By Engr. Saqlain Abid Geography is destiny. A nation cannot choose its neighbours, but it can choose how to live with them. The strongest defence in any democracy is not perpetual conflict but sustained diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and peaceful negotiations. Pakistan and Afghanistan are two countries bound by centuries of shared history, religion, culture, and ethnic ties. Yet, what was once described as a brotherly relationship has gradually transformed into one defined by mistrust, accusations, and strategic competition. Today, India has emerged as the third player in this evolving regional triangle. What exactly went wrong? How did decades of goodwill give way to blame games and border tensions? And why is India now finding greater strategic space in Afghanistan? These questions have become even more relevant following Amnesty International’s allegations regarding Pakistan’s reported airstrikes on the Omeed Rehabilitation Centre near Kabul on 14 March. The organisation questioned Pakistan’s justification for the operation, while Islamabad firmly rejected the allegations and maintained that its forces targeted legitimate security threats. The competing narratives deserve careful examination. The first perspective is that of Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of US forces in 2021, Pakistan welcomed the Taliban’s return to power. General Faiz Hameed, then ISI chief, was closely associated with the Doha process, while the government of Imran Khan projected Pakistan as a key mediator in Afghanistan’s political transition. Relations initially appeared warmer than they had been for years. However, the atmosphere soon changed. One of the major turning points was the case of Sharifullah, an alleged ISIS-K commander. Pakistan argued that his arrest strengthened its claims regarding cross-border terrorism and militant networks operating from Afghan territory. The Taliban leadership rejected these accusations, insisting that Afghanistan should not be blamed for Pakistan’s internal security challenges. Instead of responding through military escalation, Kabul gradually diversified its diplomatic and economic partnerships. Trade with India expanded while commerce with Pakistan declined. Afghanistan increasingly relied on Iran’s Chabahar Port and the India-built Zaranj–Delaram Highway to reduce dependence on Pakistani transit routes. Although these alternatives are longer and more expensive, Kabul appears willing to pay that price in pursuit of greater strategic autonomy. For the Taliban government, sovereignty has become closely linked with economic independence. The controversy surrounding the reported strike on the Omeed Rehabilitation Centre further widened the trust deficit. Human rights organisations questioned Pakistan’s account of the operation, while Islamabad maintained that the target was linked to militant activity and defended its actions as part of its counterterrorism campaign. The differing claims remain disputed and continue to shape international perceptions. Pakistan’s narrative is considerably different. Islamabad maintains that the resurgence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks represents one of its greatest national security challenges. Successive governments have argued that militant groups continue to exploit Afghan territory to launch attacks inside Pakistan. From Islamabad’s perspective, stronger military action became unavoidable because diplomatic engagement failed to produce sufficient cooperation. The arrest of Sharifullah also carried broader geopolitical significance. Pakistan’s intelligence cooperation with the United States strengthened Islamabad’s engagement with Washington. At the same time, the government accelerated the repatriation of undocumented Afghan migrants, arguing that national security required stricter border management. Critics viewed these measures as increasing pressure on the Taliban government, while Pakistan defended them as sovereign decisions taken in the national interest. Perhaps the greatest strategic miscalculation, however, was underestimating how quickly a trusted partner could seek new alliances. History shows that when friends become rivals, they often understand each other’s vulnerabilities better than long-standing adversaries. India forms the third side of this regional triangle. Over the past two decades, New Delhi has invested billions of dollars in Afghanistan through reconstruction projects, infrastructure, education, and trade. As relations between Islamabad and Kabul have deteriorated, India has found greater diplomatic space to strengthen its presence. Development assistance, expanding trade, and improved connectivity have gradually transformed India into an increasingly influential partner for Afghanistan. The result is a new regional reality. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily through the lens of security. Afghanistan seeks strategic independence and diversified economic partnerships. India has capitalised on the growing mistrust by expanding its diplomatic and commercial footprint. Geography cannot be changed, but policies can. Pakistan and Afghanistan will remain neighbours regardless of political differences. Continued confrontation will benefit neither country, while diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and mutual respect remain the only sustainable path forward. The future of South Asia will depend not on military victories but on whether Islamabad, Kabul, and New Delhi choose cooperation over confrontation.
