pakistan8217s college education

Pakistan’s College Education Crisis

Educational debates in Pakistan usually begin with schools and end with universities. Somewhere in between lies a vast public college network that has quietly undergone a transformation without receiving the reforms necessary to sustain it. For decades, colleges were viewed merely as institutions imparting Intermediate education. That perception is now obsolete. Government colleges across Pakistan award four-year BS degrees, supervise undergraduate research, implement semester systems, and produce graduates completing sixteen years of education. They have become institutions of higher education in every meaningful sense except in the standards by which they recruit, promote and evaluate their faculty.

The real crisis begins not when institutions disappear but when they continue to exist while quietly abandoning the purpose they were meant to serve. Pakistan’s college education system increasingly reflects this uncomfortable reality. Buildings stand, classrooms remain occupied, salaries are paid and degrees continue to be awarded, yet the intellectual purpose that ought to define higher education is steadily weakening. The system continues to function, but it no longer asks whether it is producing scholars, researchers and critical thinkers or merely issuing degrees.

This contradiction is not merely administrative. It is national. Countries do not build knowledge economies simply by increasing enrolment or opening new campuses. They do so by ensuring that those entrusted with educating the next generation possess the intellectual depth, scholarly discipline and professional integrity demanded by higher education. Pakistan has expanded the responsibilities of its colleges without fundamentally reforming the standards governing those who teach in them. It is this mismatch between expanding responsibilities and stagnant reforms that explains much of the present crisis.

History offers repeated warnings against confusing continuity with progress. Great civilisations have seldom been defeated by ignorance alone; far more often, they have been weakened by their refusal to reform. Ancient Troy believed its mighty walls guaranteed safety until destruction entered concealed within the famous wooden horse. Institutions, too, often collapse not because external forces overwhelm them but because internal weaknesses become too familiar to recognise. Pakistan’s colleges face a similar danger. The greatest threat is not inadequate infrastructure or declining enrolment. It is the quiet normalisation of standards that no longer correspond with the responsibilities these institutions now carry.

Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in faculty recruitment.

Every education system is ultimately only as strong as the people it appoints to teach. Laboratories, libraries and curricula matter, but they cannot compensate for weak academic recruitment. A nation’s classrooms reflect the intellectual standards it establishes at the point of entry into the profession. Countries that consistently perform well in higher education understand this principle with remarkable clarity.

Finland recruits teachers from among its highest-performing graduates and treats teaching as one of the country’s most competitive professions. Singapore invests heavily in teacher selection, structured professional development and continuous evaluation throughout an educator’s career. South Korea subjects aspiring academics to rigorous competition, while Germany closely links academic progression with scholarly achievement and research productivity. These countries differ in culture, politics and economic history, yet they share one conviction that higher education depends first and foremost upon the quality of its faculty.

Pakistan, regrettably, often operates on a different assumption.

Recruitment is frequently treated as the culmination of academic achievement rather than its beginning. A lecturer appointed with only a sixteen years education may spend an entire career within the same system without acquiring higher qualifications or contributing substantially to research, yet still retire after holding senior academic positions carrying the titles of Associate Professor or Professor. Such a framework might have appeared understandable when colleges were primarily institutions for Intermediate education. It becomes increasingly indefensible once those same institutions award undergraduate degrees equivalent to those offered by universities.

Academic titles should signify scholarly accomplishment rather than the mere passage of time. Across the world, the designation of Professor represents sustained intellectual contribution, recognised research, advanced qualifications and academic leadership. When promotion depends overwhelmingly upon seniority rather than scholarship, titles gradually lose their meaning. The loss is not symbolic alone. It diminishes public confidence in higher education itself.

This is not an argument against experience. Experience remains indispensable in teaching. A seasoned educator often possesses insights that no newly qualified academic can immediately acquire. Classrooms are enriched by years of interaction with students, evolving pedagogical techniques and practical wisdom accumulated over decades.

Experience, however, should complement scholarship, not replace it.

Knowledge no longer remains static for an entire career. Disciplines evolve at astonishing speed. Artificial Intelligence is reshaping linguistics, medicine, engineering, law and the humanities alike. Climate science has transformed environmental studies. Digital humanities have altered literary scholarship. Advances in neuroscience continue redefining educational psychology. A qualification earned thirty years ago, valuable though it remains, cannot alone certify mastery over fields that have changed beyond recognition.

Medicine provides an obvious comparison. No patient would willingly place complete trust in a surgeon who had never updated professional knowledge after graduation. Engineers continually adapt to changing technologies and safety standards. Judges engage with evolving constitutional interpretation. Military officers undergo regular professional education throughout their service. Every serious profession recognises that learning is continuous.

Higher education cannot become the sole profession where intellectual growth effectively ends with appointment.

The irony is that Pakistan’s college sector contains thousands of exceptionally capable teachers who have voluntarily pursued MPhil and PhD degrees despite limited institutional incentives. Many complete advanced research while balancing heavy teaching schedules, administrative responsibilities and family obligations. Their commitment deserves recognition because it reflects a genuine desire to improve professionally rather than merely fulfil formal requirements.

Yet the existing structure frequently sends the opposite message. Promotion often rewards waiting more consistently than learning. When advanced qualifications receive insufficient institutional value, the incentive to pursue rigorous scholarship inevitably weakens. No education system can flourish if intellectual ambition appears optional while seniority remains sufficient.

The anomaly becomes even more striking when one examines the present hierarchy within many public colleges. It is no longer uncommon to find an MPhil-qualified lecturer or even a PhD serving under an officer whose highest academic qualification remains a an undergraduate degree obtained decades earlier. Respect for seniority is a cherished academic tradition and ought never to be discarded. Administrative experience has its own value, and wisdom acquired over years of teaching deserves recognition. Yet respect for experience cannot become an argument against academic advancement.

The issue is not one of personalities; it is one of principles.

A system that allows higher qualifications to become academically irrelevant eventually discourages the pursuit of excellence itself. When a young academic spends six or seven years completing an MPhil or PhD, publishes research, presents papers at conferences and contributes to scholarly debates, only to discover that these achievements have little bearing on career progression within the college sector, the institution unintentionally tells its brightest minds that intellectual effort is secondary to the passage of time. Such messages could be more damaging for a knowledge-based society.

The irony becomes even deeper because the same colleges are now entrusted with awarding BS degrees recognised by the Higher Education Commission. Undergraduate education is no longer an extension of school education; it is the first stage of higher education. Students are expected to undertake research projects, conduct literature reviews, analyse data, prepare dissertations and engage with contemporary scholarship. Such expectations cannot be fulfilled through teaching alone. They require faculty who themselves remain active participants in scholarly inquiry.

Here lies the fundamental inconsistency.

For universities, the Higher Education Commission has laid down clear standards regarding qualifications, research publications and academic progression. An Assistant Professor is expected to possess qualifications that reflect advanced scholarship. Promotion to Associate Professor and Professor requires demonstrable research output published in recognised journals alongside academic contributions extending beyond classroom teaching. The philosophy behind these requirements is simple. Universities exist not merely to disseminate knowledge but also to produce it.

Public colleges now perform many of the same academic functions, yet large sections of the promotion structure continue to operate according to assumptions inherited from a period when undergraduate education was not their responsibility. The result is an educational hybrid in which institutions have become universities in function but not in professional standards.

This duality serves neither students nor teachers.

If a BS degree awarded by a college carries the same academic value as one awarded by a university, then students deserve comparable academic standards irrespective of where they study. The principle is not difficult to understand. Equality of degrees must imply equality of academic expectations. Otherwise, identical qualifications begin to represent unequal educational experiences.

The Higher Education Commission’s framework should therefore not remain confined to universities alone. It should gradually extend to all public colleges offering sixteen years of education. This does not require mechanically transplanting every university regulation into the college system. Colleges have distinct administrative realities and heavier teaching responsibilities. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles should remain identical. Recruitment should increasingly prioritise advanced qualifications. Promotions should depend not merely upon years of service but also upon scholarly achievement, professional development and measurable academic contribution. Research should become an expectation rather than an exception.

Critics may argue that research belongs to universities and not to colleges. Such a distinction might have carried weight two decades ago. It carries very little today.

Across the world, undergraduate teaching is increasingly enriched by faculty who remain engaged with current scholarship. Students benefit when teachers are not merely consumers of knowledge but contributors to it. A lecturer actively involved in research introduces students to evolving debates rather than outdated certainties. Classrooms become places of inquiry instead of repetition. Facts are no longer memorised merely because textbooks record them; they are questioned, analysed and tested against emerging evidence.

Teaching and research are often portrayed as competing responsibilities. In reality, they sustain one another. Research keeps teaching intellectually alive, while teaching continually reminds research of its social purpose.

UNESCO has repeatedly argued in its Global Education Monitoring Reports that improving educational quality depends upon investing in teacher competence, professional development and institutional accountability. Similarly, successive reports of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), particularly through the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), consistently demonstrate that educational success is closely linked with teacher quality, evidence-based policymaking and sustained professional learning. The World Bank has likewise concluded across numerous education studies that teacher effectiveness remains among the strongest school-based determinants of student learning.

These conclusions are neither ideological nor speculative. They emerge from decades of comparative international evidence.

Pakistan need not imitate every foreign model, but it cannot afford to ignore global experience either. Nations that transformed themselves through education understood one lesson exceptionally well that institutions become stronger when academic standards become progressively higher rather than progressively easier.

Japan’s transformation after the Meiji Restoration did not begin with factories; it began with classrooms. South Korea emerged from the devastation of war by investing relentlessly in education and research. Singapore, lacking natural resources, chose to develop human capital with uncompromising seriousness. None of these countries regarded higher education as a routine administrative service. They regarded it as a strategic national investment.

Pakistan often speaks about becoming a knowledge economy while preserving systems that reward longevity more consistently than learning.

This contradiction cannot continue indefinitely.

Another uncomfortable question deserves honest discussion. Promotions in public service generally recognise administrative competence, but academic promotions should recognise intellectual leadership. The two are not always identical. An excellent administrator may not necessarily be an outstanding scholar, just as an accomplished researcher may require support in administration. The present structure frequently conflates the two without evaluating either adequately.

Academic leadership should mean far more than occupying a higher office. It should involve mentoring younger faculty, initiating research collaborations, improving curricula, supervising undergraduate scholarship, encouraging innovation and cultivating a culture where intellectual curiosity becomes institutional habit rather than individual exception.

Without such leadership, colleges risk becoming examination centres instead of centres of higher learning.

The consequences extend well beyond campuses. Every year thousands of graduates leave public colleges and enter classrooms, civil services, journalism, business, law, industry and public administration. The intellectual habits they acquire during undergraduate education accompany them throughout their professional lives. If their education encourages curiosity, they become innovators. If it rewards conformity alone, they become efficient administrators of inherited ideas rather than creators of new ones.

The Roman philosopher Seneca observed that while we are learning, we are also teaching. The converse is equally true. Teachers who cease learning gradually lose the capacity to teach in the fullest sense. Their lectures may continue, their attendance registers may remain complete and examinations may proceed as scheduled, but education quietly gives way to routine.

Routine has never built a civilisation. Scholarship has.

If academic qualifications and research define intellectual competence, they do not by themselves define suitability for academic leadership. Universities and colleges are not factories producing identical products; they are communities of learning shaped as much by the character of their teachers as by the content of their lectures. A professor may possess an impressive list of publications, yet still fail as a mentor if arrogance replaces humility, intolerance suppresses debate or personal prejudice enters the classroom. Higher education, therefore, demands not only scholarship but also emotional maturity and professional integrity.

This brings us to a reform that is likely to invite debate but deserves serious consideration.

Before appointment to the highest academic ranks—particularly Associate Professor and Professor—faculty members should undergo a comprehensive professional assessment that includes an independently administered psychological evaluation. Such a proposal should not be misunderstood as questioning the mental health of teachers or treating them differently from other public servants. Rather, it recognises the unique responsibility entrusted to those who influence thousands of young minds over the course of a career.

The purpose of such an assessment would not be to diagnose illness or stigmatise individuals. It would be to evaluate qualities directly relevant to academic leadership, emotional stability, ethical judgement, openness to new ideas, communication skills, conflict resolution, mentoring capacity, professional conduct and the ability to work collaboratively. These are qualities that determine whether a senior academic becomes a source of inspiration or a source of institutional stagnation.

Many professions already recognise that technical competence alone is insufficient. Judges are expected to display unimpeachable integrity. Military commanders are evaluated for leadership under pressure. Senior civil servants undergo rigorous performance assessments before assuming greater responsibility. Corporate executives are increasingly assessed for emotional intelligence alongside managerial ability. It is difficult to argue that those responsible for educating future generations should be exempt from comparable scrutiny.

A teacher does not merely complete a syllabus. Consciously or unconsciously, he or she shapes attitudes towards knowledge, authority, disagreement and citizenship. Students often remember a teacher’s temperament long after they have forgotten the details of a lecture. A professor who encourages questioning leaves behind confident graduates. One who rewards silence produces obedience rather than understanding.

The ancient Greeks narrated the story of Narcissus, who became so captivated by his own reflection that he lost sight of the world around him. Institutions can suffer from a similar affliction. When they become excessively absorbed in preserving existing hierarchies, they gradually lose the ability to examine themselves critically. Educational systems, like individuals, require the courage of self-reflection if they are to remain alive.

Pakistan’s college education system stands in need of precisely such introspection.

None of these reforms should be implemented punitively. Thousands of college teachers have served the country with distinction under rules they did not create. Many have taught in remote districts with limited facilities, inadequate libraries and heavy workloads. They deserve appreciation rather than condemnation. Reform should therefore be accompanied by opportunity.

Faculty already in service should be given realistic transition periods to upgrade their qualifications through fully funded MPhil and PhD programmes, research fellowships, study leave, online access to internationally indexed journals, writing workshops and collaborative research grants. Colleges should establish research centres linked with universities so that experienced teachers and young scholars can work together rather than in isolation. Government cannot reasonably expect world-class scholarship while providing only

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    The intellectual discourse initiated by Sufi philosophers was inclusive of all religions and negated mullahism. Baba Farid is said to have been persecuted by Pakpattan’s qazi and the ruler of the city for listening to music and dancing in the mosque. Guru Nanak condemned the ritualism of mullahs and the pundits—Our distorted intellectual discourse, Dawn, September 9, 2011  Our discussion of Waris Shah ended with Erich Fromm’s distinction between having and being. Heer’s family sought to have honour, status, alliances and authority over a daughter; Heer and Ranjha sought a relationship grounded in recognition rather than possession. Their tragedy arose because a possessive social order could not tolerate human beings who refused to behave as property. To take that argument further, we must now travel backwards nearly five centuries before Waris Shah, to the beginnings of the surviving Punjabi poetic tradition and to Baba Farid (Hazrat Fariduddin Ganjshaka). Najm Hosain Syed places Farid at the opening of that tradition. What distinguishes his dohras, Najm writes, is an “austerity of tone”. Their setting is not an imaginary spiritual landscape but the “daily experience of common man”: fields, bread, dust, ageing bodies, hunger, labour and death. That austerity is precisely why Farid speaks so forcefully to an age obsessed with accumulation. Fromm, writing in To Have or To Be?, contrasted two orientations towards existence. The having mode seeks security through possession, accumulation and control; the being mode locates fulfilment in living, loving, sharing and becoming. Farid inhabited an entirely different intellectual and spiritual universe, and it would be anachronistic to turn him into a medieval Fromm. The convergence lies elsewhere. Both question the assumption that what we possess tells us what we are. Farid begins with the most democratic substance imaginable: dust. Dust Shahmukhi Roman Punjabi Literary English translation فریدہ خاکُ ن نندیئ خاکو جیڈُ ن کوئِ جیودیاں پیراں تلے مویاں اپرِ ہوئِ Farida khaak na nindiye, khaako jed na koi Jeevandeyan pairan talle, moyan upar hoi Farid, do not despise the dust; nothing stands above it. In life it lies beneath our feet; in death it lies above us.   The surviving Shahmukhi text preserves the couplet in this form. Few lines dismantle hierarchy more economically. The earth beneath the rich man’s shoe and the poor labourer’s bare foot is the same earth that eventually covers both. Rank, office, lineage, property and beauty exist for a moment between two encounters with dust. Farid is not preaching passivity before injustice. His image destroys the metaphysical arrogance on which inequality depends. Human beings may create distinctions of caste, wealth and status, but mortality refuses to recognise them. The person who imagines himself elevated above another discovers that both occupy the same final ground. This is Farid’s first challenge to the mode of having. We spend our lives converting temporary control into imagined permanence: my land, my wealth, my title, my family name, my influence. Dust reveals the grammatical error. We possess these things temporarily; they do not belong to the essential self. Farid’s poetry becomes even more striking when it turns from mortality to material inequality. Flour for Some, Not Even Salt for Others Shahmukhi Roman Punjabi Literary English translation فریدہ اکناّ آٹا اگلا اکناّ ناہی لونُ اگے گئے سننجاپسنِ چوٹاں کھا سی کؤنُ Farida ikna aata agla, ikna nahi loon Agge gaye sanjhaapsan, chotan khaasi kaun Farid, some have flour in abundance; others do not even have salt. Beyond this life it will become known who must answer for the blows. The text occurs among the saloks attributed to Farid. This is not abstract mysticism. It is an observation about distribution. One household possesses abundance; another lacks even the simplest accompaniment to bread. Farid does not construct an economic theory from the disparity, but neither does he treat it as morally neutral. The second line introduces accountability. Unequal possession cannot be separated from the question of how human beings acquired, used and withheld what passed through their hands. This is an important corrective to a frequent misuse of spirituality. Poverty should never be romanticised simply because a saint practiced austerity. There is a profound difference between voluntary simplicity and involuntary deprivation. Farid could choose restraint as spiritual discipline; the person without salt may have no choice at all. His famous imagery of coarse bread makes the distinction clearer: فریدہ روٹی میری کاٹھ کی، لاونُ میری بھکھ His bread is hard and hunger itself becomes its relish. In the following couplet, he advises eating simple food and drinking cool water without tormenting oneself by staring enviously at another person’s richer meal. The ethical target is excess desire, not nourishment. A society in which some cannot meet basic needs while others define themselves through conspicuous consumption cannot use Farid to sanctify deprivation. His poetry asks the possessor to examine himself before asking the deprived to accept their condition. Here the relationship with Fromm becomes especially productive. The having mode is not merely ownership of useful things. Human life requires food, shelter, tools and security. The pathology begins when possession becomes identity—when having more means believing oneself to be more. Farid’s answer is sabar: steadfastness, restraint, patience and sufficiency. His surviving corpus repeatedly returns to simplicity, humility and control of appetite. In contemporary political economy, however, restraint cannot be demanded only from those who possess least. An ethic worthy of Farid must speak first to those with the greatest capacity to accumulate, consume and command. His social imagination reaches its deepest point when personal suffering becomes recognition of universal suffering. The Fire in Every House Shahmukhi Roman Punjabi Literary English translation فریدہ میں جانیا دکھ مجھ کوُ دکھ سبائے جگِ اُچے چڑھِ کے دیکھیا تاں گھرِ گھرِ ایہا اگِ Farida main jaania dukh mujh ko, dukh sabhaai jag Uchche charh ke dekhia, taan ghar ghar eha ag Farid, I thought suffering belonged to me alone; I climbed higher and saw the same fire burning in every home. The couplet is preserved in the Farid saloks, and one modern scholarly discussion sees precisely this capacity to absorb the suffering of

  • Pakistan’s Defence Alliance: Is Islamabad Sh…

    Pakistan has just taken on a new kind of commitment, and it has caught people’s attention in a way that ordinary diplomatic announcements rarely do. Pakistan’s ties with Saudi Arabia go back decades, and its defence relationship with Türkiye has grown steadily closer in recent years, so cooperation between the three is not surprising on its own. What is new is the nature of the commitment: an attack on any one of the three countries is now to be treated as an attack on all three.   This is not really about whether Pakistan should be working with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. It is about whether Islamabad has entered this arrangement with a clear enough sense of what it wants from it, and what obligations it may quietly be creating for the future.   It also helps to get the timeline right. This is not Pakistan’s first mutual-defence commitment with Saudi Arabia. Back in September 2025, the two countries had already signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement, treating aggression against either as aggression against both. What is new in 2026 is the attempt to bring Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye together inside one shared framework. Seen that way, this is less a first step and more a new layer added to a relationship that was already forming. An Alliance at a Complicated Moment The agreement comes at a difficult time. Pakistan sits right next to Iran and has a tense relationship with India, while both Saudi Arabia and Türkiye maintain strong economic ties with New Delhi. At the same time, Islamabad has to keep managing working relationships with Iran, China, the United States and its Gulf partners. Any defence commitment, then, has to be understood against several relationships that do not always move in the same direction.   Pakistan is also not entering this alliance from a position of comfort. The country is dealing with economic, security and political pressures all at once, along with instability on its Afghan border and a delicate Iran border to manage. That is a lot to balance already, which is exactly why the practical details of this new commitment matter more than the ceremony around its announcement. What Has Pakistan Actually Committed To? The basic idea is simple: an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all. But what does that actually mean in practice? What would genuinely trigger the commitment, and what military support would Pakistan be expected to give—or receive? And what happens if the three countries find themselves with different interests in the same crisis?   Pakistan’s own Foreign Ministry offered some sense of this in July 2026, saying that agreements of this kind mostly involve peacetime military cooperation, and that in an actual war, how far the commitment would go still needs to be worked out. If anything, that statement makes the case for more clarity, not less.   That uncertainty matters most in two situations close to home. If Pakistan faced another serious confrontation with India, would Saudi Arabia and Türkiye offer real support, given their own important ties to New Delhi? And if tensions with Iran escalated, would Pakistan be expected to take a position that could strain its relationship with its neighbour? Even the growing water dispute with India, one of Pakistan’s most basic security concerns, has not been publicly linked to any shared plan among the three partners. These questions remain open.   There is also a quieter concern worth sitting with. Saudi Arabia brings financial strength to the table, Türkiye brings a growing defence industry, and Pakistan brings manpower, real operational experience and nuclear deterrence. If these strengths are genuinely shared, all three countries could benefit. But if the load falls unevenly, with Pakistan carrying most of the manpower while its own position in a future India crisis stays unclear, the costs could end up outweighing the gains.   History offers a useful reminder here. In his 1983 book Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, Tariq Ali examined Pakistan’s political system, its foreign policy, and the powerful role the military has long played within the state. The circumstances today are very different, but his broader question still feels relevant: can Pakistan turn its usefulness to other powers into lasting strength of its own?   Something else stood out alongside the agreement itself: the mood surrounding it. Governments naturally welcome diplomatic wins, but a defence pact carrying possible wartime obligations is a different kind of agreement than a trade deal. With so many practical details still unclear, the celebratory tone raises a fair question: is this a carefully thought-through long-term strategy, or mostly the excitement of the moment? Commitments this serious deserve a clear explanation before they deserve applause.   Pakistan must also make sure its growing ties with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye stay compatible with its long-standing relationship with China, and with the working relations it still needs with Iran and the United States. Strategic Relevance Is Not Strategic Autonomy Pakistan is becoming more important to other countries. Its military strength, its geography, its nuclear deterrence, and its relationships across very different global camps all give Islamabad real value in the eyes of others. But being useful to other countries is not the same as having a clear strategy of your own.   Strategic autonomy simply means that Pakistan knows what it wants and makes sure its partnerships actually serve that. It means asking not only what Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, China or the United States want from Pakistan, but what Pakistan wants from each of them in return. A country can be militarily valuable, geographically important and courted by several powers, and still have no defined national strategy behind it. That difference sits at the heart of this entire discussion.   Washington’s fairly quiet response also deserves attention. There is no evidence that the United States is deliberately setting a trap for Pakistan. But Islamabad should still think carefully about whether a closer Saudi-Pakistani security relationship could, over time,

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