profiling irans new

Profiling Iran’s new wartime security and military command

Following intense regional conflict involving the United States and Israel, Iran’s Supreme Leader has restructured top security and defense establishment. The new decrees assign trusted and seasoned veterans to lead critical institutions. The list includes the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC Navy and the Basij paramilitary organization.

Mohsen Rezaei will be Head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)

His role is of Secretary and Supreme Leader’s Representative to the SNSC (replacing Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr).

He’s from Khuzestan province. Rezaei was active in anti-Pahlavi underground movements prior to 1979. He also spent time in prison under the Shah’s regime. He studied mechanical engineering before being named the first formal commander of the IRGC in 1981 at age 27.

His expertise includes leading  IRGC through the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), remained at its helm until 1997. He subsequently served as secretary of the Expediency Council until 2021 and was Vice President for Economic Affairs under Ebrahim Raisi (2021–2023). Sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2020, Rezaei steps into the SNSC post following Zolqadr’s reassignment as political adviser.

Maj. Gen. Ali Abdollahi will be Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces

He is appointed as Chief of the General Staff, the supreme military coordinating body for both the regular military (Artesh) and the IRGC.

He belongs to northern Gilan province. Abdollahi fought as an IRGC commander in the 1980s and later served as deputy to Aerospace commander Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf between 1987 and 1991.

He has served as a senior law enforcement official in the early 2000s, governor of Semnan and Gilan provinces during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and deputy interior minister for security. Prior to this elevation, he commanded the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. He succeeds Abdolrahim Mousavi.

 Brig. Gen. Kioumars Heydari will be  Deputy Chief of the General Staff

He is assigned the position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff (replacing Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani).

He’s from Kermanshah province. Heydari brings an extensive career in the regular military (Artesh) rather than a pure IRGC background. He initially enlisted as a volunteer Basiji during the Iran-Iraq War before formally joining the army in 1984.

He has ccommanded egional army headquarters. He also served as deputy coordinator and later commander of the Army Ground Forces (2016–2025), and was appointed deputy commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. He has been sanctioned by OFAC, the European Union, and the United Kingdom.

Maj. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi as Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC

Vahidi will be Top Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (succeeding Mohammad Pakpour).

He is a native of Fars province. Vahidi joined the IRGC shortly after the 1979 Revolution and served on the front lines against Iraq.

Vahidi headed IRGC intelligence during the Iran-Iraq War and later became the first commander of the elite Quds Force. He has extensive political experience, having served as deputy defense minister, defense minister, interior minister, and president of the National Defence University. He was serving as deputy IRGC commander before being promoted to lead the Guard Corps.

 Maj. Gen. Mostafa Izadi as Deputy Commander of the IRGC

Izadi will be Deputy Commander of the IRGC (replacing Ahmad Vahidi).

A four-decade veteran of the Guard Corps who commanded forces in Kurdistan Province as well as the Hamzeh Sayyed al-Shohada and Najaf Ashraf headquarters during the Iran-Iraq War.

He has served in several post-war positions include IRGC deputy operations chief, IRGC Ground Forces commander, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (1993–2006), and head of the Cyber and Emerging Threats Headquarters at Khatam al-Anbiya.

Rear Adm. Ali Ozamaei as Commander of the IRGC Navy

He will be Commander of the IRGC Naval Forces (succeeding Alireza Tangsiri).

Originally from Hormozgan province, Ozamaei entered service during the Iran-Iraq War before transferring into the naval branch.

He has served as deputy commander of the 1st Naval District and spent over a decade (2012–2025) commanding the 5th Naval District in Bandar Lengeh along the Persian Gulf. He was deputy navy commander before stepping into the top naval post during high-stakes maritime tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.

Hossein Taeb as Commander of the Basij Organisation

He will be the head of the Basij Volunteer Paramilitary Force (succeeding Alireza Soleimani).

He was born in Tehran, Taeb joined the IRGC in the aftermath of the revolution.

Hossein Taeb has formerly served as IRGC deputy for cultural affairs, commander of the Basij, and spent over a decade (2009–2022) as head of the powerful IRGC Intelligence Organisation. He was later assigned as an advisor to the IRGC commander and is subject to US State Department sanctions.

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