tashkent second home

Tashkent, My Second Home: How Shavkat Mirziyoyev R…

I have a confession to make before I make an argument: I am not a neutral observer of Uzbekistan, and I have never pretended to be. My grandmother was born in Bukhara, and something of that inheritance has stayed with me my whole life, quietly, the way a language half-learned in childhood never fully leaves you. When I finally visited Uzbekistan as an adult, I did not feel like a foreign visitor taking in unfamiliar streets. I felt something closer to what my grandmother must have felt looking at me — an unearned, uncomplicated warmth that asked nothing in return. I have come to understand that feeling as the quiet, private secret of belonging to a place through blood rather than through a passport. Tashkent is, in every way that matters to me, my second home.

It was in that spirit, long before he held the office he holds today, that I once had the chance to meet and listen to Shavkat Mirziyoyev. He was not yet President of Uzbekistan when I encountered him, and I remember being struck less by any title he carried than by the scale of what he was already thinking about out loud: an economic vision that did not stop at Uzbekistan’s borders, a water and energy strategy built for the whole of Central Asia, and a sense — unusual in a region that had spent decades looking inward — that Uzbekistan’s future was inseparable from the future of its neighbors, and ultimately from the future of Asia itself. I did not know, at the time, that I was listening to a future head of state. I knew only that I was listening to someone thinking at a scale most officials never attempt.

That background should not surprise anyone who looks closely at his biography. Mirziyoyev is, by training, an irrigation engineer. He graduated in 1981 from the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Melioration with a degree in mechanical engineering, and went on to earn a doctorate in technical sciences — a foundation in water management and applied engineering, not in the abstractions of political theory. I find something quietly reassuring in that. A leader who has spent his formative years thinking about the physical realities of water — how it moves, where it is wasted, how a system either functions or fails on the ground — tends to bring a different discipline to the running of a country than one who has only ever studied power itself. When he took the presidential oath on 14 December 2016, he inherited a country that had spent decades in careful, deliberate isolation under his predecessor, Islam Karimov. What he has built since is, by any honest measure, one of the most consequential transformations Central Asia has seen in a generation.

Mirziyoyev dismantled that isolation almost immediately. Borders that had been tense and heavily restricted with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were resolved through negotiation rather than standoff. Trade and cross-border travel, once treated with suspicion, were opened. And rather than settling for improved bilateral relations, he proposed something more ambitious still: formalizing the informal annual summits among Central Asian leaders into a standing “Community of Central Asia,” with a rotating presidency and a permanent secretariat, built around shared trade, water management, transport infrastructure, and coordinated engagement with Afghanistan. It is the kind of regional architecture Central Asia lacked for the entire post-Soviet period, and it is very hard to picture it emerging under any of his predecessors.

The economic numbers now validate what, in that early conversation, still sounded like ambition rather than achievement. Uzbekistan implemented $43.1 billion in foreign investment in its most recent reporting period, of which $38.2 billion arrived as foreign direct investment — a 24 % surge over the prior year, and enough to make Uzbekistan the largest recipient of accumulated FDI stock in Central Asia, ahead of Kazakhstan. FDI absorption climbed from $19.5 billion in 2023 to $31.9 billion in 2024 before reaching this year’s historic peak, with a single record quarter bringing in $1.7 billion in net balance-of-payments inflows. China remains the leading investor at $17.1 billion, followed by Russia at $4.8 billion, with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, the UAE, and the United Kingdom all expanding their footprints. The capital is not concentrated in one sector either: energy and renewables lead at $7.1 billion, including ACWA Power’s $2.4 billion wind installation in Karakalpakstan, alongside major investment in agriculture, construction, and mining. The country’s foreign reserves stood at roughly $63.75 billion as of June 2026, after peaking above $77 billion earlier in the year, while real GDP grew 7.7 % in 2025 and is projected to hold near 6.8 % through 2026.

None of this happened by accident. Uzbekistan built nearly a thousand Free Economic Zones offering genuine tax relief and simplified customs. It collapsed business registration into a single electronic government portal, cutting the cost of starting a company to roughly $27. It fully liberalized its currency and removed the foreign exchange barriers that once made profit repatriation a genuine deterrent to investors. This is not a country hoping investors will come. It is a country that examined, line by line, every friction that had historically kept them away, and removed it.

But the achievement I find most remarkable is geographic, because geography is the one obstacle policy alone usually cannot solve. Uzbekistan is one of only two doubly landlocked countries on Earth — a nation whose neighbors are themselves landlocked, placing it about as far from open water as any country can be. For most of its history, that was treated as a permanent constraint. Mirziyoyev has instead treated it as an engineering problem to be solved, which is precisely how an irrigation engineer would see it. The Trans-Afghan Railway, first proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018 and finally formalized in a trilateral framework agreement signed with Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 2025, will run roughly 650 kilometres from Termez on the Uzbek border through Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, and Logar, crossing into Pakistan at Kharlachi in the Kurram district, and connecting onward to the Pakistani rail network and the seaports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. Once operational, it is projected to cut cargo transit time between Uzbekistan and Pakistan from 35 days to as little as three, while freight volumes are expected to reach 15 to 20 million tonnes annually by 2030 — the first direct rail access Central Asia will have ever had to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean beyond it.

I believe Mirziyoyev’s ambition here does not end with freight. Given the scale of everything else he has already delivered, I do not think it is unreasonable to hope that this corridor becomes, in time, a fully electrified, high-speed passenger and cargo route — a dual-track electric line carrying people and goods from Tashkent through Kabul to Karachi, turning a doubly landlocked nation into a genuine crossroads between Central Asia and the sea. I say this as a vision worth pursuing, not yet as an engineering fact on the ground. But I have watched enough of what this leader has already turned from ambition into infrastructure to believe he is precisely the kind of committed, technically-minded leader capable of finishing what he starts.

I am writing this now because I am hearing something directly from investors across the Middle East who once treated Uzbekistan as a curiosity: they are actively telling me they intend to shift their operations there. They describe an investment climate that feels, in their own words, close to unmatched anywhere in the world — predictable regulation, genuine ease of doing business, and a government that treats capital as a partner rather than a target for extraction.

That is the real lesson Uzbekistan now offers countries like my own, struggling simultaneously with economic fragility and deteriorating law and order. Transformation of this scale was not achieved through slogans or foreign aid alone. It was achieved by an engineer who treated his country’s problems as solvable systems, removed friction wherever he found it, and built connective infrastructure toward the sea instead of accepting geography as fate. Uzbekistan did not wait for the world to notice it. It re-engineered itself until the world had no choice but to.

Similar Posts

  • Pranking a nation isn’t wise

    There are many ways to confuse a nation. You can give contradictory statements, hold three press conferences saying three different things, or announce that everything is perfectly normal while the entire country is wondering why nothing looks normal. Or, if you are particularly creative, you can take a Supreme Court order directing a prisoner to one hospital and take him to another. Welcome to Pakistan, where even a hospital transfer can become a constitutional thriller. The Supreme Court ordered that Imran Khan, the incarcerated former prime minister, be shifted from Adiala Jail to Shifa International Hospital for medical examination and treatment. The order was specific about the medical arrangements, including a multidisciplinary medical board and the involvement of his personal physician and his sister, Dr Uzma. The Court also emphasised the State’s obligation to safeguard the life, health, dignity and security of a person in custody and directed compliance with its order in letter and spirit. One might reasonably assume that the next scene would be rather straightforward. The ambulance would arrive, the prisoner would leave the jail, the ambulance would reach Shifa, doctors would examine the patient, the court order would be fulfilled, and the nation would go home. But this is Pakistan. Here, apparently, even an ambulance needs constitutional interpretation. Instead of Shifa International, Imran Khan was taken to PIMS. The government says the change was made because of security considerations and insists that he was examined by specialists, including doctors associated with Shifa. After a brief medical examination, he was returned to Adiala Jail. And suddenly the nation was presented with a fascinating new concept in constitutional law: the destination may be different, but apparently the spirit is the same. Imagine ordering a prisoner to be taken to Lahore and the authorities taking him to Peshawar, then announcing, “Don’t worry. Both cities have hospitals.” This is not disobedience, apparently. This is administrative creativity. The Supreme Court says Shifa. The government says PIMS. The nation says, “Excuse me, did we miss a constitutional amendment?” The government’s explanation is security. Of course, security is a serious matter. Nobody sensible would argue otherwise. A former prime minister with millions of supporters cannot simply be moved around without adequate security arrangements. But there is a small constitutional inconvenience here: the Supreme Court itself had already directed the government to make adequate security arrangements for Khan’s stay at Shifa. So the obvious question is, if security was the problem, why was the solution not presented to the very court that had issued the order? Why not go back and say, “Your Lordships, we have a security problem. Kindly permit PIMS instead.” That would have been boring. And boring, apparently, is not Pakistan’s preferred method of governance. Instead, the country got a plot twist. The government challenged the Supreme Court’s direction, while its review petition reportedly faced procedural objections. Then Khan was taken to PIMS instead of the hospital specifically named in the Court’s order. It is almost as if the Constitution was handed a boarding pass for Shifa and somehow ended up at PIMS. Perhaps the poor Constitution missed its flight. Then came the most remarkable part. The government said Imran Khan was medically fit after the examination and returned him to jail. Wonderful. A man whose health concerns had prompted the Supreme Court to intervene was taken for a medical examination, declared fit and returned to prison within hours. What a remarkably efficient healthcare system Pakistan has suddenly discovered. You enter as a prisoner, you are examined by specialists, you are declared fit, and you leave. No waiting room, no follow-up appointment, no parking problem , just straight back to jail. If only the rest of Pakistan’s healthcare system worked at this speed. Of course, satire aside, the matter is not funny. That is precisely why it is funny. Because beneath the absurdity lies a very serious constitutional question. The Supreme Court did not merely say, “Take Imran Khan somewhere and let a doctor look at him.” It laid down specific arrangements concerning the hospital, the medical board, the involvement of his personal physician and his sister, and the treatment of a person in state custody. The Court recognised that imprisonment does not extinguish a prisoner’s entitlement to humane treatment and necessary medical care. So when a government changes the practical implementation of a specific judicial direction, the public is entitled to ask whether this is compliance or reinterpretation. And there is a very thin line between the two. A government that disagrees with a judicial order has legal remedies. It can appeal. It can seek review. It can request modification. It can explain security concerns. What it should not casually establish is a new constitutional principle, “Yes, Your Lordships, we received your order. We have made some adjustments.” Because once that principle becomes normal, it will not remain confined to Imran Khan. Today it is a former prime minister. Tomorrow it could be an opposition leader. The day after tomorrow, it could be an ordinary citizen. And then someone will discover that the court ordered one thing, but the administration considered another thing more convenient. That is where the real danger begins. The issue, therefore, is bigger than Imran Khan. It is bigger than PTI. It is even bigger than the government of the day. It concerns whether judicial orders are binding instructions or merely suggestions sent to the executive branch for consideration. Because if a court says “Shifa” and the executive says “PIMS,” the citizen naturally wonders, who actually decides? The judges? The administration? The security establishment? Or whoever has the microphone that afternoon? There is another uncomfortable question. Does Imran Khan’s life matter to the state? The official answer is obviously yes. The government says he is receiving medical care, has been examined repeatedly and is being treated according to the rules applicable to prisoners. It has rejected allegations of medical neglect and mistreatment, then why Imran khan stated many times to his sister Dr Uzma Khan

  • Riyadh’s Strategic Triangle: Security, Stabi…

    The visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister and Chief of Defence Staff to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 6–7 August 2026 was officially presented as a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), accompanied by the performance of religious rituals in Islam’s holy cities. Yet, diplomacy is often conducted between the lines rather than in official communiqués. French newspapers, Indian news agencies, and Israeli media all reported that Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia were working toward a defence agreement expected to be signed on Friday. While no official confirmation has emerged, the reports have generated an important strategic debate. If such an agreement is indeed under discussion, what is its real agenda? Would it amount to a military alliance, and if so, against whom would it operate? More fundamentally, why would Pakistan and Türkiye, both facing considerable economic pressures, seek to enter such an arrangement? Or are we witnessing the gradual birth of a new regional security architecture in the vacuum created by the declining American military footprint in the Middle East, with Pakistan assuming an anchoring role?   The first narrative comes from Pakistan. Political analyst Parveen Sawamy argues that Pakistan is gradually emerging as the principal anchor of a broader Muslim strategic framework. According to this view, Islamabad has evolved from being merely a facilitator of dialogue to becoming a mediator and now potentially a guarantor of regional security. Among the members of the OIC, Pakistan enjoys a unique diplomatic position. It maintains working relations with almost every important regional actor, consistently supports the Palestinian cause, and remains outside the circle of states that have normalized relations with Israel. This balanced diplomacy provides Islamabad with credibility across the Muslim world.   Pakistan also possesses one of the most experienced armed forces in the Islamic world, capable of contributing to Gulf security should regional circumstances demand it. At the same time, Washington may not necessarily oppose such a role, particularly given the perception that General Asim Munir enjoys constructive relations with the Trump administration. Pakistan’s geographic proximity to Iran further strengthens its credentials, allowing it to maintain channels of communication with Tehran while preserving strategic partnerships with Gulf monarchies. If Islamabad succeeds in converting this diplomatic leverage into economic opportunity, a defence understanding with Riyadh and Ankara could mark the beginning of a new Muslim security framework based on deterrence, mediation, and regional peace rather than confrontation.   The second narrative revolves around Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, despite facing domestic economic challenges, brings decades of NATO experience, an advanced defence industry, and diplomatic flexibility. Türkiye remains a NATO member, maintains dialogue with the United States, preserves working relations with Israel, and simultaneously engages actively with Asian and Muslim nations. Such strategic diversity enables Ankara to serve as a bridge between competing geopolitical camps.   From Türkiye’s perspective, participation in a trilateral framework would capitalize on its military technology and defence manufacturing capabilities while expanding economic cooperation with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Ankara also offers valuable diplomatic experience and could serve as a neutral venue for negotiations during future regional crises. If such cooperation enjoys quiet support from Washington, Türkiye would strengthen both its strategic autonomy and its influence across the Muslim world.   The third and perhaps most decisive narrative belongs to Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) seeks durable security guarantees to preserve investor confidence in Vision 2030 and mega-projects such as NEOM. Economic transformation cannot succeed without regional stability. Recent conflicts have exposed the vulnerability of Gulf infrastructure to missile and drone attacks, prompting Riyadh to reassess its long-term security strategy. MBS increasingly recognizes that American military bases alone cannot guarantee the Kingdom’s security in an era of rapidly changing regional dynamics.   Pakistan and Türkiye therefore emerge as relatively affordable yet credible strategic partners. Saudi energy sustains both economies, while Islamabad and Ankara can provide military expertise, training, and strategic reassurance. More importantly, MBS appears less interested in confronting Iran through perpetual military rivalry than in managing competition through diplomacy backed by credible deterrence. If this approach succeeds, it could reduce regional tensions while safeguarding Saudi Arabia’s ambitious economic transformation.   Whether the reported defence agreement materializes or remains diplomatic speculation, the convergence of Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia reflects an important geopolitical trend. All three states require economic stability, strategic autonomy, and a more reliable regional security framework. Their interests intersect around the need to protect trade, investment, energy infrastructure, and political stability. If this strategic triangle evolves into a formal partnership, its true success will not be measured by the strength of its military capabilities but by its ability to prevent conflict, encourage dialogue, and foster prosperity. In a region long defined by rivalry, the most enduring alliance may ultimately be the one built not for war, but for peace.

  • The Missing Casualties: Why Pakistan Must Count An…

    Every year, Pakistan measures the toll of disasters in human lives. We count the dead, the injured, the displaced, the houses destroyed and the roads washed away. These figures shape government responses, determine compensation, and influence future planning. Yet one category of victims remains almost invisible: animals. Whether floods sweep through Punjab and Sindh, earthquakes strike remote communities, droughts destroy grazing lands, or heatwaves scorch entire districts, there is no comprehensive national system that records how many companion animals, livestock or wild animals die. While the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has significantly advanced Pakistan’s disaster preparedness through technology-driven early warning systems, hazard monitoring and risk analysis, the routine collection and publication of animal mortality data has yet to become a core part of disaster reporting. This is more than a statistical omission. It is a blind spot that weakens disaster preparedness, environmental protection and public health. Animals are not merely victims of disasters; they are indicators of disasters. A sudden increase in deaths among birds, fish, livestock or wildlife can reveal contaminated water, disease outbreaks, toxic pollution, habitat destruction or ecosystem collapse long before these threats become obvious to people. Ignoring these signals means ignoring valuable early warnings. The relationship works in the opposite direction as well. Dead animals left unrecorded and improperly disposed of after floods or other emergencies create serious public health risks. Carcasses contaminate water sources, attract scavengers, encourage insect breeding and may facilitate the spread of infectious diseases if not handled according to veterinary and environmental protocols. Disaster management cannot end when human rescue operations conclude. Recovery also requires environmental sanitation. Pakistan has increasingly embraced the concept of anticipatory disaster management. NDMA now operates sophisticated early warning platforms using satellite monitoring, artificial intelligence, weather forecasting and hazard mapping to reduce disaster risks before they become catastrophes. But even the most advanced technology cannot compensate for missing ecological data collected on the ground. A country cannot manage what it does not measure. Animal mortality data should become as routine as reporting damaged schools or collapsed bridges. It should distinguish between livestock, companion animals and wildlife. It should identify causes of death where possible. It should map geographic clusters. Most importantly, it should be shared among veterinary authorities, wildlife departments, environmental agencies and disaster management institutions. This is not simply about animal welfare. It is about One Health—the recognition that human health, animal health and environmental health are inseparable. A disaster that devastates wildlife rarely stops with wildlife. The same contaminated river that kills fish may later provide drinking water to nearby communities. The same disease that wipes out livestock can threaten food security and livelihoods. The same habitat destruction that displaces wild animals may increase conflict between humans and wildlife. Animals also play a remarkable role in preventing disasters themselves. Mangrove forests, sustained by countless marine species, reduce the force of cyclones and storm surges before they reach coastal communities. Coral reefs act as natural breakwaters, absorbing wave energy that would otherwise damage coastlines. Beavers, where they exist naturally, build wetlands that slow floods, reduce erosion and store water during droughts. Earthworms improve soil structure, allowing rainwater to infiltrate the ground instead of running off as destructive floods. Even species that many overlook quietly contribute to disaster resilience. Vultures rapidly remove animal carcasses from the environment, reducing opportunities for disease to spread. Pollinating insects maintain vegetation that stabilises soils and reduces erosion. Forest elephants in parts of Africa disperse seeds that regenerate forests, strengthening ecosystems that absorb carbon and regulate water cycles. Healthy bat populations consume enormous numbers of insects, helping maintain ecological balance. In Pakistan, wetlands provide another example. Migratory birds, fish and aquatic life support ecosystems that naturally store floodwaters and reduce downstream flooding. Destroying these habitats weakens one of nature’s own flood management systems. History also records countless instances where animals sensed impending disasters before humans. Elephants moved to higher ground before the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Birds and other wildlife have altered their behaviour before earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Scientists continue to study these phenomena, but they demonstrate an important point: animals are deeply connected to environmental changes that humans often fail to detect immediately. Perhaps the greatest lesson is that biodiversity itself is infrastructure. We invest billions in concrete flood barriers, embankments and drainage systems, yet healthy forests, wetlands, grasslands and coastal ecosystems quietly perform many of the same functions every day without invoices or maintenance contracts. Their effectiveness depends on thriving animal populations. When those populations decline, nature’s capacity to protect us declines with them. Pakistan’s disaster laws and policies should therefore evolve beyond a human-only perspective. Disaster assessments should include veterinary response teams. Wildlife mortality should be documented after every major disaster. Livestock losses should be analysed not only for compensation but also to understand changing environmental risks. Dead animals should be safely collected, tested where appropriate, and disposed of according to scientific protocols to minimise disease transmission. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction emphasises understanding disaster risk through better data and stronger information systems. Comprehensive disaster data cannot exist if millions of animal lives remain invisible. The next flood, earthquake or heatwave will not distinguish between humans and animals. Neither should our disaster management system. Every uncounted animal is not simply a missing statistic. It is a missed warning, a missed opportunity to understand environmental change, and a missed chance to build a safer and more resilient Pakistan.

  • Beyond Riba: Reconstruction of Just Financial Orde…

    The preceding part of this series examined a question ordinarily left outside discussions on riba: who should create money? It argued that commercial-bank money creation is not, by itself, riba, but that the power to create purchasing power through credit is a matter of public importance requiring transparency, restraint and accountability. One possible reform is to separate transaction money, fully backed by sovereign money, from funds deliberately committed for investment. That proposition leads to an even more fundamental question. What exactly is a bank deposit? The answer appears obvious only because modern banking has merged several economically different relationships into the same institution. A person places salary in a current account because it must be available tomorrow morning. Another person places accumulated savings with a bank hoping to earn a return over five years. A business maintains money for payroll and suppliers. An investor deliberately commits capital to a project knowing that commercial gain is accompanied by the possibility of loss. Calling all these balances “deposits” conceals distinctions that become crucial in a financial order seeking to eliminate riba. There is a basic difference between money and investment. Money held for payment performs the functions of medium of exchange and store of nominal value. Its owner expects Rs.100 deposited today to remain Rs.100 tomorrow and to be transferable on demand. Investment capital performs another function. It is consciously placed in productive activity in expectation of gain and consequently bears the possibility of commercial loss. One cannot logically demand both absolute safety and entrepreneurial return from the same contractual relationship unless somebody else is made to carry the risk. Islamic jurisprudence recognised these distinctions long before modern banking. Funds entrusted purely for safekeeping can constitute amanah. A trustee does not own them and is not ordinarily liable for loss occurring without negligence or misconduct. Where fungible money is transferred to another person with authority to use it and an obligation to return its equivalent, the relationship acquires the character of qard, or loan. State Bank of Pakistan’s own glossary reflects precisely this reasoning. It describes an amanah as property held in trust and states that current accounts may initially be regarded as trust deposits. Once a bank obtains authority to use current-account funds in its business, however, the relationship becomes a loan because the bank must repay the full amount. This point deserves much greater attention. If a bank accepts Rs.100,000 from a customer, is free to use that money for its own financing operations and remains legally bound to repay Rs.100,000 whenever demanded, the customer is not bearing an investment risk. Whatever terminology appears on the account-opening form, economically the bank has received financing from the customer. No difficulty necessarily arises if the customer receives nothing beyond repayment of the amount advanced. The difficulty arises when banking system treats this repayable-at-par money simultaneously as the raw material from which additional financing and monetary claims can be generated. Part II suggested one possible solution: transaction accounts should be treated entirely differently. A current account used for wages, household expenditure, business payments and ordinary transfers should represent protected transaction money. If such balances are fully backed by sovereign money or central-bank reserves, they need not be exposed to the bank’s commercial financing decisions. The account holder would possess money, not an investment claim upon the success of a bank. The bank would provide custody, payments, transfers, cards, digital access and settlement services. It could legitimately charge transparent fees for those services. What it would not receive is free investment capital merely because citizens require access to a payment system. The consequences are significant. Fully backed transaction accounts would remain available on demand and at par. They would not earn an investment return because their owners have assumed no investment risk. Nor would their repayment depend upon the quality of the bank’s commercial portfolio. This is not merely a theological distinction. Modern central banking itself recognises the peculiar character of bank deposits. The Bank of England recently described commercial-bank deposits as liabilities used as money, expected to be redeemable at par on demand and relied upon as a safe store of value. It contrasted them with investment products whose values fluctuate and whose losses are borne by investors. A riba-free financial system should take that distinction seriously. The second category would consist of genuine investment accounts. Here the relationship is entirely different. A customer does not merely park money awaiting payment instructions. He consciously makes capital available for investment and accepts that lawful profit cannot be separated completely from commercial risk. Mudarabah provides one classical framework. One party supplies capital and the other enterprise and expertise. Profit is divided according to an agreed ratio; financial loss, in the absence of negligence or breach by the manager, falls upon the provider of capital. SBP itself explains Islamic investment deposits on this basis: the depositor acts as rabb-ul-maal and the bank as mudarib. Restricted mudarabah allows the investor to specify where the funds may be deployed; unrestricted mudarabah gives the bank wider investment authority. The principle is straightforward. If the depositor wants profit because capital is being employed commercially, the depositor must understand what capital is doing and what risk attaches to it. This is where present banking practice requires closer examination. Islamic banks commonly pool deposits, calculate weighted-average yields and distribute profits under elaborate regulatory rules. SBP presently prescribes profit-distribution arrangements for savings depositors, including minimum distribution requirements linked to the weighted-average gross yield of the institution. It also permits additional hiba in specified circumstances. These measures protect customers against inequitable allocation of profits by banks. Their consumer-protection purpose is understandable. At the same time, an increasingly managed and smoothed return can create in the depositor’s mind an expectation remarkably similar to a conventional savings rate. The crucial question is not whether the return happens to fluctuate by a few basis points. It is whether the depositor actually bears the economic character of an investor. An investment account should identify the pool in

  • |

    Pakistan’s Silent Hepatitis C Epidemic

    The world is changing rapidly. Artificial Intelligence (AI), genetic research, robotic surgery, and modern medicines have revolutionized healthcare in ways that were unimaginable just a few decades ago. Many deadly diseases have been brought under control, while others can now be completely cured. Yet despite these remarkable advances, one disease continues to silently destroy the lives of millions of people. It progresses for years without obvious symptoms, quietly damaging the body from within. That disease is Hepatitis C, often referred to by medical experts as the “silent killer.” Every year, July 28 is observed as World Hepatitis Day. The day aims to raise public awareness, emphasize the importance of early screening and timely treatment, and remind governments that viral hepatitis remains one of the world’s major public health challenges. For Pakistan, this day carries particular significance because the country now bears the world’s largest burden of Hepatitis C. The Government of Pakistan, in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), has officially launched the Prime Minister’s National Hepatitis C Elimination Programme in the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT). During its first six months, the programme aims to reach 1.6 million people in ICT, before expanding nationwide to provide services to more than 164 million people. Its primary objective is to eliminate Hepatitis C as a major public health threat by 2030, in line with the commitment adopted by the World Health Assembly. Globally, an estimated 50 million people are living with Hepatitis C, and nearly 10 million of them are in Pakistan, making the country home to the largest Hepatitis C burden in the world. Worldwide, only one in every three infected individuals is aware that they have Hepatitis C. The most dangerous aspect of Hepatitis C is that patients often feel perfectly healthy for many years. During this time, the virus gradually damages the liver. By the time symptoms such as persistent fatigue, loss of appetite, weight loss, yellowing of the skin or eyes (jaundice), or abdominal pain appear, the liver has often already suffered severe damage. This is why medical experts describe Hepatitis C as the “silent killer.” Rather than attacking suddenly, it quietly weakens the body over many years. Every Pakistani should ask an important question: if many countries have successfully reduced Hepatitis C infections, why does Pakistan continue to struggle with this crisis? There are several reasons. The widespread overuse of injections, the reuse of contaminated syringes, unsafe and unscreened blood transfusions, unregistered blood banks, improperly sterilized surgical and dental instruments, repeated use of razor blades by barbers, and poor infection control practices all contribute significantly to the spread of the disease. In many communities, injections are still widely believed to be the most effective treatment for almost every illness. However, unsafe injection practices remain one of the leading causes of transmission of Hepatitis C and several other infectious diseases. Pakistan’s share of the global Hepatitis C burden is alarmingly high. Every year, approximately 110,000 new infections are reported. Most of these are associated with unsafe medical practices, while a significant proportion occurs among people who inject drugs using shared needles. Many countries have successfully controlled Hepatitis C through safe blood transfusion systems, strict infection prevention measures, quality healthcare services, and widespread screening programmes. Countries such as Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have achieved remarkably low Hepatitis C prevalence. Egypt is another remarkable example. Once among the countries most severely affected by Hepatitis C, Egypt dramatically reduced the disease burden through nationwide screening, free treatment, and comprehensive public awareness campaigns. Across many urban and rural areas of Sindh, Hepatitis remains a serious public health concern. Limited access to quality healthcare, the growing number of unregistered clinics, unsafe medical practices, and low public awareness continue to worsen the situation. In rural communities, many people still prefer injections even for minor illnesses such as fever or body aches. If a syringe is reused or not properly sterilized, this common practice can easily spread the virus. The impact of Hepatitis extends far beyond the patient. When the family’s primary breadwinner falls ill, the entire household suffers. Medical expenses, loss of income, disruption of children’s education, and psychological stress together create a serious social and economic burden. For this reason, Hepatitis should not be viewed merely as a medical issue. It is also a challenge closely linked to national development, poverty reduction, and the protection of human capital. Recognizing the growing burden of Hepatitis, the Government of Pakistan has launched a nationwide Hepatitis C elimination programme focused on mass screening, free treatment, and access to modern medicines. At the same time, the Government of Sindh is implementing the Hepatitis Free Sindh Programme, providing free screening, laboratory testing, Hepatitis B vaccination, and treatment services at government hospitals throughout the province. These initiatives are important, but they alone are not enough. Unless people become aware of these services and access is extended to remote and underserved communities, the desired outcomes will remain difficult to achieve. Preventing Hepatitis is both simple and highly effective. People should always insist on the use of new, sealed syringes, receive only properly screened blood during transfusions, ensure that a new razor blade is used for every shave, confirm that dental and surgical instruments are properly sterilized, avoid sharing personal hygiene items, and receive vaccination against Hepatitis B. By following these basic precautions, thousands of new infections can be prevented every year. The fight against Hepatitis is not solely the responsibility of doctors or hospitals. Governments, the private sector, educational institutions, the media, religious leaders, civil society organizations, and every citizen all have vital roles to play in controlling this epidemic. There is an urgent need to expand free screening services across every district, take strict action against illegal clinics, strengthen the regulation of blood banks, provide mandatory infection prevention training for barbers and beauty salons, and integrate health education into school and university curricula. For Pakistan, Hepatitis C is not merely a medical condition—it is a national crisis. Fortunately, it is also a disease

  • An Insight into CPEC performance

    A great game changer, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which was launched in its first phase in 2013, has since emerged as a flagship initiative of strategic significance, fostering regional connectivity, economic growth and socio-economic development while reinforcing the enduring partnership between Pakistan and China. Over the past decade, CPEC has transitioned from a vision of connectivity into a comprehensive development framework, delivering tangible progress across key sectors and contributing to Pakistan’s economic transformation. After the quite successful completion of the first phase, brisk preparations are underway in Beijing and Islamabad at the appropriate high levels, under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, for formally launching CPEC 2.0 during 2026. According to the information gathered from the official sources concerned, on the Long-Term Plan, the 14th ICC formally agreed to review the CPEC Long-Term Plan (2017-30) in the light of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on alignment of the CPEC five corridors with the National Economic Transformation Plan (URAAN Pakistan) and the action plan to foster an even closer China-Pakistan community. The 14th ICC had further directed the adoption of the action plan for fostering an even closer China-Pakistan community with a shared future in the new era (2025-2029), signed in September 2025. The 14th ICC had also further directed the adoption of the action plan as the guiding document for CPEC 2.0, and an action matrix accordingly has been prepared by the official quarters concerned and shared with the ministries and divisions of the Federal Government. Inter-agency consultations on the revised Long-Term Plan (LTP) were underway. As regards socio-economic development, about 15 out of 17 approved projects have since been quite successfully completed, while two remaining projects were reported to be at an advanced stage of execution and were expected to be finalized soon. Furthermore, seven new development initiatives have been proposed under the third batch and submitted to the China International Development Cooperation Agency for consideration and approval. These projects include the provision of modern agricultural machinery and equipment for agro-mechanization, the supply of fiberglass fishing boats to coastal communities, the construction of a fish-landing jetty at Gwadar to strengthen the fisheries value chain, the establishment of integrated cold-chain systems for horticulture and perishable products, and other livelihood-oriented interventions aimed at enhancing local productivity, food security, employment generation, and export potential in underserved regions. During the year, efficiency improvement measures were taken in the power sector for enhancing operational performance, improving grid stability, and optimizing the utilization of existing generation and transmission infrastructure. Stakeholder consultations were also conducted for addressing issues related to bulk electricity supply for Special Economic Zones (SEZs), aimed at facilitating industrialization and investment under CPEC 2.0. A major achievement of the sector was the continued utilization of indigenous Thar coal resources, which contributed towards reducing dependence on imported fuels, strengthening energy security, conserving foreign exchange reserves, and ensuring reliable base-load electricity supply for industrial and domestic consumers. As regards transport infrastructure, the upgradation of the Main Line-1 (ML-1) railway project, spanning approximately 1,872 km from Karachi to Peshawar, remained a strategic priority under bilateral cooperation. During the reporting period, third-party financing discussions by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) advanced for the Karachi-Rohri section, while detailed financing and implementation proposals were also developed for the remaining sections up to Peshawar in close coordination with the Chinese side. Once completed, ML-1 was expected to substantially enhance Pakistan Railways’ operational efficiency by increasing train speeds from 65-105 km/h to nearly 160 km/h, improving freight-handling capacity, reducing transit times, and strengthening north-south economic connectivity across the country. Significant headway was also achieved on the Realignment of Karakoram Highway (KKH-Phase II) Project under the Government-to-Government (G2G) framework. Both sides have operationalized a phased implementation strategy and reached broad consensus on an 85:15 financing ratio. In Gwadar, the operationalization and consolidation of strategic infrastructure projects continued to gain momentum. The East Bay Expressway, a 19-kilometre, six-lane corridor connecting Gwadar Port with the Makran Coastal Highway, continued to improve port accessibility, reduce cargo transit time, and enhance logistics efficiency for commercial and port-related traffic. Further progress has also been achieved on Phase-II initiatives aimed at connecting Gwadar Port with the New Gwadar International Airport, including discussions on grant financing modalities and finalization of the draft Framework Agreement to strengthen integrated sea-air connectivity among Gwadar Port, Gwadar Free Zones, and the airport. Gwadar Port and the Free Zones have made further progress toward operational maturity through improved infrastructure provision, enhanced utilities connectivity, investor-friendly fiscal incentives, and continued policy facilitation measures by the Pakistan Government. Increased focus has also been placed on attracting industrial relocation, export-oriented manufacturing, warehousing, fisheries processing, and logistics-related investments in Gwadar Free Zone. Parallel progress has also been achieved on multiple road infrastructure projects, including strategic expressways and motorways, through the mechanisms of the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Transport Infrastructure and the Joint Technical Working Group (JTWG), thereby reinforcing Pakistan’s long-term objective of developing an integrated multimodal transport and logistics network under CPEC. Mining cooperation has also emerged as a major new pillar of CPEC 2.0, thereby reflecting the shared commitment of both countries to unlock Pakistan’s vast untapped mineral potential through bilateral cooperation, technology transfer, industrial cooperation, and investment partnership. During the period under review, both sides agreed to undertake a joint feasibility study for the proposed Mining Corridor connecting Nokundi with Gwadar Port. The proposed initiative was expected to substantially reduce transportation costs, improve supply-chain efficiency, and facilitate large-scale movement of copper, gold, rare earth elements, chromite, and other strategic minerals. The corridor would also complement ongoing developments in Reko Diq and other mining regions, while also laying the foundation for transforming Balochistan into a major mining, processing, and export-oriented economic hub. The last year has also witnessed quite significant progress in industrial cooperation under CPEC, with continuous development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and expeditious provision of basic utilities, especially electricity. Phase-1 of Rashakai SEZ has been successfully operationalized, while

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *