The Teachings of Hazrat Ali Hajveri (R.A)

Connecting Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) to the National Grid—and guaranteeing a dedicated clean hydro quota—is not merely an infrastructural goal; it is an ecological imperative and the definitive key to realizing the region’s full potential. High in the Karakoram and Himalayan ranges, where soaring glaciers feed the roaring Indus River, sits Gilgit-Baltistan—a land defined by its breathtaking landscapes, strategic geopolitical footprint, and an excruciating policy failure. Though this high-mountain region acts as the primary water tower of Pakistan, generating the very lifeblood that sustains the nation’s agricultural heartland and downstream hydroelectric dams, its own citizens spend their lives in perpetual darkness. For nearly eight decades since independence, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have endured a chronic, soul-crushing energy crisis. In the harsh high-altitude winters, when temperatures plunge far below freezing and regional run-of-the-river hydel plants freeze solid or lose flow, power outages stretch to an agonizing twenty-two hours a day. Entire cities like Skardu and Gilgit grind to an absolute halt. Modern medical facilities run on expensive, precarious diesel generators, students study by the dim flicker of kerosene lamps, and families are forced to strip fragile mountain ecosystems of firewood simply to survive the winter. This domestic isolation becomes outright tragic when set against the backdrop of broader South Asian regional integration. Today, cross-border grid interconnections are becoming standard practice across the subcontinent. India has built high-voltage transmission lines linking its power architecture with Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while making major technical strides to link Sri Lanka across the Palk Strait. Under frameworks like the “One Sun, One World, One Grid” initiative, neighboring nations seamlessly buy, sell, and route cross-border electricity to balance seasonal surpluses and deficits. Bhutan finances its national development by wheeling clean hydro power directly into the Indian market. Nepal trades its monsoon hydro surpluses across borders to avoid spilling water, pulling power back when river flows decline. Even nations separated by deep political, geographic, and sovereign boundaries manage to run copper and steel across international borders so their citizens do not sit in the dark. Yet, after 79 years of shared history, Pakistan presents an embarrassing anomaly. The state has built a national power grid that spans thousands of miles from the Arabian Sea to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and downcountry Pakistan often wrestles with systemic generation capacity surpluses, yet it has failed to link its own sovereign territory of Gilgit-Baltistan to the National Grid. Gilgit-Baltistan remains an island—an off-grid enclave stranded inside its own country, cut off from the main transmission backbone. While foreign nations in South Asia trade thousands of megawatts in real time across sovereign borders, Pakistan’s own northern frontier cannot draw a single kilowatt from the national thermal and solar reserves down south during the freezing winter months. This policy neglect is even more absurd considering that mere miles from where local populations freeze, one of the greatest engineering feats in South Asian history is taking shape. The Diamer Basha Dam Project, currently under construction near Chilas on the River Indus, boasts an astounding installed generation capacity of 4,500 megawatts and an expected annual output of over eighteen billion units of clean, renewable energy. The dam will transform Pakistan’s national economy, but it raises a fundamental moral and legal question: will it transform the lives of the people living in its shadow, or will the power simply pass over their heads to serve distant urban centers while local towns remain dark? To correct a structural imbalance that has persisted since 1947, the Federal Government of Pakistan and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) must formally dedicate a guaranteed quota of 500 megawatts of power from the Diamer Basha Dam directly to Gilgit-Baltistan. This allocation is not an act of federal charity; it is a pragmatic, economically transformative, and ethically mandatory policy that aligns local resource rights with national progress. To understand why a 500-megawatt direct allocation is essential, one must look at the region’s fragile, isolated micro-hydel infrastructure. Historically, Gilgit-Baltistan has relied on small-scale localized plants built on seasonal mountain streams. While these plants function adequately during the summer melt, they are acutely vulnerable to climate shifts and freeze cycles. When winter arrives and glacial run-offs plummet, local power generation drops by over eighty percent. Because the region is not connected to the main transmission grid, it cannot import balancing power, leaving the local economy frozen. Despite possessing immense potential as an international hub for eco-tourism, organic agriculture, high-altitude software hubs, and gemstone processing, serious industrial investors routinely stay away due to acute energy insecurity. The cost of doing business is artificially inflated by reliance on imported fossil fuels, creating a cycle of underdevelopment that forces educated, talented youth to migrate to major cities downcountry in search of basic livelihoods. Allocating 500 megawatts out of Diamer Basha’s 4,500-megawatt capacity represents just eleven percent of the dam’s total output. For the national power sector, absorbing this slight allocation is negligible. For Gilgit-Baltistan, however, this capacity is transformative. It represents complete regional energy self-sufficiency, year-round grid stability, and surplus capacity to fuel industrial growth for generations. To execute this vision cleanly and equitably, a structured cost-sharing implementation model must be established between the federal center and the region. The federal government and WAPDA must formally ring-fence a 500-megawatt generation quota from the powerhouse specifically for the region at concessional local tariffs. In return, the regional government of Gilgit-Baltistan must take complete ownership of downstream execution. The regional government must build high-voltage transmission lines connecting the powerhouse at Chilas to major regional load centers like Gilgit, Skardu, Hunza, and Ghizer, while overhauling local grid stations and distribution lines. By dividing responsibility—federal generation matched by regional distribution—both parties build a long-overdue partnership rooted in shared accountability. An allocation of this scale does far more than illuminate living rooms; it fundamentally reshapes the socio-economic trajectory of the entire northern frontier. With a dependable baseload, Gilgit-Baltistan can transition from a subsistence economy to a value-added manufacturing and processing hub. Local mineral wealth—including high-grade marble, granite, and precious gemstones—can be processed

A few days ago, Mr. Hakan Fidan, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, briefed the media on the MJDA. He said that the operational mechanisms will be decided at the first meeting of the joint committee comprising the foreign and defense ministers and the Chief of General Staff. He also provided an overview of possible areas of cooperation. In this context, it is high time to discuss the future orientation of the MJDA, especially areas of cooperation and investment to build a future-oriented alliance. A few areas have been identified for consideration.   First of all, the three partners must understand that the era of traditional war is rapidly becoming irrelevant. The concepts of 5th-, 6th-, 7th-, and 8th-generation warfare are evolving into new dynamics: 9th-generation warfare. Thus, Cooperation under MJDA must be based on the new elements and needs of 9th-generation warfare, in addition to traditional areas. Now the question is, what is 9th-generation warfare? 9th-generation warfare has a few characteristics that distinguish it from past generations of warfare.   First, 9th-generation warfare will minimize, if not eliminate, the role of humans to a greater extent. The first glimpse of this type of warfare is evident in the form of unmanned UVs. Russia-Ukraine and USA-Iran wars further reinforce this argument. However, humans are still engaged in one way or another in wars, including devising and executing plans and engaging in face-to-face combat. For example, during the application of 4th- and 5th-generation warfare in the Middle East, humans remained a constant factor in leading and executing the wars. After the bombardment of Iraq, it was humans who captured the land.   However, it is anticipated that artificial intelligence will take over this job in future wars, and future wars will be run by artificial intelligence and its tools. For example, in 9th-generation warfare, artificial intelligence-based robots can take over the role of humans. Robots can invade a country, or they can also be used in guerrilla warfare. Countries can also use robots to conduct terrorist activities. They can send the robots with an anonymous identity, and no one will be able to trace the origin. Organized crime organizations can also use them to conduct their activities, such as targeted killings.   Let’s imagine another scenario. Robots are invading a country. They fight either humans or other robots. Countries with better technology can turn robots into double-edged weapons. On the one hand, robots will be fighting machines. However, they can also equip robots with destructive explosives, such as nuclear material or other explosives. Then what would be the opponent’s choices? How will opponents fight an explosive-ridden robot? They will take over the country if they do not stop the robots. On the other hand, if they try to destroy the robots, the nuclear explosives will detonate, which can cause serious damage. The scenario would be quite scary, and countries with advanced robot and AI technology can maneuver situations in their favor.   Second, the most developed countries have recently taken war into outer space, especially the USA. The USA’s obsession with and investment in outer space have compelled other countries to follow the suit. As a result, they are investing heavily, instigating an outer space race for dominance. The race has accelerated since the establishment of the US Space Force. According to the Vice President of the USA, Mr. Pence, the force was launched with four specific objectives. First, U.S. Space Command “will establish unified command and control for our Space Force operations; ensure integration across the military; and develop the space warfighting doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures of the future.” Second, a military astronaut corps, which Pence called “an elite group of joint warfighters specializing in the domain of space.” Third, a Space Development Agency that will research and develop new technologies and “ensure cutting-edge warfighting capabilities.” Fourth, new bureaucratic structures that will define “clear lines of responsibility and accountability to manage the process of standing up and scaling up the United States Department of the Space Force.”   The USA and its allies are enhancing cooperation to outpace others and dominate outer space. As a result, they have launched a malicious campaign against China and Russia. They are portraying China and Russia as threats to global peace and to the use of outer space to attract public attention, support, and financial resources. At the same time, they also want to hinder the advancement of other countries in space technology to maintain their hegemony in the application of space technologies for war dominance. For example, during the Gulf War of the 1990s, the USA and allied forces used space technologies to outmaneuver their opponents. Since then, the USA and its allies have been working to further improve space technology and prevent other countries from developing these technologies.   Therefore, it is anticipated that space war will be multifaceted. On the one hand, there will be a race to control or maneuver opponents’ satellites by interfering with their software. This will be done to obtain information or spread disinformation. Sending arms into space to destroy opponents’ satellites is also possible. On the other hand, some countries have developed capabilities to hit satellites from the ground. This has opened a new field of military offense.   The use of space technology for military dominance created fear in the developing world. They fear that leading countries in space technology will use space for control and interference, collect information, and dictate to other countries. For example, the USA uses navigation systems to collect data and outmaneuver others in wars.   Third, in recent times, we have observed that COVID-19 has played havoc with humanity. It has shaken the whole world. The whole world came to a standstill. Markets were closed, and the tourism industry sank. It has introduced the world to a new danger of biological war. Biological war is considered one of the most lethal forms of war, as only one person can paralyze the world. One virus can shut down the whole world

By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Asma Rahmat, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University and Muhammad Ameer Hamza, Final Year Law Student, SLC, Superior University Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, enshrines one of the oldest and most celebrated principles of criminal jurisprudence, namely nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which means there can be neither a crime nor a punishment without prior law. This constitutional guarantee embodies the rule of law by prohibiting retrospective criminal legislation and protecting every individual from arbitrary prosecution or punishment. It ensures that a person may be held criminally liable only for conduct that constituted an offence under the law at the time it was committed, and that no punishment more severe than that then prescribed may subsequently be imposed. The first part of Article 12 prohibits the retrospective creation of criminal offences. A person cannot be convicted for an act or omission which was lawful when committed merely because the legislature subsequently criminalises that conduct. The second part prohibits the retrospective enhancement of punishment. Accordingly, where the law prescribes a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment or two years’ imprisonment at the time of the offence, neither the judiciary nor the legislature may subsequently impose or authorise a more severe penalty for that completed act. The constitutional guarantee thus preserves legal certainty, protects legitimate expectations, and prevents arbitrary exercises of legislative and executive power. Article 12 is founded upon the universally accepted doctrine of legal certainty, which requires that criminal laws be clear, prospective, and predictable. Individuals must be capable of regulating their conduct according to existing law without fear that future legislation will retrospectively criminalise their past actions or increase their punishment. The principle therefore operates as an indispensable safeguard against governmental arbitrariness and political persecution and constitutes a cornerstone of every constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. The constitutional philosophy embodied in Article 12 is consistent with internationally recognised human rights norms. Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, provides that no person shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission that did not constitute a penal offence under national or international law at the time it was committed, nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that applicable at the time of the commission of the offence. Likewise, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Pakistan is a State Party, reiterates the same prohibition against retrospective criminal liability while recognising only the limited exception relating to offences recognised under the general principles of international law. Comparable constitutional protection is also found in the United States Constitution, where Article I, Sections 9 and 10 expressly prohibit Congress and the States from enacting ex post facto laws. This prohibition has long been regarded as a fundamental limitation upon legislative authority and reflects a universal constitutional commitment to fairness in criminal justice. The superior courts of Pakistan have consistently treated Article 12 as an indispensable constitutional safeguard. In Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article 12 embodies the constitutional prohibition against retrospective penal legislation and protects individuals from being subjected to criminal liability or enhanced punishment under laws enacted after the commission of the alleged offence. The Court emphasised that retrospective penal laws offend the rule of law because criminal consequences must always be determined according to the law in force at the relevant time. Similarly, in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, the Supreme Court underscored that fundamental rights must receive a liberal and purposive interpretation so as to prevent arbitrary governmental action and preserve constitutional liberties. Although that case did not directly concern Article 12, its interpretative philosophy has significantly influenced the constitutional protection afforded to penal safeguards. A significant constitutional question concerns the offence of high treason under Article 6 of the Constitution. High treason, comprising the abrogation, subversion, suspension, or holding in abeyance of the Constitution, represents the gravest constitutional offence. Through the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, Parliament expanded Article 6 to include persons who aid, abet, collaborate with, or validate such unconstitutional acts. Nevertheless, Article 12 continues to apply with full constitutional force. Even in prosecutions for high treason, criminal liability and punishment cannot be imposed retrospectively. Any legislative amendment increasing punishment or enlarging criminal liability can operate only prospectively and cannot constitutionally affect acts committed before its enactment. The historical experience of constitutional development further demonstrates the importance of this principle. Following the restoration of the English monarchy, the remains of Oliver Cromwell were exhumed in 1661 upon the orders of Charles II, symbolically hanged, beheaded, and publicly displayed. Although this episode belonged to a different constitutional era, it illustrates the dangers of political vengeance unconstrained by constitutional guarantees. Modern constitutional democracies reject such practices and instead insist that criminal justice must always be governed by legality, due process, and prospective application of penal laws. Article 12, therefore, is not merely a procedural safeguard but a substantive manifestation of constitutionalism itself. It preserves the supremacy of law over arbitrary power, protects individual liberty against retrospective criminal legislation, and strengthens public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system. Together with Articles 4, 9, and 10A of the Constitution, it forms an integral part of Pakistan’s constitutional architecture for the protection of human dignity, legal certainty, and the rule of law. Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is a cornerstone of constitutionalism and the rule of law. By prohibiting retrospective criminal legislation and the retrospective enhancement of punishment, it embodies the fundamental principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, ensuring that no person is punished except in accordance with the law in force at the time of the alleged offence. In conjunction with Articles 4, 9, and 10A, Article 12 protects legal certainty, due process, and individual liberty while preventing arbitrary or politically

The subject idea of “Road To The East” is conceived by me by a textbook when the store Marco polo was described a story with a title of road to the east. The fascination of culture is everywhere especially, within the walled city of Kashi which is located comparatively on a high altitude like a natural fort. As this area from central east was under the invasion of different ethnic communities in the past. I got a chance to walk through the downtown streets which are relatively wider than the downtown streets of Lahore. The construction of the houses is also showing its beauty and culture with their traditions. Now the walled city have totally been preserved by the Chinese government and as I mentioned the tourism have become one of the most important growing industry in the region. The most famous place historically in this region is called Eig Gah. That is this famous mosque was built during the fifteenth century with the capacity of 20,000 people, can offer a prayer within the, inside of compound. While there is a huge yard outside of this compound which is the center of an attraction for all the tourists. Vice President Pakistan-China Joint Chamber There was a camel ride for the tourist attraction and these camels are special, only found in the Gobie desert, with two humps. These kind of camels are also an iconic symbol of China same as panda. It was also arranged a horse ride for the tourist who love to have a picture by riding at the back of the horse. At one time, in this area, the horses were used to have mainly without saddles. The local people are very fond of music, almost every coffee house have the people to play the traditional music, as their tradition music is with the history of hundreds of years. Duff is one of a very important part of their music playing with one instrument called Algoza. Always with the musicians, there is a singer playing the ancient music even though I did not understand the meaning but I got to know that this was mainly related with the stories of their local warriors. The conventional tea houses normally have their dance performance showing heir culture and dance skill. That all is very amazing. I love to watch that performance in different tea shops. Now, the culture have expended in different restaurants where not only girls but also men perform their traditional dance. I hope we can be able to arrange a cultural linkage between the cities of Lahore and Kashgar. All that modern restaurants are very beautiful, a clean and rich with their construction style. The waiters always dressed up like a female servant serving in the royale courts. Most of them are very beautiful to pass an impression of a royale age. Food of Kashgar (Kashi) is very traditional and tasty. The local people are really lamb lovers. You can find halal food in every corner of Kashi. Where you never need to ask the food quality is halal or not. Despite that, I have experienced the most lamb served in all over China is mostly done by the Muslims. The horse meat is one of the traditional delicacy of this region. But normally in our society we refrain to eat it. Camel milk is served as a soveigner to all the visitors. It was my first time to experience the camel milk. Most of the Xinjiang due the weather is dry and the rainfall is very limited. Despite of this all, Xinjiang is very rich for its fruit production in recent years. Chinese government have paid a lot of attention to improve the agriculture and food industry. This have helped a lot for the locals to improve their life standard. The government have paid a special attention to develop an agricultural farming industry in this region.   Walnut once it was used to exported from Pakistan to China but the border trade now have become an iconic product of Yecheng, is normally called as the capital of walnuts. They have also developed a technology to cultivate pomegranate in a sandy surface. I really hope under the BRI agriculture, is one of the major subject in Pakistan. Can we be able to get an experience from China that how they converted their barren lands into green fields. This is my proposal to the green initiative Pakistan, is that they are willing to improve their yield capability by the technology that have already been successful in the similar environment. Pakistan with its huge barren land along with the Gilgit city which can be experienced by using the technology already existing in this region. Mines and minerals is one of biggest subject that we need to pay attention. Till today, we are not been able to address our natural resources in to a successive model. I have observed to Pakistan side is full of natural resources with mines and minerals while the other sider of the border have already established the biggest units of processing. My advice to our provincial government of Gilgit Baltistan that why they don’t take an opportunity as China is already a friendly country with Pakistan, with a will of the transfer of technology. That means this can change the entire financial position of this region. We feel there is a lack with the technology of preservation of food and fruits. GB as a basket of the fruits, is not able to perform its strength where there are a lot of chances to earn a technology or going for a joint venture to improve the life standard of locals.

  In an international system undergoing rapid transformation, the emergence of a trilateral defense cooperation framework among Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia signals a notable shift in how middle powers are approaching security and strategic autonomy.Three states, each central to its respective region, are seeking to institutionalize collaboration in defense, industry, and crisis management. The significance of this alignment extends beyond bilateral ties and touches upon regional stability, defense industrialization, and the evolving balance of power in Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. The rationale for this cooperation lies in the complementary strengths that each country brings. Pakistan contributes a large, professionally trained military with extensive experience in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and mountainous warfare. It also maintains a credible nuclear deterrent and has developed a domestic defense industry in areas such as aerospace, missiles, and armored vehicles. Its location provides access to the Arabian Sea and proximity to key trade and energy routes linking South Asia, Central Asia, and the Gulf. Türkiye offers a military with NATO operational experience, combined with one of the fastest-growing defense industrial bases outside the traditional Western suppliers. Over the last decade, Ankara has demonstrated capacity in unmanned aerial systems, naval platforms, electronics, and aerospace subsystems. Its geographic position, connecting Europe, the Mediterranean, and West Asia, makes it a natural bridge between different security theaters. Saudi Arabia adds financial depth, energy influence, and a central role in Gulf security. Under Vision 2030, Riyadh has prioritized localization of defense manufacturing and diversification of partnerships. The Kingdom also carries substantial weight in the Arab and Islamic world, giving any trilateral initiative immediate political resonance across a wide geography. When viewed together, these capabilities form the basis for a partnership that is both symbolic and practical. Symbolically, it represents a commitment by three major Muslim-majority states to take greater responsibility for regional security. Practically, it creates opportunities for joint development, procurement, training, and operational coordination that can reduce duplication and increase efficiency. The regional importance of this alignment can be understood in several contexts. The Middle East and South Asia continue to face a complex mix of traditional and non-traditional security challenges. These include maritime threats in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, the proliferation of unmanned systems, cyber intrusions, and the persistent risk of transnational militancy. A structured mechanism for consultation among Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia provides an additional channel for de-escalation and coordinated response. In maritime terms alone, the cooperation could contribute to the security of sea lanes that carry a significant portion of global energy and trade. Equally important is the dimension of defense industry collaboration. All three states have expressed a desire to move away from over-reliance on external suppliers and to build indigenous capacity. A trilateral format allows for economies of scale in research and development, co-production, and technology transfer. Areas of immediate potential include air defense systems, drones and counter-drone technology, armored vehicles, naval ships, and cybersecurity infrastructure. Beyond the military domain, such industrial cooperation often generates spillovers into civilian sectors such as aviation, shipbuilding, and advanced manufacturing, thereby supporting broader economic diversification goals. There is also a clear utility in the area of human security. The armed forces of Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia have all been involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, both domestically and abroad. Institutionalizing cooperation in logistics, medical support, and rapid deployment can enhance the region’s ability to respond to natural disasters, which have become more frequent and severe due to climate change. At the global level, the impact of this pact should be assessed within the framework of a multipolar world. The era of reliance on a single security provider is receding. States are increasingly building flexible, interest-based coalitions. The Pakistan-Türkiye-Saudi Arabia arrangement fits this pattern. It is not designed to replace existing alliances, but to complement them. All three countries maintain important relationships with the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia. The trilateral framework offers them greater flexibility and reduces exposure to disruptions in supply chains or shifts in political conditionality. For the wider Muslim world, this initiative presents a model of cooperation based on functional objectives rather than ideological or sectarian lines. It demonstrates that collective action is possible on issues of security, technology, and economic resilience. If successful, it could encourage similar arrangements in Africa and Southeast Asia, contributing to a more decentralized and networked global security architecture. From an economic perspective, defense cooperation often acts as a catalyst for deeper trade and investment. Joint ventures in defense production can lead to partnerships in technology, education, and infrastructure. Secure and stable regions are also essential for the trade corridors that all three states are seeking to develop, whether linking the Gulf to South Asia or connecting Anatolia to Central Asia. The long-term effectiveness of this pact will depend on how it is institutionalized. Three considerations will be decisive. First, the framework must remain open and consultative, so that it is not perceived as an exclusive bloc. Second, communication must be clear that the purpose is defensive and stabilizing, to avoid unnecessary misperceptions. Third, the cooperation must be rooted in sustainable industrial planning and regular exercises, rather than remaining at the level of declarations. The timing of this alignment is significant. The world in 2026 is marked by geopolitical competition, technological disruption, and climate-related stresses. In such an environment, states that can pool resources and coordinate policy are better positioned to protect their interests and contribute to regional stability. In essence, the trilateral defense cooperation among Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia reflects a pragmatic recognition that security in the 21st century is interconnected. No single state can address maritime security, technological change, or humanitarian crises alone. By aligning their capabilities, these three countries are creating a platform that can deliver tangible benefits in deterrence, industrial development, and crisis response. This is not merely a defense agreement. It is an expression of strategic convergence among states that share geography, history, and a stake in a stable international order. If implemented with consistency

Every 14 August, Pakistan awakens to the familiar colours of green and white. Flags appear on buildings, national songs fill the air, children dress in traditional colours, and speeches once again remind the nation of the sacrifices that accompanied independence. Yet Independence Day is not merely an occasion to celebrate the Pakistan we inherited; it is an opportunity to ask a more demanding question: What have we done with the Pakistan that was entrusted to us? On 14 August 1947, independence transformed millions of lives. Pakistan emerged from one of the most extraordinary political movements of the twentieth century, carrying the hopes of Muslims of the subcontinent for political security, social justice, dignity and the freedom to shape their collective future. Nearly eight decades later, the country possesses a substantial population, strategic importance, nuclear capability, a young generation, a resilient economy and a remarkable human resource. But the distance between Pakistan’s original aspirations and its contemporary realities remains a serious national question. The first mistake would be to interpret patriotism as silence about national shortcomings. Genuine patriotism requires the courage to identify weaknesses as well as the wisdom to recognise achievements. A country cannot strengthen itself by denying its problems. Nor can it progress through perpetual pessimism. Pakistan’s challenge in 2026 is therefore to move beyond both exaggerated self-congratulation and destructive cynicism. The political history of Pakistan demonstrates the consequences of institutional instability, confrontation and the excessive personalisation of politics. Governments have changed, political alliances have shifted, constitutions have been amended, and civilian and non-civilian institutions have repeatedly struggled over the appropriate boundaries of authority. The result has often been a political culture in which winning power becomes more important than strengthening institutions. This is particularly dangerous for a federation as diverse as Pakistan. Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and the regions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir possess distinct histories, cultures and political concerns. National unity cannot be imposed through administrative uniformity. It must be constructed through justice, representation, constitutionalism and an equitable distribution of opportunity. The recent political and social tensions surrounding Azad Jammu and Kashmir offer another reminder that national integration cannot depend exclusively upon slogans. Reports of violent protests, deaths and political grievances in the region demonstrate how quickly unresolved questions of representation, economic opportunity and political legitimacy can become matters of national concern. At the same time, the ongoing electoral process indicates that democratic participation remains an important mechanism through which political differences can be addressed. The lesson for Pakistan is broader than any particular political dispute: the federation becomes stronger when citizens believe that institutions listen to them. Religion presents another essential dimension of Pakistan’s identity. The country was created in the name of a political and social vision deeply connected with the religious consciousness of the Muslims of the subcontinent. But Islam cannot be reduced to national symbolism, political slogans or ceremonial references. Its deeper teachings demand justice, honesty, compassion, accountability, dignity and responsibility. The Qur’anic concept of Ummah is fundamentally connected with moral solidarity. It does not mean that differences disappear; rather, it teaches that human beings and communities are bound by principles of justice and mutual responsibility. The Qur’an repeatedly places justice at the centre of social life. Consequently, a religiously inspired Pakistan should not merely ask whether society looks Islamic from the outside. It should ask whether the weak receive justice, whether public resources are protected from corruption, whether the powerful are accountable, whether minorities live with dignity, and whether the poor have meaningful opportunities to improve their lives. Pakistan’s constitutional framework itself reflects this relationship between Islamic values and democratic citizenship. The Objectives Resolution, incorporated into the Constitution, describes democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as principles to be observed, while also affirming the rights of minorities to freely profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures. This constitutional balance is important because religious identity and citizenship should not be presented as competing ideas. A confident Islamic state does not need discrimination to demonstrate its faith. It demonstrates its moral strength through justice. Protection of minorities is not a concession to another culture; it is part of the constitutional and ethical responsibility of the state. Pakistan’s social crisis, meanwhile, is perhaps more complicated than its political crisis. Millions of Pakistanis continue to demonstrate extraordinary resilience, entrepreneurship and generosity. Pakistani professionals have achieved distinction around the world, while ordinary citizens routinely support relatives, neighbours and communities in times of hardship. Yet social inequality, unemployment, educational disparities, population pressure, inflationary pressures and unequal access to healthcare continue to limit the potential of a large part of the population. The most important national resource is not the country’s geography, minerals or strategic position. It is its people. A nation with a young population cannot afford an education system that merely produces certificates. Pakistan needs education that produces critical thinkers, scientists, entrepreneurs, skilled workers, ethical professionals and responsible citizens. Artificial intelligence is rapidly transforming economies and professions, making it even more urgent for Pakistan to reform its educational priorities rather than simply expand enrolment. The same principle applies to women and young people. A country cannot speak convincingly about development while large sections of its human capital remain underutilised. Pakistan’s future competitiveness will depend increasingly upon the quality of its education, digital capacity, scientific research, vocational training and entrepreneurial ecosystem. Independence also has an international dimension. Pakistan’s geography has historically placed it at the intersection of major geopolitical interests. Its relationship with China, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, the Gulf states, the United States, Europe, Afghanistan and other regional partners reflects the complexity of its strategic environment. But the strongest foreign policy is ultimately built upon domestic strength. Economic stability, political credibility, social cohesion and institutional continuity provide a stronger foundation for diplomacy than dependence upon temporary geopolitical alignments. National security, therefore, should be understood in a broader sense. A secure Pakistan is not merely one with strong borders and capable armed forces. It is also a Pakistan where a child can