save lungs islamabad

Save the Lungs of Islamabad: Why Shakarparian Can …

To watch Shakarparian today is to mourn a broken promise. Not a fleeting vow, but a masterplan—conceived with purpose, codified on paper, and abandoned by design. I went through archives at Bazar Road, Iqbal Hall G-7, poring over the original master plan drawn up in 1960 by the great Greek architect and city planner Konstantinos Apostolos Doxiadis and his team. It was there that I first understood what Shakarparian was always meant to be. Doxiadis and his fellow planners did not design this triangle-shaped green expanse near Zero Point as an afterthought, a leftover patch of land between roads. They designated it, deliberately and explicitly, as the lungs of Islamabad — a temperature regulator, a natural sound barrier, a groundwater recharge zone, and a protective forest without which the city’s clean air was never meant to exist. This was not sentiment. This was engineering. And we have spent the decades since betraying it.

Islamabad in 1961 was home to barely 117,000 people. Today it holds well over 2.4 million. That growth was not an accident — it was, in part, the very success of Doxiadis’s vision: a green, livable, breathable capital that drew people in from across the country and beyond. But success has a cruel irony here, because the same city that grew because of its green lungs has spent decades quietly cutting into them. Between 1961 and 2024, Islamabad’s temperature has already climbed by 5 degrees Celsius, with projections warning of a further 0.7 degrees by 2039 and 2.2 degrees by 2069. This is the urban heat island effect, and it is not an abstraction — it is Doxiadis’s temperature regulator being dismantled, piece by piece, exactly as he warned it must not be.

Shakarparian itself covers roughly 1,376 hectares, formally absorbed into the Margalla Hills National Park in 1980, sitting almost at the very heart of the capital — an emerald set into the city’s crown, as it deserves to be called. A biodiversity survey conducted in November 2014 found 155 animal species sheltering within it: 23 species of mammals, 104 species of birds spanning 16 orders and 42 families, 22 species of reptiles, and 6 species of amphibians. The same survey catalogued more than 661 plant species across 28 families, with six distinct dominant vegetation communities knitting the forest floor together. This is not a park. This is a living, breathing ecological archive sitting in the geographic center of a national capital — a rarity almost nowhere else replicated in the world.

It was Roedad Khan — the legendary civil servant and statesman — who understood the fragility of this inheritance early enough to act. In 1989 he founded the Margalla Hills Society, and for decades that institution has done more than most government departments to keep the wider Margalla ecosystem intact. But Shakarparian, sitting apart within it, has not been so fortunate. It has instead become a recurring casualty of the very authority meant to protect it — the Capital Development Authority itself.

Piece by piece, lease by lease, CDA has allowed Shakarparian’s protective forest cover to be carved away. Look at what now occupies ground that was meant to remain forest: the Parade Ground, the Pak-China Friendship Centre, the Islamabad Club, the Gun and Country Club, Lok Virsa, an open-air theatre, and a string of upscale hotels and restaurants. Each addition was, in its own file, justified. Together, they are a forest reduced to a backdrop for institutions that no longer need it and increasingly cannot coexist with it. This has happened in direct violation of Regulation 4(3)(b) of the ICT Zoning Regulations of Islamabad, which exists for the explicit purpose of preventing exactly this kind of land-use change, allegedly under sustained political pressure. Satellite imagery from Landsat and Sentinel spanning the last twenty years tells the story without need for further commentary: the southwest region of Shakarparian shows a stark, measurable retreat of forest cover.

The judiciary, at least once, was willing to look squarely at this. On January 11, 2022, the Islamabad High Court delivered its verdict in Prof. Zahid Baig Mirza versus Capital Development Authority, and the ruling was unambiguous: the shifting of the Parade Ground into Zone 3, the widening of roads through the forest, and the construction of the China Friendship Centre inside Shakarparian all violated the ICT Zoning Regulations. It was, on paper, a vindication of everything Doxiadis intended and everything CDA had ignored. A court verdict that is not enforced, however, is simply another document gathering dust the way the original master plan itself so nearly did.

And here I have to say something that will not make me popular in certain circles of this city: the NGO sector stationed in Islamabad has failed Shakarparian as thoroughly as CDA has bulldozed it. The single biggest failure of these organizations is that they will not raise their own voice — they wait, always, for the government to raise it first, as though advocacy requires official permission. That is not activism. That is choreography. Too many of these NGOs are, in practice, family businesses wearing the language of conservation: leadership passed quietly within the same households for years, boards that never rotate, and a business model built not around planting a single tree in Shakarparian but around producing glossy reports, attending conferences, and mastering the art of recycling the same handful of buzzwords — resilience, sustainability, nature-based solutions — into slightly different sentences for slightly different donors. They are experts in rephrasing a crisis. They are not experts in stopping one. When the chainsaws reached the H-8 green belt, it was a lone campaigner and a worried student who spoke up first, not the well-funded organisations whose entire mandate is supposed to be exactly this.

This failure is made worse by the fact that the government itself is not short of obligations it has already signed onto. Pakistan is a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which binds it to conserve representative ecosystems and halt biodiversity loss inside protected areas — precisely what Shakarparian, folded into the Margalla Hills National Park, was designated to be. It is a party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, both of which make clearing carbon-absorbing forest for concrete a direct contradiction of the country’s own climate pledges. And in July 2025, the International Court of Justice — not to be confused with the International Criminal Court, though the two are often mixed up — issued a landmark advisory opinion declaring that states carry a binding legal duty to prevent significant environmental harm and to protect the right to a clean, healthy environment. Domestically, the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance of 1979 exists for precisely this purpose. Pakistan asks the world to trust its climate commitments while its own capital cannot honor a zoning regulation inside its own protected national park. That is not a technicality. That is a credibility problem, and it is one the government has authored for itself.

So what now? The path back is not mysterious — it has already been mapped out by people who love this forest more than they fear the authorities who keep failing it. The Islamabad Club, having long since expanded well beyond its original allotment, should be relocated to the southern part of the city rather than continue consuming forest land it was never entitled to. Every lease granted for hotels, restaurants, and private commercial development inside Shakarparian should be cancelled outright, and the land returned to the ecosystem it was stolen from. Government buildings currently occupying forest land should be shifted to a new sector of the city — a step that aligns, notably, with the fiscal discipline Pakistan has already committed to under its IMF program. And the proposed cricket stadium, which would carve yet another irreversible wound into what remains of this forest, must be shelved before a single tree falls for it.

Shakarparian, my favourite spot in this entire city, is where the larger argument becomes devastatingly concrete. Every lease CDA has quietly signed away could have been published, timestamped, and opened to public objection before a single brick was laid. Every violation of Regulation 4(3)(b) could have been flagged automatically rather than litigated years later, after the damage was already irreversible. Every NGO that claims to represent this forest’s interests could publish its own funding, its own leadership tenure, its own on-the-ground output, and let the public judge whether it has earned the right to speak for Shakarparian at all. The technology to do all of this exists today. What has been missing, every single time, is the will to use it before the forest, not after the court case, and the courage from those paid to advocate for it to speak before, not after, the public does it for them.

DOXIADIS GAVE ISLAMABAD ITS LUNGS BY DESIGN, NOT BY LUCK. He gave this city a forest meant to cool it, quiet it, and keep its air breathable for generations who would never know his name. We have spent sixty years slowly asphyxiating that gift — one lease, one road, one “temporary” structure at a time, while the institutions meant to guard it filed reports instead of raising alarms. I do not know how many more warnings, court verdicts, or degrees of rising heat it will take before Shakarparian is treated as the vital organ it was always meant to be, rather than surplus land waiting for its next tenant. But I know this: a city that forgets to protect its own lungs should not be surprised when, one day, it finds itself unable to breathe. Dear residents of Islamabad — this forest was drawn onto our master plan as an act of foresight. Let us not be the generation remembered for erasing it, nor the generation whose NGOs stood by, recycling the right words while the wrong things happened.

My last words, Despite the environmental losses, the ecological footprint can still be restored if the CDA and the Government are committed to rehabilitation. The natural ecosystem of Shakarparian can be revived to regain its original capacity for oxygen production, carbon absorption, and temperature regulation, helping to cool the local climate and improve environmental conditions

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At the same time forum also explored how journalism is adapting to artificial intelligence, disinformation and declining public trust, with discussions focusing on responsible reporting, media ethics and international dialogue. It provided a great opportunity to journalists and media experts from across the globe to directly engage with the President of Azerbaijan and ask him questions directly. The forum highlighted how today’s media is being transformed by AI, digital communication, and the growing spread of misinformation. Participants also discussed how they can uphold principles of ethical journalism and ensure factual and accurate reporting in this era of technological advancement. They also discussed how they can make people trust the media more, in what ways media and governments should respond to false or misleading information. It should be noted that the experts highlighted both the challenges and opportunities presented by digital media and the artificial intelligence. When they discussed the misuse of AI, they also talked about how AI should be used responsibly in journalism and media. It shows the responsible attitude of both the participants and the leadership of Azerbaijan that they brought such important topic under discussion. The forum also underscored that media is not just for reporting events but it plays a pivotal role in building trust encouraging dialogue and promoting understanding between nations. The role of the leadership of Azerbaijan in hosting the Global Media Forum for the 4th time is highly commendable. Creating such an engaging international platform at a time when the global information environment is becoming more complex deserves immense praise. The forum also paved the way for cultural exchange, dialogue, and increased human connectivity as people from diverse backgrounds attended the event. The most interesting and the strongest feature of the Shusha Global Media Forum, I believe, is its openness to different viewpoints. It provides equal opportunity to all the participants to ask questions, share their experiences, give new ideas, and discuss pressing global issues in a professional environment. Such opportunities encourage honest conversations and result in some pragmatic ideas that can actually help address various challenges and fight disinformation. These discussions are very important as news travels faster than ever before and public trust in media remains a global concern. Another highlight of the forum was the use of artificial intelligence in journalism, how is AI both an opportunity and a challenge for the journalism. At the forum, experts discussed the role of AI in news production, fact-checking and content creation. They agreed that technology is helpful in improving efficiency but it can never replace human judgment, moral standards, and accurate reporting done by humans. The exchange of ideas on these topics reflected Azerbaijan’s readiness to host conversations on issues that are shaping the future of global communication. A particularly positive aspect of the event was the participation of media representatives from wide range of countries. All of them came together to discuss common challenges, exchange ideas and share knowledge. Such platforms, dialogues, and collaborations help reduce misunderstanding between societies. Professional connections are built and already existing networks are strengthened. Meanwhile, such platforms also open new areas of cooperation and create opportunities for future collaborations. It also allows participants to learn from one another’s experiences in dealing with rapidly changing media environments. When His Excellency President Ilham Aliyev addressed the forum he talked about peace, regional advancements, connectivity and the increasing importance of dialogue and communication. H.E.’s participation made it clear that Azerbaijani leadership will always support international discussions on media and global affairs. Moreover, the senior government officials were also present at the forum. Their presence demonstrated Azerbaijan’s efforts to maintain direct engagement with the international media community. With the passage of time, the Shusha Global Media Forum has evolved into a respected international platform for discussing the future of journalism and strengthening media cooperation. Its significance lies in the fact that it offers an opportunity to media professionals to come together and discuss and timely resolve the pressing challenges global media is facing. The continued success of the forum showcases Azerbaijan’s commitment to promoting dialogue, responsible journalism, and global engagement.

  • The Global Experience of Dividing Large Provinces …

    By Augustine Nasim Gill The debate over new provinces or smaller administrative units in Pakistan should not be reduced to maps, language, identity, or political representation. The central question should be whether new administrative units will improve governance, bring public services closer to citizens, strengthen revenue collection, reinforce the rule of law, and restore public confidence in the state. Many countries have improved administrative performance by transferring authority from the center to states, regions, districts, and local governments. Yet these experiences have not all been equally successful. Where political authority was matched by adequate financing, competent administration, credible elections, the rule of law, and strong oversight, results generally improved. Where governments merely created new boundaries, assemblies, and ministries while corruption, patronage, and weak institutions remained unchanged, costs increased without transforming citizens’ lives. A Basic Distinction Must Come First Creating new provinces and genuinely devolving power are not the same thing. Successful decentralization has at least four dimensions: Four Essential Pillars Political authority: Local and regional governments must be created through regular, free, and fair elections. Administrative authority: They must have genuine authority to manage departments, appoint qualified personnel, and hold officials accountable for performance. Fiscal authority: Their responsibilities must be matched by revenue powers, a predictable share of national taxes, grants, and budgets. Legal and institutional authority: Their powers must be protected by the Constitution or strong legislation so that federal or provincial governments cannot abolish them at will. Why Smaller Administrative Units Can Succeed Smaller, empowered units bring government closer to citizens. Residents of remote districts are less likely to travel hundreds of kilometers to a provincial capital for matters involving land, education, health, policing, courts, or development projects. Regional governments also understand local conditions more clearly. The coastal areas of Balochistan, the agricultural districts of southern Punjab, a major metropolis such as Karachi, and the mountainous or tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa do not face identical challenges. A single policy designed in one provincial capital is often unable to respond effectively to such diversity. Smaller units can also increase political accountability. Citizens can more clearly observe the performance of their chief minister, ministers, mayors, district leaders, and civil administration. This benefit, however, appears only where elections are credible, information is open, and oversight institutions are independent. 1. Germany: Shared Powers, Shared Taxes, and Fiscal Equalization Germany is a federal country composed of sixteen states, known as Länder. Each state has its own constitution, parliament, and government, and enjoys substantial autonomy over its internal organization. The federal government is responsible for national defense, foreign policy, currency, and broad national legislation. The states play central roles in education, policing, culture, public administration, and the implementation of many laws. Municipal governments provide water, sanitation, local transport, urban planning, and many daily services. Major taxes are not retained exclusively by the federal government. Personal income tax, corporate income tax, and value-added tax are shared among the federal government, the states, and, in some cases, municipalities according to established rules. A fiscal equalization system then narrows the gap between wealthier states and those with weaker revenue capacity. Germany’s success is not simply the result of having sixteen states. It rests on clearly defined responsibilities, a strong tax administration, judicial oversight, a professional civil service, and a predictable equalization system. Lesson for Pakistan: Before new provinces are created, the country must decide how income tax, sales tax, customs duties, natural-resource revenue, property taxes, and other revenues will be divided. A permanent, transparent, and publicly understood formula is essential. 2. Spain: Regional Autonomy, Public Services, and Different Fiscal Models Spain is composed of seventeen autonomous communities. These regional governments exercise wide authority over health, education, social services, and regional development. Most regions receive a share of national taxes, limited authority over certain taxes, and equalization grants. The Basque Country and Navarre have broader tax-collection powers: they collect most taxes within their territories and then transfer an agreed contribution to the central government for national services. Regional government strengthened education, health services, and local identity, but Spain has also faced regional debt, fiscal imbalances, and separatist political movements. The lesson is that autonomy is not only a financial issue; national identity, constitutional boundaries, and commitment to the shared state also matter. Lesson for Pakistan: New units should not be designed solely around language. Administrative efficiency, population, economic viability, public consent, and national cohesion must all be considered. 3. Poland: Phased Reform, a Three-Tier System, and Local Development Poland did not devolve authority in a single step after the end of communist rule. Municipal self-government was restored in 1990, and a three-tier system was established in 1998-99: the municipality (Gmina), the county or district (Powiat), and the region (Voivodeship). Municipalities became responsible for water, sanitation, local roads, primary education, and local development. Districts managed services that were too large for one municipality but too limited for an entire region. Regional governments took responsibility for economic development, regional planning, and the management of European development funds. The reform succeeded because it was phased, local institutions were prepared, elected representatives were trained, professional administrations were developed, budgets were transferred, and responsibilities were defined. The continuing challenge is that not every municipality or district has equal administrative capacity. Some smaller units remain weak in planning, data, financial management, and specialist staffing. Lesson for Pakistan: Rather than creating many provinces overnight, Pakistan should begin with administrative pilots, stronger districts, digital systems, training, and independent audit in selected areas. 4. France: Gradual Decentralization from a Centralized State France was historically a highly centralized state, but beginning in the 1980s it gradually transferred authority from the central government to regions, departments, and communes. Regional governments manage economic development, transport, and some education and training functions. Departments play major roles in social welfare, certain roads, and local services, while communes provide day-to-day municipal services. Small municipalities often cooperate through joint institutions to manage water, waste, transport, and territorial planning. France’s challenge has been that responsibilities across different layers sometimes overlap or remain unclear,

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