missing casualties pakistan

The Missing Casualties: Why Pakistan Must Count An…

Every year, Pakistan measures the toll of disasters in human lives. We count the dead, the injured, the displaced, the houses destroyed and the roads washed away. These figures shape government responses, determine compensation, and influence future planning.

Yet one category of victims remains almost invisible: animals.

Whether floods sweep through Punjab and Sindh, earthquakes strike remote communities, droughts destroy grazing lands, or heatwaves scorch entire districts, there is no comprehensive national system that records how many companion animals, livestock or wild animals die. While the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has significantly advanced Pakistan’s disaster preparedness through technology-driven early warning systems, hazard monitoring and risk analysis, the routine collection and publication of animal mortality data has yet to become a core part of disaster reporting.

This is more than a statistical omission. It is a blind spot that weakens disaster preparedness, environmental protection and public health.

Animals are not merely victims of disasters; they are indicators of disasters. A sudden increase in deaths among birds, fish, livestock or wildlife can reveal contaminated water, disease outbreaks, toxic pollution, habitat destruction or ecosystem collapse long before these threats become obvious to people. Ignoring these signals means ignoring valuable early warnings.

The relationship works in the opposite direction as well. Dead animals left unrecorded and improperly disposed of after floods or other emergencies create serious public health risks. Carcasses contaminate water sources, attract scavengers, encourage insect breeding and may facilitate the spread of infectious diseases if not handled according to veterinary and environmental protocols. Disaster management cannot end when human rescue operations conclude. Recovery also requires environmental sanitation.

Pakistan has increasingly embraced the concept of anticipatory disaster management. NDMA now operates sophisticated early warning platforms using satellite monitoring, artificial intelligence, weather forecasting and hazard mapping to reduce disaster risks before they become catastrophes. But even the most advanced technology cannot compensate for missing ecological data collected on the ground.

A country cannot manage what it does not measure.

Animal mortality data should become as routine as reporting damaged schools or collapsed bridges. It should distinguish between livestock, companion animals and wildlife. It should identify causes of death where possible. It should map geographic clusters. Most importantly, it should be shared among veterinary authorities, wildlife departments, environmental agencies and disaster management institutions.

This is not simply about animal welfare. It is about One Health—the recognition that human health, animal health and environmental health are inseparable. A disaster that devastates wildlife rarely stops with wildlife. The same contaminated river that kills fish may later provide drinking water to nearby communities. The same disease that wipes out livestock can threaten food security and livelihoods. The same habitat destruction that displaces wild animals may increase conflict between humans and wildlife.

Animals also play a remarkable role in preventing disasters themselves.

Mangrove forests, sustained by countless marine species, reduce the force of cyclones and storm surges before they reach coastal communities. Coral reefs act as natural breakwaters, absorbing wave energy that would otherwise damage coastlines. Beavers, where they exist naturally, build wetlands that slow floods, reduce erosion and store water during droughts. Earthworms improve soil structure, allowing rainwater to infiltrate the ground instead of running off as destructive floods.

Even species that many overlook quietly contribute to disaster resilience. Vultures rapidly remove animal carcasses from the environment, reducing opportunities for disease to spread. Pollinating insects maintain vegetation that stabilises soils and reduces erosion. Forest elephants in parts of Africa disperse seeds that regenerate forests, strengthening ecosystems that absorb carbon and regulate water cycles. Healthy bat populations consume enormous numbers of insects, helping maintain ecological balance.

In Pakistan, wetlands provide another example. Migratory birds, fish and aquatic life support ecosystems that naturally store floodwaters and reduce downstream flooding. Destroying these habitats weakens one of nature’s own flood management systems.

History also records countless instances where animals sensed impending disasters before humans. Elephants moved to higher ground before the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Birds and other wildlife have altered their behaviour before earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Scientists continue to study these phenomena, but they demonstrate an important point: animals are deeply connected to environmental changes that humans often fail to detect immediately.

Perhaps the greatest lesson is that biodiversity itself is infrastructure.

We invest billions in concrete flood barriers, embankments and drainage systems, yet healthy forests, wetlands, grasslands and coastal ecosystems quietly perform many of the same functions every day without invoices or maintenance contracts. Their effectiveness depends on thriving animal populations.

When those populations decline, nature’s capacity to protect us declines with them.

Pakistan’s disaster laws and policies should therefore evolve beyond a human-only perspective. Disaster assessments should include veterinary response teams. Wildlife mortality should be documented after every major disaster. Livestock losses should be analysed not only for compensation but also to understand changing environmental risks. Dead animals should be safely collected, tested where appropriate, and disposed of according to scientific protocols to minimise disease transmission.

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction emphasises understanding disaster risk through better data and stronger information systems. Comprehensive disaster data cannot exist if millions of animal lives remain invisible.

The next flood, earthquake or heatwave will not distinguish between humans and animals. Neither should our disaster management system.

Every uncounted animal is not simply a missing statistic. It is a missed warning, a missed opportunity to understand environmental change, and a missed chance to build a safer and more resilient Pakistan.

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There would be a contract, and some value created from human identity could return to the human being. It could also create work. A person might license a recorded voice for educational narration in several languages. A model could approve a digital replica for advertisements without attending repeated shoots. People far from production centres might gain opportunities previously unavailable to them. But payment is not the same as protection. A person offered a modest amount may sign away far more than they understand. A broadly written agreement could allow a company to reproduce a face or voice for years, transfer it to other businesses, train additional models and place the replica in contexts the person would never endorse. The human receives one payment; the synthetic version may generate revenue indefinitely. Faces and voices are not ordinary digital products. A password can be changed after a breach. A face cannot. A cloned voice can imitate a family member, support a fraudulent request or manufacture a statement that was never made. The US Federal Trade Commission has warned that scammers can create convincing voice clones from short audio clips found online. The answer is not to ban every voluntary AI licence. It is to establish non-negotiable human protections. Consent must be specific, informed and renewable. Companies should state whether material will be used for training, identity replication or both. Agreements must define the product, audience, country, platform and time period. Permission for an educational video must not silently become permission for political advertising, gambling, medical claims, intimate material or religious messaging. Compensation should continue when the replica continues earning. Where a digital identity is repeatedly used, the person should receive royalties or per-use payments, not merely a small initial fee. Individuals should be able to set minimum prices, reject industries and see where their replica appeared. There must also be a genuine right to stop future use. Companies should delete source files, block new generations and notify third parties when a licence ends. Independent audits should test compliance. Strong security and penalties for leaks are essential because biometric material cannot simply be replaced. Every synthetic performance should carry visible disclosure and a machine-readable marker. The European Union’s transparency rules, applicable from 2 August 2026, require certain AI-generated or manipulated material to be identifiable and deepfakes to be disclosed. Labels will not prevent every abuse, but they help preserve the distinction between human action and machine-generated imitation. Children need stronger protection. Parents should not be able to permanently commercialise a child’s future identity. Any limited agreement should expire and require the individual’s fresh consent upon adulthood. Pakistan should treat this as urgent. As of 2026, the country still lacks a comprehensive enacted personal data protection law. This creates vulnerability just as international companies may seek diverse and comparatively inexpensive populations for AI training.  The greatest risk is not that humans will earn from AI. Fairly sharing value could correct years of silent extraction. The danger is that people will exchange permanent control for temporary payment. As AI advances, societies must recognise the face, voice and digital personality as extensions of the human person, not raw material waiting to be harvested. Without consent, continuing compensation, traceability and the power to say no, we may lose more than jobs or privacy. We may lose the trust that allows us to believe what we see, hear and recognise. AI should expand human possibility, not gradually replace human ownership of the self.

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