over generations; the Mecca Agreement is still in its infancy. Over time, it could develop stronger institutions and deeper coordination that bring it closer in character to NATO. For now, that remains a possibility rather than an established trajectory. Yet dismissing the agreement as merely aspirational would be its own mistake. Frameworks matter, especially when they are signed in Mecca rather than in a foreign ministry conference room. The choice of venue was not incidental. It was a statement about whose summit this is, and who now gets to convene the Muslim world’s most powerful states at a moment when Washington’s security guarantees have begun to look less than absolute. That erosion of confidence in Washington is precisely what makes the partnership’s internal logic so coherent: each partner brings something the others lack, and that complementarity is the pact’s real substance. Turkey supplies NATO’s second-largest standing military and an increasingly self-sufficient defence-industrial base — the same industry that in 2023 sold Saudi Arabia drones in what Ankara called its largest defence export deal to date, and which has for years supplied Pakistan with warships and trainer aircraft. Pakistan brings the only nuclear deterrent in the Muslim world and a military establishment with decades of experience training and advising Gulf forces. Saudi Arabia brings the capital and the religious legitimacy that only the custodian of the two holy mosques can offer. What ties these three complementary roles together is a detail that deserves precision rather than a slogan. Pakistan’s air force flies the JF-17 Thunder, co-produced with China. Türkiye, a NATO member since 1952, has simultaneously built its own defence-industrial relationship with Beijing even as it remains formally inside the Western alliance system. That a NATO state, a nuclear-armed South Asian state with deep Chinese defence ties, and the Gulf’s foremost oil power can now sit inside the same mutual-defence framework shows how far the unipolar security order of the post-Cold War decades has already eroded. This is not a Pakistani ambition imposed on the region. It is a regional response to a security vacuum that Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s conduct in West Asia has itself created. The timing explains the substance. The pact was signed more than five months into the US-Israel war on Iran, a conflict that has sent missile and drone fire onto Gulf infrastructure and shipping, with Houthi strikes compounding the sense among Gulf capitals that American deterrence no longer covers them the way it once did. Riyadh, battered directly by this spillover, has drawn the obvious conclusion: a security guarantee is only as good as the willingness of the guarantor to honour it, and Washington’s recent conduct has not inspired confidence on that score. Ankara and Islamabad, for their part, were the two capitals best positioned to answer that call — one with hard power, the other with a record of reliability as a security partner to the Kingdom stretching back decades, long before this agreement made it formal. While Ankara and Islamabad were positioning themselves as reliable partners, New Delhi’s response has been telling in its caution. The Ministry of External Affairs said only that India is “closely following” developments and will “study the implications” — the language of a capital reacting to events it did not shape, rather than one setting the regional agenda. That contrast is the real story here, more than any single clause in the agreement’s text. That caution is not merely rhetorical. The substantive concern for India is not abstract: analysts have already flagged the live question of how a mutual-defence clause would be read if India were to conduct cross-border counter-terror operations against targets inside Pakistan, as it has in the past — even as others note such operations sit in a different legal category from state-on-state aggression. That ambiguity is itself a diplomatic cost to India: a Gulf partner it has spent two decades cultivating on energy, trade and counter-terrorism cooperation has now formally elevated Pakistan to treaty-partner status, indifferent to how

By Dr Naveeda Katper Different countries have different characteristics regarding population, geography, and natural resources that shape their economic growth. Economists use various indicators to measure development, and population is one of the most debated among them. A large population is often viewed as a hurdle to economic growth. However, every issue deserves to be examined from different angles. The question, “Is a large population a curse or a blessing?” cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. We need to move beyond the idea of population as a burden and understand the concept of the demographic dividend. What appears to be a curse can become a blessing when viewed through the right perspective and supported by the right policies. Research by the RAND Corporation and the World Bank has shown that countries with a growing working-age population can experience faster economic growth when supported by sound education, health, and employment policies. Whether a large population becomes an economic asset depends on governance and public policy. A growing population is not necessarily a curse because every additional mind brings new ideas, different perspectives, and fresh solutions to existing problems. One mind can accomplish one task, two minds can accomplish two, and millions of minds can achieve far more. That is the value of teamwork and collective human potential. Every individual possesses different skills, abilities, and talents that can contribute to national development. What many consider a burden may actually become a country’s greatest strength if those human resources are properly developed. This is the essence of the demographic dividend—the economic advantage that emerges when the working-age population becomes larger than the dependent population. Development economists describe this period as a “window of opportunity” rather than a guaranteed outcome. Highly populated countries can utilize their youthful population to strengthen their economies. After India, China, the United States, and Indonesia, Pakistan is the fifth most populous country in the world. This should be seen as an opportunity rather than a challenge because more than 65 percent of Pakistan’s population consists of young people. That gives the country a significant advantage. A demographic dividend can only be realized when the working-age population is educated, healthy, skilled, and productively employed. When more people are working and contributing to the economy, household savings increase, investment grows, government spending on dependents declines, and both economic output and per capita income improve. The World Bank has repeatedly emphasized that human capital—education, health, and skills—is one of the strongest drivers of long-term productivity and national income. The real challenge is identifying the policies required to achieve this dividend. A country can benefit only if it creates sufficient employment opportunities, provides quality education and skill development, ensures access to healthcare, encourages women to participate in the workforce, and maintains stable economic and public policies. When these conditions exist, the country enjoys faster economic growth, greater productivity, increased investment and savings, improved living standards, and stronger entrepreneurship and innovation. Economic growth becomes inevitable when people are hardworking, equipped with multiple skills from an early age, and capable of adapting to changing economic demands. Skilled and self-reliant citizens become the driving force of national development. Evidence from South Korea, Singapore, and Ireland shows that investment in education and skills transformed youthful populations into globally competitive economies. However, a demographic dividend can quickly become a demographic burden if employment opportunities and skills do not keep pace with population growth. The consequences may include rising unemployment, poverty, social unrest, and migration. Economists and demographers consistently argue that a demographic dividend is not automatic; it is an opportunity that must be earned through effective governance and strong institutions. Without adequate planning and investment, a large youth population can become a liability instead of an asset. The International Labour Organization has warned that persistent youth unemployment can reduce economic productivity and increase social instability. A dynamic economy capable of creating millions of formal-sector jobs each year is essential for absorbing a growing workforce. Human capital development should remain at the center of national policy. Strong educational systems, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), digital literacy, coding, digital finance, and technology-based curricula should be introduced from the early years of education. Equal opportunities for girls and women in education and employment are equally important. Pakistan also needs job creation, labour market reforms, export-led manufacturing, labour flexibility, investment in high-value industries such as technology, electronics, and specialized services, support for youth entrepreneurship and microfinance, and stronger healthcare infrastructure. UNESCO has consistently highlighted that technical and vocational education equips young people with practical skills that improve employability and economic resilience. Pakistan possesses one of the largest youth populations in the region, but this advantage can only be realized through greater investment in education, skills, and employment. In conclusion, population control alone is not a long-term solution to economic growth. Developing people’s abilities, expanding opportunities, and investing in human capital are far more effective. The experiences of countries such as Italy and Japan also demonstrate that declining populations and ageing societies create their own economic challenges. The real question is not how many people a country has, but how well it prepares its people to contribute to national development. Research across both developed and developing countries consistently concludes that people become an economic asset when governments invest in their education, health, productivity, and opportunities rather than viewing population solely as a number. The writer holds a PhD from Malaysia and writes on economic development, public policy, and demographic issues. She can be reached at naveedakatper11@gmail.com