soldier mechanic cold

A Soldier, a Mechanic, and the Cold Arithmetic of …

By General Ghulam Mustafa (Served in different staff and command assignments, commanded a Corps, raised and commanded Army Strategic Force Command)

&

Engineer Arshad H Abbasi, Co-founder, Energy Excellence Centres at NUST and Engineering University Peshawar, International Transboundary Water Expert

We are not screenwriters, and this is not the plot of some Hollywood picture about killer robots. We write this together as two men who came to the same conclusion from two different directions — one of us a soldier who has stood post and commanded troops, the other a mechanic and engineer who has spent his life with his hands inside machines, the kind who can tell you what’s wrong with an engine by the sound it makes before it ever fails. Between us, we have spent the last two years doing the same thing every serious military professional on earth has been doing: watching. Watching Russia and Ukraine grind through the third year of a war that has quietly buried the twentieth century. Watching the United States and Israel fight Iran through the spring and summer of 2026 in a conflict that opened with a strike on a supreme leader and closed, for now, with tankers stacked outside a blockaded Strait of Hormuz. We have not been watching for drama. We have been watching for the future, because the future is what these two wars have been showing us, in plain daylight, for anyone willing to look.

In these two wars, our role has not been that of commentators cheering for one flag or another. It has been closer to that of historians standing over wreckage — the unglamorous, unsleeping work of the crash investigator rather than the war correspondent. Every video of an intercepted missile over the Gulf, every geolocated frame of a naval drone striking a Russian hull, every leaked spec sheet of a downed quadcopter over the Black Sea or a jammed loitering munition over the Iranian coast, has to be logged, timestamped, and cross-checked against the next one. That is what wreckage analysis actually is: not excitement, but discipline — recording what a piece of equipment was asked to do, and what it actually did, until the pattern becomes undeniable. Two years of that discipline, applied to two very different wars fought six thousand kilometres apart, keeps returning the same verdict.

Here is what we have seen. The age of the tank column, the massed infantry advance, the fighter squadron duel, and even the aircraft carrier as the ultimate expression of national power — that age is closing. Not because these machines have become useless overnight, but because a battlefield now watched by satellites, saturated with cheap sensors, and swarmed by thousands of low-cost drones has no room left for anything large, slow, or expensive to hide in. Ukraine, a country with no serious blue-water navy, used naval drones costing a fraction of a warship to cripple roughly 40 percent of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and force the rest to retreat from Crimea’s shores. In the Iran war, American carrier strike groups sat further offshore than doctrine once assumed necessary, and the campaign’s real damage was done by long-range strike, electronic warfare, and a naval blockade — not by tank divisions crossing a border, because there was no border to cross. The lesson repeats itself in both theatres: mass a large, valuable, human-crewed asset in the open, and you have built an expensive target. The war has moved to the phone in a soldier’s hand and the joystick on a folding table a hundred kilometres from the front.

That is the second thing the two of us keep coming back to, and we believe it is right: future wars will be fought on mobile phones, controlling drones and robots. A robotic aircraft or ground vehicle can turn harder, dive faster, and sit still for longer than any pilot or driver, because it carries no pulse, no fear, no fatigue, and no family waiting at home. It needs no food. It needs no rest. It bleeds nothing when it dies except budget. Robots are already taking on the jobs that used to cost human lives — clearing minefields, hauling ammunition across exposed ground, flying reconnaissance into airspace too dangerous for a manned cockpit, making split-second targeting decisions with artificial intelligence faster than any human crew ever could. Armed drones and robotic ground vehicles now engage targets without risking a single pilot or driver. And because production, not stockpiling, decides who wins a prolonged war, the country that can build the most machines the fastest — not the country with the largest inherited arsenal — will hold the advantage. That is why the truest weapon in this new age is not a missile or a jet. It is the strength of a nation’s economy: its factories, its chip supply, its ability to iterate a drone design in weeks instead of years.

Nowhere is this arithmetic more urgent than on the roof of the world, along the disputed frontier between India and China. China is not merely testing drones there; it is one of the most important production engines in the world for both, and it has been pouring resources into robotic ground systems, sensors, and autonomous platforms specifically postured along the Line of Actual Control, at altitudes where a human soldier struggles simply to breathe, let alone fight. Every one of those machines can be commanded from a warm room in Beijing, thousands of kilometres from the mountain. It needs no oxygen tent, no field ration, no medical evacuation. It can occupy a ridge and simply wait there, indefinitely, with a precision no human sentry can match, and it costs Beijing nothing but electricity and silicon when it is destroyed.

Against that, India fields one of the largest land armies on the planet — an active strength of roughly 1.25 million soldiers, organized into seven operational commands and fourteen corps of holding and strike formations, built on a tradition of sacrifice, discipline, and sheer human courage that has held some of the most unforgiving terrain on earth. But courage was built for a battlefield that had an opposing human being on the other end of it. What happens when the enemy on the ridge is not a person who can be reasoned with, worn down, or made to retreat out of exhaustion, but a machine that simply does not tire? India’s soldiers will offer their blood, as they always have. China’s robots will offer their chips — and chips, unlike blood, can be replaced by the next production run.

And here is the contrast that should trouble every planner in Delhi and every parent in a Punjab or Ladakh village alike, should the standoff on that frontier ever turn hot. When an Indian soldier falls on the Line of Actual Control, the Indian Army does what armies with a soul have always done: it wraps him in the national flag, marches him home behind a bugler, folds that flag into his mother’s or his widow’s hands, and inscribes his name where his village can visit it for the rest of time. That is a military funeral — solemn, human, and costly in every sense that matters. When a Chinese robot is destroyed on the same ridge, there is no bugle and no flag. There is, at most, a retrieval team sent up in the next supply window to strip the wreckage for salvage or simply leave it as scrap, because a machine has no name to inscribe and no family waiting for a folded flag. Beijing will not mourn a drone. It will order the next one off the production line before the mountain wind has finished scattering the debris of the last.

That asymmetry runs deeper than sentiment. A Chinese robotic sentry on the Himalayan frontier can, in principle, operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, through the entire winter, without a single one of the needs that govern a human soldier’s life on that mountain. It needs no ration resupply, no field kitchen, no rest rotation, no medical evacuation for altitude sickness or frostbite. It needs no washroom, no shelter tent, no rotation home to see a family. It needs no specialised high-altitude snow gear, no oxygen support, no acclimatisation period before it can function at 15,000 feet — because it feels neither the cold nor the thin air at all. Every one of those needs is, for the Indian soldier holding the same ridge, a matter of life and death, logistics, and enormous expense. For the machine, none of it exists. That is the arithmetic India’s planners must confront honestly: not whether Indian soldiers have the courage to hold the line, because history has already answered that question many times over, but whether it is fair to ask flesh and blood to keep matching an adversary that no longer sends flesh and blood to the fight at all.

This is not a call to despair, and it is certainly not a script for a film. It is a mechanic’s plain diagnosis and a soldier’s plain warning: the nature of the fight has changed, and the side slower to industrialize its response will pay for that delay in the coin that never gets cheaper — the lives of its own people. While we hold profound respect for the Indian Army’s unwavering dedication over the Chinese border, a stark technological divide separates the two forces: India continues to rely on traditional personnel and conventional warfare, whereas China has deployed precision-engineered military robotics capable of striking critical vulnerabilities—including a soldier’s target head—with absolute, lethal accuracy, regardless of helmet type on their head.

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The new Rs43,000 minimum wage therefore requires more than a government notification. It requires effective enforcement and monitoring, particularly where public sanitation services are outsourced. If a worker performs essential public work through a contractor, there must be clarity about who is responsible for ensuring that he receives the legally prescribed wage and other employment rights. For sanitation workers, however, low wages are not the only concern. The nature of the work itself can be fatal. In September 2025, three sanitation workers died in Karachi’s Usmanabad area after inhaling toxic gases while cleaning a manhole. The victims were identified as 22-year-old Vishal, 19-year-old Shahir and 42-year-old George. A fourth worker survived after being rescued. The deaths were followed by further fatalities. In October 2025, The Express Tribune reported that six sanitation workers had died from suffocation while cleaning sewers in Karachi in just over a month. The deaths occurred in Sohrab Goth, Garden and Landhi. According to the report, the victims were privately hired daily-wage workers who lacked adequate safety equipment and training. On April 17, 2026, three private sanitation workers died in Surjani Town after inhaling toxic fumes while cleaning a choked sewerage line. Police identified the deceased as Wilson, Waqas and Nazeer and said all three belonged to the Christian community. Such incidents follow a familiar pattern. A worker enters a sewer to clear a blockage. Toxic gases overcome him. Another worker may enter in an attempt to rescue him and can suffer the same fate. Without proper protective equipment, gas detection devices, training and rescue arrangements, a routine cleaning operation can quickly turn into multiple deaths. The exact number of sanitation workers who have died in Karachi is difficult to establish because there is no comprehensive publicly available official database covering municipal, private, contracted and informal workers. In October 2025, activist Naeem Sadiq told Arab News that approximately 100 manual scavengers die every year in Pakistan, including around 30 in Karachi. He also warned that the actual number could be higher because of underreporting. The figure is an activist estimate rather than an official government statistic, but it illustrates the scale of the concern. At the national level, Amnesty International documented 80 sanitation workers who died in 50 manhole incidents between 2011 and 2023. Of these, 40 were Christians, 22 Muslims and 18 Hindus. Most of the deaths were associated with poisonous gases and asphyxiation. The figures highlight a wider concern: minority workers are disproportionately represented in some of the most hazardous sanitation jobs, while also facing social and economic disadvantages. A survey by the National Commission for Human Rights of 42 sanitation workers in Karachi provides further evidence of poor working conditions. Thirty-three workers, or 78.6 per cent, said they had never been provided personal protective equipment. Twenty-four, or 57.1 per cent, reported workplace injuries. The same number reported verbal or physical abuse, threats, non-payment or other forms of discrimination. These findings raise a basic question about Karachi’s sanitation system: the issue is not only who will clean the city, but under what conditions the people cleaning it are expected to work. Another study involving 400 sewerage and sanitary workers in Karachi found that 228, or 57 per cent, were sweepers and 172, or 43 per cent, were sewerage workers. The study found that 96.5 per cent had not been immunised against typhoid, hepatitis and tetanus, while 91 per cent were not using safety equipment at work. For workers exposed daily to sewage, waste and potentially toxic environments, protective clothing, gloves, boots, masks, vaccination, health examinations and emergency support should not

  • Justice Begins with the Well-being of Judges

    When we talk about justice, we usually think about independent courts, fair and speedy decisions, and honest judges. But we often forget one important question: What about the justice-sector people behind all this? Judges have one of the most demanding jobs in society. Every day, they decide cases that affect people’s lives, freedom, families, businesses, property, and rights. They are expected to remain fair, independent, and impartial, no matter how difficult or ‘high profile’ the case may be. To recognize the importance of supporting judges, the United Nations General Assembly declared 25 July as the International Day for Judicial Well-being in March 2025. Judges also need healthy and supportive working conditions to perform their duties effectively. Being a judge is not easy. Many judges face heavy workloads, long working hours, difficult and emotionally charged cases, public criticism, security risks, and administrative responsibilities. These challenges can affect their physical and mental health. When judges are under constant stress, it can also affect the quality and speed of justice. Looking after judges is therefore not a personal favour; it helps the entire justice system. Healthy and motivated judges are better able to make fair decisions, uphold the rule of law, and maintain public confidence in the courts. The idea of judicial well-being gained international attention with the adoption of the Nauru Declaration on Judicial Well-being on 25 July 2024. The Nauru Declaration on Judicial Well-being is founded on seven guiding principles: (1) judicial well-being is essential to judicial independence and the effective administration of justice; (2) judicial stress should be recognized without stigma; (3) promoting judicial well-being is a shared responsibility of judges and judicial institutions; (4) courts should foster an ethical, respectful, and inclusive judicial culture; (5) awareness, education, prevention, and support measures should be encouraged; (6) each jurisdiction should develop well-being initiatives suited to its own needs and circumstances; and (7) all efforts to promote judicial well-being should respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. A 2021 survey by the Global Judicial Integrity Network of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), involving judges from more than 100 countries, highlights the growing importance of judicial well-being. The survey found that 76% of judges lack enough time to care for their physical and mental health, 92% experience work-related stress, 89% know colleagues suffering from stress or anxiety, 69% believe mental health remains a taboo subject in the judiciary, 83% say their court systems provide insufficient support, and 97% believe judicial well-being deserves greater attention. Judges also reported that poor well-being affects the efficiency of courts, the quality of judicial decisions, public confidence in the judiciary, access to justice, judicial integrity, and procedural fairness. These findings show that judges around the world face similar challenges. When judges receive proper support, they are better able to make fair and balanced decisions; work more efficiently; maintain high ethical standards; resist outside pressure; and strengthen public confidence in the courts. Supporting judges means strengthening the rule of law and improving the delivery of justice. Governments and judicial institutions should take practical steps to improve judicial well-being. These include reducing excessive workloads; providing confidential counselling and mental health services; creating peer-support programmes; offering leadership and well-being training; protecting judges from harassment and intimidation; and ensuring safe and healthy working environments. It is also important to create a culture where judges feel comfortable seeking support when they need it. In Pakistan, judges work under immense psychological pressure. The rapid growth of social media has changed the environment in which justice is delivered. Cases that are still pending before the courts are frequently debated online, with people openly expressing opinions and expecting decisions that match their own views. Such public discussion creates pressure on judges, even if it does not influence their legal reasoning or final decisions. Many judges are also present on social media or are more visible in public life than in the past. Their participation in public events and increased interaction with society have reduced the professional distance that traditionally existed between judges and the public. While greater engagement has its benefits, it also exposes judges to public criticism, expectations, and scrutiny, which can affect their psychological well-being. For a judge, there should be no distinction between an ordinary case and a so-called ‘high-profile case.’ Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan guarantees that all citizens are equal before the law. Every case deserves the same attention, fairness, and impartiality. However, media coverage and public opinion often create the perception that certain cases are more important than others. Even where judges remain completely independent, such external attention can create significant psychological pressure. Another challenge is public perception of the justice system. Justice is delivered by many institutions, including the police, prosecution, lawyers, prison authorities, investigators, and the courts. Delays and weaknesses often result from failures across the entire justice sector. Yet, when justice is delayed, or public confidence declines, the criticism is directed mainly at the judiciary. Judges become the visible face of the justice system and bear the burden of public dissatisfaction, even when the causes lie beyond the courts. This constant scrutiny, criticism, and pressure can affect judges’ morale and well-being. Pakistan has recently taken an important step by placing judicial well-being on the national agenda. To mark the International Day for Judicial Wellbeing, the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan will organize the country’s first National Conference on Judicial Wellbeing at the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 25 July 2026. This initiative is a welcome beginning. However, promoting judicial well-being should become a permanent part of judicial reform rather than a one-day observance. Protecting judges’ well-being ultimately strengthens the rule of law and improves public confidence in the administration of justice. Justice is delivered by people. Judges are expected to remain fair, calm, independent, and ethical while making decisions that can change people’s lives. They can perform this important role best when their own well-being is protected.

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