four provinces can

Four provinces can no longer govern 240m people

Regions with structural problems need structural fixes, not more funding formulas.

Pakistan’s administrative map was drawn for a country that no longer exists. We have four provinces today, the same number we had 55 years ago, while East Pakistan, which used to be one province, now has eight administrative units and 64 subdivisions or districts. Since then Pakistan’s population has multiplied several times over, but the map has not moved an inch. That mismatch is the primary reason why resources never reach the people who need them.

Pakistan’s approach when it comes to managing resources is wrong for a country this size. The population crossed 241 million in 2023, with density around 260 people per square kilometre. On its own, this is a sign of a healthy, growing country, just until we look at how that population is actually distributed.

In the last six years alone, the country has added roughly 35 million people, which is a 16 percent increase. Sixty-one percent of that population lives in rural areas, 39 percent in cities like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. The alarmingly undeniable fact is that the trend keeps moving one direction, in which young people keep leaving villages for urban areas because those are the only places where jobs, universities and hospitals reliably exist.

This migration is certainly not a lifestyle choice. This is bound to happen when four provincial governments are asked to administer a population that is five times larger than the one they were built for.

Punjab alone holds 59 percent of the country’s population. It is administered as a single unit, but its population is more than most countries on earth. No provincial government, no matter however competent it is, can deliver electricity, healthcare and education evenly across a population that size from a single provincial capital.

The same problem exists in reverse in Balochistan, which covers 48 percent of Pakistan’s landmass but accommodates only 11 to 12 percent of the population, and has absorbed six of the last six years’ 16 points of national population growth despite having the country’s thinnest infrastructure.

These two provinces tell the story of two completely different failures. The cause, however, is common: the administrative unit is the wrong size for the job.

The numbers underneath this are national rather than regional. Eighty-two percent of Pakistanis have electricity, but that average hides the gap between urban grids and rural darkness; hence urbanisation.

The list of problems does not stop here. Take Balochistan, where one doctor serves 10,000 to 10,500 people. Sixty percent of the province lacks clean water, and filtration plants are scarcer still. Moreover, 70 percent of rural communities nationwide lack adequate education, and 44 to 45 percent of people in those communities never reach middle school.

The human cost of that distance is specific and repeats itself in province after province. Young doctors trained in these regions leave for Punjab, Sindh and Islamabad. The biggest reason is safety, since their lives can be at risk in remote postings. The second is that a health facility 30 kilometres from the nearest paved road, unable to stock full equipment, offers nothing to build a career on.

Vocational training institutes exist in these areas but sit locked, not for lack of funding but because there is no administrative capacity to operate them.

These are not Balochistan’s problems alone. They can happen anywhere a provincial government is too large, too centralised, or too distant to reach its own population. Balochistan simply shows the extreme case. If it were split into three or four provinces, governments could actually reach people there.

Then there is this issue of financial distribution, and this is where the case for new provinces stops being administrative and becomes constitutional.

Pakistan’s own constitution ties resource revenue to the province that produces it. Sindh generates around 70 percent of national revenue and receives back only 24 to 25 percent. Similarly, Balochistan sits on gas fields and mineral wealth that fund the federation, while its own communities remain unconnected to piped gas or reliable power.

Calling this a technical funding gap would be wrong because the problem is structural. Provinces too large to manage internally are also too large to track what they are owed, let alone claim it.

Regions with structural problems need structural fixes, which again brings us to the dire need for carving out more provinces instead of introducing more funding formulas layered onto the same four units.

How many provinces should there be is debatable. There are four now, and making that six or eight is better than staying at four. That would certainly put administration close enough to reach a village 30 kilometres off the highway, and close enough that Punjab’s 59 percent isn’t governed as a single bloc or Balochistan’s 48 percent of the map isn’t governed as an afterthought.

Balochistan’s neglect, Punjab’s congestion, Sindh’s revenue grievance, the pressure on Karachi and Lahore are not four different crises but one. And this crisis will not be solved by anyone currently governing under the old map.

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Necessary reforms have been postponed; uncomfortable truths have been left unspoken; and the common good has been subordinated to immediate political calculation. Yet history is not an irreversible descent. Peoples have recovered from moral and administrative decline when they recovered first the will to examine themselves without illusion. Correction of direction remains possible, though it will demand more than rhetoric or the rearrangement of outward forms. It begins with the recovery of personal integrity in ordinary dealings, for no system can long remain honest if those who operate it and those who live under it are themselves careless of truth. It requires institutions to reclaim their independence and to remember that their authority derives from the public trust, not from the favour of transient power. It calls for a renewed national conversation about the ends of government—not merely the distribution of resources or the winning of elections, but the creation of conditions in which citizens may live with dignity, security, and hope. Education must once more address the formation of character as seriously as the acquisition of skill. Civic engagement must cease to be regarded as the province of a few and become again the ordinary duty of many. The task is arduous and will meet resistance from those who profit by the present disorder. Yet the alternative is a continuing erosion of confidence, a further coarsening of public life, and the gradual loss of that cohesion without which no society can endure. Our predecessors bequeathed us not a completed structure but a charge and an example. Whether we prove equal to that charge depends upon choices that are still ours to make. If we summon the courage to prefer principle to expediency, duty to advantage, and the long view to the immediate reward, the

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