invisible infrastructure civil

The Invisible Infrastructure of a Civil Society

A man’s hand emerges from a moving car window on Lahore’s Ferozepur Road, opens, and lets go, garbage tumbling onto the road like something the city never asked for. He drives on, does not look back. Nearby, another man treats a red light as inconvenience, not command, and guns through it because the road, for one careless breath, looks empty, not realizing a motorcyclist is already crossing into that emptiness. Neither would call himself careless. Ask them, and they will say, with the confidence of the unexamined life, that they are decent, law-abiding citizens, and narrowly, they are not wrong. Neither has broken a law that will ever find them. What they are missing is something smaller than law and, in the end, far heavier: civic sense.

Civic sense is a phrase worn smooth by overuse and rarely defined. It is not patriotism, that loud, flag-waving thing. It is not obedience, that bowed, fearful thing. It is, instead, a kind of seeing, the awareness that one’s actions ripple into rooms one will never enter: the neighbour’s wall, turned dumping ground; the footpath, swallowed by parked motorcycles, leaving the pedestrian nowhere to stand but the road; the river downstream, carrying someone else’s filth to a family that never asked for it. It is the quiet discipline of behaving as though other people exist and matter, even when no policeman stands at the corner.

Pakistan is not short of laws. Karachi’s bylaws on waste disposal would look entirely respectable in any city hall in the world. Islamabad’s traffic regulations are detailed enough to please the most exacting planner. What is missing is not ink on paper but something beneath the skin: the private sense that a rule is worth keeping even when no one is watching. This is why civic sense cannot be legislated into being, however many statutes are stacked atop one another. You can fine a man for littering. You cannot fine him into loving the street he lives on.

Take something as unremarkable as a queue. Anyone who has stood at a bank counter, a railway window, a hospital OPD here knows the choreography by heart: the line exists as an idea until someone decides their time outweighs everyone else’s, and it dissolves like sugar in water. This was never really about queues. It is about a deeper assumption: that public space belongs to no one in particular, and rules, somehow, are meant for other people. Multiply that across a city of ten million restless souls, and you get gridlock that swallows whole afternoons, bins overflowing like wounds left untended, and parks abandoned within a year of their own birth.

There is a cost to all this, rarely counted honestly. Karachi bleeds away enormous productive hours each year to congestion worsened, not created, by drivers who treat lanes as suggestions and red lights as optional punctuation. Public health suffers when open drains and uncollected waste become nurseries for disease, an arithmetic residents of nearly every major Pakistani city have learned to expect each monsoon. None of this appears, tidy and legible, in a budget document. It appears in hospital wards, in wages lost to sick days, in a low-grade sense that public life is something to survive rather than inhabit.

It would be convenient to lay the blame entirely at poverty or lack of schooling, and there is a grain of truth there; a person fighting daily to feed a family has little room left for civic virtue. But the explanation only carries so far. Plenty of well-off, well-schooled Pakistanis fling litter from car windows and treat public parks as private gardens annexed from the commons. Civic sense is not a simple function of income. It is a habit, built through repetition, example, and whatever a society quietly agrees to call normal.

This is precisely where schools could do far more. Civic education in most Pakistani classrooms, where it exists at all, survives as a chapter memorized for an exam rather than a practice lived out. A child taught that littering is wrong, who watches the adults around her litter daily without flinching, will absorb the adults’ hands, not the textbook’s words. Civic sense must be modelled, not narrated: teachers who insist on a clean classroom, parents who do not fling wrappers from car windows in front of watching children, local governments that follow a complaint through to its end instead of letting it dissolve into some forgotten file.

None of this demands grand reform. It demands a shift in what ordinary people find embarrassing. In cities where civic sense runs deep, a litterer feels a small, hot flush of shame, not because a fine is coming, but because it simply is not done, the way one does not spit at a wedding. That social pressure is more powerful, and far cheaper, than any enforcement machinery a government could design. Building it takes time, and begins small: a shopkeeper sweeping the pavement outside his door, a driver waiting his turn at a roundabout though no one would know if he cheated, a resident reporting a broken streetlight instead of learning to walk around the dark.

Cities are not, in truth, built by planners and engineers alone. They are built street by street, choice by choice, by the accumulated decisions of the people who walk them. A country may possess the widest roads and tallest towers in the region and still feel chaotic if the people moving through them share no responsibility toward them. Civic sense is not a lesson for children, nor a slogan for a billboard. It is the invisible infrastructure, unseen and indispensable, that makes every other infrastructure actually work.

The writer is serving as Director of the Institute of Humanities and Arts at Khwaja Fareed University of Engineering and Information Technology, Rahim Yar Khan, Pakistan.

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The government may have legitimate reasons for keeping Khan imprisoned, but it should have an equally compelling interest in ensuring that his medical treatment cannot reasonably be portrayed as political punishment. The irony is that transparency would serve everyone. It would protect Khan from inadequate treatment. It would protect his family from uncertainty. It would reassure his supporters. And it would protect the government from accusations that medical care is being manipulated for political purposes. Instead, Pakistan often chooses the opposite path. Official statements are followed by political counterstatements. Medical reports become partisan documents. Families make allegations. Governments issue denials. Social media turns uncertainty into outrage. And a question that should have been answered by doctors becomes another battlefield between political camps. This is not merely a communications failure. It is an institutional failure. A credible democratic state must have mechanisms capable of resolving such disputes without requiring citizens to choose which political side they trust. Pakistan could establish precisely such a mechanism. High-profile prisoners could be examined by independent medical boards selected through transparent professional criteria. Prisoners could have access, where appropriate, to independent specialists. Medical records could be maintained according to professional standards, while necessary information could be shared with families and the courts. Where a serious disagreement arises, an independent medical opinion should be available. Such safeguards should not be created specifically for Imran Khan. They should apply to everyone. The ordinary prisoner matters too. Pakistan’s prisons contain thousands of people whose health concerns rarely receive national attention. They may not have political parties, lawyers appearing on television every evening, influential families or millions of supporters on social media. Yet their right to humane treatment is no less important. Indeed, the treatment of ordinary prisoners may be the more meaningful measure of the state’s commitment to human rights. But Khan’s case provides Pakistan with an unusual opportunity. Because his imprisonment is already under intense national and international scrutiny, the government can demonstrate that the state is capable of separating political disagreement from humanitarian responsibility. That would require political courage. A government does not become weaker by allowing an opponent proper medical treatment. It becomes weaker when it appears afraid of transparency. A government does not demonstrate authority by controlling every narrative. It demonstrates authority by allowing facts to withstand scrutiny. This is particularly significant for Pakistan’s international reputation. Pakistan frequently presents itself as a democratic state committed to constitutionalism, human rights and the rule of law. Yet international credibility is not built through diplomatic declarations alone. It is built through conduct, especially when circumstances are politically uncomfortable. The treatment of political opponents is one of the clearest indicators of democratic health. A democracy cannot be judged only by how it treats

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